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Introduction 
• Background 
Land is the most important productive asset and source of livelihood for around 71% of 
Cambodian people, whose main income is derived from agricultural activities. The central plain 
lowland of the country is used for food production, while the upland areas are used for plantations. 
Population growth and infrastructure development cause the rural areas and peripheries to 
gradually change to downtown and urban areas. Many problems such as a shortage of agricultural 
land, insufficient food supply, agricultural landlessness, illegal land encroachment and land conflicts 
may be getting worse since the country adopted a free market economy in the early 1990s. 
Problems of land transactions, land conflicts and agricultural landlessness might occur while the 
country is pushed towards increased privatization, large scale infrastructure and tourism 
development, new plantations and increased investment. At the same time, population pressure 
increases and law enforcement is limited. Population pressure has caused an increasing demand 
for agricultural land and food production. To solve the problem, farmers have adopted improved 
agricultural techniques to increase agricultural productivity and have encroached upon new 
forested land areas. Moreover, the shortage of agricultural land for effective work and landlessness 
has forced farmers to migrate to new farm areas. Some farmers have cleared new land for farming, 
occupied private land and state public or state private land without legal distribution. 
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) formulated the land policy and other policies 
related to land by issuing legal documents such as the 2001 land law and sub-decrees on social 
land concession (SLC), state land management and economic land concession (ELC), which aim to 
promote sustainable economic and social development to alleviate rural poverty and prevent 
people losing their land through land registration, resolving land disputes and providing land for the 
poor. However, these projects and plans have an impact on land tenure and land transaction 
dynamics (land selling, land renting, sharecropping, land expropriation, forest or land 
encroachment and relocation). Tourism development, increasing numbers of workers in this sector 
and plantation development also need increased access to land.  
A study in land transactions cannot restrict itself to the study of land selling and buying 
mechanisms. It also needs to focus on other modalities of access to land. 
Thus, it is important to study agrarian contracts (institutional arrangements) as social processes of 
negotiation between actors involving various political-legal authorities. It is of crucial importance to 
identify the places and processes of land transaction validations and to assess both their legality 
and legitimacy. This implies that we take into account local state functioning (at commune, district 
and maybe provincial levels) as well as forms of local leadership. Any policy intervention in the field 
of land transactions must be based on well-documented knowledge of local practices and 
processes. How land markets actually work is not well known. There have been a few studies1, 
                                                            
1 See for instance various CDRI working papers on Land ownership, sales and concentration in Cambodia (n°16, 2000), 
Land tenure in Cambodia. A data update (n°19, 2001), Social assessment of land in Cambodia (n°20, 2001), Land 
transactions in Cambodia. An analysis of transfers and transaction records (n°22, 2002), CEDAC/JVC study on Landlessness, 
land dispute & project affected people (2004), as well as OXFAM’s work on land issues and various studies (see for instance 
Fabienne Luco for UNESCO or Caroline Hughes for the Centre for Peace and Development/CDRI on conflict management at 
local level). 
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however, and in-depth research on land rights transactions as social processes could serve to 
nurture the policy making debate. 
The study on land transactions focuses on agrarian contracts, and places and processes of land 
transaction validation. The study also assesses both the legality and legitimacy of land transactions, 
land disputes and agricultural landlessness through the work conducted by the research team from 
the Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC) with methodological 
support from Groupe de Recherche et d’Échanges Technologiques (GRET). 
This report presents the findings of research conducted in 13 districts, 16 communes and 50 
villages (36 villages for qualitative method and 14 for qualitative and quantitative methods) in 4 
provinces: Kampong Thom (KPT), Sihanoukville (SHV), Siem Reap (SR) and Rotanak Kiri (RTNKR) over 
a period of 9 months (January-September, 2005). The study was funded by the French Embassy to 
Cambodia. 
• Research objectives 
This land transaction study aims to investigate the changing process of land rights and the actors 
involved. The objectives of the study are also: 1) To encompass the whole range of land rights 
commoditised transfers: land purchases and sales (alienation rights or ‘definitive transfers’) and 
‘derived rights’ such as provisional transfers of land rights (renting, sharecropping, 
pawning/mortgaging, etc.) and other non-commodity transfers; 2) To study the real content of 
agrarian contracts, including the duration, land tenure clauses (nature of the rent, rights, duties and 
interdictions, etc.), non- land clauses (labour and service exchanges embedded in cliental ties), 
local denomination of contracts and land tenure relations, actors involved, existence of written 
contracts; and 3) To understand the purchase/sale markets, transaction processes and actors 
involved (distressed sales, impact of urban actors in rural or peri-urban areas, intermediary actors 
and brokers). To meet the above objectives, key research questions/hypotheses were designed, 
such as: 1) What has been the evolution of agrarian contracts (institutional arrangement) and 
modalities of access to land, especially since 1979?; 2) What are the places and processes of land 
transaction validation, in terms of legality and legitimacy compared to the status of knowledge and 
experiences in land transfer practice?; and 3) Do distressed land sales and land transfers lead to 
land disputes? 
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Research methodology 
• Partnership and research areas 
CEDAC was in charge of the study (both field and desk research) and GRET provided 
methodological support. The study involved combined workshops with collective and individual 
fieldwork from January to December 2005. A pragmatic approach should resort to the existing 
knowledge that both institutes have acquired on regional land situations. This could mean selecting 
sites where they have already conducted research. CEDAC also carried out field research on land 
issues, in SHV and KPT provinces within the European INCO-Dev (Rurb-Asie Project). GRET is also 
involved in development projects comprising a land dimension, especially in Prey Nup and Stung 
Chinit where land titling and land adjustment are at stake. There is on the side of GRET an objective 
interest in exploring these issues from a more ‘research-oriented’ point of view.  
In SHV, Prey Nup district might be a zone for agricultural production development to respond to 
urban needs, tourism needs and the market demand for agricultural commodities. The agricultural 
district of Prey Nup was selected for the study based on an assumption that land transactions would 
be very dynamic under the influence of urban development and the establishment of the special 
economic zone. However, in KPT, considered as an agricultural province, it would be the same as 
the dynamics of land tenure rights because of the development of receding rice and plantations. 
The north-eastern province of RTNKR, considered as a natural eco tourism area in which lowlanders’ 
in-migration and land encroachment generate conflicts with so-called ‘ethnic minorities’, was also 
a relevant site for the study. SR province was also selected for the study due to the historical area for 
the tourist sector. Here, in-migration and land sales would be also considerable. Additionally, the 
peri-urban of SR, like the Prey Nup district of SHV, might be a zone for agricultural production to 
respond to urban needs, in which land transactions would be very dynamic and land speculation 
and plantation would be the critical issues leading to encroachment.  
Before the site selection in each province, a meeting with key persons was held to gather 
information on the background of the areas (districts, communes and villages) where there are high 
incidences of land sales, land disputes and agricultural landlessness. A rapid field study was also 
conducted in four provinces to explore communes and villages for the in-depth study. Informal 
sampling was used to explore related issues. Then, stratified sampling was carried out in order to 
identify two groups of farmers: farmers who have land for farming and those farmers who do not 
have agricultural land. Ten land holding farmers (LHF) and five agricultural landless families (ALF) per 
village were randomly selected as the sample for in-depth interviews based on the designed 
questionnaire.  
• Research organization 
The study was carried out by six Cambodian researchers. The terms of reference for the research 
program were jointly drawn up and agreed upon and the approach and methods were supported 
by GRET. The terms of reference provided the basis for the proposal and the research design. The 
initial research proposal was submitted for comments in mid-2004 after the preliminary mission of 
GRET. Revised versions of these proposals were discussed at the first preliminary workshop held at the 
CEDAC office in Phnom Penh in January 2005. This meeting allowed all researchers to meet and 
present the findings of the preliminary inquiry.  
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The study was carried out in three phases; in the first phase, a rapid study was conducted with 
three administrative levels: 1) National, provincial and district: The rapid study aimed to identify the 
areas where there were high incidences of land transaction, land conflict and agricultural 
landlessness, activities to resolve these problems and NGOs working on land issues in the areas. The 
rapid interviews were conducted with key persons working on land issues such as governmental 
officials at the provincial and district levels and also NGO officials; 2) Commune level: Interviews 
were conducted with commune councilors aimed at identifying the villages that have a high 
incidence of all three issues: land sales/purchases, land disputes and agricultural landlessness, 
trends, processes and factors determining those issues and stakeholders involved in the process of 
land sales and disputes. However, the agricultural statistics and development projects and activities 
in the commune were also collected; 3) Village or community levels: Interviews were conducted 
with village chiefs, farmers as key persons, and village elders in order to gather basic information on 
population, migration, village history, land use, households without agricultural land, economic 
activities of villagers, land sales, land disputes and agricultural landlessness, and stakeholders, e.g. 
land owners and land buyers who were involved with land disputes and agricultural landless farmers 
(ALF). However, the investment and development projects or activities of outsiders (institutions or 
NGOs) were also identified; and 4) Individual interviews with persons to explore processes of land 
right transfers and derived rights selected according to the recommendations of the local 
authorities and other key persons. 
In the second phase, in-depth interviews were conducted with all stakeholders, local authorities 
(village chiefs and commune councilors), key farmer-informants, village elders, land holding farmers 
(LHF or FH), agricultural landless farmers (ALH) and people involved with land sales and land 
disputes. Stakeholder interviews were conducted with people who were involved in land disputes 
and local authorities. Information that was lacking or unclear during the rapid survey was 
subsequently completed. Projects or activities that were carried out to prevent people losing their 
land were identified and studied in depth. Individual interviews were conducted with those persons 
involved in land right transfers for the process of land right transfers. The interviews with LHF aimed to 
gather information on family history, land access, land possession, land sales or purchases and the 
reason for them, disputes over land and points of view. The interviews with ALF aimed to understand 
their family history and their current livelihood systems in addition to their points of view. 
Also, participation in workshops, public forums and meetings was necessary. The study team had 
many opportunities to participate in different workshops and round table discussions arranged by 
organizations such as Oxfam GB, STAR Kampuchea and CDRI, in particular, the monthly meeting 
organized by Land Action Network for Development (LAND) and Resettlement Action Network 
(RAN) of the NGO Forum on Cambodia to share information and experiences related to land issues, 
and in public forums between people and parliamentarians to discuss land rights and the many 
cases of land disputes organized by Comfrel. 
In October 2005, two seminars were organized with regard to the third phase, with stakeholders 
from both NGOs and government institutions presenting the first findings. The research team then 
conducted additional case studies in November and December 2005. However, new information 
was updated through further studies in 2006, a regional workshop in December 2006 and monthly 
meetings/workshops on land disputes with LAND members in 2006. 
Overall, a rapid field (explorative) survey was conducted by the team between January and 
February, 2005, in order to select areas (districts, communes and villages) and to design an effective 
in-depth survey, household-survey and case studies. The household survey reports on the issues 
related to land sizes, land access modalities (appropriation and agrarian contracts) and reasons for 
agricultural landlessness. In addition, case studies were conducted to understand the process of 
modalities of access to land with purposive samples according to the characteristics of: agrarian 
contract, appropriation, land disputes and landlessness. This field research was undertaken 
between March and July 2005. Two field researchers were accommodated for over one month in 
each of the selected areas of the province. Except in RTNKR, field researchers worked with 
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interpreters in cases where the informants belonged to ethnic minorities. Each field researcher 
drafted the findings with the assistance of senior researchers. The senior researcher conducted the 
field studies through interviews with several key persons working on land issues in the four selected 
provinces. Three internal workshops were organized in order to share information and increase 
understanding among the research team. In October, 2005, two seminar-workshops were organized 
to present the findings to the key technical personnel of both the government and NGOs working 
on land issues, as well as the key personnel of the Land Security Working Group and donors at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The findings were improved by conducting 
additional case studies in November and December 2005 and by updating the information in 2006. 
The synthesis of findings in the four different provinces was sent to GRET for its comments. In addition, 
one regional workshop was organized in KPT province in December 2006 to consult and wrap up the 
findings.  
• Data collection methods 
The study employed a qualitative research methodology rather than a quantitative method. The 
study team also conducted individual household interviews with LHF and ALF, key persons involved 
with land sales/purchases, brokers, institutional arrangements, land disputes, key persons involved in 
dispute resolution and key informant interviews. The methods that were employed for data 
collection were: 1) Reviews of the secondary data from existing documents; 2) Discussions with the 
key persons working on land issues at national, provincial and district levels and NGO officials; 3) 
Rapid surveys with the chief of commune and village or community-level key persons to gather 
basic information on population, land use, land appropriation, agrarian contracts, the number of 
ALFs, land loss from infrastructure projects, cases of land disputes and mechanisms of land dispute 
resolution; 4) In-depth interviews with 10 LHFs; 5 ALFs per village on reasons for landlessness, how the 
ALFs generate income, how to secure their livelihoods and what they will do to secure their 
livelihoods in next few years; 5) Individual interviews with people involved in land rights transfers, land 
sales and/or land disputes; 6) Participation in workshops, public forums and meetings on land issues, 
particularly the monthly meeting with both Land Action Network for Development (LAND) and 
Resettlement Action Network (RAN), two networking groups of the NGO-Forum on Cambodia; 7) In-
depth interviews with village chiefs to gather additional information on process of land 
sales/purchases, processes of agrarian contract, cases of land disputes and mechanisms for 
resolving land disputes, survival measure of ALFs, compensation for land loss from infrastructure 
projects; 8) Organizing seminars in October 2005 and conducting additional case studies; and 9) 
Organizing the consultation workshop at the regional level in KPT town with the provincial and 
district officials, local authorities, reservoir owners and concessionaires, community members and 
village elders to review the findings and recommendations, in December 2006.  
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Structure of the report 
This report consists of eight chapters. Following this introductory section, Chapter 2 addresses the 
approach and methodology of the study. Chapters 3 to 6 consider the synthesis of findings in SR, 
KPT, SHV and RTNKR, a chapter for each province. Chapter 7 discusses the general synthesis of 
findings in the four selected provinces and Chapter 8 discusses land policy issues. Each chapter can 
also be summarized as follows: 
Chapter I provides the background and further explains that the study of land transactions 
cannot restrict itself to the study of land selling and buying mechanisms. It also focusses on other 
modalities of land appropriation and agrarian contracts. The objectives and research questions or 
hypotheses are presented and focus on what the evolution of institutional arrangements might be. 
This chapter also describes the characteristics for the selection of the study location, individual and 
key persons to be interviewed, research organization and methods of data collection. 
Chapter 2 defines the ethnography of land rights as exploring a neglected issue related to land 
transactions, land markets and land rights transfers, analyses the four levels of ‘bundle of rights’ over 
a plot, including justifying principles, norms, rights and practices, and explains the different types of 
rights and transferring land rights. This Chapter describes in-depth the related methodological 
framework: the organization of workshops, the criteria of the selected sites, the qualitative method, 
descriptive indicators for land transaction study and how the indicator checklist for land transactions 
was designed (including descriptions of the people involved in the transactions, the transactions, 
the informants involved in agrarian contracts, and institutional arrangements. 
Chapters 3-6 include a synthesis of findings for each province: Chapter 3 relates to SR, Chapter 4 
to KPT, Chapter 5 to SHV, and Chapter 6 to RTNKR. The important relationship between the regional 
and local context and land transfer modalities in the area under this study are discussed, as are the 
land appropriation and agrarian contract (institutional arrangements) and the types and reasons for 
land disputes and stakeholders involved in it. For example, we have observed a strong link between 
land sales, land clearing and mobility, and also a link between land sales and agrarian contracts 
(derived rights such as loans, sharecropping and leasing). Each chapter also observes access being 
gained to land through capital investment in water reservoirs and the buying of large areas of land 
by rich and urban people with the active participation of local authorities acting as brokers. Each 
chapter provides cases of land disputes related to land transactions, for example the dispute over 
unclear land rights before definitive transfer. The land market has expanded. This has led to many 
cases of land disputes for various reasons, for example, unclear land rights before land transfers or 
sales such as loans, occupation for over 5 years before the issuance of the 2001 land law, and rice 
land abandoned for 3 consecutive 3 years. In addition, each chapter describes the actions of 
stakeholders’ groups in land issues: brokers involved in land transactions and the intervention of 
other stakeholders in land transactions and resolving land disputes. Regarding agricultural 
landlessness, the importance of immigration as a factor of landlessness shows at once that mobility 
is a key factor in land tenure by occupying the abandoned (or unused) land for cultivation.  
Chapter 7 makes a general synthesis of findings from the four selected provinces regarding the 
trend of land transfer modalities, the links between different land transfer modalities such as strong 
connections between land sales and land clearing or between land clearing and loans, and the 
relationship between land sales or capital investments and derived rights. This chapter also 
compares the land appropriation and agrarian contracts between the four selected provinces. For 
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example cases of abandoned DW-FR land in KPT could be differentiated from SHV. In KPT, local 
farmers abandoned DW-FR land while in SHV, rich/urban people abandoned rice land but they 
have legal possession rights. Officials say that the 3-year abandonment rule does not apply to land 
where a person has a legal document/certificate. The chapter also presents the differentiation 
between resolving land disputes over sales of borrowed ethnic minorities’ community land, and 
sales of borrowed land in the lowland areas, over the occupation of ethnic minorities’ ancestral 
land and the ownership of land received through distribution in the lowland areas. 
Chapter 8 discusses land policy issues, the roles of formal and informal politico-legal institutions in 
securing land ownership, land right transfers resolving land disputes and identifying legal gaps 
and/or contradictions and the need for regulation. The chapter also analyzes from a historical 
standpoint the gap between policy and legal frameworks on land and rural people's practice. 
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CHAPTER II.  
 
Approach and Method 
 
Pierre-Yves Le Meur 
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Defining the issues 
• Context: exploring a neglected issue 
Any policy should be based upon well-documented knowledge of local practices and 
processes related to the field of intervention. This commonsensical idea is all too often forgotten 
(and the link between knowledge and policy might be less straightforward as one might think; cf. 
Mosse 2005). This is obviously true with regard to land transactions. 
How land markets (i.e. the purchase and sale of land rights) actually work in rural Cambodia is 
not well known, to say the least. There have been a few studies2 but in-depth research on land right 
transactions as a social process and interaction involving an array of social actors is currently 
lacking. 
Moreover, many texts, both in the field of research and policy tend to reduce land transactions 
to land sales and purchase mechanisms. 
At a policy level, the new 2001 land law that replaced the 1992 law proposes new policy tools 
(social and economic concessions, short- and long-term leases, and legal recognition of collective 
land rights for ethnic minorities). However, it bears the hallmark of a strong ‘proprietarist’ orientation 
symbolised by the national-scale land survey and titling project (LMAP) funded by the World Bank. 
Land rights other than ownership rights (namely the bundle of administration and use rights) as well 
as agrarian contracts (rental markets and derived rights) are significantly neglected. 
At research level, there is a lack of empirical studies describing and analysing land transaction 
modalities in rural areas. Land transactions are generally equated to land sales and purchases (see 
for instance, Chan Sophal and Sarthi Acharya, 2002). The domain of land rights transfers (agrarian 
contracts and derived rights) is almost terra incognita (and this is also true outside of Cambodia; see 
for instance, Lavigne Delville and al., 2002, for West Africa). 
More generally, policy and research documents are strongly influenced by an evolutionary 
frame of reference. Within evolutionism, historical events (and tragedies, in the case of Cambodia) 
are not studied and analysed per se but implicitly conceived as factors generating a blockade or a 
delay in the ineluctable, quasi ‘necessary’ evolution from subsistence agriculture and customary 
law to commercial agriculture and land ownership. Our viewpoint is based upon a rejection of this 
non-historical frame of reference, the origin of which combines 19th century evolutionism, 
modernisation theory as far as development is concerned and the evolutionary theory of property 
rights (Kitching, 1982; Platteau, 1996; Colin and al., 2006). Rather, we try to demonstrate how actors 
and institutions interact at different levels, generating land tenure dynamics that follow various and 
largely unpredictable paths. We endorse a standpoint, at once theoretical and methodological, 
seeing land transactions as social processes defining arenas that are pervaded by matters of 
“wealth, power and meaning” (Shipton and Goheen, 1992). 
                                                            
2 See for instance Van Akker (1999); Kato (1999); Boreak (2000); Hughes 2001; Sovannarith and al. (2001); Sophal and al., 
(2001-2002); Luco (2002); Sokha and al. (2004). 
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• Land transactions, land markets, land rights transfers 
A study in land transactions cannot restrict itself to a study of land selling and buying 
mechanisms. It must encompass the whole range of land rights commoditised transfers: 
> Land purchases and sales (alienation rights or ‘definitive transfers’). 
> Derived rights (provisional transfers of land rights: renting, sharecropping, mortgaging, etc.) or 
agrarian contracts. 
In other words, we need to clarify what we mean regarding land transfers, transactions, transfers 
and market.  
Firstly, a land transfer is only a shortcut for talking of the transfer of land rights. The word ‘rights’ is 
conceived here in social terms – an action over a resource that is seen as socially legitimate – rather 
than in legal terms. 
Secondly, studying land rights transfers implies then, to explore the nature and the contents of 
the rights (prerogatives and duties) that are transferred. We must also identify the giver (the owner 
of the land rights) and the taker, who can be a tenant or a land buyer, depending on the rights he 
receives from the transfer. As we will see, though the transfer, it implies at very least a ‘giver’ and a 
‘taker’. There is often a ‘third party’ acting as an intermediary or ‘broker’ in the transaction. 
Beyond this triangle, and especially in cases of conflict, other actors are involved, namely 
politico-legal authorities endowed with the power to arbitrate disputes and enforce decisions. 
Thus, the notion of ‘market’ does not only refer to the virtual place where land would be sold 
and bought, it regards the whole range of land rights transactions and thus encompasses various 
types of sharecropping and rental markets. It is also an arena, a set of actors linked by interactions 
revolving around land right transactions (transfer of money, goods, information and expression of 
power). 
Our empirical stance allows us to avoid the pitfall of normative categorisations and dualisms 
(such as the one between a land owner and a tenant). Categories of property are used in policy 
and research without being questioned. For instance, most of the studies categorise the various 
forms of land acquisition or appropriation according to the following terminology: land purchases, 
land grabbing, encroachment and land title (see for instance So Sovannarith et al. 2001: 16-19). 
Empirical studies show that these categories are problematic and their boundaries not as clear-cut 
as one might think. For instance, land purchases do not always look like a commercial transaction 
between partners standing, at least formally (from the legal point of view) on an equal footing 
(corresponding thus, to the model of bargained transaction; see the policy chapter). Land 
purchases are often comprised of elements of threat, violence, force and corruption - let alone the 
question of controlling information - and thus, often resemble land encroachment. The title can also 
function as a device for regularising land grabbing or encroachment, thanks to corruption or social 
relations. Additionally, the boundary between land grabbing and land encroachment can be a 
matter of diverging interpretations between actors involved in such transactions. All this means that 
we need to carefully describe transactions (1) as they happen on the ground, and (2) as they are 
enacted and understood (and sometimes contested) by the actors involved, before letting them 
enter into any category (‘sale’, ‘grant’, ‘encroachment’, etc.). The conceptual work of categorising 
transactions must take root in fine-grained empirical fieldwork. 
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Theoretical approach 
• Ethnography of land rights 
In the previous section, we outlined the issue and the scope of the research. We will now enter 
more specifically into the theoretical background underlying our approach. I will label it 
ethnography of land rights, which might appear as a paradox as this label sounds methodological 
rather than theoretical. Actually, both levels are intimately intertwined. 
Ethnography is naturally associated with anthropological discipline as its core methodological 
dimension. It conveys the importance of its empirical orientation and refers to the qualitative 
aspects of cultural impregnation, long-term fieldwork and participant observation. Beyond 
disciplinary boundaries, ethnography is a set of methods rigorously used for organising fieldwork and 
paying attention to the actors’ point of view – their categories, opinions, discourses, moral principles, 
representations, justifications and actions. There is also a reflexive dimension inherent in the process 
of ethnographic fieldwork. The observer is necessarily part of the scene and other actors tend to 
attribute him (or her) with a specific, though changing role. 
Thus, when speaking of the ethnography of land rights, we stress the empirical orientation 
underlying our approach of land tenure. It is about contextualising data about land rights, how 
rights are defined, enacted, contested, negotiated, transformed.  
Furthermore, we use the (old, tracing back to Maine’s Ancient Society, 1861) notion of ‘bundle of 
rights’ to take account of, and describe the plurality of rights and right-holders involved in the 
appropriation and use of an area or a plot of land. Understanding how the bundle of rights over a 
plot or the bundle of rights held by an individual or group is put into practice requires analysing the 
norms and principles backing the rights. We can analytically distinguish these four levels (Colin 2004): 
Justifying principles, legitimising rights and referring to value systems and moral principles. They 
are general, non-prescriptive principles, as the principle of belonging to a common mankind, giving 
to everybody the right to subsistence, or the principle of intergenerational justice. 
Norms, the prescriptions resulting from principles: for instance the duty to welcome migrants 
stems from the principle according to which any man has a right to subsistence. 
Rights, conceived as socially legitimate and regulated actions over/about landed resources, 
backed by principles and norms. 
Practices, corresponding to the effective access to land resources. The distinction between rights 
and access shows that gaps exist between norms, rights and actual actors’ practices, gaps related 
to legal pluralism (several normative sources or ‘orders’), or that access without right does exist (by 
force, corruption, social ties, economic capital, etc.), as symmetrically does rights without access 
(cf. Ribot and Peluso 2003 on the “theory of access”). 
Rights and practices define together the field of interventions for politico-legal institutions 
involved in conflict-solving processes. 
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One can distinguish different types of rights in the same area (which comprises different 
resources and/or possible uses of these resources): 
- ...of use (before use right, one should first consider the right of passage), 
- ...of getting an income from use, 
- ...to bring about changes and improvements of the land resource (land development, 
irrigation scheme, plantation, fertilisation, etc.), 
- ...to delegate land use with compensation (leasing, sharecropping, pledging) or without 
(loan, concession), 
- ...of alienation through commercial transfer (sale) or non commercial (gift, inheritance), 
- ...to inherit, 
- ...of administration, namely the right to define others’ rights. 
The main distinction to be made is that between operational rights and administrative rights. 
Furthermore, there is an array of possible restrictions on these different rights: 
- ...temporal, 
- ...regarding use (for instance annual crops allowed but not perennial crops), 
- ...need to ask for agreement (this is matter of distribution of administration rights among 
several right holders), 
- ...regarding the form of delegation, 
- ...regarding the beneficiary of delegation (the two last restrictions are often linked, the 
nature of the delegated right being related to the type of beneficiary). 
As mentioned previously, a precise description of the ‘bundle of rights’ is not sufficient per se. 
Ethnography of rights must take a broader picture into account, expressing the social and political 
embeddedness of rights and defining the field of variables which we need to describe and analyse: 
Origin of the rights, basically refers to transfer mechanisms, including all the forms of 
appropriation and delegation, from clearing to sales, via inheritance, leasing, etc. One hypothesis 
here is that the origin of a right might influence its contents. The description of this variable requires 
exploring the history of settlement and also the degree of commoditization of land transfers. 
Content of the rights, corresponding to the description of the bundles of rights and of their 
restrictions. This description allows empirically tested hypothesis about privatisation (the possibility of 
a ‘real alienation’ for instance) and observes the impact on resource use. 
Right holders, who can be individuals or groups. This variable is thus about the hypothesis of the 
individualisation of land tenure. However, one must pay attention to the internal heterogeneity and 
hierarchies within ‘collective right holders’ such as ‘household’ or ‘lineage’. The distribution of rights 
(land fragmentation or concentration) can be assessed from this standpoint. 
Regulatory framework, made of all politico-legal authorities – formal or informal, state or non-
state, modern or traditional, local or supra-local – involved in conflict-solving and arbitration. The 
hypothesis to be tested through this variable is about land tenure security and rules enforcement 
(through an empirical evaluation of the changing legitimacy of authorities). 
These four sets of variables constitute the ‘backbone’, the structure of land tenure as a social 
field. They give a picture, a static view which is insufficient. How is this structure enacted? This is the 
question of land tenure dynamics conceived as a social field, to be empirically explored by paying 
attention to social processes, principles used by the actors, conflicts, negotiations, alliances, etc. 
Central here is the notion of pluralism: 
> The plurality of politico-legal institutions, 
> The plurality of legal and normative orders. 
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• Transferring land rights 
As said in the introduction, land transfer is the shorthand for land rights transfer and land market 
for land rights market, the latter implying that these markets do not only deal with land sales and 
purchases but also with various forms of commoditized delegations of rights. 
The following definition, from a study on derived rights in West Africa, is also relevant in the 
Cambodian context: 
“We use the expression ‘systems for delegating use rights’ (or ‘derived rights’ for short) to 
describe procedures whereby someone who controls rights of access over a plot of farmland, in his 
own name or that of his close family group, grants such rights of use to a third party, on a non-
permanent basis and in accordance with specific rules. The word ‘rights’ is used here to describe a 
set of locally recognised prerogatives and duties, rather than in a legal sense. 
Consequently, ‘delegation of use rights’ covers a whole series of different procedures giving 
access to farmland for third parties, outside the family group, ranging from open-ended loans to 
systems more akin to rental or sharecropping. The term stresses the contractual relationship between 
the two parties and the continuum along which the various systems lie. It also avoids the 
connotations of ownership which underlie the term ‘indirect entitlements’, which presupposes 
privately owned land – something that is far removed from reality in most rural areas” (Lavigne 
Delville and al., 2002: 2). 
An empirically-grounded analysis of land rights transfers requires going beyond reductionisms 
and oversimplifications – for instance, when one boils down the diversity of the institutional 
arrangement regulating access to land in the mere dichotomy between ownership and tenancy. 
The objective is to identify the diversity of land transfer modalities. For this, we resort to simple 
double-entry categorization: 
> The commoditized or non-commoditized nature of the transfer, 
> The scope of the transfer: regarding appropriation rights or restricted to use rights. 
This approach, summarized in the following table, allows leaving open, as an empirical issue, the 
question of the limits between boxes. It is often a matter of (diverging or conflicting) interpretations 
between parties involved in the transaction, or of temporal perspective or time span (for instance as 
regards pledging, also in the case of open-ended loans that happen to be ‘seen’ as a gift in the 
course of time; the jump from one generation to the next one often adds layers of indeterminacy 
and contestation). 
The table also leaves open the possibility of integrating local forms and categories, thus avoiding 
the imposition of (generally western) categories defined a priori. Empirical research should as much 
as possible, adhere to local categories and avoid ‘forced translations’. 
 
Transfer type Non commoditized Commoditized 
Restricted to use rights
(delegation) 
Intra-household delegation 
Common-pool resource management 
Fixed-term loan 
 
Open-ended loan 
Grant, concession 
Leasing 
Sharecropping 
Exchange land for labor 
 
 
Pledging 
Including transfer 
rights 
(appropriation) 
Inheritance, gifts, donations 
Land distribution (administrative transaction) 
Land clearing 
Purchase 
Investment in capital 
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In brief, It is as important to study agrarian contracts as social processes of negotiation between 
actors and involving (for instance in case of conflicts) political-legal authorities to be identified. It is 
of crucial importance to identify the ‘places’ and processes of land transaction validation and to 
assess both their legality and legitimacy. This implies taking into account local state functioning (at 
commune, district and maybe province level) as well as the forms of local leadership (formal and 
informal)3. 
As far as derived rights are concerned, the study will focus on the ‘real content’ of agrarian 
contracts. Relevant features to be documented include duration, land tenure clauses (level and 
nature of the rent, rights, duties and interdictions, etc.) and non-land clauses (labour and service 
exchanges embedded in clientelistic ties), local denomination of contracts and land tenure 
relations, actors involved, existence of (informal) written contracts. 
As far as land purchase/sale markets are concerned, we also need more information on 
transaction processes, actors involved (distress sales, impact of urban actors in rural or periurban 
areas), intermediary actors and brokers, price formation, access to information. 
                                                            
3  See on this topic the works of Ebihara (1993), Ly Sareoun & Vijghen (1996), Ledgerwood & Vighen (2002), Luco (2002). 
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Methodological framework 
• Workshop organization 
Objectives 
As mentioned above, the study consists of a twofold combination of workshops and fieldwork 
and collective and individual phases. The first workshop had the following objectives: 
> Concerning methodology: especially on the qualitative approach of land issues (see the 
section on descriptive indicators below) (day 1 & 2). 
> Concerning research topics and sites: short presentation of each research site by researchers 
who will be in charge of individual fieldwork and a discussion to define more precisely the points 
to be explored. It was assumed at this point that each had already carried out a short field trip 
in order to identify roughly a few relevant local issues in order to nurture the discussion. It was 
more than that in the case of the two INCO RURBASIA research sites of Kompong Thom and 
Sihanoukville, where fieldwork had already been carried out on land issues (day 3). 
> Concerning the organization of the whole study: especially on how to combine collective and 
individual fieldwork in order to harmonise field research methods and ‘terms of reference’ on 
the different sites. We also had to adjust the time schedule (day 4). 
Sources 
Regarding methodological issues in land tenure study, a power point presentation was based on 
two main sources: 
Colin, J.-P. 2004. Droits fonciers et dimension intra-familiale de la gestion foncière. Note 
méthodologique pour une ethnographie économique de l’accès à la terre en Afrique. Document 
de travail de l’UR REFO 8, Montpellier: IRD. 
Le Meur, P.-Y. 2002. Approche qualitative de la question foncière. Note méthodologique. 
Document de travail n°4 de l’UR REFO, Montpellier : IRD. 
Workshop participants 
Pel Sokha and Meak Pramol (CEDAC senior researchers), Pierre-Yves Le Meur (GRET), Ms. Im 
Sothy, Ms. Leaknena, Mr. Pel Setha & Mr. Laing Lan (CEDAC junior researchers), Sam Vitou (CEDAC, 
resource person), Amaury Peeters (University of Louvain, resource person). 
• Research site selection: rationale 
This study focuses on rural areas. We have excluded urban situations from our investigation. This 
choice did not imply any dualism or any overestimation of the difference between both areas. The 
Cambodian countryside is subject to the influence of urban factors, as we will see in the regional 
case studies. Land buyers are very often urban people and the cities are also a target for rural 
migrants (not the only one: intra-rural migrations should not be underestimated).  
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Beyond this general orientation, the rationale for selecting research areas was a matter of 
balance between scientific and pragmatic factors. As the study was a short-term assignment with 
limited funding, we have chosen to exploit the knowledge already accumulated through other 
research programmes, especially the INCO programme RURBASIA, on the impact of urban 
processes on surrounding rural areas. One of the INCO research components is about land tenure 
and the present study could provide complementary insights. 
Furthermore, GRET was leading two development projects (funded by AFD and ADB) in both of 
the areas of Prey Nup (Sihanoukville) and Stung Chinit (Kampong Thom), in the latter case co-
operation with CEDAC. Project agents had to deal with land issues in a practical way within the 
project (land transaction registration, land survey, land re-allocation). They were interested in 
getting more information about land tenure. For instance, the Prey Nup project leader mentioned 
the following topics (interview with Jean-Marie Brun): 
> The project has only observed one-year rental contracts so far, despite the issuing of property 
titles that should have made landowners feel more secure for longer periods of leasing. There is 
a shared interest in gaining insights around the rationale of these institutional arrangements from 
the stakeholders’ point of view. 
> Land transactions formalising procedures do exist now. To what extent are they known and 
used by people for securing transfers? To what administrative level do people go (village, 
commune, district or province) to have transactions secured? 
> The maintenance procedures for registering land transactions seem to be a new concern for 
LMAP. How do they work? Are they well-known to people? 
The same questions needed to be discussed by CEDAC field research team with Stung Chinit 
project staff.  
Regarding the selection of further sites, CEDAC researchers have chosen the provinces of Siem 
Reap and Rotanak Kiri. 
In the following table, we have very briefly summarised the criteria pre-identified by the research 
team relying on previous knowledge of the areas. These criteria are broad and rather synthetic, 
combining different elements and expressing dynamics or trends deemed to be relevant for the 
study. They were of course, debated and refined in the course of the research. 
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Kampong Thom Sihanoukville 
♦ Cashew nuts plantation, land purchase by urban 
people (and sharecropping) (north-east of the 
national road) 
♦ Land speculation along the national road 
♦ Tourism development zone (provincial level) on 
cashew nut plantation zones 
♦ Deep water rice zones (south-west of NR 6), 
fishery, land transaction (e.g. Roca village) 
♦ Sales for changing of activities (north-east, KPT 
direction) 
♦ Large landowner renting out (leasing, 
sharecropping) 
♦ Landless people selling land: lack of credit and 
draft animal (rural), illness and lack of food  
♦ Dry season migration (Thailand) 
♦ Forest exploitation (firewood for selling and sugar 
palm processing) 
♦ Systematic land registration and titling 
♦ Urban dwellers (sometimes high-ranking) buying 
land for speculation (renting ‘back’ to villagers), 
later for plantation (recent) 
♦ Brokers buying land under their name for 
someone else and renting it out to get their 
remuneration 
♦ Encroachment in the foothills (state forest area), 
fruit trees and crops (cassava) 
♦ Krom Samakki distributed to families by 1985-86 
(official recognition 1989), collective decision to 
sell (early 1990s) 
♦ Public policies: deforestation banning, industrial 
zones (300 ha to a Chinese company) or special 
economic zone (SEZ), eco-tourism 
♦ Systematic land registration and titling 
conducted by LMAP 
Siem Reap Rotanak Kiri 
♦ Demobilised soldiers and Red Khmer settlements 
(news villages) (north of Angkor, toward Kulen 
national park) 
♦ Future urban development south of SR, future 
agricultural development west/south-west of SR 
♦ Urban dwellers speculation (highway, airport) 
♦ APSARA zones, Kulen National Park 
♦ Conflict over land between APSARA authority 
and villagers and between local authorities and 
villagers. 
♦ Spatial dynamics: selling land for buying cheaper 
(or clearing) far away. 
♦ Land selling: accumulation or ‘dis-accumulation’ 
(distress sales, social frailty, lack of resources). 
♦ Sporadic form of land registration and SLR. 
♦ Strong state intervention (triangle development 
zone /agreement, road & airport: ADB loan) 
♦ Speculation (land purchase along the national 
road), brokers (‘canvassers’) 
♦ Development of plantations (purchase of land, 2 
Chinese and 1 Vietnamese companies 
negotiating for cashew nuts, rubber and coffee 
plantations) 
♦ Encroachment of Khmer lowlanders. 
♦ Ethnic minorities (2 chiefs: administrative and 
‘traditional’) shifting from shifting cultivation to 
permanent farming, effect of the new land law 
(collective ownership without the right of selling, 
individual use rights) 
♦ 2 MLMUPC pilot projects of systematic land 
registration (SLR) for communal land of ethnic 
minority communities.  
 
Within each research area, we relied first on two main factors for selecting villages, once again 
combining scientific and pragmatic criteria: 
> Coping with the constraints of the study: how many staff, how much time, how much money? 
> Taking account of the scope and objectives of the study, in terms of a scientific approach and 
expected results: in-depth description and qualitative analysis of land rights transfers, rather than 
a quantitative survey. The objective is consistent with the exploratory dimension of the study. 
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We could thus reason the localisation of the inquiry in relation to: 
> Existing knowledge (for instance inquiries within INCO). 
> Interest of the locality (for instance, regarding the diversity of land arrangements, land 
market activity, emerging trends, conflictive situations or the impact of important state 
intervention in land issues). 
All of this converged towards a synthetic criterion of feasibility for the study. In other words, we 
have chosen two villages (with a maximum of three villages) per site in order to reach the expected 
results. 
• Qualitative method 
Relying on the identification of the main variables (origin and content of the rights, right holders 
and politico-legal authorities) as a guideline, a fieldwork strategy is needed. The starting-point is 
made of the threefold identification of: 
> Issues at stake, symbolic or material, political, economic, social, involving identity and 
belonging, etc. 
> Social actors, collective or individual, claiming access or rights to resource, or the control of the 
rights over resources (administrative rights, inclusion/exclusion). 
> Politico-legal institutions (formal or informal), claiming a legitimacy to, for example, the law, 
particularly through the legitimacy to arbitrate disputes. 
This approach draws on the hypothesis of a mutual interaction – a symbiosis (Lund 2002) – 
between competing claimants for access to resources and competing authorities for politico-legal 
legitimacy: 
“The process of recognition of property rights by a politico-legal institution simultaneously 
constitutes a process of recognition of the legitimacy of this institution” (Lund 2002: 14) 
The ethnographic description of these processes resorts to three methodological principles: 
> It starts from the actors’ point of view: their categories, representations, knowledge, moral 
principles, discourses, strategies, logic… 
> It goes through the observation of social processes: a matter of following actors, conflicts, 
negotiations, plots, discourses, in different social contexts and arenas. 
> It uses conflicts as an entry-gate for identifying and understanding social cleavage, strategic 
groups as a research hypothesis (correspondence between converging interests and strategies) 
and arenas as an abstract social field of confrontation, negotiation, alliance, etc. 
The main empirical sources are: 
> Interviews: the main source of information, requiring a capacity to listen, to adjust questions, in 
order to let new and unexpected issues emerge from this specific form of social interaction. 
> Participant observation, rather a research attitude implying a long-term presence and allowing 
access to people and data than a method. 
> Systematic procedures of data collection, to be devised according to the need (the topic), for 
instance census, genealogies, transects, participatory or mental maps, kinship diagrams, 
resource use calendars, etc. 
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> Written sources: scientific literature, ‘grey literature’ (project reports, consultancies, etc.), legal 
texts and archives, formal and informal contracts (also aerial photographs, maps, cadastral 
plans, etc.). 
The methods are not employed according to a predefined receipt but combined along a form 
of strategic eclecticism. Field researchers must be able to adapt their fieldwork strategy to fieldwork 
constraints and unexpected ideas and tracks arising from the inquiry, they must be innovative in 
selecting, adapting and combining methods. 
Case studies are a central device to follow in time and space actors and interactions between 
them, the social processes that contribute to structuring and transforming land tenure as a social 
field. 
One must develop a strategy of triangulation of sources: crosscutting of information coming from 
different interviews and of data produced through different methods. 
Lastly, field researchers have deal with tension inherent in the qualitative inquiry, between 
flexibility, adaptability, and cultural impregnation on the one hand, and distance and control over 
fieldwork as a social situation. 
• Descriptive indicators 
Function 
We have presented so far the theoretical background and the methodological orientation of 
the study, as well as fieldwork organization. In order to delineate ‘terms of reference’ that could be 
useful for the researchers during individual fieldwork and that could help to provide a comparative 
dimension to the whole study, we have outlined a list of ‘descriptive indicators’ for helping to 
organize data production and analysis. 
These indicators are listed above. They fulfill the following functions: 
> They constitute a chapter of ‘things’ to observe, a sort of guideline or reminder for the inquiry. 
> This means that they have to be adapted to the needs of the enquiry (as they partake in a 
qualitative framework with the advantage of flexibility). 
> They are also used through different methodological tools (this is what makes them different 
from a guideline for interview). 
> They function as provisional research hypotheses within a comparative framework (and this at 
two levels: we have four big areas of research and several spots – villages – within each area). 
> They are conceptually located between ‘raw data’ and ‘final interpretations’, helping to 
organize the former and prepare the latter. 
The first phase of collective fieldwork was used to build provisional indicators on the following 
areas of research: 
– Stakeholders 
– Politico-legal authorities 
– History of the village 
– History of land tenure and land policy 
– Main production systems and economic activities 
– Main public interventions related to land issues 
– Conflicts about land (what is at stake? resources? arguments? actors involved?) 
– Types of institutional arrangements regarding land tenure 
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List 
We then established a more detailed list of descriptive indicators to be used during the intensive 
phase of individual fieldwork. An important point was managing the tension between the 
requirements of a comparison (namely, a certain level of standardisation of the indicators) and the 
need to adjust indicators to the specificity of each area under study. 
History of settlement and/or foundation of the village (waves of settlement/migration, returnees, 
settlement of demobilised soldiers and ex-Red Khmers) (key informants? More than one informant? 
Village chief, village elders, etc.). 
Agro-ecological constraints, opportunities, risks (GRET-CEDAC projects, INCO project, 
Cambodian Australian Agriculture Development Project, etc.). 
Agro-eco-system typology and zoning (and main changes in farming systems), qualitative 
assessment (key informants, written sources, maps, INCO project, mental maps). 
List of the holders of power positions, formal (politico-administrative positions) and informal (key 
informants and in the course of the inquiry, through interviews). 
Main changes in the local history of land tenure and land policy (Krom Samakki, land distribution, 
1989 reform, 1992 and 2001 land laws, 1997 deforestation banning, 2002 forestry law, land titling, 
local aspects regarding state intervention, etc., and before 1979 and 1975 when it is relevant) (key 
informants and in the course of the inquiry, through interviews). 
Identifying the stakeholders’ groups in land issues (different classes of farmers, urban dwellers, 
landless people, brokers or intermediary actors, NGOs, development projects, state agencies – like 
APSARA – etc.) (to be refined and specified during the inquiry). 
Identifying the formal and informal politico-legal institutions involved in land issues and conflict 
solving (at the different administrative levels, village, commune, district, state services, NGOs, so-
called traditional authorities, local ‘big men’, etc.) (to be refined and specified during the inquiry). 
Identifying and following cases of land conflict (stakeholders, stakes, authorities involved, 
alliances and oppositions, negotiations, arguments and discourses, mode of conflict resolution, 
enforcement, etc.) (following people through institutions, cases, discourses, etc.). 
Identifying the modalities of access to land (clearing, inheritance, purchase, social/economic 
land concessions, forms of derived rights), assessing their relative importance (written sources, key 
informants). 
Localising territorial dynamics (clearing directions, dynamics of selling for buying cheaper or 
clearing elsewhere, delimitation of state intervention structuring factors such as road building, social 
and economic land concessions, localising conflicts) (official sources, topographic & administrative 
digital maps, key informants, and through the inquiry). 
Identifying the main public interventions affecting land tenure (infrastructure, natural resource 
and bio-diversity conservation, road building, etc.) (official and written sources, key informants at 
the district, commune levels). 
Following a few cases of public policy intervention (for instance regarding social concessions: 
actors involved, target groups and effective beneficiaries, negotiations and institutional 
arrangements) (interviews with persons involved directly or indirectly, official documents). 
Biographies of a few ‘big men’ (especially as regards land tenure strategy) (interviews). 
Identifying landless people/groups, their land tenure trajectory, their strategies as regards access 
to land (agrarian contracts). 
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Identifying external stakeholders involved in land rights transactions (politicians, urban dwellers, 
‘big men’ and entrepreneurs, state agencies, etc.). 
Identification of brokers involved in land rights transactions, both rental and purchase and sale 
(exact function, social features, official position, local or outsiders, relations to the actors involved in 
the transaction, strategies, remuneration, etc.). 
Making a glossary of the main local terms and categories used to characterise land contract, 
land rights, institutional arrangements, etc. 
Identifying and describing land institutional arrangements including all the forms of rights 
delegations (see slides about the description of rights): actors involved, negotiation process, 
exchange logic (labour, services, products, credit, ‘chain of rights and duties’), contents of the 
rights, temporal dimension, local categories, names, interpretations, etc. (interviews and 
questionnaires). 
Land sales and purchases processes: actors involved, reasons for selling, buyers’ strategies 
(production, speculation, renting out – and ‘back’ – to the sellers, formalisation procedures, brokers, 
etc.) (interviews and questionnaires). 
• Indicator checklist for land transactions 
We have established a specific list of indicators as regards the transactions themselves. This list 
(especially as regards derived rights) was elaborated on the basis of the methodological note by 
Chauveau & Colin in Lavigne Delville et al. (2002). 
Land sales and purchases 
♦ Description of the people involved in transactions 
– Social characteristics (sex, age, status, origin) 
– Farmer’s life history 
– Characteristics of his/her farm: list of plots or ‘land patrimony’ (owned and used by the 
farmer, owned and not used by the farmer, not owned but used by the farmer) 
– Household, evolution and life cycle 
– Non-farm economic activities and other positions (social, religious, political, association, etc.) 
– Resource availability and constraint (labour, land, credit, draft animals, technical 
knowledge) 
♦ Description of the transaction 
Actors involved: 
– Characteristics of the buyer: local or outsider, professional; 
– Characteristics of the seller; 
– How did they engage in the transaction? Existing relations between buyer and seller (before 
the transaction)? Direct contact, or through a third person? 
– Intervention of a third person (broker): exact function, social features, official position, locals 
or outsiders, relations to the actors involved in the transaction, strategies, remuneration, etc. 
Reasons for selling: 
– Distress (illness, lack of credit or means of production) or ‘accumulation’? 
– Leaving agriculture (running another business), buying land cheaper elsewhere (or clearing 
land)? 
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Negotiation of the price, mode of payment: 
– Formalisation procedures; 
– At what level (village, commune and district); 
– Payment of the tax, informal paper, witnesses, etc. 
Buyers’ objectives and actual practice (what does he do with land?): 
– Production (type: plantation, annual crops, etc.); 
– Speculation (anticipation of a new infrastructure, etc.); 
– Renting out (and ‘back’ to the sellers). 
Conflict due to the transaction: 
– Concerns about the price, delay of payment, the limit of the field (with a neighbour); 
– Other people do not agree with the sale (for instance a member of the buyer’s family), 
multiple selling; 
– Concerns about the formalising procedure (problem of recognition), ‘misunderstanding’ 
about the meaning of the ‘sale’, etc. 
Agrarian contracts 
♦ Description of the informant 
– Social characteristics (sex, age, status, origin); 
– Farmer’s life history; 
– Characteristics of his/her farm: list of plots or ‘land patrimony’ (owned and used by the 
farmer, owned and not used by the farmer, not owned but used by the farmer); 
– Household, evolution and life cycle; 
– Non-farm economic activities and other positions (social, religious, political, association, 
etc.); 
– Resource availability and constraint. 
♦ Description of institutional arrangements 
Description by field plot: 
– Nature of the field (agro-ecological characteristics, existing investment like a plantation); 
– Management of production factors (division of labour between the landowner and the 
tenant); 
– Management of output (mode of product sharing: rate, timing, negotiability; fixed rent, 
decision-making regarding the sale of the product, etc.); 
– Management of the contract: partners involved, how broad the rights are (and restrictions), 
length of the contract, dimensions of the contracts not related to land (exchange of labour, 
services, etc.), how the contract was established (witness, paper, etc.) and negotiated. 
Economic aspects of the contract on management of the plot: 
– Payment, inputs, outputs. 
Choice of contract: 
– Rationale underlying the ‘choice’ (from both partners’ point of view): economic benefit, risk-
avoidance strategy, relation of force, etc. 
– How has the contract been carried out in practice? 
– Combining contracts 
– Evaluation of contract 
– Evaluation by the persons involved: advantages, difficulties, conflicts and re-negotiation. 
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Critical comment  
on the fieldwork process 
My role in this investigation was methodological support. I was involved in delineating the 
research orientations and organising a preliminary workshop in order to discuss and adjust 
qualitative methods to the goal and scope of the inquiry. We organised a mid-term supervision field 
trip, which gave us an opportunity to take stock of the first results and the main difficulties faced by 
the junior researchers (see annex 2 for Rotanak Kiri research site). 
Obviously, the study has generated significant results. Rich empirical material was gathered 
about a theme that was unkown, or at least, not well-known. This is a true achievement (please see 
the other chapters). Obviously, in addition, field researchers did not completely ‘enter’ into the 
logics of qualitative fieldwork, let alone ethnography. This has manifested in different aspects of the 
final product: 
Field researchers did not stay in the villages. Thus, they missed the specific dimensions of local 
dynamics; an understanding which is crucial to contextualise and therefore, make more reliable the 
interpretations. 
By doing so, they also had difficulties in grasping logic that was more foreign to them, namely 
the social relations among non-Khmer groups; significantly undifferentiated (as ‘ethnic minorities’ or 
even, ‘ethnic people’) in the reports. 
The specificity of the village level was largely ignored whereas the history of settlement and 
displacements is a crucial factor for a sound understanding of land tenure dynamics at the local 
level in rural Cambodia. 
The significance of cases, conflicts, specific events, was thus downplayed, as well as the holistic 
nature of the ethnographic approach. 
Ethnography is not only about producing data, it is also a form of writing and reporting, it is a 
literary genre. In this respect, the first draft of the site reports I happened to read bore the hallmark 
of a “culture of a consultancy” (Stirrat 2000). Topics were listed without highlighting the links 
between them (e.g. between land sales and loans or land clearing), thus missing the overall 
dynamics of land tenure generated (at least in part) by land transactions, which was the very topic 
of this study. At this intermediary stage, this was a result of the options made during the fieldwork (as 
said above) as well as a more or less conscious way of following the aesthetics of reporting that 
predominates within the development world. 
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CHAPTER III.  
 
Siem Reap 
 
Pel Sokha, Laing Lan, Hay Leakhean and Im Sothy 
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Context 
• Regional context 
Siem Reap province has a population of 734,488 inhabitants with a density of 61 persons per km². 
It is situated in the north-west of Cambodia about 360 km from Phnom Penh. Siem Reap is located 
on the north bank of the Great Tonle Sap Lake and was the place of the former capital city of the 
Khmer Empire of Angkor. Siem Reap is rich in its many archaeological sites and is the first tourist 
destination and attraction in Cambodia. It is a rapidly developing town since the introduction of the 
open sky policy4 at the end of 1998. Siem Reap has seen a rapid surge in new luxury buildings that 
offer a wide range of international standard, three to five-star hotels (within a capacity of 
accommodation largely exceeding the current volumes of tourists), fine restaurants and several 
shopping centres. 
In order to attract tourists, the government has planned to improve the Tonle Sap Lake 
environment by implementing the environmental improvement project that is expected to start in 
2008 with a US$30 million ADB loan. It will strengthen the APSARA management capacity of the 
Angkor Park areas, especially in terms of regulation enforcement, and also fund the (re-) 
construction of main roads linked to the provincial capital and the renovation and expansion of the 
international airport. The close peri-urban area of Siem Reap is delineated in four main different 
zones: agricultural development zone, urban development zone, archaeological sites or Angkor 
preservation zones (managed by APSARA) and the hotel development zone. This zoning has a 
strong impact on the development of land sales/purchases and the increasing land prices in the 
urban development zone. 
• Local context 
Don Tro is one of the 12 villages of Lvea commune. Pouk district is located about 20 km from Siem 
Reap Town or about 2 km from Pouk market along the NR 6. In 2004, Don Tro accommodated 146 
families with 719 persons. From 1998 to 2004, the number of households increased 1.35% and the 
population increased 0.52%. The village covers 470 ha of which 3.5 ha (0.74%) are homestead areas 
and 176 ha (37.44%) are rice land. Population density is 153 persons per km². Don Tro village was 
created a long time ago. In the Pol Pot regime, the villagers had been forced to leave the plains 
area and move closer to the NR 6 for the sake of easier control over peoples’ movements. In 1979, 
after the Pol Pot regime, people continued to stay in the new resettlement village and returned this 
village to its previous name, Don Tro. The former (pre-Khmer Rouge) settlement area was cleared 
again and used for rice cultivation. Almost all land is wet season rice (WSR) land. Some people also 
own dry season rice (DSR) land close to the river as well as in the flooded area. Almost all families 
grow WSR. Besides, they sell labour for construction work and for fishing. For dry season rice 
cropping, there about 50 families who are practicing DSR. After the harvesting of DSR, farmers 
plough the field before the floods come in order to replenish the soil fertility from flood sediment for 
RR growing in the following year. In the dry season, farmers grow hot pepper, water convolvulus, 
and other aromatic plants or herbs in their home gardens. They cannot grow on the WSR field since 
there is no water source for irrigation. The difficulties of growing WSR are the affects of drought due 
to a shortage of water and the lack of an irrigation scheme. Due to the development of a golf 
                                                            
4 Policy related to direct flight from abroad to Siem Reap airport. 
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course owned by the Kheng Someth Company, the majority of people sold land to the company 
and land speculators. After selling the land, they depended on waged labour in the town, thus 
outside. Some other farmers have also sold land for renovating their houses. 
Kok Trach village of Khat commune, Pourk district is situated about 16 km south-west of Siem 
Reap. This village is located in the zone managed by the APSARA Authority and had 156 families in 
2004. Between 1998 and 2004, the annual family growth rate was 0.43% with a population growth 
rate of 2.71%. On the whole, this village covers 160 ha of land with 41% of residential land and 59% of 
rice land. This village is situated in the lowland rice field area or zone, but farmers used to own land 
in the lower field DWR zone. The village could be classified into three agro-ecological zones: 1) 
Residential land and RSR land; 2) RSR zone, in which people face many constraints such as natural 
disasters (drought, irregular rainfall) even though canals exist; and 3) DSR area situated in the lower 
field DWR zone about 15 km from the village. Kork Trach was established a long time ago. Local 
people reported that when they first came here they saw one large tree growing on the farm. So 
they named this village Kok Trach from that day on. There were 11 Khmer families and three ethnic 
Kuoy families (minority group). In 1941, Thai military forces and Thai teachers’ families came to 
control this village and subsequently forced the villagers to provide them with food. They built a Thai 
school and forced people such as illiterate adults to attend school. They collected taxes (on crops, 
animals and carts) from villagers. At that time, the villagers mainly relied on auto-subsistence; they 
did not buy or sell anything. For example, there were no clothes to buy and people made cotton 
cloth and grew crops for their own consumption in the absence of a market. After taking control for 
about 6-7 years, the Thai armed forces withdrew. Then, French armed forces took control of this 
village again and forced people to pay identification tax. The villagers fled to the forest when they 
didn’t have any money to pay for it. During the war, in 1974, villagers moved away, some to the 
cities controlled by the Khmer Republic and some to the forest controlled by the Khmer Rouge. In 
1975, they came back to practice collective farming. In 1979, there were 100 families, including 
those from displaced households from Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham provinces. From 2000 
to 2004, land sales and purchases rapidly increased in this village. However, at the end of 2004, as 
people became increasingly aware of the classification of this land, in the zone II controlled by the 
APSARA authority, land sales/purchases rapidly decreased. 
Khna village of Khna Sanday commune, Banteay Srei district is situated about 32 km north of 
Siem Reap, along road number 67, outside the zone I and II of the APSARA Authority and in the 
upland zone. There are newly cleared forest lands for chamkar or fruit tree plantations. In 2004, Khna 
village had 173 households. The annual growth rate of population and households was 1.91% and 
2.85% between 1998 and 2004. The village covers 15.1 km² of which 71 ha (4.6%) are residential land, 
19.3% rice fields and 6.9% chamkar land. It was established in the 1950s. At that time, the commune 
was mostly covered by forest. In the 1960s, the provincial authority suggested that villagers move to 
settle along road number 67. People cultivated chamkar rice more than RSR. Under the Pol Pot 
regime, people practiced collective farming. They did not flee to other villages, whereas, the 
people from other villages fled to this village. After the Pol Pot regime, solidarity groups were 
mobilized to carry out collective farming. However, in 1982 collective farming was dismantled. As a 
result, some farmers re-occupied their ex-residential land. Among the villagers who came during the 
Pol Pot time, some of them returned back to their homeland while others remained in this village. 
The development of tree plantations, tourism and the construction plan of the paved road 67 
resulted in a growing volume of land sales/purchases. Increasing land prices encouraged people to 
sell their rice lands and chamkar lands. Some farmers who sold land were expecting to find new 
land by encroaching degraded forests. However, the result fell short of their expectations because 
the remaining forest lands were prohibited from being cleared by the forest administration (FA). 
Moreover, the FA officials implemented restrictions and banning measures on chamkar chas (fallow 
land) too. Fallow land used for shifting cultivation was sold through land brokers and they lost 
agricultural land. Land sales occurred under the strong pressure of brokers and urban buyers and 
many farmers anticipated the loss of land by selling early due to the fear of being cheated or being 
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forced to give up their land. These anticipating strategies strikingly reflect a felt insecurity as far as 
land appropriation is concerned.  
Bos Kralanh is one of the seven villages of Chreav commune and is located in the urban 
development zone, southeast of Siem Reap. In 2004, there were 182 households. The annual growth 
rate of household and population of the village was 2.57% and 2.06% between 1998 and 2004. The 
village covers 380 ha of which 30 ha (7.89%) is residential land and 71.05% is rice fields. Around 4 ha 
of the land of a small ancient temple and pond in this village belonged to the APSARA area. Bos 
Kralanh village was created in 1954. During the Khmer Rouge era, villagers were not displaced. Nor 
did anyone try to escape. However, there were only 100 families remaining in 1979. In 2002, seven 
families came from Battambang province to settle in the village. The village is located in the 
lowland rice field and lower fields DWR zones. All households conduct wet season transplanting rice, 
or RSR. Some of them practice irrigated, dry season rice and recession rice. Around 70 to 80 
households grow subsistence crops and vegetables in hilly homesteads areas between July and 
December. Despite the fact that there is a canal system connecting Siem Reap River to the village, 
it is becoming shallower and does not continue to function for irrigation. The RSR production 
provides low yields due to droughts. Urban people from Siem Reap and Phnom Penh have bought 
dry season rice land in places where many farmers have not cultivated for a long time due to very 
low yields. There are other existing constraints for farmers against expanding the DSR production 
area toward the Tonle Sap Lake, such as limited land for cultivation of DSR and a ban on rice 
cultivation from fishery officials. Due to the low yields, farmers stopped cultivating the DSR and sold 
land (with the formal recognition of the village chief). Where people can irrigate rice using water 
from the reservoir of the seasonal flood of the Tonle Sap, farmers continue to practice DSR or RR, 
even though it is banned to protect flooded forest. Sixty households (33%) in this village grow DSR in 
the lower field DWR zones. 
Figure 1: Map of area studied in Siem Reap 
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• Land transfer modalities in the area under study 
In Siem Reap, non commoditised forms of transactions on land rights have been playing a major 
role in regional land tenure dynamics: administrative transactions such as land distribution, grants to 
military, resettlement of returnees, but also land clearing and land grabbing. Land redistribution was 
not limited to the post-Khmer Rouge/PRK era in the 1980s, it continued into the 1990s. In the uplands, 
degraded forest land has been distributed to landless farmers and land poor farmers with the formal 
recognition of local authorities. 
Nevertheless, we observed a clear trend toward the commoditisation of land rights transfers. This 
is partly due to the development of tourism that has favoured speculative behaviour in regard to 
land. This creates a sort of distorted urbanisation with infrastructure and hotels, the displacement of 
administrative buildings and rather limited growth in residential areas. 
The peak of land sales/purchases occurred in 1998/2004, that is, somewhat later than in 
Sihanoukville. In this respect, the APSARA authority has been playing a key role since 2004, when its 
regulatory power was strengthened by the government in freezing large tracks of land as protected 
areas. Thus, they were removed from speculation. 
As in Sihanoukville, or perhaps more than in Sihanoukville, there are two sets of mutual links 
resulting from the development of land sales: 
We have observed a strong link between land sales, land clearing and mobility. Smallholders 
living in the agricultural areas surrounding the city of Siem Reap sell their land under pressure (which 
is, very often, under the threat) of land brokers and buyers, or when anticipating the risk of complete 
land loss, and move to peripheral areas to buy land at a lower price or, more often, to clear land, at 
the risk of being evicted by forest agents or concessionaires (military). In the uplands, there is also a 
tendency toward the commoditisation of land and the individualisation of property rights in former 
areas of shifting cultivation. 
There is also a link between land sales and derived rights, which is of a similar nature to what we 
have observed in Sihanoukville. Land sellers, generally smallholders and poor farmers, take in loan 
the plot they sold. Very often, the loan is changed into a rental contract without any negotiation, 
due to a highly uneven power imbalance. Or, if the plot is used for planting cashew nut trees, the 
loan duration is limited to 4 to 5 years according to the growth of the trees. We also observed a 
trend toward the commoditisation of derived rights with the development of rental contracts and to 
a lesser extent; sharecropping at the expense of loans. 
Another trend that is specific to the Tonle Sap area is the access to land through capital 
investment in water reservoirs with the active participation of local authorities who act as brokers. 
 
Right transfer 
modalities 
Non-commoditised Commoditised 
Institutional 
arrangement 
(use rights) 
Loan 
 (Exchange land/labour) 
Loan (loan against a gift in paddy) 
Leasing 
Sharecropping 
Pawning (& 
Mortgaging) 
Transfer rights 
(appropriation) 
Land distribution by the local authorities and krom samaki 
Spontaneous ‘re-occupation’ of former land property 
(sometimes negotiated with local authorities, monetary 
compensation) 
Inheritance 
Clearing (encroachment, grabbing) 
Military development zone 
Land distribution by the local authorities to returnees and for 
resettlement 
Purchase 
Capital investment 
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Land appropriation 
In Siem Reap, land appropriation has been carried out in various ways, such as land distribution 
by local authorities and solidarity groups, re-occupation of former land and houses, free access by 
land clearing, occupation of state or public land, inheritance and sales/purchases. The recent 
evolution of the modes of land appropriation is summarised in the following table. 
 
Date/Year Mode of appropriation 
Land distribution by the local authorities to the solidarity group, krom samaki, 1979-80 
 Re-occupation of former residential land 
Redistribution (several times) by krom samaki to groups’ members  1982-86 
 Forest clearing (upland area & flooded forests) 
1990-1992 Sporadic land registration (in three districts of Siem Reap, Pourk, Prasat Bakong) 
1992 Distribution to returnees (‘negotiated expropriation’) 
1992-1993 Beginning of land purchases (close to roads/urban areas) 
1995 APSARA authority established by royal decree 
1996-1997 AGRISUD development project: land distribution to landless farmers  
Strong development of land sale market 1998-2004 
In 1998, the government declared the ‘Open Sky Policy’ (direct flights from abroad to Siem 
Reap) 
2002 Distribution by local authority to landless farmers (Khar Sanday Commune) 
2003-2004 Forest clearing (for selling) increased heavily 
2004 June (09), issuance of botbanhchea (regulation) No 01 on The Prevention, Suppression and 
Elimination of Clearance Burning and Encroachment and Fence to Occupy the Forest Land. 
February, distribution of 1,600 ha of (4 km * 4 km) in Khun Ream commune, Banteay Srei 
district, to the military.  
2004 
 
- Strengthening of APSARA enforcement capacity 
- Relocation out of Angkor zone 1 to the development zone of 1,012.5 ha Run Ta Ek 
established by the sub-decree issued in Oct. 2004 
- Demarcation of the APSARA zone  
In December, the forestry administration filed a complaint to the provincial court to repossess 
the state land from the military 
2005 
 
- Beginning of systematic land registration in Siem Reap commune of Siem Reap district 
- Starting the capital investment of the private sector for access to the former DWR lands in the 
flooded areas towards the Tonle Sap lake. 
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Protest of over 100 people with the participation of four commune chiefs (Khna Sanday, 
Thbeng, Romchek and Khunream) and district governor of Banteay Srei against the 
expropriation of 3,440 ha of land being ruled by the provincial court in favor of the forestry 
administration at the end of March.  
The Provincial Committee on Forest Clearance and Encroachment secured the return or 
expropriated 47,701 ha of land Siem Reap province, around 7,000 ha of them in Banteay Srei, 
with 54 deikas (provincial decision); refer to a Botbanhchea (Regulation) No 01, in May, 2006, 
and at the request of the National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution (NALDR). Degraded 
forest land with fencing without use and new farm land in the upland area is considered as 
state land but it was illegally occupied and mostly sold to urban people.  
On the 16th May, however, the prime minister ordered to return 3,300 ha in O Manas area of 
Khna Sanday commune, as SLC to the villagers/farmers and military families in Banteay Srei 
district. 1,190 ha or 37% of the land was allocated for military Battalion 4, where 245 soldiers 
and their families have been living since 2000. 
2006 
 
At the end of May, 677 ha of forest land in Khna Sanday commune has been newly cleared 
and fenced for ownership. The large land occupants hired labour/people to clear land at 
5,000 riel per day. 
• Land distribution 
The cultivated land was distributed by local authorities to the solidarity group (krom samaki) in 
1979. Later, it was redistributed several times between 1982 and 1986 to the members of krom 
samaki due to the conflict around land allocation in which they were accused of not being equal in 
terms of land quality. In some villages, there was a need to allocate land to newcomers. The area of 
land being distributed per household varied according to the number of household members and 
the availability of land. For example, in Don Tro village (Pouk district), each member could access 
1,000 m2 for rainy season rice and many households could get between 0.25 and 0.50 ha per 
household for dry season rice. For residential land, in some villages local authorities distributed land 
to the households equally, while in other village’s people re-occupied land that was their property 
prior to 1975. 
In the new villages created during the Pol Pot regime, villagers continued to settle and occupy 
the residential plots that were allocated during the Pol Pot time. Land distribution continued in the 
1990s and 2000s to returnees in 1992 and to landless farmers in 1996-97 and in 2002. 
• Land clearing 
After the redistribution of agricultural land, farmers in the lowland zone toward the Tonle Sap 
Lake also encroached in the flooded forest for cultivation of dry season rice due to the lack of rice 
land, while those farmers in the upland zone encroached into the forest to expand their chamkar 
land (16% of interviewed farm-households) or for selling. Many of them sold their newly cleared land 
to address their urgent needs (distress sale) or under pressure – the usual mix of threats and 
persuasion – from brokers, buyers and/or local authorities. Some of them also anticipated a 
complete loss of land by selling land earlier: this is not a matter of distress sale; one could say that 
this is a ‘felt distress’ which is linked to the perception of a strong institutional insecurity and of 
powerlessness. 
Furthermore, the rich and powerful people bought newly cleared land, chamkar chas (fallow 
land) or chamkar land for tree plantations. Often, the Forest Administration accused the rich and 
powerful people of having snatched up state land.  
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• Inheritance 
In Siem Reap, 75% of the interviewed FHs inherited land from their parents (let us be reminded 
here of the Khmer tendency towards bilateral kinship rules), and 37% of the total plots were 
transferred by inheritance. New couples inherited land from their parents. This land had been 
distributed to them during the early 1980s. The inheritance process can be different from place to 
place, depending on a parent’s decision and negotiations among the family’s members and 
always without written contracts or informing the local authorities: inheritance is strictly an intra-
family (domestic/private) affair. For those households without parents, the inheritance process is 
strongly decided by the elder brother (there can be contradictions and conflicts between collateral 
and agnatic kin). Different inheritance processes has been found, such as:  
Parents distribute all their limited land that they received through distribution from the solidarity 
group to the first child without giving any of this land to their other children. This is because the elder 
child received land commonly from parents during the land distribution process in 1980s; 
Parents distribute only residential land if they have small rice land; 
The elder brother acts as the manager of the family patrimony and distributes land to his young 
brothers. Normally, those brothers who are poor receive more land than the other brothers. For 
example,  
Mr. Eang Yi has five children and lives in Kork Trach village, Khnat commune, Puok district. During 
the land distribution by the solidarity group, two of his children also received land as their share. The 
family received in total 0.20 ha of land. Moreover, he bought around 2 ha of land. After marriage, 
the first child inherited around 0.80 ha of land while the second child inherited around 0.60 ha. The 
parents are the decision-makers for this inheritance and made it without any written contract. 
Mr. Kang Nhor, a farmer in Kork Trach village, Khnat commune, Puok district. He has nine children 
and lives near the house of the village chief. During the land distribution by the solidarity group, he 
and his wife received 0.15 ha of land. After the land distribution process he bought 0.50 ha of rice 
land. He said that when his daughter gets married he will distribute part of their residential land to 
her but they do not want to give rice land to her now because he and his wife own only a very small 
rice land. 
Mr. B, has 5 children and lives in Krasaing village, Chreav village, Siem Reap district. He has 0.70 
ha of rice land. 0.40 ha among all land that was given by the village authority in 1989 for his family of 
three members including one daughter when he left the army. Moreover, he bought 0.30 ha of rice 
land. In 2003, he allocated around 0.30 ha of rice land to his daughter as anticipated inheritance 
when she got married (what he would not do for his next children). 
Mr. An Pork, has two children and three siblings. During the land distribution process in the early 
1980s, he and his two elder brothers received 1.5 ha of land from the solidarity group. In 1990, he got 
married and his two elder brothers gave him 0.25 ha of land. Normally, he could take 0.50 ha of land 
but he thought that his wife already had a lot of land because she was the daughter of people 
from better-off households. His first brother kept 0.60 ha, and gave the rest of 0.65 ha to his second 
brother. 
• Land access through capital investment 
In Siem Reap, local private investors seek to invest in reservoirs on the former and abandoned 
deep water rice (DWR) lands in exchange for parts of that land. This way of accessing land must be 
differentiated from a purchase. A common point between these two modalities of land 
appropriation is however, the role of brokers (often commune authorities) in the process; at the 
interface between local communities and external investors. 
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In 2005, a project of reservoir construction was funded by a private investor in three villages of 
Prey Chrouk commune, Pourk district. The project aimed to convert the former and abandoned 
DWR areas into receding rice fields of about 450 ha. The project was implemented under the 
mediation of the commune authorities who work for creating a favourable ‘climate’ for external 
investors and institutions, while at the same time representing the local authority of the government. 
They typically fulfil the function of brokerage. The water reservoir project needs support and 
participation from farmers in sharing the cost of reservoir and former DWR land. Before starting the 
dam construction, the commune chief mobilized farmers in a Dry Season Rice Farmer Community of 
58 members which increased to 250 in the mid dam construction due to the farmers’ growing 
interest for the process of capital investment in RR production - in particular, on how to share the 
cost of the reservoir, and how to consolidate land or share land. From this investment, the investor 
will access the abandoned DWR land that was shared by all members of the community. Farmers 
have to contribute to investment costs of the reservoir by making payment over a period of 3 to 4 
production years at an amount depending on land size. However, the capital investment appears 
as a modality for redistributing, economically, former DWR land among investor and farmers. The 
potential farmers can receive more land than other farmers. The local leaders name this process 
deysampatein (concession). By law, it is an Economic Land Concession (ELC) that organises the 
temporary transfer of state private land to the private sector. The MAFF has the right to grant over 
1,000 ha of state land to the private investor for a period in order to stimulate economic 
development. Up to 10,000 ha of ELC could be leased, for a period of up to 99 years (article 59 of 
the 2001 land law). Additionally, the provincial authority is delegated to lease state land of fewer 
than 1,000 ha, or the capital investment less than 10,000,000,000 riel (ten thousand million riel, 
equivalent to about US$2.5 million) (article 29 of sub-decree on ELC in Dec. 2005). 
The farmers who did not agree with the project accused the local authorities of land grabbing. 
For example, two farmers in Prasat village (Mr. Pak Leap and Mr. Pak Sam) who have 2 and 4 ha of 
DWR land in that area, but abandoned it since 2000 due to a number of natural disasters, were not 
informed about of the project and did not know what happened to their land. However, the local 
authorities replied by referring to article 76 of the 1992 land law, which stated that “any land that a 
possessor has abandoned for three consecutive years shall become the private domain of the 
state”. 
In other (rare) cases, local farmers resisted the external intrusion by grouping themselves to 
mobilise resources and invest in the reservoir. 
To the contrary, a group of 125 farmers in Chambak village (Roluos commune, Prasat Bakong 
district) mobilized themselves into a farmer community as a strategy that aimed to secure and 
prevent their land rights from expropriation by investing the reservoir in the former DWR area for 
receding rice production. A dam management committee was elected for managing the dam in a 
sustainable way. 
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Institutional arrangements  
(derived rights) 
Poor land farmers or agricultural landless farmers (ALFs) have access to land through other 
modalities such as loans of land, renting and sharecropping. Moreover, pawning/mortgaging has 
been practiced by farmers who are in need of money for immediate purposes. However, many 
urban land buyers prefer loaning the land they have bought to the local farmers (very often the 
seller himself) for temporary cultivation in order to keep land and protect it from shrub or forest re-
growing. 
• Loans of land 
Rights usually cover annual cropping, but not tree planting or the delegation of rights to a third 
party. Loans (kar oay dei theu sen) are temporary transfers of land rights without payment, or in 
some cases against a gift in-kind (paddy). The land owner can reclaim the land whenever he/she 
wishes in cases of open-ended loans. Also, a loan could be a measure to ensure release from state 
obligation. By law/policy, the owner of unused land is liable for a tax of 2% of the market price of the 
land value, which is determined each year by the committee for valuation of unused land (CLP, 
2002). 
In selected areas of Siem Reap, there are different land owner groups that loaned land to 
farmers: land poor farmers, relatives, commune councillors, government officials, urban land buyers, 
companies, military and land buyers living abroad. They loan plots of land, in many cases in 
exchange for labour, to keep and clear (this case is situated at the edge of a loan and a land-for-
labour exchange). One can distinguish different strategies of loans practiced by the different 
categories of actors (land owners):  
1. Urban land buyers, companies or buyers living abroad bought land for speculation, and as they 
generally do not need the land immediately, they loan it to farmers: here is the link between 
land sales and loans. In such cases, brokers often act as land keepers/managers for the owners 
and collect the rental fee. 
2. Farmers who lack land or draft animals have loaned land to their neighbours or relatives and 
they have left their villages to seek new chamkar land elsewhere for cultivation. This is a sort of 
reverse tenancy (the landowner is the poorest in the relationship) with a link between loan, 
mobility and land clearing. 
For example, two poor farmers in Khna village of Banteay Srei district have loaned land to their 
relatives and left the village to seek new chamkar land in Omanas settlement for growing rice. 
Some farmers acted as land brokers for their relatives from the cities, Phnom Penh or abroad. They 
could borrow land for temporary cultivation in the form of a loan. In some cases if the land owners 
are poor land farmers and the tenant farmers’ relatives, the tenant farmer can give them an 
amount of paddy as a gift at harvest time (another case of reverse tenancy). In cases of an alliance 
between the land owner and keeper, after having bought land, the owner also gives rice to his land 
keeper. For example, 
Mr. Poeung Heng, an urban resident of Siem Reap. He is an army officer in the General 
Secretariat of region II. He bought 0.5 ha of residential land in 2000 and 6 ha of rice land in 2003-04 
in Kok Track village. After buying this land, he loaned it to a soldier for rice cultivation in exchange 
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for labour (keeping or taking care of land). Due to his alliance to this soldier, he also gave some rice 
to the soldier. 
Loans can follow two procedures: (1) with written contracts; and (2) without written contracts 
depending on trust/accountability relations between local actors and the development of land 
markets. For example, in Khna village of Banteay Srei district, one buyer of 30 ha of fallow chamkar 
land, Mrs. San, a Khmer-American, has loaned land to the farmers without any written contract. The 
loan was processed without writing any written document as the buyer thought that she had 
enough formal (legal) land right documents from the chiefs of village and commune. However, in 
2005, learning from past experience of land disputes, the military requested written contracts 
recognized by the village chief as a witness before loaning land to 19 farm-households in Khna 
village, Khna Sanday commune.  
There are 19 families in Khna village, Khna Sanday commune (Mrs. Nga Proeurng is 49 years old, 
Pan Bech 38 years old, Mrs. Nga Lot 41 years old, etc.) have asked for loans of land from the soldiers 
under the military brigade No 4 based in O Poung. Loans have been processed according to 
written contracts, which have been made by the village chief. Farmers then had to sign them using 
a thumbprint as signature. For example, Mrs. Nga Proeurng cleared degraded forest land for rice 
farming 2 years ago before the army moved into the area (in 2004) for land occupation. Also, since 
then, she has had to borrow her former land from the army by making a written contract of loan, 
with thumbprint signature and recognizing the village chief as witness. 
Similarly, for rice land, in or close to the urban development zone and the newly cleared land in 
the upland areas that have good market opportunities, loans without contracts have been 
increasingly replaced by loans that rely upon written contracts. 
In 2003, a rich and powerful man came from Phnom Penh. He contacted the village chief of Bos 
Kralanh seeking land sale opportunities in the DSR fields. In 2003-04, he bought 400 ha of RR/DSR 
land and flooded forest land in five villages of Chreav commune, 120 ha of them located in Bos 
Kralanh village about 10 km from the village. The village chief claimed that land in that area is 
concession land because farmers abandoned it a long time ago. Rice land abandoned for more 
than 3 years is given back to the state (refer to the article 76 of the 1992 land law even though it was 
un-validated by the issuance of 2001 land law). For this reason, the village chief and his fellows 
persuaded their villagers to sell the land. They told the villagers that land was located far from the 
village and also that the rice yields have always declined. They told villagers that “if we do not sell 
that land we might lose it”. Therefore, all villagers decided to sell the land. The village chief was 
responsible for making the sale contract. However, the villagers did not know any details suggesting 
when and how much money the village chief received from the land buyer. The people said the 
village chief told them that he used the money from the sale of the land to construct a public rest 
house (sala chha tean). The remainder was shared among the villagers, US$70 per each household.  
To date, the land buyer has loaned the buying land to villagers for RR/DSR cultivation without 
any written contract through a land broker. Farmers who want to borrow land need to ask the land 
broker who is in fact the village chief. In the growing season 2005, the owner requested the chief of 
Bos Kralanh village to make the loan with a written contract. However, the village chief promised to 
do this in the next growing year, 2006. 
In some cases, loans have been processed when the large land owner lacked enough rice 
seedlings or had insufficient agricultural equipment. According to farmer’s habits, if they have no 
more rice seedlings to transplant, they prefer to loan other un-used land to their neighbours. In such 
cases, the loan is a form of land adjustment to the farmer’s production means. For example, 
Mr. Mouv Sameth is a ALF in Khna village. He borrowed 0.5 ha of rice land from other villagers in 
2004 without any written contract. Five farm-households in Sanday village loaned land to their 
neighbours because they have not enough agricultural equipment. Then they left the village to live 
on a new settlement and to clear degraded forest land occupied by, or belonging to the military 
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for farming. The military has loaned the land to the people for temporary cropping in exchange for 
labour to clear the land. Farmers will return land to the military and seek to clear another new plot of 
land. This shows the link between military concessions and the reproduction of shifting cultivation 
through short-term loans. 
Otherwise, the shifting cultivation farmer borrowed land from other villagers, their relatives, or 
from the military when they lost all their land by expropriation or banning from the government 
authorities. In the following year, the loan is changed to sharecropping even though they still use the 
term ‘borrowing’ (som dei thveu sre sen). 
Mr. Ngor Lot, aged 42 years, has eight children. He is a farmer in Khna village, Khna Sanday 
commune. He used to be a shifting cultivation farmer on land far from the village but access to this 
land was difficult since the army moved in to occupy their chamkar land, and the forestry 
administration enforced its control in this area. Otherwise, he did not inherit land from their ancestors 
and parents. Thus, he became a landless farmer, and to secure the family’s livelihood he asked for a 
loan of 30 m x 350 m rice land (around 1ha) from his elder sister for rice cultivation. His elder sister 
loaned him the rice land in the growing year 2003-04 because she lacked family labour. The loan 
modality has changed to sharecropping in 2004-05 even though they still use the term ‘borrowing’, 
but the amount of paddy is not fixed in advance. In this year, he harvested about 1,000 kg of paddy 
(12 bags), and shared 120 kg with his elder sister. This loan was made without any written contract. 
However, some loans practiced between villagers or between relatives without written contracts 
have changed to become rental. Landowners receive a sort of rent in-kind (paddy). Interestingly, 
this rent is not considered as such. Rather, as symbolising a kind of mutual help or gratitude. For 
example, 
Mrs. Long Meng, a widow who has four members in her family was born in Khna village. She has 
loaned 0.5 ha of land to her cousin since 2000 because he didn’t have draft animals, and his family 
practices shifting cultivation. The loan agreement is not written down. At the harvest of 2004, his 
cousin shared with/allocated to her family 5 taings of paddy (125 kg) because of their family 
relationship. However, sharing is not an obligation. It seems to be a form of mutual help among 
relatives at time when the tenant has a good harvest. 
Both interviewed farmer groups, landholding farmers (FHs) and agricultural landless farmers (ALFs) 
have borrowed land, mostly from urban land buyers for annual cultivation. Over 4% of FHs and 35% 
of ALFs could access land through loans and some ALFs also asked for loans of land from the land 
buyers who bought land from them. Thus the loan is an important means of access to land for both 
ALFs and land poor farmers. 
• Renting 
Renting (Kar Chuol Dei) is a modality of land tenure rights transfer (derived rights) for provisory 
cultivation. The agricultural landless farmers or land poor farmers often rent in land for growing 
annual crops. Leasing has increasingly replaced loans or sharecropping as a result of the growth in 
the land market and easier management. In some cases, the owner has lost his trust in the 
sharecropper. Other reasons for renting out land are the lack of labour, large cultivated land and 
labour competition between farming and non-farming activities. Lack of labour in some cases 
could be linked to households headed by elderly people. If children live separately from them, the 
elders have to rent land or practice sharecropping for making their living. In some cases, the 
practice of renting rice land for cultivation has led to distress land sales as the tenant was not able 
to pay the rental due to experiencing a bad harvest and the impact of declining rice prices.  
Ms. Pec York, living in Chreav village, sold 1950 m² of her residential land in 2001 with 13 
damleung of gold (US$5,200) because of indebtedness. In 2000, she rented in 10 ha of rice land for 
dry season rice production. The production cost of DSR was high, as it included the renting of a 
tractor for land preparation and the hire of labour. The harvest was poor due to the effects of heavy 
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rainfall. After the harvest, the price of paddy declined so that she was not able to pay the rent. She 
asked the land owner to extend the date of payment until next year but the owner did not agree. 
The owner proposed to convert the rental agreement into a loan of money at the market interest 
rate of 4% per month. As a consequence, she was forced to sell land to pay the rent. Moreover, in 
2003, she sold another plot of residential land (1,125 m²) for US$675 for paying the credit instead of 
the credit borrower because she was cheated. In this case, she agreed to give her thumbprint as 
witness for one villager who borrowed 2 damleung of gold (US$800) from the private lender with a 
monthly interest rate of 5%. The villager borrower fled from the village and left the witness to 
reimburse the money lender instead. However, she did not file a complaint against the neighbour to 
local authorities. 
Mrs. Peng Sot, or Yeay (female elder) Peng Sot who lives in Sanday village has 2 ha of rice land 
and has rented her land out to her niece for the last 4 years because she lacks family labor. Her two 
sons are soldiers. Renting has been always processed without written contracts because they were 
her relatives. She received a rent in-kind of 150 kg of paddy per ha. 
Some farmers have more land than they can cultivate, while other farmers are too busy in 
running other non-farming economic activities. The local landowners can be classified in two 
groups: small land farmers who lack the means and family labour, and large land owners. 
Sometimes, both groups rented land out because they were busy with off-farm or non-farming 
activities. In this case, the adjustment through rental works at another level: between farm and non-
farming activities. 
In 2004, Mr. Ven Kann, a villager in Don Tro village, Lvea commune, Puok district, rented 1.3 ha of 
land from Mrs. Chhun Chhy, a villager in Puok Thmei village, Puok commune, with the rental of 12 
taing of paddy (about 290 kg) or 225 kg per ha and per season. The reason for renting land out was 
that Mrs. Chhun Chhy is too busy with other non-farming economic activities and lacks labour for 
cultivation. The process of renting is carried out without written documents and is only a verbal 
agreement as both parties depend on trust and their relationship with each other. Renting is made 
for a one year period. In cases where the tenant wants to continue cultivation he will re-negotiate 
again. 
In some cases, poor farmers rent land for increasing rice production to meet the consumption 
needs of their families. Even though the agreement is not written down, both the owner and the 
tenant make a verbal agreement in which both parties agree that the rental should vary 
depending on the harvest. The tenants stopped renting land as the soil fertility declined after 5-6 
years of cultivation. Even in processes between farmers of different villages, agreements are not 
written down. 
Mr. Tor Lai, a farmer living in Khna village has rented in 0.18 ha of rice land for the last three years 
ago from Mr. Sorm Say, a relative living in the same village, because he does not have enough rice 
land for cultivation. The leasing is not written down, and the rental fee is 87 kg of paddy. Last year 
the tenant harvested 210 kg of paddy. 
There are 15 farm households in Tromeng village, Khnat commune, that have rented in 15 ha of 
rice land from villagers in Kok Snuol village. Between 1998 and 2004, the rental fee was 250 kg per 
ha. In 2005, the farmers in Tromeng village stopped renting this land due to the declining rice yield 
compared to the rental or because it was found not to be profitable. Renting was re-negotiated 
every year through a verbal contract.  
In some cases, farmers sold their rice land, but they rented other land for rice cultivation. The 
process of land renting occurs mostly without any written contract, only a verbal agreement. This 
arrangement is for one rice growing season, or for one year. The tenant has to re-negotiate with the 
land owner every year for the next growing season. As mentioned above, rental is often paid in-kind 
with paddy. This arrangement could be reduced if the rice yield does not meet expectations or if 
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the harvest is bad. However, in the case of a 10-year investment in weaving handicraft, the renting 
of land is made with a written contract and also recognized by the chiefs of village and commune. 
Mr. Hen Hear, living in Bos Kralanh village, Chreav commune, sold 0.50 ha of rice land. After 
selling this land, he had to rent in this same land back from the land buyer for rice cultivation. The 
rental was in the form of 100 kg of paddy per season. The process of land renting had no written 
document and it needs to be negotiated every year. The owner (land buyer) would stop renting 
land to him when he needs to get the land back to resell it. 
A prince has rented in land from a villager in Kok Track village, Mr. Liv Lon, to install a weaving 
handicraft business. Land renting is for a period of 10 years with a written contract and recognized 
by the chiefs of village and commune, as witnesses. The rental fee is US$100 per month and it will be 
paid after 5 years of renting. To facilitate this arrangement the handicraft provided an employment 
for the daughter of land owner.  
Results obtained from an in-depth interview show that 5% of FHs and 15% of ALFs have rented in 
land for rice cultivation. Rental of rice land is often paid in-kind with paddy and ranges from 150 to 
250 kg per ha and per cropping season. The variation depends on the relations and negotiations 
between owners and tenants in which rental could be diminished in cases where the harvest is bad 
or lower than was estimated. The process of renting does not resort to any written document. It is 
based on mutual relations of trust and accountability. 
• Sharecropping  
Sharecropping (kar thveu sre chek phal khnea) in rice production was often practiced 10 years 
ago, including between villagers from different villages. Sharecropping arrangements were 
generally open-ended and conducted with a re-negotiation before the next growing season. 
Sharecropping has rapidly declined and has changed to leasing arrangements (kar chuol dei) 
for two main reasons. They are both related to the issue of the embedding of property relations in 
social relations which warrant both trust and accountability: 
– The landowners say they have lost trust in the farmers. However, sharecropping remains 
practiced between close relatives or neighbours. Landowners accuse the tenants of 
cheating them by refusing to disclose the real level of their harvest and accuse them of 
being lazy. 
– This change also relates to the change of land ownership from local people to urban 
people, or urban dwellers who mainly work outside the village on non-farming business. They 
have no time to follow up the process.  
Thus there is a link between the commoditisation of land relations and the diminishing role of 
localised social relations. 
The landowners want tenants to pay part of rental costs before starting the cultivation and do 
not further consider the harvest conditions. Moreover, the contract is not written down. Villagers 
seem to confuse the process of rental with that of sharecropping. During the interviews, the 
interviewees talked of sharecropping by using the Khmer word for renting (kar chuol dei), probably 
because both arrangements are similarly paid in-kind (paddy). The amount could be similarly 
diminished according to negotiation.  
Regarding sharecropping arrangements, the harvested product is shared according to the 
respective contributions of the tenant and the landowner: 
– 40/60, namely two shares for the tenant and three for the landowner if the farmer contributes 
only labour and the landowner to land preparation; 
– 60/40, namely three shares for the farmer if the farmer has traction animals or prepares the 
land; 
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– In other cases, the landowner only receives 1/3 or 1/2 of the harvest depending on the 
negotiation. Sometimes, the landowner provides the tenant with seeds because farmers 
lacked rice seed or land owners do not want to keep land unused. The range of 
arrangements is broad and the interpersonal relationships within them play a key role. 
Ms X, a farmer in Chreav village, Chreav commune, Siem Reap district. She has access to 1.5 ha 
of rice land from her uncle who has lived in the same village since 2003 without a written contract, 
and pays a 50% share of paddy to him. Last year, she received 30 thangs (720 kg) of paddy after 
sharing the harvested product. Her uncle will take the land back because he has a nephew-in-law 
who will now be in charge of rice cultivation.  
For close relatives such as brothers or parents, the product share is not fixed before the cropping 
season: it is an intermediary case between loan and sharecropping involving relatives. In some 
cases, the loan of land seems to have been changed into unfixed sharecropping if the landowner 
contributes to the cost of land ploughing. The land owner wants the farmer to also keep land for 
clearing. Farmers can give the landowner any amount of the harvested product depending on the 
farmer’s decision and the results of the harvest because they are intra-family. Habitually, the 
product is shared at the ration of 2/5 for the farmer and 3/5 for the landowner, if farmers contribute 
labour and the landowner spends on land preparation. In some cases, the loan of land is changed 
to sharecropping. But sharecrops were not fixed in advance if the landowner contributed to 
production costs such as ploughing. Sometimes, this arrangement changes if the owner wants the 
farmer to keep land and clear it or if the tenant is poor and does not have any draft cattle or 
capital to start farming.  
Moreover, urban people settle in rural villages for land brokerage and speculation and they loan 
land to farmers for sharecropping, aiming to create a close relationship with local villagers. Urban 
people try to re-embed property relations into social relations, for example, 
Yi Vien, is a female elder, who is a widow with three members of her family that were born in 
Siem Reap town. She moved to settle in Khna village, Khna Sanday commune on 0.75 ha of land 
that she bought in the form of gold at the cost of 3.8 dam loeng (around US$2,000) in 1997. She felt 
that living in the provincial capital was more difficult and it had become harder for her to run a 
business. However, the village chief said she moved to live in this village because she lost belief in 
her political party. Besides, being a trader and a money lender, she is also a land broker and buys 
land for speculation. She is an influential woman in this village and if someone wants to sell land they 
can contact her. At the time of this study, she had 20 plots of land (around 12 ha) along road 
number 67 from Prey village to Khna village, Khna Sanday commune. Also, she loaned the villagers 
that land for farming without any written contract due to trust, and to the neighbours in the same 
village in exchange for labour to keep and clear lands. She also paid for the ploughing service for 
the villagers. In turn, she didn’t demand a share crop from those villagers or farmers, depending on 
villager’s kindness and good harvest results. The farmer can give the land owner any amount of the 
harvested product he wants. In this case, it could be concluded that it is an evolution from loan to 
monetary transfer of sharecropping if the land owner contributes to that production costs. As a new 
settler in the village she made good acts in favour of the local villagers. She aims to strengthen 
relationships with local villagers and partnerships. As she is a well-off woman she does not care so 
much for rice sharecrops. 
• Pawning land for credit 
Land pawning (kar banhcham dei or antichrèse under the 2001 land law) is the transfer of land 
use rights to the money lender against access to credit. The landowners pawn land for credit by 
ceding use right on it for a period to the credit lender. The land acts as a guarantee for the loan, 
while the cultivation rights serve as a form of interest payment on the granted capital. The villagers 
pawn their land for a loan from their relatives, people in the same village and people from 
neighbouring villages. If the landowner cannot reimburse the loan, the money owner will continue 
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to use the land and the money owner can rent it out to a third person for temporary use. In this 
case, the villager will not lose the land if they can’t reimburse the money. The money lender 
continues to use the land until the landowner pays the money back. Some money lenders decide to 
pawn land that is located close to their land because of the optimization of cultivated land size and 
easier management. Land pawning may be written down or not depending on relationship 
between land owners and money owners or on the type of money lender. Land pawning practiced 
by close relatives does not require a written contract, while pawning land to other people such as 
villagers in the same village, a villager in the neighbouring village is written down and recognized by 
the village chief as a witness. Sometimes, the written contract is made only between both parties 
without informing the local authorities. The amount of money and duration of land pawning 
depends on land size and type and the negotiation between both parties. In some cases, the 
villager pawns the land for money to be released from other debts while the other villager buys new 
land. These cases show that pawning can pertain to diverging strategies: pawning land for repaying 
a debt is closely related to distress sale (and sometimes may result in a sale) whereas pawning land 
for buying another plot is rather an accumulative strategy. Examples are as follows: 
Mr. Pich Nem has eight children and lives in Kork Trach village, Khnat commune. He used to have 
around 1.5 ha of rice land through distribution of the solidarity group and buying. At that time, two 
of his children received land commonly with the family during the land distribution. In 2002 he 
pawned 0.75 ha of rice land with 2 chi of gold (US$107) to a villager in the same village with a 
written contract, which was also recognized by the chief of village. The gold or money was used to 
pay back to the ACLEDA bank, and also the money lender, as a trader, and also to buy food. In 
2004, he sold that land for 1.1 damleng of gold (around US$500) to another villager because that 
person offered a higher price than the money lender, and he did not have enough money to pay 
the debt. Thus, he needed more money. In 2003, he pawned 0.30 ha of rice land to villagers for 2.5 
chi of gold with a written contract for the duration of 3 years. Until now he has not yet reimbursed 
the debt but he plans to do so in 2006. In 2004, he also pawned 0.008 ha of land located close to 
the village for 100,000 riels (US$25) to the villager with a written contract. In 2005, he reimbursed the 
credit and got the land back. As a consequence, the two elder children who got married in 2003 
and 2004 were not able to inherit land from him. 
Mr.A, a farmer in Kork Trach village, Khnat commune has nine children. In 1998, he pawned 0.50 
ha of rice land to a villager in the same village for 2 chi of gold (US$107) in order to buy the land. 
Pawning was made without a written contract for 4 years. In 2003 he reimbursed the gold and 
received the land back. In this case, when the farmer does not have enough money to pay back 
the debt he does not lose land. The money lender can continue to use the land. 
Mrs. Niv, a farmer in Chreav village, Chreav commune. She received in pawning 0.50 ha of rice 
land from her relatives for 3 chi of gold (US$160) in 2000. Her relatives pawned the land to her 
because she needed money for her daughter’s wedding. Pawning was made without a written 
contract and was open-ended. She will give land back to her relatives when she receives money. 
Nowadays, she continues to cultivate rice on that land. This also compares to other farmers in other 
areas, who sell land for ceremonies, or for their children’s wedding. In this case, it could be for 
mutual help between relatives. The land owner did not want to sell land immediately. Maybe, he is 
waiting for a high price. This is because Chreav village is located in the urban development zone or 
the urban area and will be developed toward this village area according to the provincial plan.  
Mr. Sure, a farmer in Chreav village, Chreav commune. In 2001, he pawned 0.70 ha of rice land 
from the villager from Veal village in the same commune for 2.5 chi of gold with a written contract 
between both parties. He decided to pawn this land because he also has a plot of land nearby. In 
2004, he gave the land back after getting the money.  
In the above cases, we can see that pawning (as leasing or sharecropping; see above) can be 
part of a strategy of rationalising and optimising land use according to accessibility and availability 
of assets for cultivation. 
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• Mortgaging 
For mortgaging (kar dak dei or kar dak dei theanea) or hypothek in the 2001 land law, the 
recipients or farmers have all rights of both land and money use alone. Money is transferred to land 
owners in return for pledged land in the form of a legal (certificate of possession or ownership) or 
formal document of land rights. The mortgaging contract is written between both parties and with a 
thumbprint which is recognized by the village chief as a witness. The document must be returned 
when the loan is repaid. In some cases, the land owner requests that the money lender sell the 
mortgaged land as they cannot reimburse the credit due to business failure or illness. Land 
mortgaging has been practiced in Khnat and Lvea communes of Pourk district, but it has declined 
since the APSARA authority reinforced its management of the Angkor zones I and II, contributing to 
decreasing land prices (in the archaeological zone, all kinds of settlement and construction are now 
prohibited). For example, in Khna village, Khnat commune, the cost of residential land diminished six 
times compared to costs at the beginning of 2004, before the reinforcement of APSARA authority. 
Previously, people were able to mortgage land for the credit of a large amount of money from 
ACLEDA bank or from private money lenders. From now on, villagers should mobilize themselves into 
a guarantee group of five members to gain access to a group loan of US$125 at maximum. 
In 1999, Ms. Prom Ly, living in Krasaing village, Chreav commune, borrowed 1.5 damleung of gold 
(about US$600) from the private money lender, Ms. Lab; a grocery owner in the neighbouring 
village, with a 10% monthly interest rate. Borrowing was processed by giving the document of 
possession of 750 m² of residential land as credit collateral. The document of land possession is 
recognized and signed only by the village chief. The borrowed money was used for buying a boat 
and fishing gear. Because Ms Prom has a lot of children and that her mother became sick, she is not 
able to pay back the credit. Also, she asked the creditor to sell her mortgaged land and share the 
remaining money so that she can be released from this debt. At the time of our study, the residential 
land was advertised for sale with US$13 per m². As a consequence, she will move off the residential 
land. 
An example of mortgaging land after a bad experience of borrowing with a daily payment of 
interest (Luy Rab): 
Mr. Pat Non and Mrs Kab Huo, a farmer in Kok Trach village, Khnat commune Pouk district, has 
four children. He borrowed 200,000 riels (about US$50) (Luy Rab) at an interest rate of 7% per day 
from one villager for buying food in 2000. He had to pay a daily interest of 14,000 riels. Every day the 
money lender came to take the money from the farmer. The duration of borrowing is open; he can 
pay whenever he has money. Also, in 2000, he had to sell his 0.32 ha of land to pay back the debt, 
and then he became a landless farmer. Presently, he also borrowed US$200 at an interest rate of 
12% per month from a Khnat villager (Mr. Palla and his wife are medical servants) by giving the 
receipt of residential land possession to the money lender as collateral. The contract was written 
down between both parties by thumbprinting and was recognized by the village chief as a witness. 
In this case, mortgaging land is more favourable compared to the previous arrangement with a 
daily payment of interest (Luy Rab). 
Mrs. Tong Huot, living in Kamro village, Lvea commune. Her husband was in jail. Thus, she sold 0.5 
ha of land in 1989 for US$134 to pay for the release of her husband from jail. In 2001, she mortgaged 
land ( 40m x 40m) by giving the receipt of residential land occupation as collateral for the credit of 
Hatha Kasekor (an NGO working on micro-finance) with US$134 at an 3% interest rate per month in 
order to buy fishing equipment. However, the fishing business did not go well and she could not earn 
enough income for the family. In the meantime, her husband often got sick. Thus, she did not have 
money and decided to sell 0.16 ha of land again to pay back the credit. In this case, Hatha Kasekor 
requested customers to pay back money for getting back the receipt of land occupation. Then, she 
became an agricultural landless farmer. 
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• Agrarian contracts and derived rights in Siem Reap province 
The diverse modalities of accessing land through agrarian contracts and institutional 
arrangements are giving shape to a wide array of derived rights in Siem Reap. They are summarised 
in the following table with a mention of vernacular terms. 
 
Contract form 
and 
arrangement in 
KPT 
 
Rights transferred 
 
Other conditions 
Open-ended 
loans  
(kar qay dei 
theu sen)  
Cultivation rights (in particular, rice),  
Mostly without a written contract, 
then changed to written contract in 
the following years. 
Loans as measures to secure land and be released 
from tax on unused land. 
Land poor farmers loan land to their relatives, then 
they seek to clear land elsewhere in the upland 
areas or borrow land from military for provisory 
cultivation. 
Local authorities who have a lot of plots/ large 
land, loan land to farmers. 
Urban dwellers and rich people loan land being 
bought to farmers or land sellers or land brokers, in 
most cases without a written contract. 
New settlers as land brokers, large land owners 
and speculators loan land to villagers in order to 
build close relationship with local villagers. 
In some cases, borrowing land from military and 
loan of DSR lands of the large land buyer changed 
to a written contract, recognized by the chief of 
village as witness and broker. 
Loan could be changed to monetary transfer of 
sharecropping if the land owner provides the cost 
of land preparation. 
Access to land 
for a fixed fee 
of rental 
payment or for 
leasing  
(kar chuol dei) 
 
Cultivation rights. Verbal contract or 
without a written contract.  
Renewable at start of each 
growing season. 
Farmers have either many economic activities or 
they lack family labour so they lease their land out. 
Urban dwellers/rich people lease land to farmer. 
The rental is in-kind of paddy and it could be 
diminished depending on the result of the harvest 
and/or negotiations. 
Rental ranges from 100 to 250 kg of paddy /ha.  
No right to plantation and owner can take the 
land back whenever he/she wants. 
One case occurred where the tenant sold land to 
pay the rental of 10 ha DSR land due to rice being 
damaged by heavy rainfalls. 
Tenants stopped leasing rice land after 5 
consecutive growing years due to declining soil 
fertility 
Farmer rents back the land that they had already 
sold. 
Renting of residential land in 10 years with a written 
contract, recognized by the village chief for 
handicrafts.  
Sharecropping  
(kar thveu sre 
chek phal 
khnea)  
 
Cultivation rights, Harvest 
depending on arrangements 
made. 
In some cases, land owner provides 
land preparation cost. 
Mostly this was practiced over the last 10 years. 
Now this system is rapidly declining and has 
changed to a leasing arrangement. This is 
because landowners have lost trust in the farmers. 
This remains practiced between close relatives, 
intra-family members or neighbours. 
Changed to leasing and is related to the changing 
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of land ownership from local people to urban 
people /dwellers due to easier management. 
Payment at the end of harvest and paddy is 
shared. For example: 
- 2:3; 2/5 shares for farmer and 3/5 for landowner if 
the farmer contributed only labor, the owner spent 
on land preparation; 
- 3:2; 3/5 for farmer if farmer has traction animals or 
spent on land preparation; 
- 1/3 or 50% of paddy being paid to the land 
owner, sometimes land owner provides rice seed 
to the tenant and does not want to keep land un-
used. 
Pawning 
(kar banhcham 
dei) 
(Antichère)  
No right to sell, but the money 
lender can rent or transfer the use 
rights of land to a third person.  
The money lender gives the land 
back after being paid the money. 
 
 
Practiced between relatives, between villagers 
and neighbors. 
Money lender continues to use land until the 
landowner pays the money back.  
Some money lenders decide to pawn land 
located close to their land. This is because of the 
optimization of cultivated land size and easier 
management. 
Pawning made by close relatives occurred without 
a written contract while pawing to neighbors and 
moderately-rich people in neighboring villages 
with a written contract and recognized by the 
village chief as a witness.  
Written contract could be opened-ended or not 
up to 4 years. If farmer does not have money to 
pay back he does not lose his land. The money 
lender can continue using the land. 
Sometimes, the written contract is made between 
both parties without informing the local authorities. 
In some cases, villagers pawn their land for money 
to release from other debts while other villagers 
buy new land. 
In areas close to the urban development zone, 
pawning is practiced as mutual help among 
relatives. The owners do not sell land immediately. 
They wait for land prices to rise. 
Mortgaging  
(kar dak dei or 
kar dak dei 
Theanea) 
(hypotheque)  
 
Farmers or recipients have all rights 
of use both for land and money.  
Money transferred to land owners in 
return for pledged land in the form 
of a document of land right (legal / 
formal). This must be returned when 
loan is repaid. 
This can be between farmers and banks or farmers 
and private money lenders. This practice has 
declined inside the Angkor zones I and II due to 
land devaluation since the Apsara authority 
reinforced its management role. 
Mortgaging is practiced with an interest rate which 
can be up to 10% per month with private money 
lenders or 3% with NGOs working on micro-finance. 
Farmers ask creditors to sell the mortgaged land 
and share the remaining money when they are 
unable to pay back the debt. 
Mortgage contracts are written down and thumb 
printed by both parties. They are recognized also 
by the chief of village as a witness. Mortgaging 
becomes more favourable compared to the past 
practice of borrowing money with an additional 
daily payment of interest (Luy Rab) up to a daily 
interest rate of 7% .  
 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 57 
Land sales/purchases 
Land sales and purchases have occurred since the privatization policy that was introduced in 
1989. Land sales began in 1992/93 for land close to urban areas and main roads. They have risen 
considerably and peaked in 2004 in response to the effects of the ‘open sky policy’ launched by 
the government in 1998. Urban dwellers and rich local people bought land close to main roads for 
speculation, while they bought new clearing lands in the upland zone (e.g. in Banteay Srei district) 
and the lowland zone toward the Tonle Sap Lake for tree plantation and receding rice (RR) 
production.  
Land sales have frequently occurred in the urban communes and, particularly since the end of 
1997, land sales had rised in Khnat and Toeuk Vil communes. Land was bought particularly by the 
urban dwellers. However, this has declined since the enforcement of the APSARA authority in 
November 2004 for land inside the APSARA zones I and II. APSARA’s new competency has had a 
strong impact on land markets and land sale/purchase patterns in the areas. Since the APSARA 
authority has enforced its management role, land sales/purchases have decreased inside the 
APSARA zones. On the contrary, land prices outside the APSARA zones have risen. Land prices in the 
APSARA zones have decreased 5-6 times or from US$5 to US$1 per m2, while they have increased 
from US$0.25 to 1 per m2 or 300% for newly cleared land in the upland areas. However, land prices in 
the upland areas tend to be stagnant since the Forest Administration filed several complaints 
against land occupants/owners to the provincial court for illegal grabbing of forest land. In the peri-
urban areas and outside the APSARA zones, the price of land has increased between 15 and 20 
times compared to the last 4 years and increased by 30% compared to 2005. Also, the increasing 
land market may cause land encroachment on degraded and flooded forests. The mutual relation 
between land market development in peri-urban areas and land clearing/encroachment in 
peripheral areas is at work. 
Land sales have risen in urban communes outside of the APSARA zone, and land speculators 
moved to Chreav commune. Land has changed hands mostly at the local level and the process is 
different for rural and urban communes. In urban areas, most land has changed names and is 
registered at the district office of Land Management, Urban Planning, Construction and Cadastral 
(OLMUPCC). In Siem Reap which is an urban district, 80% of land changed hands at the OLMUPCC 
and another 20% changed hands at the commune level. Normally, for changing names on 
definitive sales and getting sale documents at the OLMUPCC, land buyers have to pay a transfer 
tax of 4% of the total land costs and US$25 per plot for registration. To the contrary, in Pourk district, 
far from the provincial capital, 99% of land sale changed names at the commune level. For land 
sales among people, they think that changing hands at the commune level is enough secure. There 
is no tariff system for changing names at the commune level, but the land buyer has been 
requested to pay between US$10 and US$20 per plot, and in some cases, up to US$100 depending 
on land type, with an additional transaction tax and registration cost of about US$800. This means 
the illegal payments were eight times lower than legal payments at the district registration unit. In 
some cases, if they bought land from their relatives, the sale contract was made only at the village 
level and the chief of village recognized and witnessed it. For example, 
Mrs. San Cheach living in Kok Trach village, Khnat commune bought 0.2 ha from her relatives in 
1991. She made the sale contract upon the chief of village because she thought that buying land 
from her relatives did not require her to make a sale contract at the commune level, which is costly. 
Otherwise, she thought that nobody would grab rural land, as rice land is located far from the 
village. 
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By law, land transactions are subject to a sale or turnover transfer tax of 4%5 and also a 
registration cost. The inter-ministries of MLMUPC and MoEF issued in 2004 a new declaration to revise 
the 2002 declaration on income/cost of land registration services. In the four provinces of Phnom 
Penh, Sihanoukville, Kandal and Siem Reap, the registration costs are 100, 000 riels (US$25) per plot 
of land located outside the urban or provincial capital and US$50 for land inside the city. However, 
the sporadic registration costs in these four provinces are higher than in other provinces due to the 
increasing price of land. 
In Siem Reap district, land selling is prohibited in Chong Khneas commune, a floating commune 
located close to the Tonle Sap Lake. Authorities aimed to create a favourable climate for 
development projects. In Chreav commune, land sales increased in 2003-04 due to a good 
opportunity of future urban development planning. As urban land is at stake, the changing of a 
name after sale takes place at the OLMUPCC in about 95% of cases,6 with 318 plots of land in 2004 
and 62 in 2005 (up to April 28. 2005). Similarly, in Banteay Srei district, an upland district with newly 
cleared land areas, land selling started in 1997 and peaked in 2004. For example, the cost of a 
hectare of land has risen from US$2,500 to US$10,000. Most buyers are urban dwellers from Siem 
Reap and Phnom Penh. Some of them buy land for speculation while others buy land for growing 
crops or tree plantations. Mostly, in Khna Sanday commune, land to be purchased is degraded 
forested land and chamkar chas (fallow land). However, unclear land rights have led to some 
serious cases of land disputes (see below). On the contrary, in the APSARA zone II and of Pourk 
district, the cost of land has reduced five times, from US$5 to US$1/m² after the enforcement of 
APSARA Authority at the end of 2004. Since then outsiders or urban dwellers would buy land if they 
wanted to invest in farming only. All new construction is strictly prohibited except for renovation 
under the authorization of APSARA.  
Also, since 2004, investment in the former deep water rice (DWR) land for receding rice (RR) 
cultivation in the dry season has tended to increase. This has been caused by an increase in land 
prices of up to US$265 per ha. or about 400%. compared to 2004. Also, the RR cultivation on the ex-
DWR land, enabled by constructing water reservoirs, has developed through two modalities of 
access to land. For example, one investor7 sought a joint-investment with a farmer community 
through the mediation of the commune councillors, while other better-off families bought the ex-
DWR land by themselves. In another example, in Mukh Paen commune, Pourk district, two unknown 
better-off persons (probably representing a private company) were seeking farmers who wanted to 
sell ex-DWR land. Up to April 2005, they had already bought nearly 100 ha8 at a cost of nearly 
US$300/ha. Buying large areas of land has been processed through land brokers who are chiefs of 
villages and communes as well as commune councillors. Those farmers who did not want to sell their 
abandoned DWR land were convinced and/or threatened by those land brokers to sell because 
the local authorities intended to preserve that land as state property.  
We find here the configuration organising land markets in rural Cambodia we have observed in 
the other research areas: external (powerful) buyers, local authorities working as brokers and the 
use of latent violence to force farmers to sell their land. 
On the other hand, in Chambak village, Roluos commune, Prasat Bakong district, a group of 125 
farmers mobilized themselves in 2002 into a Farmer Community that aimed to prevent their land 
rights from expropriation by investing in the water reservoir in the DWR area for RR production. The 
dam management committee consists of seven persons elected for a 5-year mandate, and 
responsible for sustainable use of the dam. Family fishing in the reservoir is strictly banned by the 
                                                            
5 Council of Land Policy, 2002. 
6 Interviewed with Mr. Sa Chanphallin, vice chief of OLMUPCC, in charge of administration and registration conservation. 
7 Mr. An, investor from Prasat Bakong district. He is doing the same investment in Prasat Bakong district. 
8 Estimated by Mr. Aom Sarath, Vice Chief of Agricultural Office of Pourk. 
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community and it is made clear that the fish in the reservoir are sold for expenses related to dam 
rehabilitation. If the money from selling fish is not enough they will ask members to contribute. 
The persons who have sold land close to the main road and the urban development zone buy 
less expensive land elsewhere for farming and use the rest for house construction, while farmers in 
the upland zone encroached on forested land for farming after they sold their land. We can 
observe double dynamics here: between land sales in peri-urban areas and land purchases in 
peripheral areas, and also land sales in peri-urban areas and land clearing in peripheral areas. 
Twenty per cent of the interviewed farm-households bought land, while about 48% of them sold 
part of their land because of many reasons, including insecurity (threatening). Also, the Golf Course 
Company sought to buy large areas land (up to 128 ha) in Lvea commune through the intervention 
of commune councillors as land brokers. Many villagers sold land to the company and those people 
who did not want to sell their rice land were forced to sell land to the company through the 
provincial court. For example, 
Mrs. Song Yeouth, owned 1.5 ha of land and then sold it to the Kheng Sameth Company for the 
construction of a golf course. Previously, she did not agree to sell this land as with this land she could 
grow sufficient rice to support her family. In 2003, the Kheng Sameth Company offered her US$1 per 
m² and forced her to sell her land. But in 2004, the court requested her to solve this conflict, 
threatening that her land has no legal document. The court told her to sell for US$0.5 per m², and 
“that was better than being expropriated”. She agreed, as her plot is located in the middle of the 
Golf course and there was no road access. Mr. Sun Ay and another eight families also faced the 
same situation of being forced to sell their land to the company.  
For land sales by instalments, sometimes the ex-landowner refuses the price that was agreed 
upon previously and then asked for a higher price, or decided not to sell the land. When the buyer is 
actually the broker, after depositing some money, he seeks someone who wants to buy land and 
waits for a higher price for resale. Sometimes, the dateline of the payment exceeds the time frame. 
Also, in this case the seller always asks for additional money. For example, 
Mrs. Peng Soth lives in Sanday village, Khna Sanday commune sold 10 ha at the cost of US$130 
per ha to a land broker in 2003 and the land broker deposited US$100. The reasons why she sold 
were due to a lack of money for house construction and of family labour. It is a kind of forest land 
that she has occupied since 1979 and she always thought this land belonged to her. In late 2004, 
the land broker paid the rest of money to her but she refused it because she wanted to get the 
current (higher) land market price that the land broker agreed upon.  
Sometimes, farmers who initially do not want to sell land decide to sell it because they fear it 
might be expropriated by local authorities or encroached upon by others (because they have 
abandoned rice land). The appropriation of newly cleared land in upland areas is not secured. The 
process is also cumulative: as many farmers/neighbours have sold their land, other farmers fear of 
land encroachment/grabbing. In this case, they made the hypothesis that selling land was better 
than nothing. What is at work here is a strong feeling of land tenure insecurity. It has actually been 
nurtured by the ‘real’ functioning of the land market, through brokerage, power relations and 
threats. For example, 
Mr. Loek Yav, aged 70 years, lives in Sanday village. He sold 0.40 ha of shrub land to Mr. Om 
Chay in 2004 for US$130 because he feared that someone would encroach on his land. In this case, 
the buyer bought in a collection of large land, including his land. Even the chief of Khna village sold 
5 ha of land to an urban dweller in Siem Reap when other people sold all their land around his land 
because he felt that his land was not secure. 
In some cases, farmers re-occupy the land to be sold because they did not receive a share of 
money from selling it. Often, the local authorities persuade farmers to sell chamkar land and fallow 
land and other people agree to sell due to the fear of expropriation. This occurred in the communes 
of Khna Sanday and Romchek, when the land brokers (policemen in this case) did not share money 
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with them, as described in the section on land disputes. The villagers petitioned the Prime Minister 
asking for help to get their land back. They claimed that they were persuaded or threatened to sell 
land. Furthermore, in this area the forest administration has lodged a complaint to the provincial 
court against land buyers and farmers for illegal land occupation. For example, 
The authorities of Khna Sanday commune sold 30 ha of chamkar land which was occupied by 
villagers to a rich man (an urban dweller) in Siem Reap. The urban dweller bought land for growing 
cashew trees, but the villagers re-occupied the lands for cultivation because they did not get 
money as their share from selling this land as promised. In this case, the villagers were accused of 
land grabbing.  
Farmers in Knat commune located in the rain-fed lowland area bought rice land elsewhere far 
from the main road. It was less expensive after they sold land with a higher price. It could be a 
farmers’ strategy aiming at expanding their land for rice production, inheritance or speculation. For 
example, 
There are six families in Trameing village, Knat commune, Pourk district that sold their land close 
to the urban area and road at a very high price in 2004. Then they bought 8 ha of wet season rice 
land from farmers in Kok Snuol and Keo Por villages of the same commune, and bought 5 ha of dry 
season rice land from farmers of Kok Trach, Khnat and Kok Snuol village. 
Sale contracts of rural land sales are mostly registered and recognized at the village and 
commune levels. Only purchases of large tracts of land by companies or urban dwellers and the 
purchase of residential land in urban areas are completely legally processed and registered at the 
district cadastral unit. 
However, many cases of land sales lead to disputes between the new and the former owners 
due to diverging interpretations over the ‘bundle of rights’ at stake: was it a loan, former abandoned 
rice land, or a part of fallow land and chamkar land? 
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Land conflicts 
Land conflicts are becoming a serious problem in Siem Reap since the government introduced 
the ‘open sky policy’, leading to a rapid increase in the number of tourists. The main type of land 
dispute has changed from disputes over boundaries to ownership rights. The land market has 
expanded and this has led to many cases of land disputes due to various reasons:  
– Unclear land rights before land transfers or sales such as over loans of over 5 years before the 
issuance of the 2001 land law, rice land abandoned for 3 consecutive years, etc.; 
– Absence of demarcation between the state forest land and private, or community land; 
– Ignoring traditional rights of fallow land in shifting agriculture areas; 
– Illegal encroachment on forested land for selling; 
– Overlapping of administrative boundaries; 
– Enforcement of APSARA Authority.  
Farmers practicing shifting cultivation want to keep clearing their fallow land, chamkar chas or 
old chamkar after selling their rice land, while other farmers in zone III or IV toward Tonle Sap Lake try 
to clear flooded forest for receding rice cultivation. Clearing the flooded forest often leads to 
disputes between dry season farmer’s groups and the officials of the Fishery Administration. Also, 
snatching up land illegally has been becoming a serious problem for both groups of people: farmers 
and rich and powerful men. However, in Banteay Srey district, most land conflicts involved 
degraded forest land while in Puok and Siem Reap district conflicts were around abandoned deep 
water rice/floating rice (DW-FR) land or dry season rice land and flooded forest land. The type of 
land conflicts and parties involved related to land transactions could be summarized as disputes: 
– Between land brokers over land encroachment; 
– Between land owners and land borrowers (loan) over land rights without a written contract 
and between their siblings over loans of residential land; 
– Between new land owners and old land owners over land rights related to the re-distribution 
of land to the returnees or occupation of the abandoned land; 
– Between two farmer’s groups of two neighbouring communes over the commune 
administrative boundaries ( e.g. Khna Sanday and Rumchek commune);  
– Between villagers and local authorities, e.g. over selling fallow land without informing shifting 
cultivation farmers, granting the abandoned DW-FR land to private investors in exchange for 
reservoir construction and sale of abandoned rice land; 
– Between military and farmers over ignoring the right of chamkar land and fallow land; 
– Between land owners/sellers and land brokers as military; 
– Between local people and provincial authorities over the leasing of a natural lake to be used 
by villagers to the company, and between a group of farmers and the provincial 
department of fisheries; 
– Between a parliamentarian and the APSARA Authority. 
• Conflict between land brokers over land encroachment; 
This conflict occurred in 2004 over 0.5 ha of rice field in Don Tro village, Lvea commune, Puok 
district. The conflict occurred between Mr. Kok Un, a commune councillor acting as land broker and 
Mr. Cham Roeun, a land broker of the Kheng Sameth Company. The commune councillor reported 
that the Kheng Sameth Company dug a canal into his land which was not sold to the company. Mr 
Kok Un stopped working as commune councillor. Then, the construction supervisor acted as a land 
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buyer or broker for the company and filed a complaint against him to the provincial court that he 
did not give land even though he received the money. He prevented the ground work to be 
carried out by the company. But, the former commune councillor rejected the land sale rather than 
receiving money for the brokerage fee. However, the court decided in favour the company by 
giving land to the company because the company has all the necessary documents of land sale. 
The commune councillor claimed that the documents were fake. He claimed that he agreed to 
give land to increase the appearance of land size on document. According to the commune chief 
and another commune councillor, the company also filed a complaint against its construction 
supervisor and broker for illegally accepting the money from the company. The company was 
disappointed that the land size did not fit with the area on the document. To date, the broker of the 
company was arrested by the court. 
• Conflict between land owners and land borrowers (loan) without any written document 
This conflict occurred in 2005 in Don Tro village, Lvea commune, Puok district over 0.5 ha of land 
between villagers in Don Tro and villagers in nearby villages. According to the report from conflicting 
parties and village chief, this land previously belonged to Mrs. You Yem (Party A), a widow in Don 
Tro village. Mrs You Yem gave (as a loan or open-ended loan) that plot of land to a farmer in the 
neighboring village who came from a refugee camp (returnee, as Party B) without written contract. 
Mrs You Yem just said that when her child grows up she will take the land back. After 15 years, in 
2005, Party A asked to get her land back from the returnee. However, the other party did not agree 
to this, claiming that he had been occupying this land for 15 years and claimed ownership. In this 
case, Mrs. You Yem filed a complaint against Party B to the village chief, but there is no resolution 
yet. At the date of the study, this land remains occupied by party B and party A has not filed 
another complaint to commune chief/councillor. 
The land borrower claimed for ownership by relying on the fact he occupied and used land 
before the issuance of the 2001 land law (Art. 30). He used article 30 which states “any person who, 
for no less than five years prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested 
possession of immovable property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request 
a definitive title of ownership”, and article 38 which states “In order to transform into ownership of 
immovable property, the possession shall be unambiguous, non-violent, notorious of the public, 
continuous and in good faith”. However, occupying land for over 5 years does not automatically 
mean ownership if borrowing was processed with a written contract. 
• Dispute between siblings over loan of residential land 
The conflicting parties said that this conflict occurred in 2004 in Kok Trach village, Khnat 
commune, Pouk district over 1,500 m2 of land, between two siblings, Mr. Rot Yon and Mr. Rot 
Saroeurn. In 1987, the solidarity group distributed that land to Mr. Rot Saroeurn, the younger brother. 
Also, Mr. Rot Yon got another plot of land located far from the village. For this reason, he asked for a 
plot of land from Mr. Rot Saroeurn, his younger brother, on which to build his house in 1990. In 2003, 
Mr. Rot Saroeurn sold 0.15 ha of his land to an urban dweller from Siem Reap for US$3,000. He shared 
US$1,700 with his elder sister and gave US$200 to Mr. Rot Yon. In 2004, he told his elder brother, Mr. 
Rot Yon, to move off the land. However, Mr. Rot Yon disagreed and claimed that he had occupied 
that land since 1990. In this case, neither party complained. To resolve this dispute, Mr. Rot Saroeurn 
agreed to give his residential land to his elder brother, Mr. Rot Yon. Thus, he has lost all land by selling 
and loaning. 
To date in rural areas, the allocation of inheritance land was traditionally processed before the 
death of the parents. Parents allocated their land to their children without written documents. The 
father was the decision-maker or had more influence with regard to inheritance. Cases have 
occurred in which the rural parents allocated land to the children living commonly with them, and 
did not consider the elder children who had left the family previously or were rich enough. When 
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there was a dispute over heritage land, the court judges in favour of all successors, based on the 
equity principle, referring to article 75 (2001 land law) which states that “in case the partition of the 
succession is contested, the co-successors are titled to file a complaint to the court to rule the 
case”. 
• Conflict between new and old owners (both villagers) related to the occupation of 
abandoned land  
This conflicting case of land right occurred in 2004 in Don Tro village, Lvea commune, Puok 
district over land of 0.5 ha between two villagers. Mr. Mao Nuok sold land 0.5 ha in 2004. This land is 
located in Lvea village. Mr. Mao Nuok cleared this land in 1987 and grew rice on the plot over the 
next 15 years. When he sold the land in 2004, Mr. Lach Ry living in Traing, Levea commune, claimed 
that the land belonged to him. The village chief had distributed this land to him when he lived in 
Lvea village. Because of his poor living standard he moved to the Cambodia-Thai border to make 
money. Since his return, he did not come to live in Lvea again. He has filed a complaint to the 
commune chief. The commune chief and councillor have asked Mr. Mao Nuok to give US$200 to 
Mr. Lach Ry in order to end this conflict. Both parties agreed with the resolution proposed by the 
commune councillors.  
• Conflict between new and old owners (both villagers) related to the re-distribution of 
land to returnees  
This conflict occurred in 2004 in Don Tro village, Lvea commune, Puok district over rice land of 1 
ha between Mrs. Oeurn An and another four families living in the same village. According to the 
conflicting parties, before 1987 the land belonged to the four families. In 1987, Mr. Un Vong, the 
commune chief of Levea, took part of the land from each of the four families to grant the land to 
Mrs. Oeurn An, who was a landless farmer and a new settler in this village. During that time, the 
commune chief had the right to take part of the land from villagers who owned large tracts of land 
in order to re-distribute it to landless households. Land was confiscated from four large landholding 
households and 1 ha was given to Ms.Oeurn An. Mrs.Oeurn An used this land for rice cultivation until 
2004. Then, she decided to sell the land for US$20,000 due to her poverty/shortage of money. After 
that the four families who formerly owned the land (Nav So, Nan So Norm, etc.) asked Mrs. Oeurn An 
to share the money she received from the sale of the land, claiming that this land belonged to 
them. Moreover, the four families filed a complaint against the land seller, Mrs. Oeurn An, to the 
district governor of Puok, Mr. Teas Chan Kiri. The district governor came to meet her and asked her 
for US$4,000 which would be shared with the families of the four households. At this request, she 
agreed to give US$4,000. In the land right transfer or the land sale document, she was asked to pay 
an additional US$500 to the district cadastre office. Finally, a consensus was reached through 
negotiation and she paid US$350 to this office. 
The above disputes briefly presented show that people are far from being completely aware of 
legal contexts in regard to the issues of continued exploitation of land. As they used to occupy a 
plot of land, they believe they have kept the ownership rights although they have abandoned the 
plot. Article 76 of the 1992 land law states that “any land that a possessor has abandoned for three 
consecutive years shall be returned to the private domain of the state.” Local authorities tend to 
favour new occupants by referring to the 1992 land law (art. 76) and the new 2001 land law (art. 
30). However, they do not just re-assert the law, they also act as mediators by organising 
negotiations according to a principle of equity and an objective of social peace. With regards to 
the re-distribution of land to newcomers or couples, this is also true. They refer to the period 
preceding the promulgation of the 1992 land law. Between 1979 and 1989, all land belonged 
officially to the state and solidarity groups (krom samaki). They occupied and used land for 
agricultural and residential purposes. Thus, to assist the landless people, the expropriation of land by 
local authorities from large land occupants was officially recognized. However, villagers still think 
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that the land belongs to them because they did not abandon it. However, to end such disputes, the 
local authorities often judge in favour of new occupants but request them to compensate the 
former owner with some money for land clearing.  
• Conflict between two farmer’s groups of two neighbouring communes over the 
commune administrative boundaries (e.g. Khna Sanday and Rumchek commune) 
This conflict over land boundaries occurred in 2004, over 200 ha of forest land between Sanday 
village, Khna Sanday commune (first side) and Kan Nseng village, Romchek commune (second 
side). Before, this land was under the control of Khna Sanday commune but in 1983, the Ministry of 
Interior established a new village, Rumchek, in this commune. In 2004, the conflict happened 
between villagers on that land. Khna Sanday’s villager claimed that this land used to belong to 
them before Romchek village was established. However, the second group of Romchek villagers 
stated that this land belonged to them because the government gave it to them in 1983. In 2005, 
Banteay Srei district chief decided to attribute the land to Romchek commune because they 
lacked land. Khna Sanday villagers can use and sell that land under the management of Romchek 
commune. 
When land conflicts occur, if people cannot reach an agreement by themselves, they complain 
to the village and commune chiefs. Some cases are resolved by village elders and village chiefs, 
particularly disputes related to plot boundaries and those among siblings. If the village and 
commune chiefs cannot resolve disputes, people take cases to the DCC for intervention. 
Sometimes, people file complaints of land disputes directly to the DCC, for instance, in cases where 
the commune council or chief is involved in disputes. There was a dispute case where the chief of 
commune sold abandoned rice land to an outsider without informing people in Taruos village, 
Krabey Riel commune, Pouk district. 
The villagers and village chief said that there was a land conflict between villagers and 
commune chief in 2005 in Taruos village, Krabey Riel commune, Pouk district. They accused the 
commune chief of having grabbed villagers’ land. In 1988, the village chief distributed 19 ha of DWR 
land to 67 farm households. However, villagers abandoned that land in 1988 due to a variety of 
problems such as a lack of draft animals and poor (sandy) soil. In 1993, the former village chief 
requested the commune chief to keep land without any written document. The reason was that if 
the villagers kept land they had to pay a contribution to the authority. However, the commune 
chief said he bought that land from the former village chief for 100,000 riels without making any sale 
contract. Later, the commune chief sold that land to other people in Prama and Boeng Veng 
villages without informing the village chief of Taruos. In 2005, the newly nominated village chief of 
Taruos, Mr. Yav Van, on behalf of his villagers complained directly to the OLMUPCC in order to 
reclaim that land. However, he did not sue in this case to the commune councillors because the 
commune chief was also involved in this dispute. To date, this dispute remains pending. 
• Dispute between a rice farmer group and local authorities on the granting of 
abandoned deep water rice/floating rice land to private people in exchange for 
access to the reservoir construction 
Thirty-four representatives of 411 land grabbing protesters from three villages: Chantor, Prasat 
and Plaing, Prey Chruk commune, Pourk district (Siem Reap) demonstrated in front of the National 
Assembly on 23 April 2005. They requested a justice resolution from the Prime Minister. 
Representatives of the victim farmers reported that local authorities expropriated 1,500 ha of DWR 
land from them with re-grown shrubs and grass in order to grant an economic concession to a 
private investor for the cultivation of dry season rice with access to the construction of reservoir. 
However, those farmers who did not agree with the project lost their land and subsequently 
complained of land grabbing by the local authorities. This dispute occurred in December 2004 and 
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at the same time, the fishery department alleged that all land is covered by the flooded forest and 
is located in the fishery domain. Flooded forest is protected for fish spawning or fishery purposes.  
• Conflict between military and farmers over ignoring chamkar land and fallow land 
The government provided 16 km² of forest land in Omnas near the hill of Chor (Phnom Chor) to 
the soldiers of the Low Military Brigade No.4 (under the Military Brigate No.2). Before 2004, the 
soldiers’ families lived near Phnom Bok (the ancient temple zone) under the control of the APSARA 
Authority. Those soldiers and their families moved to live on the new land that was allocated to them 
by the government. This new settlement consists of 740 people. They could get 400 m² of residential 
land per family without the provision of agricultural land. Due to a lack of farm land, they needed to 
encroach on the forest land for farming (chamkar) or in many cases; they encroached on the 
fallow land or chamkar chas of farmers. Moreover, some farmers encroached on forested land that 
is part of the area exploited in shifting cultivation by other group of farmers. All this led to serious 
disputes between military and farmers. The farmers were arrested and stopped by the soldiers from 
clearing the forested land. Their chainsaw was also withdrawn until the village chief came to resolve 
this problem. Nowadays, people dare not clear the land anymore. They ask the village chief for 
help. However, the village chief claims that he had no right to solve this problem because the 
government granted this land to the military. At the time of this study, the village chief added that 
the military has applied for official rights to that land. 
• Conflict between land owner/seller and military as land broker 
The village chief and vice-chief said that this conflict occurred in 2003 in Khna village, Khna 
Sanday commune, Bantay Srei district, between Mr. Ki Kan (Party A) and Mr. Lach Lorm (Party B) 
because the land broker (Party B) did not give all the money from the sale of his land to the 
landowner. Party A sold the land along road number 67 to Party B in 2003. The land costs US$14,500, 
but Party A received only US$12,000. A payment contract was made by both parties. The first 
payment was US$1,500 and the second was US$10,500 with an agreement signed by both parties at 
the commune office. At the time of the study, party B had not paid the full amount of money. Even 
though the dateline was terminated, party A dared not sue party B because Party B is part of the 
military.  
In this case, Party B is a land speculator and makes profit on selling land. After he deposited a 
part of the money, he sought another person who wanted to buy land. However, since the forestry 
administration claimed that large parts of this area is included in the degraded forest land and 
complained against the illegal occupants, urban dwellers or rich people are reluctant to buy land. 
Normally, landowners could reclaim without returning the money being paid by Party B. In this case 
they cannot do so because Party B is perceived to be a powerful man. 
• Conflict between local people and provincial authority 
In Phnom Krom village, Siem Reap commune, Siem Reap district, 386 families protested against 
the decision of the provincial authorities to lease over 30 ha of ‘Trapaing Cheung Kruos’, a natural 
lake to a private company from Korea9 for 25 years. The company plans to grow lotus for the tourism 
sector. However, people disagreed with this transaction because this lake is a reservoir for irrigating 
dry season rice or recession rice (RR), and used for cattle and collecting herbs and fish. This dispute 
was recently resolved by a parliamentarian10 (on 03 Jan. 2007). This parliamentarian resolved this 
dispute in the name of the Cambodian Prime Minister and referred to his recommendation in favour 
of local people by returning the lake to them. 
                                                            
9 Reported by RK, 05 January 2007. 
10 Sieng Nam, a parliamentarian for Siem Reap province. 
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In dealing with this collective dispute, the villagers’ tactic was to bypass local levels in order to 
move directly to upper levels and ask influential decision makers to intervene on their behalf. In 
particular, when disputes over land with powerful men occurred, people complained directly to a 
parliamentarian who has a close relationship with the Prime Minister. The 2001 land law creates 
three types of land classification: state private, state public and private land. State public property 
(Art. 15 and 16) is that land held by the state in public trust which carries a public interest use. It 
includes the properties of a natural origin such as the permanent forest reserve, floatable 
waterways, lakes, etc. It is important to note that state public property may not be sold or 
transferred to other legal entities, though it may be subject to rights of occupancy or used in ways 
that are strictly temporary in nature. 
• Dispute between a group of farmers and the provincial department of fisheries 
This dispute occurred in Kampong Phluk commune, Prasat Bakong district, in two locations: 
Boeung Phdao (lake), and downstream dam of Huk. It was a dispute over 50 ha of land. A fishery 
official alleged that farmers had illegally grabbed and cleared the flooded forest toward Tonle Sap 
Lake for dry season rice growing or selling. However, people and local authorities consider that the 
land is situated under the administrative boundary of the commune and, thus, rejected the 
seasonal payment. In this case it would be important to clearly demarcate the boundary between 
cultivated land and the flooded forest. In this case, the commune authorities assume the role of 
managing all land and water areas in the administrative boundary of the commune because the 
authority is also a government agency. 
However, the claim is against article 45 of the law on the administration and management of 
commune/sankat issued in 2001, in which it states that the commune administration shall have no 
power to decide on forestry. On the ground, there is no demarcation between forest or flooded 
forest land and private land. Also, the definition with regard to flooded forest is not clear about 
abandoned rice land with re-growing forest. Some farmers have consecutively possessed land for 
DSR since the 1980s at the time of distribution and slashed land with flooded re-growing forest. 
• Dispute between a parliamentarian and the APSARA Authority11 
This case of dispute was referred to the Siem Reap provincial court. Later, on 18 Dec. 
2006 the court ordered the parliamentarian, Mr. Son Chhay, a lawmaker to vacate his land in Siem 
Reap town and sell it to the APSARA Authority. The court ordered Mr. Son Chhay to sell his 3.14 ha of 
land to the state for US$19,740 in total or around US$0.62 per m². However, Mr. Son Chhay disagreed 
with the price offered. He claimed that the market value is US$100 per m². However, when he (Mr. 
Son Chhay) bought the land in 1995, the chiefs of Slar Kram commune and Dang Don Pa village 
signed off on the sale document. The APSARA Authority has the land title and has controlled this 
land for a long time already. The government lawyer who represented APSARA said (CD, Dec.19, 
2006). 
“It can be concluded that land is located in the APSARA zones for protecting the agro 
ecosystem of the Angkor monuments. When the land was bought, the APSARA Authority 
competencies were limited and the APSARA zone was not demarcated. However, the local 
authorities might encourage the sales/purchases of land under their administration because of the 
brokerage fee without providing information on restricted zone”. 
                                                            
11  Reported by CD, Dec. 19, 2006 p:16 
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Stakeholders’ groups in land issues 
• Brokers involved in land transactions 
In Siem Reap, as in the other research sites, brokerage and intermediary actors are a widespread 
phenomenon as far as land transactions are concerned. One must also analytically differentiate 
‘brokerage’ as social function from brokers, as social actors. In Siem Reap, land brokers are 
extremely diverse: village chiefs, commune chiefs, commune councillors, policemen, the military, 
villagers, relatives and wives of local leaders in addition to company staff, urban dwellers and real 
estate companies (for land in urban or peri-urban areas).  
The village chief is a key actor at the village level. He is a person who can resolve conflicts in the 
village related to land and other matters. Moreover, he acts as a land broker in order to generate 
more income, and he and his commune councillors or chief of commune builds an alliance for 
buying large tracts of land at the request of rich and/or urban people or of various companies. We 
also observed alliances between commune councillors and land brokers of various companies. For 
example, 
Mr. Kok Un is a commune councillor of Lvea commune, living in Don Tro village. He also acts as a 
land broker in the commune. The processes of land sales are as follows. Firstly, the company or land 
buyer comes to contact him seeking people who want to sell land. The land buyer or company 
normally tells him where they want to buy. Secondly, he contacts the village chief to seek land 
owners who want to sell their land. Then, he meets the owners and persuades them to sell their land. 
Thirdly, he makes separate appointments with the land owner and the buyer to meet each other 
and negotiate the price. Fourthly, the buyer deposits some money as a guarantee for the purchase. 
Fifthly, the village chief prepares documents of land sale (contract of land sale and letter of land 
tenure transfer) upon the commune office. Lastly, the final payment is made immediately after 
receiving the sale contract document. However, we cannot assess the total amount of money he 
earned from land brokerage. He receives a brokerage fee of 3% of the total land price from the 
seller, and the amount he receives from the buyer depends on their relationship. However, villagers 
think that land brokers have the capacity to earn a lot of money as they can receive money from 
both parties; the land owner and buyer. 
Land sales and purchases between villagers and urban dwellers mostly occur through the 
intervention of brokers, while sales and purchases between villagers are carried out directly without 
the intervention of brokers. Local brokers seek villagers who want to sell land and inform urban land 
brokers or urban land buyers. Urban land brokers contact local brokers, seeking land sellers. In some 
cases, the urban/outside brokers come from other districts, provincial towns and Phnom Penh and 
also build alliances with local brokers; this means there is a channel between local and external 
brokers. For example,  
Mr. Cham Roeurn and Mr. Chhlob Borb, living in Siem Reap town, play the role of land brokers in 
Don Tro village. They develop contacts with the village chief and villagers in order to identify 
potential land sellers. After identifying the land sellers, prices are negotiated between land buyers 
and other brokers in town. When urban land brokers and land owners agree on the price, the urban 
land broker deposits some money as a guarantee of land purchase. Then, the village chief prepares 
land sale documents; the urban land brokers pay the brokerage fee to the local land broker (village 
chief). The urban land broker continues to make registration of definitive sale contract at the 
cadastre district office. In this process, the name of the urban land broker can be used as the land 
buyer in the sale contract registered at village and commune levels. Then, they transfer the right of 
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land to the company or name of a big land buyer at the district level. However, it is not possible to 
assess the amount of money which the urban land brokers pay to local land brokers. However, 
villagers told us that it is around 3% of the selling price. 
Brokers can become land keepers/managers after the transaction. Some brokers as soldiers or 
village chiefs are loaned plots of land by land buyers for provisory cultivation. In some cases, military 
brokers become land keepers and have been supported with a supply of rice by their commander 
as the land buyer. In some cases, the chief of village, after the brokerage phase, becomes a land 
keeper/manager on behalf of a large land buyer. He makes a written contract with his villagers for 
temporary cultivation of land. 
In some cases, urban people, having settled in rural areas engage in land speculation, land 
brokerage and other businesses such as money lending and grocery running. They loan land to 
villagers for temporary cultivation as a strategy to build a close relationship with other local villagers. 
Then, they identify villagers who wish to sell land and then they use this information and knowledge 
of the local situation to support negotiations with urban people. Policemen and the military, acting 
as brokers strive to avoid any direct contact between land buyers and sellers. For example: 
Mr. Kem Sa Roeurng, a police official, is an important land broker in both districts of Banteay Srei 
and Prasat Bakong. The process of brokerage is that at first, the urban people come to see him 
seeking a person who wants to sell land. Then, he identifies a landowner and tries to persuade him 
to sell land. If he agrees, the policeman prepares the document of land right transfer at the village 
and commune levels. The land broker accepts money from the land buyer as a deposit. The final 
payment is made after the document of land sale has been completely recognized and registered 
at the commune level. We do not know how much he gets from each side. However, some people 
reported that if the broker buys chamkar land at US$100 to US$130 per ha he sells land to the buyer 
at US$300 per ha. In many cases, the land buyers and sellers have never met each other from the 
beginning untill the end of the land sale process. 
Villagers or local brokers organise meetings and direct negotiations between land sellers and 
land buyers on a small scale, whereas local authorities act as land brokers for entrepreneurs or 
companies on a larger scale. The brokerage fee of village broker will depend on both sides in the 
land sale process, while the intervention fee for other brokers is 3% of the price. Additionally, another 
2% of the land selling price has to be paid illegally to the commune chief and other local authorities 
for recognizing the sale contract or letter of land rights transfer and also for changing the name on 
the back of the receipt of land possession. 
• Formal and informal politico-legal institutions 
A wide array of stakeholders are involved as politico-legal institutions in the land tenure 
regulations in Siem Reap: the provincial department of land management, provincial court, 
provincial and district cadastral commission, a parliamentarian, human rights organizations 
(ADHOC, LICAHDO), as well as a monk and a military official. 
Provincial department of land management urban planning and construction (DLMUPC) 
The DLMUPC is in charge of the two forms of land registration in Siem Reap: 
Sporadic land registration has been conducted since the land registration campaign in 1990 
and 1992. This started from the peri-urban communes where there was a high incidence of land 
sales and people needed to have a land rights certificate as credit collateral. Sporadic registration 
is implemented at the request of landowners who pay for the service. In three urban and peri-urban 
districts (Siem Reap, Prasat Bakong and Pourk), 30% of the total plots of land were titled through the 
sporadic registration process. A certificate of possession right can assist people to access credit from 
ACLEDA up to US$10,000 while with the receipt of land possession is only up to US$1,000.  
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Systematic land registration (SLR) started in Oct 2004 in an urban commune of Siem Reap under 
the aegis of the DLMUPC. Titles were provided to people in 2005. SLR is conducted commune-by-
commune, aiming at registering all ownership rights in particular jurisdictions. It is now carried out in 
a second urban commune of Sala Kamreuk. 
The SLR program officially aims to prevent and eliminate land disputes and assist people from 
losing their land by grabbing and expropriation. The owner has the right to require compensation if 
his land is expropriated, referring to the 2001 land law (art. 5) and 1993 Constitution (art. 44). At the 
regional level, to prevent land encroachment and land loss, the DLMUPC has implemented a pilot 
project of participatory land use planning (PLUP) in three districts before the SLR: Angkor Thom, Soth 
Nikum and Prasat Bakong.  
Provincial court (PC), provincial and district cadastral commission (PCC and DCC) 
Two legal institutions work on resolving land disputes: provincial court (formal mechanism) and 
cadastral commission (informal mechanism).  
The RGC set up the Cadastral Commission CC on 31 May 2002 by a sub-degree. The CC 
operates at three levels: national, provincial and district. The NCC is chaired by the Minister of 
LMUPC. Other members are the Secretary of State of Interior and of Council of Ministers. The 
Provincial Governor or one of the Deputy Governors chairs the PCC. The CC also has a working 
group at district levels with the DCC and chaired by the district governor since 2005. The DCC 
conciliates land disputes while the OLMUPCC is responsible for land registration and titling. Since 
August 2002, the different mandates of the CC and the Court System have been clarified. The CC 
works on complaints of land disputes through conciliation based on mutual respect between the 
parties involved. The CC also deals with land disputes, where parties have no land titles. It does not 
however, have the authority to rule on disputes unless a case is brought before the NCC in Phnom 
Penh. The system is organized with cases passing from the district to the provincial and then national 
level. Officials at the district level conduct investigations on land disputes and collect evidence. A 
case can then be referred to a higher commission if a high-ranking authority is involved. Currently, 
attainment of this goal is still complicated by a lack of trained staff and politically partisan 
appointees at its lower level.  
However, at the request of the company, the court threatened farmers in Don Tro village during 
the conciliation process to sell land which is surrounded by the golf course at the price offered by 
the company, which is under the market price. However, the court has not solved one single case 
related to the grabbing of degraded forest land that was raised by the forestry administration. The 
PCC and DCC work on complaints of land disputes through conciliation based on mutual respect or 
equity principles of parties involved in such land disputes. The DCC investigated cases of land 
disputes after receiving complaints from villagers or cases returned from the PCC. However, the 
PCC could not conciliate such disputes without the participation of a parliamentarian. In 2004, 
farmers repossessed their land in 8% of total complaints and received the temporary use rights for 
rice cultivation on disputed land (55%). However, ownership rights remain uncertain12. 
Parliamentarians 
One parliamentarian13 assisted villagers involved in land disputes with powerful men and the 
military or government institutions by monitoring and organising conciliation. In some disputed 
cases, he was able to assist farmers to continue cultivating on disputed land. He will bring the 
unsolved cases of the PCC to the president of the National Assembly for intervention. Recently, he 
resolved a dispute in the name of the Prime Minster in favour of local people by giving back to the 
                                                            
12 Interview with ADHOC provincial coordinator. 
13 Sieng Nam, a parliamentarian for Siem Reap province. 
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people the natural lake located in Phnom Krom village, Siem Reap commune. This lake had been 
leased by the provincial authorities to a private company. 
Monk and pagoda 
In some cases, monks play an effective role in the conciliation of land disputes. In the case of 
one dispute over land rights between two villagers from two nearby villages (Pongro Chas and Kouk 
Run of Sasar Sdam commune), the DCC and monk succeeded in arbitrating a dispute by 
requesting that both parties swear at the pagoda in face of both the Buddha statues and monk. 
Both parties agreed to give the disputed land to the monk for public use in this commune. 
ADHOC and LICAHDO 
These two human rights NGOs have assisted people through training around land issues. They 
have taught people how to file complaints and monitored those complaints that have been 
referred to the court, PCC or DCC. ADHOC and LICAHDO monitored the land dispute process and 
investigated it for the court. In cases where the local authorities could not solve the problem, the 
villagers filed complaints to ADHOC. Rural people are far from being fully aware of the existence of 
the DCC and PCC and of the roles that these institutions play. Despite the fact that both of these 
human rights organizations are well known, they are not able to do a great deal except to monitor 
the cases in dispute. However, collaboration with the legal institutions is still limited.  
Local authorities 
The chiefs of villages and communes also play a major role in resolving disputes over plot 
boundaries between villagers. Most cases that are conciliated by them are based on reference 
documents and equity principles.  
Military official 
In some cases, villagers did not complain to the local authorities, the DCC or PCC. However, they 
filed their complaints to their relatives, high–ranking officials working at the Ministry of Interior or 
Defence or to the opposition political party. However, these cases were sent back to the provincial 
governor. The governor referred them to the PCC, and the PCC referred them back to the DCC for 
investigation. 
The Provincial Committee on Forest Clearance and Encroachment 
This committee secured the return or expropriated 47,701 ha of forest land, around 7,000 ha of it 
in Banteay Srei district, with 54 deikas (provincial decisions), referring to botbanhchea (government 
regulation) No 01, in May, 2006, at the request of the National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution 
(NALDR).  
Land inequity 
In the areas studied in Siem Reap, nearly 63% of interviewed FH who had land equal to, or less 
than 1 ha per FH occupied nearly 23% of the total land. Around 13% of FH held more than 3 ha per 
FH and occupied around 44% of total land. However, a Gini-coefficient (0.53) confirms the 
conclusion that 20% of investigated FH own around 4% of total land, while another 20% of the FH 
own around 57% of the total land. 
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Agricultural landless farmers 
The number of agricultural landless farmers (ALFs) has increased significantly between 2002 and 
2004, the peak period of land sales. The rate of landlessness is highly variable from one commune to 
another. However, the number of ALFs is on average 16% of the total households,14 ranging from 2% 
in Khnat commune, to 31% in Khna Sanday commune, depending on location and zones. It is lower 
in Khnat commune in the APSARA zone (2%) compared to 31% in Khna Sanday commune outside 
the APSARA zone. The main reasons that farmers do not have farm land are illness, a lack of food, 
being a new couple, indebtedness and immigration. The importance of immigration as a factor of 
landlessness shows at once that mobility is a key factor in land tenure and that mechanisms for 
outsiders’ inclusion are not effective. 
In some cases, the sale of land occurs as a result of strong pressure (from persuasion to threat) 
exerted by brokers or buyers. This demonstrates that the real function of land markets is not only a 
matter of supply and demand but of power and violence. Some households have lost all their land 
through land encroachment. For example, 
Mrs. Heng Ren, widow, aged 58 years, has seven children who all live in Khna village, Khna 
Sanday commune, Banteay Srei district. She practices shifting cultivation, therefore it’s easy for her 
to lose her land, especially at times when she lays her land in fallow. Her land was encroached and 
fenced by someone after she moved to new land. Therefore, she fears and dares not to grow on 
her old (fallow) land. The other land located far from the village was occupied and controlled by 
the army. As a consequence, Mrs. Heng Ren has no agricultural land now and has become an ALF. 
In order to secure her livelihood, she has borrowed the soldier’s land for cultivation, firewood 
gathering and charcoal production. 
The ALFs we have interviewed diversify their activities to sustain their livelihoods: collecting non-
timber forest products, selling labour for farming and borrowing land. Also, regarding access to land 
for temporary cultivation, the ALFs ask for loans (also to land keepers) (40%), clear degraded forest 
land (25%), and rent in (15%). In the near future, many ALFs show their interest in agricultural 
production such as pig raising (20%) and renting in land for farming (20%), while 10% and 5% of ALFs 
will clear land and buy chamkar land for farming, respectively. About 45% of ALFs suggested that 
the outsiders or government should assist them by providing capital/credit in order to start a new 
business such as selling groceries or buying a motor bike to operate a transport service. Thirty-five 
per cent suggested that the government should provide land for rice farming. 
                                                            
14 Rapid survey with the chiefs of villages in the four selected communes, May-June 2005. 
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Summary of the main findings 
• Modalities of access to land 
In Siem Reap, access to land follows different modalities: appropriation (administrative 
distribution, clearing, re-occupation, occupation, inheritance, purchases and investments) and 
agrarian contracts (loans, renting in, sharecropping). Agricultural land was distributed by the local 
authorities to solidarity groups, before it was redistributed many times in the early 1980s. However, 
the lack of land forced farmers to clear more land for cultivation.  
In the upland areas, ignoring the right of fallow land for shifting cultivation led to many land 
losses. Several farmers lost all of their land by expropriation and the granting of land to the military 
(military development zone). They became agricultural landless or land-poor farmers. Expropriation, 
encroachment and military grants have generated new dynamics in terms of access to use rights. 
To sustain their livelihoods they had to borrow land for cultivation in exchange for labour to clear 
land. However, loans without contracts have recently changed to become loans with contracts 
with the recognition of the village chief, in order to avoid disputes on land rights and illegal sales.  
The number of farm-households losing all their agricultural land was at its highest level in 2002-
2004, parallel to the land sales peak. As a consequence of the ‘open sky policy’ land sales (often 
under the pressure of threats) and expropriation for selling and providing land to the military 
happened without proper investigation. ALF coping strategies are diverse. However, agriculture 
remains an important survival measure through which ALFs could gain access to land, through 
loans, clearing and renting in. Some ALFs can cultivate on the land of their relatives through loans. 
Increasingly, however, this has changed to sharecropping. 
Loans are linked to land sales/purchases: Land buyers from urban areas or from abroad buy 
land for speculation or for investment in tree plantations. However, it is loaned to villagers or local 
brokers for temporary cultivation. Sharecropping has declined and has changed to a leasing system 
over the last 10 years. However, this system is sometimes practiced between relatives.  
Land lease duration has increased depending on the negotiation process between land owners 
and tenants. There is no written contract for short term rental, while it is carried out with the village 
chief as witness. In some cases, for a long-term investment, particularly in the non-agricultural sector, 
renting in with written contract is practiced in order to prevent withdrawing land before the 
dateline.  
• Land sale/purchase 
The government’s ‘open sky policy’ and tourism development has shaped the current land 
market and increasing land concentration, which has had an effect on the evolution of agrarian 
contracts. In some cases, farmers have sold their land, fallow lands or abandoned DWR land under 
pressure of threats or because of the fear of expropriation (anticipating strategy).  
Land sales began in 1992/93 which relate to land in the proximity of urban areas and main roads. 
It has increased steadily, as an effect of the ‘open sky policy’ and peaked in 2004. Since the 
APSARA authority has enforced its management role, land sales/purchases have decreased in 
APSARA zones 1 and 2. However, land prices outside the APSARA zones have increased.  
Land sales/purchases occurred between villagers and urban dwellers through the intervention of 
brokers, while sales/purchases between villagers are carried out direct without intervention of 
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brokers. In many cases, external brokers came from other districts, provincial capitals and Phnom 
Penh. There are channels between local brokers and external/urban brokers. Some local brokers 
have been loaned land by land buyers for cultivation or have become land keepers.  
By law, land transactions are subject to a transfer tax of 4% and the registration cost. In practice, 
a great deal of tax is evaded. Land changes hands by transaction that is generally approved by 
the village and commune authorities. Officially, land transactions have to be registered and 
changed into the names of the owners at the district office of land management, urban planning, 
construction and cadastre (OLMUPCC). However, fewer people follow this rule because of the 
associated costs and time. Most people by rural land without registration at the OLMUPCC. For an 
unofficial fee, village or commune chiefs change names on the back of receipts as the rural land 
changes hands. An exception is the collection of large areas of land by rich and powerful urban 
dwellers or companies in order to invest in a large projects or plantations, where the buying of land 
in the urban areas is registered at the OLMUPCC.  
• Land disputes 
Land conflicts have become a serious problem since the government launched the ‘open sky 
policy’. Types of land disputes changed from disputes over boundaries to those of land possession 
or ownership rights. Since then, the number of tourists has increased. Land market has risen and led 
to many cases of land disputes due to a variety of reasons such as: 1) unclear land rights before 
transfer, 2) absence of delineation between state or public land and private land, 3) ignoring the 
traditional right of fallow land, and 4) illegal encroachment on forested land for selling. 
People have been confusing the act of possession with the borrowing of land for temporary use. 
Many people asked for land from their neighbour or their relatives for temporary cultivation before 
1989-1990. Similarly, people have asked to borrow land from the owner before 1996. Then, they 
claimed the right of ownership under article 30 of the 2001 land law. 
Rice production remains a main source of rural income even though the tourist sector has rapidly 
grown. Increasingly, more farmers are interested in converting their deep water rice and floating 
rice (DW-FR) land to receding rice (RR) land with the construction of a reservoir. Moreover, many 
private investors seek access to that land by capital investment in the reservoirs, with the 
intervention of local authorities. Disputes over rights to that land would be a serious problem if the 
authorities grant or provide the DW-FR land of farmers to private individuals or companies by 
referring to article 76 of the 1992 land law, even though it was invalidated by the 2001 land law. To 
avoid expropriation of that land, a group of farmers mobilized themselves into a farmer community 
in order to collectively invest in a reservoir in DW-FR area for RR production. Therefore, a dam 
committee was elected for a mandate to manage the dam/reservoir in a sustainable way. 
The shifting cultivation farmers hoped to clear their fallow land, chamkar chas after selling their 
rice land, while other farmers in zones III and IV toward Tonle Sap Lake tried to clear flooded forests 
for RR cultivation. Sometimes, they were encouraged by rich and powerful people to clear land 
and then sell it to them. As a consequence, snatching up land illegally has become a serious 
problem for both groups of people: farmers and rich and powerful men. However, land 
encroachment has declined since the forestry administration officials filed complaints to the court 
and claimed for repossession of state forested land. 
Land security is the key to sustainable development. There is no empowerment and no hope for 
farmers who lack land security. Ignoring the traditional rights of shifting cultivation farmers on fallow 
land and the rights of farmers on former DW-FR land will cause an increase in the numbers of 
agricultural landless and land poor farmers. Farmers who lose all their land by expropriation and the 
granting of land to the military have an uncertain future. Their livelihoods are currently based on 
loans of land for cultivation in exchange for labour to clear the land. However, loans could be 
changed to leasing if all land has to be cleared. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Kampong Thom 
Pel Sokha, Sam Vitou, Laing Lan & Pel Setha
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Context 
• Regional context 
The development of irrigation is the priority of the third mandate of the Royal Cambodian 
government. In Kampong Thom province (KPT), it is closely correlated with the development of 
receding rice (RR) or dry season rice (DSR) production, in particular, where former deep water rice 
and floating rice (DW-FR) land has been rehabilitated for RR cultivation (cf. the government 
declaration on the issue). Irrigation and RR cropping systems have been developed in relation to 
different land transfer modalities which have made land prices increase. 
In KPT, many reservoirs/dams for blocking flooding water were constructed in former DW-FR 
areas. Up to June, 2006, 71 reservoirs were constructed (and re-constructed) for RR in five districts: 
Baray, Santuk, Steung Sen, Kampong Svay and Stoung (31 in Stoung, 23 in Steung Sen, nine in 
Kampong Svay, four in Baray and four in Santuk). However, only 21 (30%) of them had gone through 
a formal/legal process with the permission of provincial deika (decision) for construction.15 For 
example, 30 reservoirs in Stoung district cover 3,444.7 ha and can irrigate 5,546.6 ha of RR (with a 
ratio of 1:1.6). All reservoirs are able to irrigate 17,353 ha16 of RR land in the Tonle Sap basin of KPT. 
This area remains limited when compared to the ‘vacant’ grassland of 162,627 ha (PRDC, 2005). 
Thus, the potential for increasing RR production remains high. As a consequence, flooded forest 
declined from 109,300 ha in 1985-87 to 84,335 ha in 1996-97 (or -29.6%) (RK, 04-05 June 2006). 
Furthermore, the unclear boundary between flooded forest/shrub and former DW-FR land area and 
the different understandings on flooded forest and former DW-FR land with regenerated shrub/grass 
often led to disputes between farmers and Fishery Administration (FiA) officials. In the 1960s, there 
were 86,000 ha of DW-FR field in KPT, but this decreased to 27,000 ha in 2001 (Pel Sokha et al. 2002), 
before increasing to 28,447 ha in 200517. Also, over 60,000 ha of abandoned former DW-FR land 
remain unexploited due to natural disaster (drought and rapid flooding). The provincial authorities 
and governor intend to convert that land into cultivated areas through a policy of reservoir18 
construction (RK, Feb.11, 2006). 
• Local context 
This section briefly presents the villages where field research was carried out with regard to 
population, surface, land use and farming systems, history of settlement and displacement, 
development projects and external investments. 
We will show that villages are very different from one another, as far as ethnicity and the history 
of settlement and displacement are concerned (one Kuoy village with recent Khmer immigration; 
variable importance of forced displacements under the Khmer Rouge regime).  
Roung village, Trapaing Russey commune, Kampong Svay district had 147 households with a 
population of 682 in 2004. Between 1998 and 2004, the annual household growth rate declined 1.7% 
with a declining population rate of 4%. This was because of out-migration of local people mainly to 
areas such as Anlong Veng district (Otdar Meanchey province and Roveang and Tbeng Mean 
Chey districts (Preah Vihear province) for buying and clearing (encroachment) forest land. The 
                                                            
15 Reported by Mr. Nou Hensenara, chief of administration office of PDA of KPT (RK, Jan. 06, 2006). 
16 Report of the provincial governor during the meeting on disaster management, 27 July 2006, (64 reservoirs)  
17 PDA, 2005 or RK, 02.Nov.2006.  
18 Report of H.E. Nam Tom, KPT provincial governor, to Japanese expert (RK, Feb. 11, 2006). 
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village covers 328 ha, of which 44 ha (13.4%) were allocated for residential land, 79% for rice land 
and 7.6% for Chamkar land. The village population density is 208/km². Roung is an old Kuoy village 
(Kuoy are an ethnic minority group which is also present in Kratie, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear 
provinces). No villagers can remember the history of the village. According to word-of-mouth 
tradition, this village was a forest land and there was one lake which had one mound in the middle 
with a big cave snake (Roung). This would be the origin of the village name of Trapaing Roung 
village (cave pond). In 1950, 2-3 Khmer families came to settle in this village. In the Lon Nol regime 
(1970-1975), 40 families moved to live here. The majority of them were from Takeo province. These 
families moved to settle here before 1979, while others settled after 1990 as they came along to be 
near their relatives. They heard about the possibility of running businesses in this village. According to 
the slope of land and cropping systems, this village is located in the rain-fed lowland rice zone and 
can be classified into two sub-zones; (1) residential and rice cultivated land located straddling NR 6, 
(2) shrub-land, located about 4 km from NR 6 where one has observed changes in cropping 
patterns. Before 2004, people cultivated only rice. However, after that year, people no longer grew 
rice in this area due to soil fertility degradation. People sold their rice land to an urban dweller, Mr. 
Oum Chhay, to plant fast-growing trees (acacia, eucalyptus). Actually, about 20 ha of shrub-land 
has become eucalyptus plantation. Many people from KPT downtown and Phnom Penh bought 
land for growing trees and speculation. 
Roluos village, Srayov commune, Steung Sen district accommodated 430 households in 2004 
with a total population of 2,274 persons. From 1998 to 2004, the growth rate of households and 
population was 1.8 and 1.5% per year. The village covers nearly 691 ha of which 42 ha (6%) are 
allocated for residential land, 50.5% for rice cultivation land. The population density is 191 people/ 
km2. Roluos is an old village and nobody clearly remembers its history. According to local oral 
tradition, the place was a hilly forest land a long time ago. The king always prayed to gods at this 
hilly forest before leading the troops to fight against the Siamese enemy. Because of this, people 
believe that the village was named according to its role as Tuol Romluos Kam (released from bad 
luck). Later on, people came to live in this area and named the area Roluos village. During the 
Khmer Rouge regime, villagers were forced to move to other villages but came back after 1979. 
According to the slope of land and cropping system, Roluos village is located in the upper field DWR 
zone and lower field DWR zone. Also, sub-zone 1 is residential land with fruit trees and cash crops 
and DWR rice land. Sub-zone 2 is floating rice land, located about 20 km from the village. The 
cropping system changed due to the abandoned of DWR cultivation at the Sre Krom (lower land in 
the west part of the village). After 1986 due to (1) natural disasters (drought, rapid flood); (2) low 
prices of DWR products; (3) insecurity (in particular in the remote rice field areas or lower DW-FR field 
and (4) lack of rice seeds or varieties resistant to more than 3-meter water depth such as Kanlong 
Phnom, Bangkok, Popeay, and less than 3 meters (Kanhol). 
Puk Yuk village, Srayov commune, Steung Sen district had 474 households in 2004 with a 
population number of 2,227. From 1998 to 2004, the annual growth rate of family was 1.75%, but the 
population number decreased by 0.38%. The village covers 1452.10 ha of total land; 69.10 ha (48%) 
are allocated for residential land, 54% for rice land. The population density is 153 people per km2. 
Puk Yuk is an old village. In the Lon Nol regime (1970-75), nobody lived in this village because of their 
fear of being of bombed. During the Khmer Rouge regime, some people moved to other villages, 
while others came here. However, after 1979, those people returned to their home village. Similar to 
Roluos village, Puk Yuk is located in the upper field DWR zone and lower field DW-FR zone. Sub-zone 
1 is residential land with fruit trees and rice fields along NR 6 and sub-zone 2 is DW-FR fields located 
up to 27 km from NR 6. Since 1988, the DW-FR cropping systems gradually changed to RR from 
around the natural lakes on the cleared land. Farmers grew DW-FR before, but some of them have 
abandoned their DW-FR land for the same reasons as those farmers in Roluos village. Then, the 
shrub/forest has regenerated.  
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Tboung Krapeu village, Korkoh commune, Santuk district located about 25 km, south-east of KPT 
town, straddling NR 6. In 2004, Tboung Krapeu had 121 households with a population number of 
1,099. From 1998 to 2004, the annual population growth rate was 0.36% per year and the density of 
population was 83 people per km2. The total land surface of this village is 1,325 ha, of which 71 ha 
(5.4%) are allocated for residential land, 73.6% for rice field and 16.2% for chamkar land. Tboung 
Krapeu is also an old Khmer village. According to the legend, a king from Phnom (hill) Santuk came 
to visit that village (forest). He saw a crocodile (Kra Peu) cave in the eastern part of the village. So, 
he named this village “Rong Kra Peu” or “Pong19 Kra Peu”. Later on, people named this village 
“Tboung Krapeu”. In the Lon Nol regime (1970-1975), people escaped from this village because it 
had become a battlefield between the Khmer Republic and Khmer Rouge armies in 1970-1973. 
After the Khmer Rouge victory, they came back home. Moreover, other people, particularly soldiers, 
returned to what was formerly their home village. According to the slope and cropping systems, 
Tboung Krapeu is located in the rain-fed lowland rice zone and could be classified into two sub-
zones; (1) rain-fed season rice fields which is located on both sides of NR 6 (due to the lack of water 
people cannot grow dry season rice); and (2) chamkar land and forest toward the foothill of Santuk. 
Currently, people face constraints such as droughts and land shortages. Moreover, urban dwellers 
have started to buy big areas of chamkar land in this village for the plantation of fast growing trees 
(acacias and eucalyptus). As a consequence, land prices have rapidly increased. The increase of 
land prices caused land encroachment on degraded forest land located in the natural protected 
area/resort site of Phnom Santuk (delimited according to a provincial decision on 11, May in 1995). 
People have been accused of illegal occupation of state land. Consequently, chamkar land in the 
foothill, chamkar land with a distance of more than 200 m from NR 6 and within 3,000 m around the 
Santuk hill were not titled, even though people have occupied it for growing cashew trees and 
other field crops since the end of 1980s.  
                                                            
19  This means “ eggs”. 
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Figure 2: Map of area studied in Kampong Thom 
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• Land transfer modalities in the communes studied 
As in other areas under this study, non-commoditised forms of access to land have been exerting 
a strong influence from the 1980s onward: 
? Land distribution has not been restricted to Krom Samaki creation, dismantling and 
distribution to returnees continued in the 1990s. 
? Economic land concessions (ELC) have been rapidly developing from the end of the 1990s. 
We can clearly see the importance of the provincial level in granting concessions, obviously 
without much coordination with the national level. 
? There is a more recent (and rather limited to-date) development of social land concessions 
(SLC). 
? There are strong dynamics of land clearing oriented toward the peripheral areas of the 
region (uplands) and also in flooded forest areas. 
In relation to the last point, we also observed the dynamics linking the development of land 
purchases (or investments in water reservoirs) by outsiders (urban entrepreneurs and civil servants) 
and farmers’ mobility, moving to clear land in remote areas after having sold their fields to outsiders. 
The dynamics of land sales and purchases are, nonetheless, not as strong as in Siem Reap 
province and Sihanoukville where tourism and urbanisation play a strong role in the development of 
land transactions. 
Land tenure dynamics (land purchases and land clearing) are also linked to specific agrarian 
dynamics: 
? The development of water reservoirs as a central device for irrigation development. 
? The growth of plantations, especially with fast-growing trees (eucalyptus, acacias), but also 
cashew-nut trees and rubber trees. 
With regards to derived rights, we observed similar tendencies as in Siem Reap and Sihanoukville: 
? Links between land purchases and loans (by the buyers to the former owners), but also links 
between access to land through capital investment (water reservoirs) and agrarian 
contracts (leasing, sharecropping). 
? Shifts from loans (and sharecropping) to leasing. 
? Division between agrarian contracts made between or outside the localised sphere of 
trust/accountability. 
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Land appropriation 
In KPT, land appropriation has been following different modalities, as mentioned above: land 
distribution by the local authorities and solidarity groups, re-occupation of former properties, free 
access by land clearing (aimed at claiming ownership), occupation of state private land, 
inheritance and sales/purchases, development of leasing arrangements (and decreasing 
importance of loan and sharecropping) and social land concessions (SLC). The forms of land 
appropriation have also varied according to historical changes, as shown in the following table. 
 
Date Mode of appropriation 
1979-1980 Local authorities distributed the rice land to solidarity group, krom Samaki 
1979-1980 Local authorities distributed residential land to farmers 
1979-1980 Re-occupation of pre-1975 residential land 
1982-1986 - Department of Agriculture and local authorities distributed DW-FR land to the solidarity 
group 
- Solidarity group re-distributed land to members or families several times 
- However, farmers occupied forest lands to expand their fields 
1986-1987 Farmers occupied and cleared forest land in the upland areas, in particular in Santuk district 
1994  Establishment of new settlements with distribution of land to refugees from Cambodian-Thai 
border in Trapaing Russey commune 
1995  The provincial declaration on conservation of natural eco-system of Santuk for resort zone. 
The zone over 200m from the national road 6 and 3km around the Santuk hill. Land in the 
resort zone is not registered by the LMAP project for any person 
1997 GTZ implemented a pilot project of systematic land registration (SLR) in Kokoh commune, 
Bareay district 
1998 The MAFF granted ELC to Ever Sky Investment Company to grow fruit trees, fibber tree and to 
construct a processing factory in Santuk district. To date, no activity of the company is 
remarkable but farmers are encouraged by the private sector to grow trees (acacias) 
1998  Provincial government provided 100 ha of chamkar land in Tapreach village, Kokoh 
commune to Community Development Program of HAGAR, an NGO, for establishment of 
development community by distributing land to the vulnerable women as SLC 
2000 24 women volunteered to resettle in the development community assisted by HAGAR, and 
each woman was distributed 2 ha of farm land  
2001  Issue of sub-decree for establishment of state new rubber plantation in Tomring commune, 
Sandan district. The government granted red soil land to the state rubber company of Chup, 
and promised to give 3 ha of young rubber plantation to each farm household in form of 
land consolidation or exchange with expropriated chamkar land  
2003 Granting of the former DW-FR land remained as state property, to farmer groups by the 
district authority in Baray district 
2003/2004  Peak of clearing forest land by local people for selling or growing cashew trees, and clearing 
flooded forest for RR cultivation by rich people 
2004  Peak of investment in DW-FR land; many urban dwellers in Kampong Thom seek to buy 
former DW-FR land for cultivation of RR by construction of water reservoir 
2004 Started to grant/offer DW-FR land, as ELC, to the private investors. The provincial authorities 
have granted DW-FR land that farmers had abandoned for more than 3 years to private 
investors for development of RR production through the construction of reservoir. For some 
cases, this led to dispute between farmer groups and investors 
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2005  - Chinese Korea company bought around 100 ha of land for a car factory investment 
- In 2005, a serious dispute occurred between 136 farm households in Tom Ring commune, 
Sandan district and the state rubber company because, to date, they have not yet got 3 ha 
of land for ownership as the Prime Minister promised in 2001 in exchange with the 
expropriated chamkar land 
- The government granted 9.863 ha of ELC in two communes (Sala Visei and Toul Kreul), 
Prasat Balang district, to An Mardy Group for cultivation of agro-industrial crops (acacia) and 
animal raising, with duration of contract of 70 years 
- The provincial authority provided 300 households with 300 plots of SLC in Toul Kreul 
commune, Prasat Balang district 
2006 In May, the provincial authority expropriated 1,200 ha of state forest land in the communes of 
Kampong Thmor and Beung Lvea (Santuk district) and Mean Rith (Sandan district) at request 
of the National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution (NALDR), and following the government 
Botbanhchea, Regulation No 01, in May, 2006 
• Land distribution 
Land distribution was conducted in different stages. In 1979, agricultural land was distributed to 
solidarity groups by the authorities. Then, it was re-distributed several times between 1982 and 1986 
to individual households on a rather egalitarian basis (depending on household size). The residential 
land was distributed by local authorities. However, in some areas people could re-possess their 
former land prior to 1975. Up to 1989, the government officially recognized the distribution of land to 
the solidarity group (de facto dismantling of the krom samaki).  
Land distribution did not stop at the end of the PRK era. The commune of Trapaing Russey 
(Kampong Svay district) has 20 villages; three of them are new settlements created in 1994 for 
returnees from Thailand. The three settlements were first administered and managed by the military 
in the operating zone of KPT province. After a period, the military handed it over to the authorities in 
Tropaing Reussey commune. 
Over 63% of interviewed FHs accessed land through the process of distribution by the solidarity 
group, while nearly 55% accessed it through the local authorities. About 13% of FHs accessed land 
through re-possession of their former land prior to 1975. Distribution was between 600 and 2,600 m2 
per person for agricultural land and between 800 and 2000 m2 per household for residential land.  
• Economic land concession 
Economic land concession (ELC) (dei sampatein sethakech) is one of the land transfer 
modalities that refer to the sub-decree issued in December 2005.20 The MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries) is allowed to grant over 1,000 ha of state land to private investors for a period 
in order to stimulate economic development. Up to 10,000 ha of ELC could be provided (Article 59 
of the 2001 land law).The provincial authorities are allowed to grant state land up to an area of 
1,000 ha. This policy is backed up by the recommendation of both Prime Minister and Minister of 
MAFF for the rehabilitation of former DW-FR land through the cultivation of RR through reservoirs. This 
policy was attractive to investors who applied to receive a grant of ELC. 
In KPT, the ELCs were granted in two areas: the flooded land in the Tonle Sap lake basin, 
considered as wetlands, and the upland areas. In several cases, the lack of negotiation and the 
brutal implementation of the concession led to land conflicts. For example, 
In Tom Ring commune (Sandan district), the government granted 4,359 ha of land as ELC to the 
rubber state company of Chub through the sub-decree issued in August 2001 for the establishment 
                                                            
20 Approved by the ministers meeting under the leadership of Prime Minister on December 16, 2005. 
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of new rubber plantations. Moreover, the company was also granted land occupied by villagers 
(912 ha). Thus, land consolidation arrangements provided that each household would receive 3 ha 
of young rubber tree plantations in exchange for the other plots of land expropriated by the 
company (929 ha in whole). Land close to the village was distributed in exchange to the villagers. 
Referring to the sub-decree, the Chup state rubber company will provide rubber farmers with 
technical support and land titles will also be given to them. During the visit in Tom Ring commune 
the Prime Minister promised to establish the Forestry Community and ordered companies to stop 
exploiting the forests where people are tapping or collecting resin (NGO Forum, 2005). All this was 
presented as measures for preventing land disputes. However, the improper implementation of land 
consolidation has led to land conflicts. In 2005, a serious dispute over land occurred between 136 
farm households (11% of the total households in the commune) and the state rubber company. 
Those people living in seven villages (Tom Ar, Ron Teah, Khaos, Samroung,...) of Tom Ring commune 
complained through their representatives to ADHOC and the public forum between people and 
parliamentarians represented in KPT. This was because they did not receive 3 ha of land for 
cultivation as promised by the prime minister in 2001. Some of those households were newly married 
couples between 2001 and 2005 and officials objected to their claims that were not registered as 
land distribution beneficiaries. 
Another case of a land dispute was caused by the granting of an ELC in April 2005. The 
government had granted an ELC of 9.863 ha in two communes (Sala Visei and Toul Kreul), Prasat 
Balang district to the An Mardy Group (company) for the cultivation of agro-industrial crops and 
animal raising.21 Even though the ELC area was made of degraded forest land, people were 
worrying because the ELC boundary was close to the housing area. They also used this area for 
collecting non-timber forest products (NTFP) and for animal raising. The first protest happened in 
April, 07. 2006. The main claim was about solving the problem through the granting of a social land 
concession (SLC). This dispute was resolved by providing land as a SLC for farming to farmers, 
referring to article 4 of the sub-decree no. 146 on ELC (Dec. 2005). This article states that the 
evaluation of ELC demands shall be based on seven criteria, which state that any links and mutual 
support between SLC and ELC shall be considered (one might cast doubt upon the effectiveness of 
this promise). Moreover, four other ELCs have been granted since 1998 in Santuk district (communes 
of Krayea, Beung Lvea) for fast-growing tree plantations in the upland of Santuk district. 
In the flooded areas toward the Tonle Sap in KPT, modalities of access to the former DW-FR lands 
are different, including distribution by solidarity group (1985-86), clearing, granting ELC of flooded 
shrub and grass lands remaining as state property to concessionaires or farmer group, buying of 
former DW-FR lands from farmers and borrowing land from farmers or commune militants link with 
sharecropping. Also, the concessionaires gained access to DW-FR land through two modalities: (1) 
ELC granting on state land and (2) buying, while investors gained access to those lands by (1) 
borrowing or renting in exchange with irrigated water; and (2) borrowing in relation to 
sharecropping arrangements (see below the section on agrarian contracts). However, some of 
them play two roles: (1) acting as concessionaire; and (2) investor. Rich people bought former DW-
FR land before submitting a proposal of ELC to the provincial authorities. The loan was mentioned in 
the written contract. But in practice, it was a rental contract with a group of farmers represented by 
the village chief who acted as fee collector. The contract eventually mentions a loan from people 
represented by the village chief with validation from the commune chief. 
• Access to land through capital investment 
In KPT as in Siem Reap, local and external private investors seek to invest in reservoirs on former 
and abandoned DW-FR lands in exchange for parts of that land. This way of accessing land must be 
differentiated from purchases. This arrangement is formalised by a written contract of temporary 
                                                            
21 Rasmei Kampuchea Daily dated 09-10 April 2005. 
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cultivation (up to 25 years) between the investors and the group of former landowners. Interestingly, 
it is seen as a mechanism for resolving disputes over the rights to abandoned DW-FR land. 
In Stoung district, many wealthy people had access to land by capital investment in reservoirs. 
The provincial authorities granted former DW-FR lands that farmers did not cultivate and 
abandoned a long time ago (or that had remained within the state domain) to concessionaires for 
RR production through water reservoirs. To prevent land right disputes and to satisfy both groups, 
different arrangements were made, such as providing water to farmers who were expropriated from 
DW-FR land in exchange for access to concession land and sharecropping. Land will be returned to 
the state or commune at the end of the contract (this clause is written down) for the sake of 
commune peoples’ use. However, people expressed concern that land might be repossessed as 
state land, or that the government would give ownership to concessionaires, expressing a strongly-
felt insecurity as regards land tenure. 
Since 2004, the provincial governor has granted former DW-FR lands to private investors by the 
issuance of deikas Khet (provincial decisions). The investor must give an entrance fee and a yearly 
rent. However, use rights of that land are poorly specified; this has led to many cases of conflict with 
farmer groups.  
An example of this is the dispute over rights to DW-FR land in Kampong Chen Tboung commune, 
Stoung district. The former DW-FR lands were allocated to farmers but they abandoned for more 
than three years since the end of 1980s due to many reasons such as insecurity (kidnapping) and 
natural disasters (drought and rapid flooding). Then the provincial authority granted that land to the 
concessionaire for RR cultivation for up to 25 years. The unclear land rights (before investment) led 
to land dispute between the investor and the farmers’ group when farmers reclaimed their land as 
the former owners. This dispute was resolved by sharing benefits, under which the concessionaire 
agreed to share water to farmer or make sharecropping with farmers.  
Another example was in Ngoun Siam and Svay Sa villages, Kampong Chen Tboung commune, 
Stoung district, where a serious dispute over DW-FR land occurred between two private investors in 
rice production who are living in Chheu Teal village in the same commune and a group of 197 
farmers. In 1981, DW-FR land was distributed by the provincial department of agriculture in 
collaboration with the local authorities to the solidarity group (Krom Samaki). Then, in 1984, Krom 
Samaki redistributed land to the farmers. In 1986-87, after 5-6 years growing, farmers abandoned 
DW-FR land due to insecurity and kidnapping in those areas. Farmers said the area was a battlefield 
between the government army and Khmer Rouge guerrillas. In 1997-98, many farmers started again 
to grow DWR but the repeated floods from the Tonle Sap in 2000-2002 destroyed DWR production 
and seed. As a consequence, the DW-FR cultivated land was abandoned again. In March 2005, the 
provincial governor leased that land without informing the farmers; 160 ha of abandoned DW-FR 
land in Ngoun Siem village and 120 ha in Svay Sa village for a period of 25 years to two private 
investors for RR production for the construction of a reservoir. 
On June 12, 2004, a group of 50 farmers who were affected by the reservoir issue split up into two 
groups: one supported the construction of water reservoir, while the other group opposed this 
project. The opposition group complained that the commune chief had given DW-FR land to 
investors without informing the farmers. Moreover, the investor collected fake documents with 
thumbprints as evidence to the provincial authorities in order to make a decision in favour of the 
investment plan. However, they said those farmers who gave thumbprints do not have land in that 
area. On the other hand, the group supporting the project said DW-FR land was abandoned. Based 
on the investigation, the provincial governor resolved it by requesting the investors to respect the 
contract and to give compensation in the form of land to those farmers who lost their land because 
of the reservoir construction. Thus, the investors have to clear the land surrounding the reservoir for 
compensation. However, the compensation is not written in a deika khet (provincial decision). The 
provincial decision states that the investors have to share water with farmers around the reservoir as 
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much as they can. In this case, the provincial governor conciliated in favour the project-affected 
farmers.  
In conclusion, land changed hands without informing the farmers as land owners. The authorities 
consider abandoned lands over three years as state private land by referring to the article 76 of the 
1992 land law. Those lands can be granted to the investor as ELC. However, this article should be 
compared with article 70 according to which fallow land for reproducing soil fertility is not 
considered as abandoned land. Also, the authorities should keep recognizing the farmers’ 
possession right, because DW-FR lands were abandoned due to many reasons (insecurity, 
kidnapping and natural disaster). Referring to the sub-decree on SLC issued in March 2003, and 
following the poverty reduction strategy of the government, farmers should have an opportunity to 
mobilize the farmer association or community in view of making decisions on their land together, in 
order to meet their interest or utility. In such a case, they could lease land to the investors or practice 
sharecropping with them instead being subjected to an outsider’s decision. 
Article 76 of the 1992 land law, states that “any land which the temporary possessor has 
abandoned for 3 consecutive years shall become the private domain of the state”, but officials say 
that the three year abandonment rule does not apply to land to which a person has legal 
certificate. However, the provincial authorities’ intention to preserve those lands as the state 
property refers to the 1992 land law even though it was un-validated or repealed by the 2001 land 
law, especially articles 30 and 38. Article 30 states that “any person who, for no less than five years 
prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested possession of immovable 
property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request a definitive title of 
ownership”, and 38: “In order to transform into ownership of immovable property, the possession 
shall be unambiguous, non-violent, notorious of the public, continuous and in good faith”. 
In Samproach commune, Stoung district, the granting by the provincial governor of abandoned 
DW-FR land in July 2004 was smoothly processed without land dispute because farmers and 
investors agreed upon the project. The following case is interesting as it shows links between access 
to land through investment in capital (reservoir building) and derived rights (sharecropping 
arrangements) expressing the agreement between investors and local farmers.  
Mr. Som Korn, aged 53, living in Ma Chheay village, Samproach commune, applied in 2004 to 
the provincial authorities for the construction of three water reservoirs covering 125 ha of land in the 
commune. It was a 25-year grant as written in the application. He borrowed the former DW-FR land 
from the commune and received also the farmers’ support. The land should be given back to the 
commune in 2029. After receiving the authorization in the same year, he invested jointly with a 
wealthy entrepreneur from Siem Reap province. Both reservoir owners grow rice by themselves and 
give portions of the land in sharecropping to nine other farmers from Prasat Bakong district of Siem 
Reap province (and a female farmer, Mrs Sar Navy, living in Rolous village, Rolous commune, Prasat 
Bakong district takes 5 ha in sharecropping from both investors). The investors provide farmers with 
cultivation rights, ploughing, constructing rice dikes in the first year and water, while the farmers 
cover the rest of the production costs. Then, the rice product is shared 50:50. Due to the lack of 
capital, the investor’s need the farmers to go through the sharecropping arrangement. Moreover, 
they want all the land to be cleared to protect rice pest damage (e.g. rat damage). There is no 
written contract in this sharecropping case. 
In Steung Sen and Kampong Svay districts, the granting of former DW-FR land has occurred. 
Moreover, many rich men and government officials have bought ex DW-FR land for RR cultivation 
through reservoirs. Purchases are processed in two ways. Some of them have occupied the land 
since before the 2001 land law, but needed to expand the area under cultivation. Thus, they did not 
apply for concession land. On the contrary, other investors gained access to land through 
investment in reservoirs in exchange for land, or by buying land from the former DWR farmers after 
the issuance of the 2001 land law. However, they needed to apply to receive a land concession, 
which was granted for a period ranging from 18 to 25 years. The land will be returned to the 
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commune or state when the concession contracts terminate. In this case, the purchase of former 
DW-FR lands seems to be similar to a transaction on use rights. There is no brokerage (private or local 
authorities) in the process of purchasing large plots of DW-FR land. In this case, if the land investor 
requests village and commune chiefs to sign a sale contract for registration and recognition, the 
land buyer has to pay them an unofficial fee. The authorities need to be paid for surveying the plot 
to be sold. The buyers have then cultivated rice by themselves (with hired labour), leased land to 
farmers or/and practiced sharecropping with voluntary farmers. In this case, the ownership of land 
remained unclear, as the land investor/buyer could not always apply for a certificate of ownership 
rights. There is also an idea to preserve that land as state land which could be bought after the 
issuance of 2001 land law.22 
Moreover, some reservoirs directly affect the livelihood of farmers. Dams block the flow of rainy 
water which causes harsh problems for land ploughing and prevents preparation to be made on 
time in the early rainy season. Moreover, this situation has an impact on and damages rice 
production during the maturity stage. In the following cases, we see also examples of links between 
access through capital and agrarian contracts (sharecropping and leasing). 
Mr.Iv Vanna, living in Kampong Krabaov village, Kampong Krabaov commune, Steung Sen 
district, and other four representatives of farmers in four villages were granted as an ELC 1,500 ha for 
the construction of three reservoirs through a Deikar (decision) of the provincial governor dated 
September 2004 (although the sub-decree on ELC issued in December 2005 states that provincial 
authorities can grant land of ELC up to 1,000 ha). However, during the working process in 2005, they 
confronted the farmers who are the former landowners but had abandoned this land since the mid-
1980s. The reservoir construction also confronted the claim of both the fishery community and 
farmers who complained that the reservoir dam enclosed the natural lake where people had 
previously fished, accessed and used water for free to raising animals and also block the oxen cart 
path. Mr. Vanna gave part of the land back to the people and kept only about 420 ha. This land 
was allocated for the first growing year 2006. 250 ha was arranged for renting and for sharecropping 
with farmers from four villages of Sroyov commune with water provision. In this case, the chiefs of 
villages as brokers assisted in seeking farmers who wanted to grow RR. The arrangement contracts 
(informal) between Mr. Vanna and farmers were recognized by the village chiefs as witness. The 
owners developed RR farming by themselves on 78 ha and the rest was planned to be cleared in 
the following years. With regards to leasing, the rental fee is 1 ton/ha for the first year but it is 
expected to be reduced to 0.8 ton/ha for 2007. In the case of sharecropping, the harvested paddy 
product is equally shared between the investor (landowner) and sharecropper. For this, the owner 
gives cultivation right, provides the tenant with chemical fertilizer, pesticide, irrigated water, cleared 
land and threshing, while farmers need to spend on rice seed (in average 200 kg for broadcasting) 
and labour to take care of rice plants and also the harvest.  
However, Mr. Vanna planned to change from sharecropping arrangement to renting in the 
growing dry season 2007, because he claimed that farmers/sharecroppers do not make an effort to 
take care of the rice plants. During Feb.-March of 2006 he sought to buy more former DW-FR land 
from farmers to expand his land. 
In Baray district, a group of farmers living in both communes of Sralau and Soyoung, was granted 
by the provincial authorities the ex-DW-FR lands that had remained state property. This did not raise 
conflict because these areas were not allocated to farmers during the 1980s. Farmers have the right 
to temporary cultivation of RR through group investment in reservoirs (in Sralau commune). The land 
was granted without a dispute and it has been suggested23 to preserve these areas for granting to 
farmers or for SLC or to lease to LPFs and ALFs. 
                                                            
22 According to Mr. Long Be, the deputy director of DLMUPCC. 
23 Stakeholder workshop in Santuk district in January 2004, with 16 participants. 
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In some cases, however, the granting of land did not lead to disputes over land rights but did 
lead to disputes over community boundaries (within or between communes) as people became 
aware of RR as a good harvest. 
Farmers of Sralau commune complained to the authorities to return land being used by farmers 
from Soyoung commune, a neighbouring commune, to them even though farmers of Soyoung paid 
the cost of reservoir construction and cleared the land. As a resolving mechanism, farmers of 
Soyoung are not permitted to exploit more shrub land. Moreover, another two ELCs over 3,000 ha in 
the flooded area were offered by the provincial authority in 2006 to two Villager Communities of 
Sralau commune for an acacia plantation. 
As mentioned above, the reservoirs have increased the potential for RR production (against the 
decline of DW-FR) and given room to a new activity beside (or replacing) NTFP collection and 
selling labour for wood exploitation. However, the reservoir dams have impeded the natural flow of 
water from uplands and affected the livelihoods of many small farmers. This has resulted in conflicts 
between reservoir owners and farmers. The reasons for such disputes are: (1) farmers who own 
upper land cannot plough land for broadcasting on time because the land is submerged by deep 
water; (2) rice was harvested in water even in the dry season and the losses of harvest paddy 
product by submersion are high; and (3) ox-cart paths were blocked or the dam crossing has 
become more difficult to access. However, farmers who used to sell labour for keeping cattle during 
the dry season faced a lack of place for cattle grazing and abandoned this complementary 
activity. Farmers and fishing communities complained about the lack of water for cattle and the loss 
of fishing area because the natural lakes were enclosed by the dams. Many farmers often say that 
their cattle became sick because of pesticide residues.  
One must refer to the articles 58 and 144 of the 2001 land law, in which it is stated: “A land 
concession can only be granted on land that is part of the private property of the State. The land 
concession may not violate roadways or their borders and the ground necessary for their 
maintenance, nor to waterways, pools, ponds and water reserves to be used by the people in their 
daily lives” (article 58), and “lower land shall receive waters flowing naturally from upper land. The 
owner of lower land may not build dams, dikes, barriers, or other works to impede the water flow” 
(article 144). 
Nowadays, accessing former DW-FR land through ELCs directly granted by the provincial 
governor has become difficult due to the confrontation with people’s claim on their former land.  
Moreover, the rehabilitation of long-unused DW-FR land and flooded shrub/ forest is often 
confronted with the Fisheries Administration’s diverging interpretations of “flooded forest” and 
“former DW-FR land with re-generating shrub/forest”. 
There are initiatives involving various actors at the provincial level to organise negotiations to 
solve conflicts and issues related to these areas and the consequences of the water reservoirs 
policy: 
To claim land rights, farmers have complained to human right organizations: ADHOC and 
LICADHO and the provincial governor. The public forum gathering people and parliamentarians 
from all parties represented in KPT province in March 2005 and organized by COMFREL and ADHOC 
was an opportunity for the farmer representatives to complain to parliamentarians. The latter 
promised bringing the case to the parliamentarian commission on human rights protection and 
reception of complaints. Then it was forwarded to the Prime Minister.  
In order to prevent serious disputes over land grabbing and preserve state private land for ELCs, 
two sub-decrees on economic land concession and state land management were approved in 
October and December 2005. Also, on April 07, 2006, a meeting was organized under the 
presidency of the provincial governor and the director of Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve, to discuss 
converting the former DW-FR land into RR by reservoir construction, while preserving the flooded 
forest and bird zones. The objective was to solve issues related to flooded land use and 
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conservation, including the questions of new clearing in the area and of reservoirs, and 
inappropriate constructions that negatively affect the social and environmental situation. As a result 
of this meeting, an Integrated Commission was set up as secretariat of the provincial governor for 
reservoir development. The concrete duty of this commission is to conduct environmental and social 
impact assessments (ESIAs) and report to the governor. The commission is comprised of five district 
governors and CCs (KSP, 20 April 2006). 
• Social land concession 
Social land concession (SLC) (dei sampatein sangkumkek) is a legal mechanism to transfer 
private state land for social purposes to the poor who lack land. That is, they do not have land for 
residential and/or family farming purposes (article 2 of the sub-decree No 19 on SLC, in May, 2003). 
In KPT, the Provincial Land Use and Allocation Committee and District Working Groups in each 
district were nominated in October 2003, and comprise of officials from different departments and 
offices. They have implemented a SLC project in Toul Kreul commune, Prasat Ballang district. 
In Santuk, Hagar, an NGO is working to assist vulnerable women and children living on the street. 
They set up the Community Development Program in 1995. In 1998, the provincial government 
provided 100 ha of degraded forest land close to the foothill of Santuk, a natural resort for 
establishment of a new community ‘Tapreach’. In 2000, 24 women volunteered to resettle in the 
community with the allocation of 2 ha for farming and housing, a 20m² (4 m x 5 m) wooden house 
with latrine and well, a grant of US$20 per year per child to assist them to send their children to 
school, training on agricultural techniques and follow up support, irrigation equipment for a 
women’s group, and land preparation during the first 5 years of cultivation (e.g. beans). For the time 
being, they have received use rights of land through this formal distribution and they can apply for 
land ownership after a consecutive period of 5-year exploitation (article 18 of sub decree No 19 on 
SLC, 2003).  
For another example, in Toul Kreul commune, Prasat Ballang district, the provincial Land Use and 
Allocation Committee has provided 300 households with 300 plots of SLC to establish a new village 
‘Boung Pe Thmei’. Each plot is 25 m x 56 m. However, people have said that they needed more 
land than this for farming during the protest that happened in April 2006, as mentioned above24.  
• Land clearing 
Since 1986-87, people have occupied and cleared degraded forest land in upland areas. 
However, clearing has become difficult since 1999 due to the ban on deforestation in accordance 
with sechkdei prakas (declaration) n° 06 of the government to (with a bit of irony) “Eliminate 
anarchy in forestry sector and land clearance”, issued in September 1999.  
On newly cleared lands, farmers have cultivated perennial crops to assert/protect their land 
rights. In the upland areas of Santuk and Baray districts, located over 5 km from NR 6, people 
cleared more land even though they already owned agricultural land that had been allocated to 
them by solidarity groups for growing industrial crops, in particular cashew-nut trees. In the studied 
area, nearly 40% of interviewed FHs cleared land in the upland area and occupied over 11% of total 
plots, while the ALFs said they never cleared land because they have not occupied forest land. The 
latter result seems paradoxical as landless farmers are the ones who logically should be interested in 
this mode of accessing land. It could be a matter of labour availability. 
A study in Kokoh and Phnov communes conducted by the PDA (June, 2006) found that 23% of 
the interviewed families cleared flooded forest for cultivation of RR during the dry season. Since the 
issuance of botbanhchea (regulation) no 01 of the government in 2004, forest land clearing has 
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become increasingly difficult. In the uplands, the FA complained about illegal grabbing of state 
forest land, while clearing flooded shrub and regenerated shrub led to the complaint of Fishery 
Administration (FiA). However, 16% of interviewed farmers cleared flooded forest for RR between 
2001 and 2006. According to article 29 of the 2001 land law, “any beginning of occupation for 
possession shall cease when this law comes into effect”. However in practice, it is difficult to know 
who cleared land after 2001 and claimed for ownership, and all the more if the local authorities 
register land with the intention to help them by changing the date of occupation to before 2001.  
However, in January 2006, representatives of the ministry of agriculture spoke about the change 
from warning to suppressing the encroachment into forest land and flooded forest land of over 2,700 
ha in KPT. The big land owners were accused of illegally snatching forest land through ‘persuading’ 
people to clear it in exchange for the cost of clearing (around US$75 per ha) and a loan of land for 
2-year cultivation. In many cases, they bought newly cleared land from local people and then 
requested the witness and recognition of the chiefs of village and commune25 for the sale contract. 
We are back here to the classical configuration linking land purchase by powerful outsiders, the use 
of persuasion/threats and the imposition of agrarian contracts (loan, exchange labour/capital) on 
the former owners. 
• Inheritance 
New couples inherit land from their parents (see Ledgerwood 1995 on bilateral Khmer kinship, 
Nepote 1992 for another view stressing matrilineal kinship). Most of the cases we have investigated 
confirmed that land was distributed to them, personally, together with their parents during land 
distribution in the early 1980s. Nearly 48% of FHs accessed land through inheritance and occupied 
nearly 17% of total plots. The inheritance process goes through negotiation among family’s 
members, but usually the father is the actor who has most influence on the final decision. 
Inheritance is a strictly intra-family matter and there is no written trace of the decision made. 
When the parents do not have enough land, they keep it for themselves and will pass it to child 
who will be in charge of looking after them when they get old. However, we can distinguish different 
modalities of inheritance:  
? Allocation of land to all children; the parents distribute land to all children but the elder 
child will get more than the younger ones. In this case, the explanation given is that the 
elder child has helped them more than the others in farm work. 
? Giving land to the children who had a share in the landholding jointly with their parents 
during land distribution in the 1980s, and giving plots of land bought or cleared since then to 
other children. 
? Allocation of farmland to the children who had a share in the landholding jointly with their 
parents during land distribution in the 1980s and giving residential land to the youngest. 
Traditionally, in the rural areas, the parents will keep the residential land and house, if they 
do not also lose it, for the youngest child. In particular, the youngest daughter will look after 
them in their old age. 
The two last modalities highlight a relation between the origin of land rights and the modality of 
their transfer through inheritance rules (see the following examples). 
                                                            
25 Extension meeting of government officials led by the Under-Secretary of State of MAFF in Kampong Thom in Jan, 4. 2006, 
and reported also by RK Daily dated 05 and 06 Jan 2006. 
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Allocation of land to all children, but the elder child will get more land than the younger 
Mr. Seap has six children, lives in Rolous village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district, and is 
member of a fishing community. He received around 2 ha of rice land from a solidarity group and 
during land distribution, only four of his children got land. He allocated two plots of 1 ha to his two 
children because they were married. He said he still has 1 ha more to distribute to the other children. 
He will divide the big plot into small plots. 
Allocation of land given by solidarity group to some children, but giving bought land to other 
children 
Mr. Um Khem has nine children and lives in Chey Monkul village, Chrob commune, Santuk 
district. He received 2 ha of rice land for both upper and lower DW-FR land in 1984 from a solidarity 
group. Only six of his children received land from the solidarity group, in common with the family 
during that time and the other three did not receive land because they were born after the time of 
land distribution. Moreover, he has bought around 2 ha of rice land. When his three children got 
married he allocated 0.5 ha of rice land for each without written contract and registration at the 
commune office. The allocated upper DW-FR land was recently (in 2005) registered on behalf of his 
children by the SLR. He will distribute the land which he bought to his other children. 
Mr. Ki Try, the chief of Kuk Nhoun village, has eight children. During land distribution by a solidarity 
group in 1984, only four of his children received the land, with a total size of 1.5 ha. Moreover, he 
bought 0.5 ha of rice land. Two of his children got married but did not take the land from their 
parents because they moved out to live in another district. He will allocate this land to his other 
children by sub-plotting. 
Allocation of land to the children who received land during land distribution and of residential 
land to the youngest 
Mrs. Chou In has four children and lives in Rung village, Trapaing Russey commune. Now, he is a 
landless farmer because she has distributed all land to her children. She said that during land 
distribution in 1984, she received 0.75 ha of rice land and 0.25 ha of residential land. Three of her 
children received land from a solidarity group but another child did not receive land because she 
was born after the time of land distribution. She distributed 0.75 ha of rice land to her three children 
because they got married. She said she will distribute residential land to her youngest child.  
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Agrarian contract (derived rights) 
Poor land farmers or agricultural landless farmers (ALFs) must negotiate other terms on which to 
gain access to land through rental, loans of land, and sharecropping agreements. The institutional 
arrangements for accessing land in KPT are summarized as in table below. 
One must take note that we have not included ELCs in this section on agrarian contracts and 
derived rights. Although ELCs are formally close to long-term rental agreements, the concrete 
modalities of ELC attribution show similarities with administrative transactions and grants. See for 
instance the unresolved question of the fee and the extreme opacity of the whole process. 
 
Contract form and 
Arrangement in KPT 
Rights transferred Other conditions 
Open-ended loans  
(kar oay dei theu Sen-
min kamnot pel)  
Cultivation rights (in particular 
rice) in exchange for labor to 
keep land or clear.  
Smallholders loan land to their relatives, then seek to 
clear land elsewhere. 
Urban dwellers loan land they have bought to farmers, in 
most cases without written contract.  
Plantation right 
(kar tenh /mao 
palitphal chamkar)  
Right to collect plantation fruit 
for sale after loan. 
Urban dwellers by land for establishment of cashew tree 
plantation. Most loan the young plantation to villagers 
/land sellers for annual crop cultivation between rows in 
exchange for labor to keep the plantation. They take the 
plantation back when the tree is big enough or continue 
to sell the harvest right of cashew nut to villagers. 
Access to land for a 
fixed fee of rental 
payment or leasing 
(kar chuol dei) 
 
Cultivation rights. Contracts are 
renewable at the start of each 
growing season. 
Urban dwellers/rich people lease land to farmers.  
The rental fee ranges from the amount of rice seed 
being used (Deam Pouch) to 500 kg/ha depending on 
soil and distance from settlement.  
One case of land leasing in Trapaing Russey village was 
made with a written contract for 3 years. Later, the 
owner took land back for leasing to another farmer. 
In case of crop damage, the land owner does not take 
rental of paddy or reduce the agreed amount.  
Sharecropping  
(kar theu sre chek phal 
khnea) 
 
The delegation of use right of 
land to farmer tenants for a 
growing season or year, in 
exchange for a part of 
harvested rice product, 
according to negotiation.  
 
Tenants have cultivation rights. 
Division of input costs and the 
harvested product will depend 
on negotiation. 
Arrangement depends on cropping or harvest situation. 
Payment after harvest, and rice product is shared 
depending on rice cropping system and land types:  
- For DSR; 1/3 going to landowner and 2/3 to farmer 
tenant. 
- For RSR; rice harvested product is shared 2:3 or 50:50. In 
the last case, landowner just pays the amount of seed 
being used. 
- For RR production on the former DW-FR land: 
1) Land and reservoir owner gives cultivation right and 
provides water, and sharecropper covers all expenses. 
Sharecroppers pay 40 thangs/ha (1 ton/ha) of paddy to 
landowner after harvest, and the same as 2); 
2) Farmer/sharecropper has land but needs irrigated 
water from reservoir owner. He pays 40 thangs/ha to 
reservoir owner. The content of agreement did not state 
as sharecropping, instead it stated as cost of irrigated 
water; 
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3) Concessionaire gives land, land preparation in 1st 
year, rice seed in 1st year and threshing till the end of the 
borrowing land contract. Farmer covers other costs 
(fertilizer, pesticide, harvesting). Then, the product is 
shared 50:50 after extraction of seed; 
4) Concessionaire gives land, water, rice seed, and 
farmer broadcasts. Other costs are calculated and 
shared equally before sharing the harvested rice 50:50; 
5) Reservoir owner gives water, land preparation in 1st 
year, rice seed in 1st year and threshing. Sharecroppers, 
as former commune militants give cultivation right, built 
dikes, take care of plants and harvesting. The product is 
shared 50:50 after extraction of seed; 
6) Investors /reservoir owners give cultivation right of land 
to be borrowed from the commune, water, ploughing 
and building dikes in the 1st year, and sharecroppers pay 
for all production costs. Products are shared equally. 
Loan (Kar Oay Dei 
Theu Sen) contracts 
with access to land 
against provision of 
labour)  
Cultivation rights of annual 
crops. The owner will take the 
land back when he wishes. 
In some case, a rich man pays back the credit instead of 
farmer as borrower and buys land from farmer. He loans 
the land to a farmer as land seller for cultivation 
between acacia rows.  
Urban dwellers loan young plantation of cashew nut to 
farmers for bean cultivation between rows. 
Land access through 
capital investment 
 
Modality to get part of land to 
be shared by the farmer group 
for provisory cultivation of RR. 
Private investors or companies gain access to former 
DW-FR lands, as private land for cultivation of RR through 
capital investment in reservoirs and/or canals to retain 
flood water. Growing year could be extended to 25 
years. Investors agree to share water with farmers or 
practice sharecropping with farmers. 
ELC, granting state 
land refers to the Sub-
Decree on ELC in 2005 
to investors/ 
companies in order to 
stimulate economic 
growth. The provincial 
authorities are allowed 
to grant state land less 
than 1,000 ha to 
concessionaires  
Cultivation right within a period 
of 25 years as written in the 
contract. 
Right of temporary cultivation 
on state land as former DW-FR 
land. 
- The provincial authorities grant former DW-FR land 
remaining as state land to farmer’s groups for growing 
RR or acacia trees.  
- The provincial authorities grant former DW-FR land that 
farmers abandoned to concessionaires for RR growing 
through water reservoirs. To resolve land disputes and 
satisfy both groups, different arrangements are made 
such as: providing water to farmers in exchange for 
access to land and sharecropping. Land will be returned 
to the state or commune as written in the contract. 
Mortgaging  
(kar dak dei or kar Dak 
dei theanea) 
(hypothek) 
 
Recipient has all rights of use 
alone. Money transferred to 
land owner in return for 
pledged land. Land 
documents must be returned 
when loan is repaid. 
Some farmers mortgage land for credit from the bank 
and lose land at the end because they cannot 
reimburse the debt. Mortgaging is conducted with 
written contracts, witnessed and recognized by the chief 
of village. In many cases, mortgaging land to the bank 
leads to land disputes that are ended by a judgement of 
the court, which rules that the mortgaged land is to be 
sold to reimburse the bank.  
Pawning  
(kar banhcham dei) 
(Antichère)  
No right to sell but the money 
owner can rent or transfer the 
use right to a third person. 
Between farmer and farmer or relative; landowner can 
take land back when the loan is reimbursed. If farmer 
cannot reimburse the debt, the money owner will 
continue to cultivate on the land.  
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• Loans of land 
Loans are based on the temporary transfer of use rights without codified fees or compensation 
from tenants. There are many types of loans of land: open-ended loans, short term loans and fixed 
term loans. Rights usually cover annual cropping, but not tree planting, nor the delegation of rights 
to a third party. Loans are mostly practiced in the communes where there is a high incidence of 
land sales to urban dwellers. The land buyer loans the land for temporary use to a farmer who is 
often the land seller. In some cases the urban dwellers loan their new plantation (acacia and 
cashew nut) to farmers for growing annual crops (rice, bean, water melons etc.) in exchange for 
labor to take care the plantation. 
In KPT, there are two types of land loans: open-ended and fixed terms. 
Open-ended loans 
Open-ended loans are made of rice land bought by urban dwellers and given in loan to farmers 
or their relatives for cultivation. In most cases, there is no written contract and no intervention by a 
broker. There is a stronger link between land loan and land purchase when the land is given in loan 
to the farmer who has sold the plot. The open-endedness of the transaction means that there is no 
time limit; however, the owner can take the land back whenever he wants. He must, nevertheless, 
inform the borrower of this decision before the time of land preparation. 
There is no payment in cash to the land owner. However, sometimes land borrowers have to 
provide the landowner with a service of labour. For example, in assisting with transplanting or 
ploughing the owner’s land, making the boundary between loan and land-and-labour exchange is 
somehow blurred. Another interpretation (depending on whether the service is negotiated or not, 
voluntary, fixed, etc.) would be that the land-tenure dimension of the agrarian contract is 
embedded in broader social ties of reciprocity and dependence. 
One observes a progressive decline of loan frequency. This arrangement is often turned into 
renting and the landowner takes back his land (for instance, plantations). For example: 
A farmer has nine children and lives in Po Sensnay village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district. In 
1984, a solidarity group distributed 0.50 ha of rice land to her and her aunt because during that time 
she lived with her aunt. Then, she cultivated on that land with her aunt until 1996. In 1996 she loaned 
the land to her aunt for cultivation and she also cultivated on another 1 ha of rice land which 
belonged to her husband. In 1999, she sold that land (her husband’s land) and returned to cultivate 
on the former land. Her aunt had moved to live with another niece. In 2004, during the systematic 
land registration (SLR) her aunt allowed the registration team to register the land in the niece’s 
name. The niece said if her aunt gets sick, she will give money for medical treatment instead of 
selling the land. 
Mrs. Yung San, a widow with three children, lives in Tbong Kra Peu village, Kokoh commune, 
Santuk district. She sold all of her land due to a lack of labour and food shortage. In 2000, she 
became a landless farmer because other villagers encroached on her land. Actually, she has 
abandoned the land and the forest has re-grown. In 2004, the vice chief of village loaned a plot of 
land (15m*30m) to her without a written document. However, she helped him to transplant and 
harvest the rice. The village chief said that he has loaned the land to Mrs. Yung San because she is 
his third step wife (there is some confusion between the chief and vice chief of village).  
Mr. Ngen Ben, who has eight family members lives in Tbong Kra Peu village, Kokoh commune, 
Santuk district. He is a new settler to this village. This explains why he does not own any land. Since 
2002, he has borrowed 0.45 ha of land from his brother without a written document for growing rice 
and water melons. However, he just plowed land for his brother. Besides being a farmer, he is also a 
fisherman and a worker in the village. 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 95 
Fixed-term loans 
Fixed-term loans are related to land purchase by outsiders and the developing economy of 
plantation. When urban dwellers buy degraded forest lands and/or plant trees (usually fast-growing 
trees such as acacias and eucalyptus), they loan the land to farmers for annual cropping 
(watermelons, mung beans) between the rows of young trees. 
This kind of institutional arrangement occurs between villagers and urban dwellers who are 
relatives. The boundary between loan and land-for-labour exchange is somehow blurred in this 
case, for instance, when the landowners transfer harvesting rights in exchange for labour to take 
care of the plantation. For example, two farmers in Tbong Kra Peu village, Kor Koh commune, 
Santuk district have accessed cashew plantations through loans by urban dwellers. These contracts 
are not written down. 
One urban dweller bought 7 ha of cashew nut plantation in 2005 for US$300 per hectare. Then, 
he loaned this plantation to his relatives, Mr. Chhan Hak from Samnak village. Mr. Chhan Hak can 
harvest fruit for selling in exchange for looking after the plantation. This loan is made without a 
written contract.  
Both interviewed farmer groups, LHFs and ALFs, have borrowed land from land buyers for 
cultivation. Nearly 8% of interviewed LHFs and over 15% of ALFs have accessed land through loans. 
This form of derived rights thus remains important in improving poor farmers’ livelihood. 
• Sharecropping 
Sharecropping has strongly declined in KPT. It remains practiced for rice cultivation between 
relatives and between villagers from the same village. The agreement is not written down and is 
made for a growing season. It is an open-ended transfer and needs to be re-negotiated before 
each growing season. Landowners transfer the temporary use right to villagers, but they can take 
the land back whenever they want. However, this must be done before the ploughing season. 
Sharecropping as practiced in KPT is thus representative of the social embedding of agrarian 
contrasts in local relations of trust and accountability in a context where wealth inequalities are 
limited (see the examples below). 
Sharecropping on RSR land (upper rice field) has progressively declined, while sharecropping on 
DW-FR land remains practiced. For RSR, sharecropping was still practiced 5 years ago. Now, this 
practice has been replaced by land renting. Rice harvested product was shared at a 2:3 or 50:50 
rate. In the case of equal harvest sharing, the landowner just provides rice seed to sharecropper. For 
dry season rice (DSR), 1/3 will go to land owner and the remainder is for the farmer tenant. Also, 
sharecropping for rice land is arranged and varied depending on negotiation. 
Landowner also provides seed and helps to harvest rice, while sharecropper spends on other 
inputs. 2/5 share of the rice product is paid to the owner and the remainder is for the tenant. 
Landowner gives land use right to the sharecropper and helps to harvest or prepare land and 
seed. The harvested rice product is equally shared (50:50). 
Sharecropping on RSR land (upper land) 
Mr. Dy Pech, the farmer in Roca village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district. He practiced 
sharecropping on 0.60 ha of rice land with his mother in-law in 2004 because his land is small. His 
mother in-law practiced sharecropping with him because she has no draft animal and a lack of 
seed. He practiced sharecropping with her without a written contract and the product shared is 
50:50. Last year he harvested 10 thang26 from sharecropping. 
                                                            
26 The thang is a Khmer unit to measure rice product, equally 24 kg of paddy.  
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In 2004, Mr. Mao Teth, the village chief of Puk Yuk village, Sro Yov commune practiced 
sharecropping on his 0.80 ha of rice land with a villager because he lacked rice seed (drought 
continuously for 3 years). He also paid 50% of the hired labor costs for working and he received 50% 
of total harvested product. The land was delegated without a written contract.  
Mrs. B has a child and lives in Roca village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district. She lives with her 
mother. In 2004, she practiced sharecropping on 0.50 ha of rice land which she inherited from her 
mother with a farmer in the same village because she had no seed or draft animal and lacks labour. 
She gave the land use right to the farmer for 1 year without a written contract. The shared product 
was 2/5 for owner and the remainder of 3/5 for sharecropper. Last year (2004), she received only 5 
thang of paddy from sharecropping.  
In Ponhea Chey village (Steung Sen district), farmers gained access to RSR land through 
sharecropping at a 50:50 harvest rate on the condition that the landowner contributes 50 % of 
labour costs for rice harvest. The harvest product is shared equally after extraction of the amount of 
harvested rice product equal to amount of rice seed furnished by the tenant. 
As we have seen in the cases above, sharecropping is practiced on ELC and land accessed 
through capital investment through different arrangements (see the table above). 
The concessionaires or investors give the land in sharecropping and provide the tenant with land 
preparation, rice seed and chemical fertilizers, while the farmer covers all the other costs. The 
product is equally shared. 
Another arrangement is where the concessionaire gives land and rice seeds and the farmer 
contributes labour for broadcasting and also takes care of the rice plants. All production costs are 
calculated before the equal sharing of the product. 
Sharecropping on DW-FR land 
The chief of Rolous village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district practices sharecropping on 5 ha 
of rice land with an urban dweller in KPT who bought DW-FR land for receding rice production 
through reservoir construction. The process was made without a written contract, and the 
landowner provides water to the village chief. The village chief must pay 40 thangs per ha to the 
land owner at the time of rice harvest. 
Mr. Som Korn, aged 53, living in Ma Chheay village, Samproach commune, applied in 2004 to 
the provincial authorities for the construction of three water reservoirs covering 125 ha of land in the 
commune for 25 years. He borrowed the former DW-FR land from the commune with written 
contracts and farmers’ thumbprint for supporting the investment. After receiving the authorization, 
he invested jointly with one colleague. Both reservoir owners grow rice by themselves, and practice 
sharecropping on part of the land with another nine farmers from Prasat Bakong district of Siem 
Reap province. The investors give the cultivation rights, do land ploughing and dike construction in 
the 1st yea, and provide water, while the farmers cover all expenses on production costs. Then, the 
rice product is shared 50:50. Due to the lack of capital, the investors need the farmers to make a 
sharecropping arrangement with them. Moreover, they want all the land to be cleared to protect 
rice pest damage (e.g. rat damage). There is no written contract. 
• Leasing 
In the case of rental agreement, the tenant has temporary use right to grow annual crops but no 
right for plantation. Renting generally regards rice land. Landowners can take the land back 
whenever they want but they have to inform the tenants before the time of land preparation. Land 
renting is usually arranged without the intervention of a broker (see the example below). 
Two forms of this type of transaction are practiced, according to the actors involved: between 
villagers or between a villager and an urban dweller. In the second case, written contracts are more 
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frequent, with the recognition of the chief of village. In the first case, there is no written contract for 
a rental period of one year or season. However, it is renewable for the next growing season. In one 
case in Trapaing Russey commune, an urban dweller has rented land with a written contract for 
three years, changing the tenant at the end of this period, which is a way of providing security for 
himself (he feels secure). The observation of a link between social/local dis-embedding of the 
agrarian contract and the increase of its formalisation (written contract, recognition by local 
authorities) is confirmed. For example: 
Mr. Ngeth Ngim, a farmer living in Trapaing Russei village, Trapaing Russei commune, has rented 
2 ha of rice land in Snor village from Mr. Heng Touch, a pig seller in the urban market of KPT. The 
rental is in-kind, 500 kg of paddy per ha, and he harvests an average of 2,000 kg per ha. In case of 
bad harvest, the rental fee will be reduced depending on the concrete situation. This renting is 
done through a written contract between land owner and tenant. He rented the land through the 
villager broker in Snor village. The landowner said he takes the land back from the tenant after 3 
years leasing and rents it out to someone else because he is afraid of losing his land by grabbing if 
land is rented out to the same tenant for a long term period. He has heard that if someone uses 
land more than three years, that land will belong to that person. This is a distorted interpretation of 
the content of article 76 of the 1992 land law as mentioned above. 
Most villagers rent lands from other villagers. Leasing is practiced for both types of rice land: RSR 
and DW-FR. Rental fees range according to the amount of rice seed being used (deum pouch) for 
DW-FR land to 15 thang (US$38) per ha for RSR, while it ranges from US$50 to US$75 for chamkar 
land. In 1998-99, when chamkar land had recently been cleared, the rental was US$100 per ha. It 
varied depending on distance from settlement, soil fertility and type of rice land. The rental is paid at 
the time of harvest. A land owner can reduce the rental depending on the harvest result. Tenants 
pay a fixed sum of money or fixed amount of paddy to the land owner either after harvest or 50 % in 
advance. In the case of paying in advance, tenants can keep all rice products if the value of 
harvested rice is lower than production cost. In most cases, the rental is usually paid in paddy. 
Leasing in cash happens when landowner urgently needs money. However, tenants prefer 
practicing sharecropping because they fear crop damage. For RSR land, renting in an area far from 
the town occurrs in most cases between villagers, while renting in the peri-urban happens between 
villagers and urban dwellers. For DW-FR land for DWR growing, farmers/tenants pay only the rice 
product equally deum Pouch (rice seed being used) to land owner.  
Currently, many urban dwellers have bought DW-FR land from farmers and converted it into RR 
land by constructing water reservoirs. Some urban dwellers practice sharecropping with farmers. 
Arrangements are diverse, but in some cases, landowners provide irrigated water to farmers, clear 
flooded shrub /forest in the first year while the farmers cover all production cost/activities. In another 
case, a rental arrangement is preferred that includes access to land and to water. Tenants/farmers 
are allowed to access land and irrigate water from a reservoir in return for 40 thang (1 ton) of paddy 
per ha to the land and reservoir owner. Even if a farmer has land, the same amount has to be paid 
to the reservoir owner for water services. 8% of interviewed FHs accessed farm land by renting in 
and occupied 3% of total plots. For example: 
Mr. Um Khem has nine children and lives in Chey Monkul village, Chrob commune, Santuk 
district. He has rented in 0.5 ha of rice land from a villager since 2002 with the rental equivalent to 
rice seed being used for broadcasting (Chuol Yok Deam Pouch). He said he used 4 thang of seed 
for rice broadcasting of 1 ha. In 2004, he harvested 20 thang and gave 2 thang to the landowner. 
The landowner has rented the land to him because he had no draft animal. 
Mrs. Sor Neng 57 years old has two children and lives in Po Sensnay village, Srayov commune, 
Stung Sen district. In 2004 she rented 0.6 ha of rice land out to the vice chief of village because she 
is growing old and does not want to continue with farming. The rental is 4 thang per hectare without 
a written contract for one year. 
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One elder man, aged 65 years, lives in Roca village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district. In 2003 
he rented 1 ha of rice land out to a villager because he had no draft animal. The rental is equal to 
rice seed (deum pouch) for one year without a written contract. The rental is usually 4 thang, paid 
at the time of harvest. 
A farmer living in Po Sensnay village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district, rented in 0.90 ha of 
rice land in 2004 from his relatives living in another commune (Balaing) in the same district without a 
written contract for 9 thang, equivalent to 10 thang, per hectare. The rental is paid at harvest time. 
In the case of crop damage, the landowner will not take the rental fee. His relatives rented land out 
to him because they have no draft animals. 
• Harvest right sale on a plantation 
Urban dwellers have bought land for establishing cashew-nut tree plantations. Most of them 
loaned the young plantation to villagers or land sellers for annual crop cultivation between rows for 
a period in exchange for labor to keep the plantations. They have taken back this plantation when 
it became productive. However, some of them continued to sell the harvest right of cashew nut fruit 
to villagers. For example, around 10 households in Toul Vihear village, Chrab commune, Santuk 
district bought the harvest right to cashew nuts for one period and needed to renegotiate this 
arrangement each year. In this case, the owner preferred to sell cashew nuts because they need to 
work on other businesses as well. The tenant – the buyer of the harvest right - collects the fruit, but he 
must also look after the plantation. This means that this arrangement is hybrid, combining the 
purchase of a right (to harvest and use/sell the product) and an exchange for labour (taking care of 
the trees). 
Usually, the agreement happens without a written contract for a collecting season or a year. In 
the case of a bad fruit collection/harvest, the buyer or tenant is obliged to pay without exception. 
For example: 
A farmer whose family lives in Chey Monkul village, Chrob commune, Santuk district, bought in 
2004 the harvesting right of 1.5 ha of cashew nut plantation with 2,000,000 riels (around US$500). He 
was requested to look after the plantation instead for the owner until the end of the harvest season. 
The land owner was busy with other economic activities. Now the plantation has returned to the 
land owner. 
• Land pawning 
Land pawning is one type of agrarian contract. It is commonly practiced in the area studied. 
Pawning (or antichrèse) is a contract pursuant to which the debtor delivers an immovable property 
to his creditor as a guarantee for the payment of his debt (article 206 of the 2001 land law). The land 
acts as a guarantee for the loan, while the cultivation rights serve as a form of interest payment on 
the granted capital. Pawning has increased, especially for cashew-nut plantation. Pawning period 
depends on the negotiation between landowner and pawnbroker, but it is usually for 2-3 years. The 
pawning process is made with a written contract and with the village chief as witness. If people 
need money immediately or face serious problems, they pawn land to villagers, relatives or money 
lenders. For relatives, the contract is often practiced without a written contract. However, in many 
cases, such processes involve a written contract which is witnessed by the chief of village. If the 
farmer cannot reimburse the debt, the money owner will continue to use and cultivate on the land. 
In this case, the villager will not lose the land. The money owner can delegate temporary use rights 
on the land to a third person, but he cannot transfer ownership right to the third person. The land will 
be returned to the landowner at the end of the process if the landowner has enough money to pay 
back the pawnbroker. However, in this case, he must pay before the time of land preparation. Five 
per cent of interviewed FHs have gained access to cultivation rights through pawning. In some 
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cases, the money lender has requested a fixed-term pawing of 3 years, in relation to the benefit of a 
plantation. For an example: 
Mrs. Nhen Nol, a widow, lives in Tbong Kra Peu village, Kokoh commune, Santuk district. In 2000, 
she pawned her 1.5 ha of cashew tree plantation to the village vice-chief for 5 Chi of gold 
(approximately US$250) to pay a debt. The agreed period of pawning was 3 years with a written 
contract and recognized by the village chief. The village vice-chief said he could not get benefit 
from the land if the period of land pawning was too short. At the time of our study, the vice chief still 
keeps the plantation for selling fruit because Mrs Nhen Nol has not yet paid the money back to him. 
Although the contract has terminated, the owner of the plantation has negotiated a delay by 
making a new contract. 
Mr. Meas Leng has six children and lives in Rolous village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen district. In 
2001 he pawned 0.12 ha of rice land to his relatives in the same village for 1.5 Chi of gold without a 
written contract because he needed money to cure his son’s disease. Until now he has not yet 
reimbursed the debt. He will get the land back when he reimburses his debt in cash or gold. 
In some cases, the land owner has requested more money from the pawnbroker. At the end to 
the process, as the land owner did not have enough money to pay back. He had to sell the plot of 
land to the pawnbroker. Then, pawning is turned into sale. In some cases, pawnbrokers ask for a 
supplementary amount of money to compensate currency devaluation compared to the gold 
price. Five per cent of interviewed FHs received cultivation right through pawning. For example: 
Mrs. Sari Chanthy has twelve children and lives in Rolous village, Srayov commune, Stung Sen 
district. She pawned 1.15 ha of rice land for 1 Chi of gold (US$35) in 1994 to Mr. Chun Houn, a 
villager in the same village. She pawned the land without a written contract for money to cure her 
daughter’s illness. Because she could not reimburse the debt, she took an additional 2 Chi of gold in 
terms of selling land. Moreover, in 2004, she pawned another 1 ha of rice land to her nephew for 
200,000 riels (US$50) without a written contract. The arrangement is opened-ended. She pawned 
land for money to cure the disease of her grandson. She will be able to take the land back if she 
has money to reimburse the debt. 
Mrs. Cheach Savat, a woman who is the head of her farm household. She has five children and 
lives in Puk Yuk village, Srayov commune, Steung, Sen district. She grows rice, raises animals and 
fishes. In 2001, she pawned 920 m2 (23m x 40m) of land to Mr. Oeurn Hom living in the same village 
for 300,000 riels (3 chi of gold) to cure an illness. The pawning was written in a contract for 3 years 
and recognized by the village chief. Over this period land will be the ownership of the pawnbroker. 
In 2004, she paid the 300,000 riels back to Mr. Oeurn Hom, but he disagreed and asked for 600,000 
riels as the equivalent of 3 chi of gold at that time (2001). This conflict was resolved when Mrs. 
Cheach Savat agreed to pay 600,000 riels back to Mr. Oeurn Hom. 
This case led to conflict as the landowner requested more money. For the second time of 
payment, the money lender made a written contract which was actually a sale contract. It was 
rejected at the time of reimbursement and the landowner accused the money lender of having 
cheated him about the contract. 
The following case shows interference with and a manipulation of the systematic land registration 
(SLR) process in the context of a dispute around a pawning arrangement. 
The following dispute occurred during SLR in 2004 over 1 ha of rice land. In 1995, Mr. Ton, an elder 
(party A) pawned the land to Mr. Chheang Chhoeun (party B) for 2 Chi of gold (US$107) for 2 years 
without a written contract. Two years later, party A had no money to reimburse the debt. Also, he 
borrowed additional money from party B with a written contract. The time to reimburse had come. 
Party B did not receive any reimbursement and mentioned that party A sold that land to him with a 
written contract. However, party A said he signed on the contract, but denied the contract of land 
sale (party B asked party A to sign the contract at 19.00 o’clock). The dispute could not be resolved 
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at the village level. It has been referred to the commune level, but it remains un-resolved at the time 
of our study. 
• Mortgaging 
Mortgaging of land is a transaction through which a villager borrows money from a bank (e.g. 
ACLEDA) or credit institution by giving the legal or formal document of land right as collateral for a 
loan, but the borrower has all use right alone; the money is transferred to the land owner in return for 
pledged land which must be returned when the loan is repaid. Article 198 of 2001 land law states 
that “a mortgage is a surety in rem which, without dispossessing the owner of such immovable 
property allows the creditor to claim the sale of such immovable in court on the due date of the 
debt”. If the money borrower fails to pay his debt by the due date, the bank may have the right to 
sell the land to take the money back, and the rest is given to the money borrower. In this case, the 
land owner will lose the collateral land. In some cases, the bank complains to the court for its right to 
sell the land. 
For example, 12 farm-households in Roung village, Trapaing Russei commune, Kampong Svay 
district sold their land due to a lawsuit loss with the bank. One case was noted where rice land had 
to be sold to reimburse credit of the ACLEDA bank. Then, the borrower left the village with the 
remainder money to go elsewhere. For example: 
Mr. Chhay Vanna, working at CMAC,27 actually he lives in Pailin province. In 2000, he lived in 
Roung village, Trapaing Russei commune, Kampong Svay district. He borrowed US$4,000 from the 
ACLEDA Bank in 2000. With this amount, he has given US$2,000 to Mr. Por Vannei because he was 
the one who went to borrow the money. Both men have to pay the interest together. They paid 
interest to the ACLEDA Bank for 2 years. The rest which had to be reimbursed was US$1,790, but Mr. 
Chhay Vanna was not able to pay to the ACLEDA Bank because Mr. Por Vanne did not pay him. 
When he was unable to pay back loan to ACLEDA, Mr. Chhay Vanna fled to Pailin municipality. In 
2003, the ACLEDA Bank filed a complaint to the provincial court to expropriate his land. In 2004, the 
court convoked Mr. Chhay Vanna for judgement. However, the court judged in favour of the bank 
and he had to pay $US 2,690 (loan, interest, a penalty and the lawsuit cost). In 2004, Mr. Chhay 
Vanna sold 0.50 ha rice land for US$4,630. He paid the ACLEDA bank, and then went back to Pailin 
municipality with the remainder of the money. 
In some cases, there are linkss between mortgaging, sale and loan. Urban dwellers or wealthy 
people reimburse a loan to the credit institution or private moneylenders on behalf of farmers under 
the condition that the farmers agree to sell the mortgaged land to them. They agree to offer a 
higher price than the cost evaluated by the credit institution. For example, 
A farmer in Rung village (Mr Ngi Torn) who borrowed credit from ACLEDA could not pay it back. 
Then, Mr Chhay, a wealthy urban dweller and president of Chhay Chhay Company, reimbursed the 
money on the farmer’s behalf but the land was sold to him. Moreover, in order to sustain his 
livelihood, this farmer had to borrow from Mr. Chhay the plot of land he had sold to him for growing 
rice in exchange for keeping other land or young acacia plantation. In another case regarding the 
same businessman, Mr Cheurn Phal sold all his land to Mr Chhay. Then, he left to work for in CMAC28 
in Preah Vihear province. 
                                                            
27  Cambodian Mines Action Center. 
28 CMAC, a military group of the ministry of defense in charge of clearing explosive mines. 
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Land sales/purchases 
There have been land sales and purchases since the privatization of land in 1989. They mainly 
concentrate on the areas located close to the national road (NR) 6. By law, land transactions are 
subject to a sale, or turnover, transfer tax of 4%29. In practice, a great deal of tax is evaded. 
Changing hands by land transaction generally receives the approval of the local authorities (chiefs 
of village and commune). Officially, any land transaction has to be registered and the name of the 
owner must be changed at the OLMUPCC. However, few people follow this rule because it is costly 
in terms of money and time. In practice, the village or commune chiefs change names against an 
unofficial fee on the receipts as the lands change hands. Sometimes, the village chief is not 
informed and the sale is only expressed an agreement between buyer and seller. 
Since 1998, land sales and purchases have increased, resulting in increase land prices. Many 
urban dwellers in KPT have been interested in investing in DW-FR land. The price of abandoned DW-
FR land far from the village increased 4-5 times from about 50,000 riels (US$20) per ha in 1998 to 
$US80-100 in 2005, while the price of newly cleared land in upland area has increased about 1,900%, 
from US$40 per ha. For example, 
In Kampong Reussei commune, where farmers possess many plots of land in different agro-
ecosystem zones there has been a high incidence of land sales since the end of 2004. They have 
sold all their DW-FR land to urban dwellers. In Rung and Kok Ngoun villages, farmers have sold all 
their DW-FR land and prefer keeping only rain-fed lowland rice land straddling the NR 6. The 
returnees sold their land and then migrated to the district of Anlong Veng, north of Cambodia. This 
area was formerly occupied by the Khmer Rouge untill 1998. It is believed that access to land is still 
easy and freely available there. Most urban dwellers and rich farmers in local areas bought land for 
speculation or planting fruit and wood trees (acacia and eucalyptus) in upland areas, while they 
bought DW-FR land in lowland areas for RR production through the construction of reservoirs. There 
are also farmers who bought land to extend their cultivated land or convert it to residential land. 
Over 20% of interviewed FHs bought more land for cultivation. 
Currently, investment in large plots of DW-FR land has become increasingly attractive thanks to 
the government policy oriented to development of RR production through reservoirs instead of DW-
FR. Land transfers had been made mostly at the commune level. The only purchases legally 
registered at the provincial and district levels are purchases of large areas by companies. 
Degraded forested land around Santuk hill, the natural resort site, had been sold through a sale 
contract being made between both parties. Some of the sale processes were recognized by the 
chief of village even though he knew about the provincial declaration banning land sales. The lack 
of coherence between administrative levels does not only regard the provincial/national link, but 
also the local/provincial one. However, land sales between villagers were usually made without a 
written contract. However, they have been changed to written contracts with the thumbprint of 
two witnesses of the neighbours. In some cases, villagers purchased land without informing the chief 
of village. The following example illustrates once again the link between land purchase and derived 
rights (sharecropping/leasing). For example: 
In Kuk Nguon village, Kampong Russei commune, former DW-FR land was sold in 2005 at 150,000 
riels (for land already cleared) and 50,000 riels (for land with regrowing shrubs). Mr Moul Kim Oun, an 
urban dweller and former official of provincial rural department, bought land with the intention to 
                                                            
29 Council of Land Policy, 2002. 
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grow RR with the construction of reservoirs. The investor planned to make sharecropping with 
volunteer farmers in which farmers would contribute labour, rice seed and other costs such as land 
clearing, water and land preparation in the 1st year would be in charge of the land investor. The 
land owner will get 720 kg (equivalent to 30 thang) of paddy per ha. In this case, there is a fixed 
rental. Thus, it is a leasing arrangement, but people still refer to this as sharecropping because the 
owner contributes the production cost and the rest of the costs remain for farmers. Actually, the 
contract is hybrid, but the owner’s contribution to production costs is perceived as crucial by the 
tenants who thus, categorise such arrangements as sharecropping. 
Land buying without informing the village chief has sometimes led to land disputes with the 
village chief. The buyer loses this buying land as the land had been registered on name of the 
village chief during systematic land registration (SLR). 
In Tboung Krapeu village, Korkoh commune, it was a dispute between the chief of village (Mr. 
Tob Bunheng, 57) and a farmer living in Samrong village, Tipou commune (Mr. Chhe Yoeun, aged 
about 60), in the same district of Santuk. Mr. Chhe Yoeun bought a residential land of 8192 m2 (128 
m x 64 m) from a farmer of Tboung Krapeu village in 1982. The plot changed hands without 
registration at the office of local authority or with the chief of village. A land dispute occurred when 
Mr. Chhe Yoeun, a land buyer, planted fruit trees in 1995 because the chief of village banned the 
planting of trees on land. The chief claimed that the he did not recognize this transaction. Thus, Mr. 
Chhe Yoeun complained to the chief of commune and to the district and provincial governors. 
However, the provincial governor recommended him to conciliate with the chief of village. 
Nonetheless, the case was not resolved. Land was registered on the name of the chief of village 
during the SLR in 2002. Supposedly, Mr. Chhe Yoeun filed a complaint to the provincial court 
because the court subpoenaed (invited) the chief of village for investigating the case. But, the chief 
of village informed the court that he received land title from the SLR team. Thus, the court 
recognised the village chief as the land owner.  
Thus, land titles have been an instrument for local authorities in land disputes. It allows them to 
solve cases quickly and to their own benefit. However, SLR can also provoke land grabbing 
disputes. As we will see in the next section, arbitration mechanisms have not always been fair and 
people have lost their land although they have occupied and used it over the last 5 years before the 
issuance of the 2001 land law.  
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Land conflicts 
As far as land conflicts related to land transactions are concerned, we observe three important 
trends:  
• The transfer of land without clear rights, or where people's land rights are ignored, leads to 
disputes. Disputes are becoming hot issues since the provincial authority has granted land for 
large scale agricultural projects. In a way, we could say that the problem might not be the mere 
lack of rights clarity, but also rampant expropriation by provincial authorities in favour of allied 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, local authorities were reluctant to report disputed cases involving 
powerful men or state companies (see below).  
• However, land disputes have changed from disputes over boundaries to disputes over 
unclear ownership rights.  
• As an effect of private investment in DW-FR land, granting land to private and state 
concessionaires has also led to many cases of land disputes.  
Land conflicts related to land transactions in KPT can be categorised as follows: 
? Between farmer’s group and private investors in a reservoir over the affect on the farmer’s 
livelihood, related to unclear right to the abandoned DW-FR land; 
? Between farmer’s group and a provincial authority over unclear rights to former DW-FR land 
before granting land to concessionaire; 
? Between land owner and children of former (old) owner prior to 1975; 
? Disputes over the possession rights of land between ex-owners and new owners; 
? Between land owners and land borrowers;  
? Between land owners and land occupants;  
? Between villager and villager on pawning (with fake land document, without a written 
contract, inflation compared to gold price), on buying land by instalment; 
? Between two villagers, as land owner and money lender over land pawning without a 
written contract;  
? Between money borrowers and banks or money lenders; 
? Between successor or relatives on heritage land; 
? Between villagers (group) and the chief of village over the right to village (public) land 
during SLR, and on informal purchasing of land; 
? Between fishery community and farmer’s group growing dry season rice. 
We have already evoked these serious cases of land disputes in the commune of Kampong 
Chen Tboung, Stoung district.  
The dispute over DW-FR land occurred between two concessionaires of ELC for RR production 
and a group of 197 farmers. Farmers who had abandoned DW-FR land more than 3 years tried to 
claim their land back from the concessionaires. However, the contract mentions the borrowing of 
land (against money) from villagers represented by the village chief and recognized by the chief of 
commune. As a result of the provincial governor arbitration, from now on, investors who want to 
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invest in RR production have to buy the land/use rights of former DW-FR land before submitting any 
ELC proposal. At the end of the contract, the land will be re-allocated as state land, generating 
misunderstanding for people convinced they have (bought ownership of) land without knowing the 
legal texts. The transfer of ownership shall be considered valid upon the registration of the contract 
of sale with the Cadastral Registry Unit (article 69 of 2001 land law). Moreover, the provincial 
authority intends to preserve those lands as state property in accordance to the 1992 land law, 
even though it was un-validated or it was repealed by the 2001 land law. Otherwise, investors give 
land in sharecropping to farmers in exchange for access to land for reservoir construction and rice 
cultivation. But according to them, the farmers are inefficient in protecting the rice plants through 
weeding and pest control, and they use this reason to turn sharecropping into renting with irrigated 
water selling. 
Discrepancies and ambiguities between 1992 and 2001 land laws gave room to diverging 
interpretations from different administrative levels. Article 76 of the 1992 land law states that “any 
land that a possessor has abandoned for three consecutive years shall become the private domain 
of the state” but this article should be also compared with article 70: “Keeping land vacant for 
improving the soil fertility will not mean abandon”. The lack of coordination between government 
officials; provincial officials and farmers also leads to land disputes. The provincial authorities 
proceed to expropriated land in accordance with article 76 of the 1992 land law. But officials say 
that the 3-year abandonment rule does not apply to land to which a person has a legal certificate. 
However, article 30 of the 2001 land law states, “Any person who, for no less than five years prior to 
the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested possession of immovable property that 
can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request a definitive title of ownership”. 
Buying DW-FR land might mean buying the use right of land. Then, the buyer has to submit a 
proposal for receiving a land concession and all land will be repossessed as state private land when 
the contract terminates (after 25 years). As written in the 1st and 3rd points, the concessionaire has to 
pay at the beginning US$2.5 per ha and US$7.5 per ha yearly for the provincial budget. However, 
those lands must be given back at the state’s request. In a way, the sequence made of concession 
granting and state request constitutes a form of economic expropriation for the state, the private 
sector playing an intermediary role in this respect, the granting of a concession contributing to 
ground the state claim over land. 
There is a high incidence of land disputes in Steung Sen district as farmers’ livelihood is affected 
by reservoirs, while in Stoung district some cases of serious disputes occurred around the 
expropriation of ex-DW-FR land. Moreover, disputes over unclear plot boundaries of DWR land and 
land right between ex-owners and new owners were very common during the SLR. Most cases of 
land disputes during the SLR related to boundary because plots of DWR land were not clearly 
measured during land distribution in the 1980s and have no dike for demarcation. Moreover, 
disputes over land right between new owners and old owners and between successors often 
remain unresolved because of diverging interpretations of the law, even though they were brought 
to the NCC.30 Disputes over plot boundaries were resolved by equal allocation to both conflicting 
parties according a principle of equity: the chiefs of village and commune or the Administration 
Commission (AC) equally share the disputed plot. Legally, land dispute which is not resolved or 
conciliated by the AC during the SLR process has to be referred to the NCC in Phnom Penh, and the 
disputed plot is not titled. This has led to a reduction of dispute cases and titles could be issued. 
However, the SLR process has let emerge numerous land disputes highlighting the plurality of 
historical and legal layers of land property. 
Dispute between land owner and former (pre-1975) owner’s relative 
In Svay Kal village, KoKoh commune (Santuk), because of a dispute involving a plot of 
homestead between new owner (Mr. Kang Sinoeun) and a relative of the former (pre-1975) owner 
                                                            
30 National Cadastral Commission, the government body in charge of resolving disputes over land without title.  
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(Mr. Lach Saron) since 2002. The plot was not registered, although the provincial court had judged in 
favour of the new owner who has occupied this land since the 1980s. The former owner’s relative, a 
retired district official, has allegedly referred this case of dispute to the appeal court in Phnom Penh. 
In this case, the AC referred the case to the NCC in Phnom Penh because the provincial court can 
only resolve disputes on titled land. Moreover, Mr. Lach Saron also claimed another residential plot 
for ownership during the SLR, from an elder farmer in Svay Kal village (Mr Yet, aged 67). This 
residential plot used to belong to his mother in-law until 1975. However, this plot was registered on 
the name of Mr. Yet according to the article 7 of the 2001 land law which states that “any regime of 
ownership of immovable property prior to 1979 shall not be recognized”. 
In some cases, the AC conciliated disputes over land rights between ex-owners and new owners 
not by sharing land, but by giving compensation according to the equity principle. 
Disputes over the possession rights to land between ex-owners and new owners 
This dispute occurred during the SLR in 2004 between a group of villagers who claimed their land 
back. In 1984, the solidarity group had distributed 0.1 ha of shrub lands per person to the farm 
household, but no one had cultivated on these lands. Until 1999, Mr. Nuon Chhuon, chief of the 
group, cleared these shrub lands to cultivate rice without any objection from other group members. 
In 2004, during the SLR display, members of the group claimed ownership of their former land. 
However, the chief of the group did not agree to give land back to them. The dispute was 
conciliated by the administrative committee (AC). To resolve this conflict, the chief of group had to 
pay 80,000 riels to all members of the group, as a result of conciliation which was based on the 
equity principle. These lands were registered for the chief of group. 
However, arbitration mechanisms are not always fair and people happen to lose their land.  
Dispute over abandoned rice land between ex-owner and new owner 
This dispute occurred during the SLR campaign in the Roluos village, Sra Yov commune, Stung 
Sen district. A farmer from this village claimed the abandoned rice land for ownership. He received 
1.65 ha of rice land from the distribution of solidarity group. In 1985 he sold 1.15 ha and he kept the 
rest of 0.5 ha of land for himself. Then, he moved to Kampong Chhnang province because he 
heard that it was easy to do business there. In 2001, he came back to his homeland, Roluos village. 
Later, he returned to Kampong Chhnang until the SLR campaign. During the SLR process he came 
to claim the remaining land back. He could not find his land. Therefore, a conflict occurred 
between him and the villagers. A complaint was filed to the AC. As a consequence of not finding 
his land, he lost his land through encroachment by his neighbour. Also, for lower DW-FR land, farmers 
do not build dikes to maintain water as the RSR. If they abandoned land for a while they may 
confuse the location. Otherwise, other farmers were unfair and tried to encroach on the 
abandoned DW-FR land. 
Dispute between villagers and chief of village over right to village (public) land during the SLR 
Since January 2005, a serious dispute occurred between 97 villagers in Po Ta Un village, Sra Yov 
commune, Steung Sen district and local authorities over four plots of public village land. 
Theoretically, this area is preserved for new settlers for temporary use, village development and a 
loan to the village chief in addition to a low fee paid by the government. Under the village rule, 
land will be handed over to the new village chief for his mandate. However, during the SLR in the 
early months of 2005, the SLR team registered the land to the village chief. Villagers have turned to 
ADHOC for assisting them to keep land for community development. This case was also discussed in 
a public forum organised by Comfrel and ADHOC, two NGOs, gathering people and 
parliamentarians at KPT province level. Despite the district governor’s promise to solve the case, to 
date, this case remains pending. 
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Dispute between the chief of village of Tboung Krapeu and a land buyer from a neighbouring 
village over informal land buying (without informing the village chief) 
As regards the theme ‘unclear land rights’, we have observed that many cases of land loans or 
informal occupation started around 5 years before the 2001 land law resulted in disputes, as people 
use article 30 to ground their claim to ownership: “Any person who, for no less than five years prior to 
the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested possession of immovable property that 
can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request a definitive title of ownership”. Due to 
the room for interpretation generated by the absence of written contracts and the informal nature of 
many settlements and arrangements, arbitration results were often different or inconsistent. 
Moreover, SLR process was instrumental in the expression of claims. 
For example, seven cases of rice land loans led to disputes between owner and borrower in 
Chong Da village, Korkoh commune in May 2004 during SLR. 
Dispute over borrowing land during SLR 
Since 1993-1994, seven farmers have borrowed land from the former owner for farming without 
(formal) written contract. During SLR, the owner complained to the SRL team to get the land back 
but the land borrowers refused to givethe land back. This was because they had cleared the land 
and claimed that they occupied it more than 5 years (Art. 30 of 2001 land law). The authorities 
resolved these disputes in favour of the former owners because they knew them and had distributed 
land to them before. The owners had receipts of request for land possession from the local 
authorities. During the public display of land owners, the new owners did not complain. Thus, the 
land was titled in the name of the former owners. One case has not been resolved yet. The chief 
asserts that Mr. Seng Rou has cultivated rice since 2000 on the land of Mr. Moeung Lout who lacked 
a draft animal. During the SLR, the borrower did not agree to give the land back to the landowner. 
This case was referred by the Administration Commission to the NCC. It was still pending at the time 
of this study. However, in another case, the land was titled with name of the borrower and the 
owner lost his land. Mr. Pich Yort, a farmer, has 0.8 ha of rice plot which was distributed to him by the 
local authorities, but he never cultivated on it. In 1984, he lent (loaned) land to a farmer from the 
nearby village of Kalmek. In 2004, after the public display of systematic land titling, Mr Pich Yort 
complained to the local authorities to take the land back but the land title had already been issued 
to the borrower. In this case, the chief of village said if Mr Pich Yort complained during the public 
display (of 30 days) it would be possible to assist him. 
Conflict over loan between siblings 
Villagers and the village chief of Roung reported that a conflict occurred in 2004 between two 
half-brothers (different mothers) named Uong Khoeun (party A) and Kong Kam (party B) over the 0.8 
ha of rice land. The houses of both parties are nearby each other in Roung village, Tapaing Russei 
commune, Kampong Svay district. In 1993-1994, party B, who is the younger brother, gave that land 
to party A to grow watermelons. In 2004, party B asked party A to give the land back, but party A 
refused and argued that it was him who had cleared and occupied land for a period of time. The 
chief of village tried unsuccessfully to resolve the conflict. He referred this case to the commune 
level. The commune authority decided to split the plot into two equal sub-plots for each conflicting 
party. 
In another case, the loan of DW-FR land led to dispute over land right. This dispute occurred in 
Posen Snay village, Sra Yov village, Steung Sen district). The borrower has claimed land for ownership 
since 2004. 
Conflict between land owners (group of villagers) and land borrower, who occupied DW-FR land 
more than 5 years before the issuance of the 2001 land law 
In 1989, 30 households who had cleared deep water rice (DWR) land for growing rice, had to 
abandon the area due to many reasons: several years of rapid flooding, rat damage, robbery, 
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insecurity and its remote location. Thus, the DW-FR was vacant. In 1994, Mr. Chheng Ang borrowed 
150 ha of that rice land for DWR growing from farmers without making any written document. After 
1998, when the last Khmer Rouge surrendered, security improved and the land price rose due to the 
development of recession rice (RR). In 2004, all former farmer owners wanted to take the land back. 
But, Mr. Chheng Ang disagreed and he said that he held that land for more than 5 years before the 
2001 land law. Thus, that land must come to him; hence his claim for ownership on that DW-FR lands. 
The conflict hasn’t been resolved up to now. 
There are also many cases of land transfer from the former owner to the land occupants (thus the 
new owners) under the aegis of the local authorities or AC, because the new owners claimed that 
they possessed land 5 years before the 2001 land law. 
In 2004, a land conflict occurred in Puk Yuk village, Sra Yov commune, Steung Sen district over 15 
ha of rice land. In 1984, a solidarity group allocated rice land to households as members of this 
group. Then, some farmers grew rice on that land but some didn’t. Since 1988, other villagers from 
the same village cleared regenerated shrub for growing rice. However, in 1998, the former land 
owners claimed that land from the new owners which was refused by the new owners. As a 
consequence, in 2002, two former land owners filed a complaint to the village chief, but he was 
unable to resolve this conflict. Then, they filed the complaint to the OLMUPCC. However, the 
OLMUPCC could not resolve it and referred it back to the commune authority. 
Another type of conflict involves credit, pawning, mortgage (see also cases in the section on 
these transaction modalities). 
Conflicts between landowner and money lender over credit collateral 
The village chief and the conflicting parties reported that this case happened in 2004. Mrs. Oeun 
Nann stole a land title from her mother-in-law (Mrs. Cheng Yem, party A) to make a photocopy and 
use this photocopy title for credit collateral of US$460 from Mr. Samrith Ros (party B). Party B is a seller 
in Kampong Thom Market and Pol Pot’s nephew. The village chief added that on the loan contract, 
there was stamp seal of commune office. However, the commune chief said that he did not sign 
that loan contract. Until July 6, 2004 when Ms Oeun Nann run away from home, Mr Horn Khon, the 
neighbor of party A, told him (party A) that he had seen Ms Oeun Nann taking the land title to 
access credit collateral in Kampong Thom market. Then, party A went to ask party B. Party B showed 
him the land title but party A refused it. Until December 2004, party B filed complaints against party 
A to the police asking them to intervene to assist in getting reimbursement. The police convoked 
party A to explain the case and decided that party A has to pay to party B on behalf of his 
daughter-in-law. But, party A refused to accept the decision of the police. Until now, no solution has 
been found.  
In this case, the complaint was lodged to the police instead of the court, which was too far from 
the locality. This also means that people think the police could resolve the dispute. Usually, the 
police try to reach conciliation first without referring to the court. One could ask whether the lack of 
solution is caused by the informal nature of the process or by the police’s inability to arbitrate this 
type of conflict, reflecting a poor knowledge of the distribution of competence as far as justice is 
concerned. Another hypothesis could be that the police tend to favour social peace (e.g. by trying 
to reach a compromise) rather than to ‘say the law’. This attitude would be similar to that of the local 
authorities who equally share the disputed plots (see above). 
Conflict between two villagers, a land owner and a money lender, over land pawning without a 
written contract 
The conflict occurred in 2004 during the SLR between Mr. Ouch Mao (Party A), land owner, and 
Mr. Oeurn Ham (Party B), money lender. Both villagers live in Puk Yuk village, Srayov commune, 
Steung Sen district. In 1999, Mr. Ouch Mao pawned 1,750 m2 of land to Mr. Oeurn Ham for the 40,000 
riels. However, Mr. Oeurn Ham said that he had bought that land from Mr. Ouch Mao for 40,000 riels 
in 1995. Pawning was made without a written contract. As a result, the chiefs of village and 
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commune conciliated this conflict by selling the plot. Thus, Mr. Oeurn Ham agreed to pay 300,000 
riels (US$75) to the land owner, Mr. Ouch Mao. 
Conflict over inheritance can be complicated (case 1) or solved (case 2) through the SLR 
procedure. 
Conflict between a woman and her daughter over land inheritance and titling 
This conflict occurred in 2004 in Sra Yov Chhoeung village, Sra Yov commune, Steung Sen district. 
In 1995, a woman sub-divided her land into two plots (28 a per plot); one plot for her daughter and 
one plot for her son. For registration, she made only one land title (certificate of possession right) 
which belongs to her daughter in order to reduce the tax amount to be paid to the administration. 
In 2001, her son moved to live with his relatives in Tang Kra Sang commune, SanTuk district. At the 
same year, the mother and her daughter mortgaged money from the ACLEDA bank by giving the 
land title as loan collateral. In 2004, when the SLR was conducted, the woman demanded her son’s 
share of land but her daughter disagreed and said that all of the land belongs to her as is proved by 
the certificate of possession right. This conflict hasn’t been resolved yet. 
Conflict between a woman and her children on inherited residential land 
In 2003, a land conflict occurred on 0.20 ha of land. In 1986, a mother gave 0.10 ha of residential 
land to her daughter and she kept 0.10 ha for herself and her granddaughter. But in the same year, 
her daughter, Mrs. Sim Nan, sold her land to people in KPT downtown because of her poverty. Then 
she became a landless farmer. So she demanded some more land from her mother. Her mother did 
not agree to this. When the conflict occurred the village chief and other people (relatives and 
neighbours) intervened to conciliate it. Mrs. Sim Nan’s siblings agreed to fingerprint on the land 
register document for her mother, attempting to give that land to Miss Dy Noun, a niece, who looks 
after their mother. But, Mrs. Sim Nan also disagreed. Finally, the SLR team decided to give that land 
to Miss Dy Noun. However, at the time of this study the land title has not been issued. 
The following cases involve fishery areas and communities. Since the government decided in 
2001 to cut 536,289 ha of fishing lots, equivalent to 56.23% of the total exploitation lots, in order to 
put at the people household’s disposal with the establishment of Fishery Communities (FiCs). It led 
sometimes to dispute between FiCs and a group of dry season rice (DSR) farmers who have used 
water for a long times ago for irrigating their rice. 
Dispute between a Fishery Community (FiC) and a farmer group of DSR 
The dispute occurred since 2004 during the period of ploughing. It was caused by the group of 
farmers from O Kontho and Baktouk communes, Stung Sen district who, came to cultivate DSR near 
Antong Lake (the conservation lake of FiC in Roluos village, Sro Yov commune) and used the water 
of this lake to irrigate their rice which caused the lake to dry out. Farmers who used the water did 
not stop their activities even when the representative of FiC asked them to stop. They relied on the 
argument that they have cultivated on this land for 10 years. Actually, the case of land dispute 
between FiC and this group of farmers is also occurring in Minav village, Sra Yov commune, but the 
dispute has not been referred to the commune level.  
However, all FiCs in KPT province are formal but still not recognized legally by the provincial 
authorities (at the time of the study). The fishery administration (FiA) is waiting for the Fishery Law. 
FiCs legal recognition and a fully-fledged integration of fishery management into community 
development plans are still a challenge due to the conflict of interest between the FiC and officials. 
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Stakeholders’ groups in land issues 
The stakeholders involved in land tenure dynamics and more specifically in land transactions in 
KPT fulfil different roles: brokerage in land transaction, legal brokerage, dispute arbitration, 
regulation enforcement, policy making. Each function does not correspond to a specific type of 
actor and many of them are involved in different forms of action. A typical case in this respect is 
represented by local authorities acting according to their context as land brokers, dispute 
arbitrators or for the enforcement of regulations. From this point of view, which is more or less private 
or public depends on the situation and does not necessarily reflect their official position. 
• Brokers involved in land transactions 
Until 2004, land sales and purchases were mostly processed without brokers’ intervention. From 
2004, brokerage has been playing a growing role, particularly as far as large plots of land are 
concerned. In such cases, brokers are often local authorities’ representatives (chiefs of village) and 
urban dwellers.  
Many categories of people can act as land brokers, however: villagers (rice farmer and cattle 
traders), money lenders, village chiefs, urban dwellers (also traders of agricultural products, 
motorbike repairers and land keepers). The latter keeps land for an urban land buyer and he is 
intermediary in other sales and purchases of land. People do brokerage to earn additional income.  
Professional activities can play a role in facilitating access to the strategic information controlled 
by the broker. For instance, an urban dweller knows someone who wants to sell land during the 
collection of agricultural products at the farm gate. Local authorities act as intermediary actors in 
various ways: 
The chiefs of village may be requested by urban people or wealthy investors to persuade 
villagers to sell former DW-FR lands, to share land in return of water, or to register those farmers who 
want to grow RR in practicing sharecropping for reservoir owners. In this case, the broker is not only 
controlling strategic information, he plays an active role in persuading (or threatening, see below) 
people to sell or to engage in other land transactions. 
In some cases, the land buyer or company requests the urban dweller broker to seek villagers 
who want to sell land in zones determined by them. We have also observed alliances between 
urban and local brokers allowing them to reach a broad sphere of information and action.  
The following example is unique (as far as we know) but significant. A wealthy man bought land 
from villagers who were not able to repay his loan, and bought land from other debtors of the bank 
through his client. One of commune chiefs (Kampong Russei) was offered US$2,000 by the company 
for assisting the purchase of 100 ha of land.  
In many cases, the chief of village persuades his villagers to sell abandoned DW-FR land to urban 
rich people. In most cases, they take money for recognizing the signature on sale contract from 
land seller or someone who made the sale contract. Only 50% of the selling plots sought formal 
recognition from the chief of commune, and 8% were sold without informing the chief of village due 
to the associated costs.  
The brokers might earn more money than they told us because in many cases, the land sellers 
never met urban land buyers. 
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In one case, a Khmer citizen, a school teacher, bought land through the intervention of a land 
broker instead of an international religious organization that was engaged in the process. 
According to article 8 of the 2001 land law, “only natural persons or legal entities of Khmer 
nationality have the right to ownership of land in the Kingdom of Cambodia. A foreigner who 
falsifies national identity to become an owner of land shall be punished”. 
For example, land buyers go to meet the village chief, in Kok Ngoun village, Kampong Russei 
commune; the village chief plays another important role as land broker. The chief of village had 
actively sought to buy DW-FR land for an urban dweller in return of receiving a brokerage fee from 
both villagers and land buyer. The land buyer pays 10,000 to 20,000 riels per plot or hectare for land 
sale letter/contract at the village and commune levels. In the majority of cases, they take money for 
recognizing the signature on a sale contract from a land seller or someone who made the sale 
contract. Farmers sold DW-FR lands following the neighbours of Krasaing village where all DW-FR 
lands were sold in 1998 to an urban dweller. He also tried to negotiate with farmers in Kok Nguon for 
buying DW-FR land but did not reach an agreement on land price at that time. In 2005, through the 
village chief, 99 farmers (69.7% of the total households) agreed sell all their DW-FR land located 
about 20 km from the settlement to another urban dweller, a former official of provincial rural 
development department (Mr. Moul Kim Oun). However, the land price was lower than the previous 
offer. Those farmers who did not want to sell their land were threatened in order to follow other 
farmers who sold land “if you did not sell land you throw the money” (Beu neak min lak dei neak 
noeung choal luy heu), it means that DW-FR land will be expropriated as well because many 
farmers abandoned DW-FR land since the end of the 1980s, and some plots since 2001. In particular, 
those who did not have draft animals and abandoned land since the 1980s could not remember 
where their DW-FR plots were located. The village chief arranged a meeting in order to let farmers 
sell their 300 ha of land. Then, he went to meet the land buyer in the provincial capital. In this case, 
all farmers agreed to pay the mediation costs, 10,000 riels per farmer. The broker might also get a 
fee from the big land buyer. Moreover, each farmer contributed other 10,000 riels for the community 
fund which was established after the land sale. All 99 farmers are members of the community fund. 
They elected a fund management committee composed of five members. The chief of village, who 
also acts as a land broker, was elected as the chairman. Currently, all money has been lent to the 
members at a monthly interest rate of 4 %, and 1 % of it is for management cost according to 
internal regulation. Each member can borrow up to 150,000 riels in one time or for one cycle. 
Collected interest will be used for village development projects selected through participatory 
discussions.31 The land sale contract was processed with registration at the commune level and 
recognition by the commune chief. 
• Formal and informal politico-legal institutions 
The social field defined by land transaction processes is structured by various stakeholders 
(state/non-state, individual/collective) in KPT: MLMUPC/DLMUPCC, the provincial governor, FiA, AC, 
the National authority on land dispute resolution (NALDR), local authorities, human rights 
organizations such as ADHOC, Comfrel and LICAHDO, development agencies such as GTZ, NGOs 
(HAGAR for instance). 
Ministry of land management, urban planning and construction (MLMUPC) and GTZ 
Identifying the land registration process led us to understand the intervention of the government 
in preventing and resolving land disputes. LMAP, a project lodged at the MLMUPC, has conducted 
an SLR. GTZ funded the pilot SLR project in Kokoh commune of Santuk district in 1997 before taking 
action in 11 provinces for a first period of 5 years (2002-2007). The process of land registration and 
titling can follow two paths: sporadic land registration and systematic land registration: 
                                                            
31 Interview with three villagers or farmers in Kok Ngoun village, as land sellers, Mrs Chhay Mon, aged 73 and Mr Mom Khong, 
aged 74 and also a member management committee of the community box, Mrs Leng Yeat.  
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Sporadic land registration: Between 1992 and 2002, the department of cadastre, currently 
DLMUPC,32 conducted sporadic land registration. In particular, there were more applications for 
land possession in Steung Sen than in other districts because it is an urban and peri-urban area with 
a strong dynamics of land sales and purchases. Around 30% of residential lands in Stoeung Sen 
district have certificate of land possession. Around 30% of total households in Santuk district have 
receipt of residential land possession provided in the early 1990s. 
Systematic land registration (SLR): In 1997, the pilot project of SLR was conducted with technical 
assistance and funding from GTZ in the commune of Kokoh, Santuk district. Lesson learned from this 
pilot project are used for implementing the SLR project in 11 provinces for the first 5 years (2002-
2007). DLMUPC in cooperation with LMAP and other programmes has carried out an SLR in several 
communes such as Tipou, Chrab and Srayov. Rice lands and homestead plots were registered while 
chamkar land on the foothills, newly cleared land or chamkar land located over 200 m from NR 6 
and 3,000 m of distance around Phnom (hill) of Santuk were not titled even though people have 
occupied and cultivated this land since the end of the 1980s. The land is considered as state private 
property, and used for conservation of natural eco-system, a resort site of Santuk, refer to deika khet 
(provincial decision) on 11, May 1995. Also, rice land in all destructed reservoirs and canals weas not 
registered but farmers can cultivate it temporarily. 
In most cases of inheritance and sales of rural land, the plots have changed hand without 
registration at the OLMUPCC.33 With regards to land sales, there was often (not always) formal 
recognition at the commune office. An SLR is an opportunity to actualise official names (title holders) 
of the successors and buyers. For example, 
In Chroab commune, 30 % of the total registered plots (2,992) of land changed hands to their 
successors through inheritance and 1 % to land buyers during the SLR34 in 2005. Similarly, in Sroyov 
commune, 30% of the total registered plots that are mostly rice lands changed hands to new 
landowners through sales/purchases, inheritance and gift in 2004. However, in Tipou and Chroab 
communes of Santuk district, many people are still reluctant to pick up their land titles. They argue 
they lack money for the contribution fee35. 
Administration Commission (AC) 
The AC was set up during the SLR to resolve land conflicts activated or generated by the process. 
The AC was set up during the SLR to resolve the conflicts regarding land without title of ownership. 
The AC was a transitory body and was demobilized as soon as the SLR campaign was over. If the 
conflicts could not be resolved by the AC, they were brought to the national cadastral commission 
(NCC) in Phnom Penh. Article 3 of the sub-decree on SLR no 46, issued in May 2002 states that “the 
composition of AC includes a representative of the provincial/municipal governor, 2 officials of 
DLMUPC, the district governor or representative, the chief of commune or representative, the chief 
of village or representative and two village elders”, eight members altogether. In KPT, the AC was 
composed of the vice director of the DLMUPC, the chief of OLMUPC, three commune councillors, 
the chief of village and two village elders. They referred many cases to the NCC. However, many 
cases of land dispute have remained unresolved, which also means without the eventual issuance 
of land titles. 
                                                            
32 Department of land management, urban planning and construction (at province level). 
33 Office of land management, urban planning, construction and cadastre (at district level). 
34 Interview with Mr Yin Phan, Chief of OLMUPCC and member of SLR team of LMAP. 
35 For new land policy, LMAP claims for people’s contribution for land tilting about 1 riel / m² for agricultural land, 10 riels for 
rural residential land, and 20 riels for urban residential land. 
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Fishery administration (FiA) 
FiA plays a main role in facilitating the establishment of Fishery Communities (FiCs), management 
of fishery domain and flooded forest. However, some NGOs complained of a lack of cooperation 
from the FiA in the establishment of FiCs. Also, disputes occurred between the FiA and RR farmers 
because the flooded forest boundary is still not delineated. There is a different understanding of the 
flooded forest land in differentiating from the former DW-FR land for re-growing shrub/forest. 
According to the 2006 fishery law, the construction of crossing dams or filling in the water bodies or 
digging or construction of new buildings in the fishery areas/flood plains has to be evaluated by the 
MAFF/FiA (article 25). It is prohibited to expand cultivated land and to provide ownership or 
occupation rights of land in the fishery area/flood plain (article 28). However, the enforcement of 
this law will probably generate or activate many disputes. 
ADHOC, LICAHDO 
The two human right NGOs have tried to assist people by organising training on land law and 
workshops on land issues. They have helped people involved in land disputes to lodge complaints 
and monitored claims and complaints that have been brought to the court or to cadastral 
commissions. In other cases, they have monitored the land dispute process and helped people in 
collaboration with the companies or projects involved in a specific action, to define compensations 
for project-affected people in exchange for moving out from land.  
Comfrel 
The NGO Comfrel, in cooperation with ADHOC, has organized public forums between people 
and parliamentarians from all parties represented in KPT. In the forum, farmers or their 
representatives have an opportunity to ask and make complaints on land disputes to 
parliamentarians. Usually, they promise to pass cases of disputes to the parliamentarian commission 
on human rights, protection and reception of complaints and to the prime minister. 
HAGAR 
HAGAR is an NGO that has worked to help vulnerable women access land since 1998 through 
SLCs. In Santuk, Hagar has implemented the community development programme since 1995. In 
1998, the provincial authority of KPT provided this programme with 100 ha of degraded forestland, in 
which the community of Tapreach was established at the end of 1998. In 2000, 24 women 
volunteered to resettle in this community. Each woman was allocated 2 ha of land for farming and 
homestead; titles would be given to the women after 5 years of consecutive cultivation. 
Local authorities 
Local authorities are key players as far as land transactions are concerned: they act as brokers, 
arbitrators and state representatives. They follow customary approaches and local principles of 
justice, favouring negotiation and compromise for resolving land disputes involving neighbours 
and/relatives. The village chiefs help facilitate the negotiation when the conflicting parties prove to 
be unable to reach agreement by themselves. If the land dispute is not resolved, they pass the 
complaint to the commune councillors /chief of commune. When the disputes can not be resolved 
at the commune level, they sometimes assist people to the district cadastral commission (DCC). On 
the other hand, as we have seen in several other examples, local authorities do not only act as 
‘neutral facilitators’, they are deeply involved in the local politics of land, corrupt practices and 
collusions with entrepreneurs and other ‘big men’. 
NALDR and the Provincial Governor 
NALDR was established by a royal decree in February 2006 and its composition was fixed by a 
sub-decree in March 2006. The NALDR mandate is the resolution of disputes referred by the NCC 
and conflicting people. NALDR has requested the provincial authorities to investigate illegal 
encroachment into forest land and seeks to bring this land back to the state domain. In May 2006, 
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the provincial governor issued four deikas (decisions) to repossess 1,200 ha of state forest land in the 
communes of Kampong Thmor and Beung Lvea (Santuk district) and Mean Rith (Sandan district) at 
request of NALDR, and referring to botbanhchea, the government’s regulation no 01 issued in May 
2006 on the prevention of forest clearing for claiming land ownership. The repossessed land will be 
used for reforestation or SLC. However, up to mid-June 2006, the authorities (Forest Administration 
and provincial deputy governor) found that another 12,083 ha (3,493 ha in Stoung district, 2,055 ha 
in Prasat Sambo, 327 ha in Sandan, 2679 ha in Prasat Ballang and 1,114 ha in Kampong Svay) were 
cleared for illegal ownership and that land is expected to be repossessed as state land36. 
 
 
Land inequity 
The analysis of land inequity lets us evaluate the high level of land concentration in KPT province. 
Nearly 28% of interviewed FHs, who had land equal or less than 1 ha per FH, occupied over 6% of 
total land. Nearly 23% of FHs hold more than 3 ha of land each and occupied almost 48% of the 
total land. However, a Gini-coefficient (0.43) confirms the conclusion that 20% of FHs investigated 
own around 1% of the total land, while other 20% of the FHs own around 42% of the total area. There 
are farmers who used to have land but sold all their land and are now ALFs. 
 
 
                                                            
36 Rasmei Kampuchea Daily, June 15, 2006. 
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Agricultural landless farmers 
In our study, we define agricultural landlessness or agricultural landless farmer (ALF) as people 
who have never had farm land and have had to sell all agricultural land to meet an immediate 
need. 
In KPT, the average number of ALFs is about 8%. This varies from 5% in the rural areas to 11% in the 
commune close to the urban area. Forty-five per cent of ALFs used to have land but they lost all of 
their agricultural land due to many reasons such as selling, inheritance and rural migration. The main 
reasons that they sold all their agricultural land are: indebtedness, lack of food, changing village 
(displacement) and illness. In KPT, we have observed similar mechanisms in the working of the land 
markets, namely the widespread use of persuasion and threats, often through brokers. Nevertheless, 
this trend seems less developed than in Siem Reap and Sihanoukville where urban interests are 
stronger. Moreover, the rapidly growing economy of plantation and RR production play a central 
role in the process of land commoditisation and concentration. 
However, farming remains an economic measure to sustain livelihood of the ALFs. Fifteen per 
cent of interviewed ALFs have borrowed land for cultivation. However, in the next 2-3 years they will 
practice farming through land clearing (20%), land borrowing (5%) and buying chamkar land (5%). 
Thus, they requested to the government or outsiders to assist them by providing agricultural land 
and credit for farming.  
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Summary of the main findings 
Modalities of access to land 
People accessed land through both land appropriation and agrarian contract. Many farm 
households accessed land through administrative modes. Even though land was distributed in the 
early 1980s, many farmers have cleared more land in both the upland areas for selling or cultivating 
perennial crops and in the flooded land for RR cultivation. Many urban dwellers bought land in the 
upland areas for tree plantation and loaned it to the land sellers or other villagers for growing 
annual crops in exchange for labour (plantation keeping) while others purchased DW-FR land for RR 
cultivation, with the intention of renting it out to farmers or practicing sharecropping. In many cases, 
there is an interaction between land purchases and loans (fixed term loan for young tree 
plantation). However, those people who occupied new-cleared land in the upland areas for 
cultivation have faced the state policy of land repossession strategically resorting to botbanhchea 
(regulation) no 01 of the government issued in 2006. 
Since 2000, many urban dwellers have been interested in buying chamkar land and DW-FR land 
due to the limited potential to run off-farm businesses. They have also had good opportunities to 
buy it at a lower cost. Particularly, since 2004 many urban dwellers have purchased DW-FR land for 
RR production because smallholders were not able, even collectively, at community level, to invest 
in reservoirs. Moreover, RR production has rapidly increased as the impact of policy of rehabilitation 
of DW-FR land remained unexploited for a long time and was enforced by the issuance of the sub-
decree No 146 on ELC issued in 2005, and the right of provincial governor to offer/lease state private 
land (Art. 29). As a result, the rights to former DW-FR land have changed through different 
modalities: purchases, granting ELC in exchange for reservoir/canal investment, granting ELCs to 
farmer’s group/communities, sharecropping and renting. However, the granting of ELCs has led to 
disputes due to ambiguous rights over abandoned DW-FR land before the investment started and 
the neglect of rights for new couples. 
The provincial governor granted former DW-FR land to concessionaires for RR production through 
reservoirs. To prevent land right disputes and to satisfy both groups, different arrangements were 
made, such as providing water to farmers who loaned DW-FR land in exchange for access to 
concession land and sharecropping. The land has to be returned to the state or commune at the 
end of the contract. However, people expressed their concern that land will be repossessed as 
state land or the government will give ownership to the concessionaries, thus expressing a 
widespread feeling of distrust toward state authorities. 
We can observe the following trends as regards agrarian contracts: 
Sharecropping remains an easy way to gain access to land in the short-term. But it is increasingly 
being replaced by leasing systems.  
On the former DW-FR land areas, sharecropping with a written contract is a mechanism helping 
to resolve land disputes between land concessionaires and former land owners. In this case, 
however, it is replaced by an arrangement combining land renting and water selling, which is 
favourable to the land owner and investor in terms of cost and management.  
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However, sharecropping remains an important mode of land access at the level of relatives and 
neighbours involved in a localised sphere of mutual accountability (generally, there is no written 
contract, only a verbal agreement). 
The development of leasing does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with the diffusion of written 
contracts. More precisely, one-year agreements do not require written contracts, which are 
reserved for long-term leasing as a means for land grabbing prevention. 
Access to land through capital investment (in water reservoirs) entails an important shift in land 
transactions and land tenure dynamics: 
The construction (or re-construction) of water reservoirs to retain flood water has increased the 
potential for RR production, while providing a new activity, complementary to (or replacing) NTFP 
collection and wage labour in wood exploitation in the upland area.  
Many small farmers could gain access to land for RR cultivation through sharecropping and 
renting with a written contract. However, many natural lakes have been transformed into reservoirs 
and constructed/reconstructed reservoir/dams without technical assistance have impeded water 
from naturally flowing downstream. This has affected the livelihoods of other small farmers and 
caused conflicts between reservoir owners and farmers/fishers.  
Land sale/purchase 
Access to large pieces of land through purchase is made easier by the intervention of brokers, 
who are very often local authorities’ representatives (village chief, commune chief, commune 
councillors). They play an active role in persuading villagers to sell their land and are paid as private 
persons (brokerage tariff). These configurations of actors show to what extent the functioning of land 
markets is structured by power relations rather than by the interplay of so-called ‘supply and 
demand’. 
By law, land transactions are subject to a sale, or turnover, transfer tax of 4 %.37 In practice, a 
great deal of tax is evaded, and fewer people follow this rule because of cost and time. The 
changing of hands by land purchasing is generally registered at the commune office, but for an 
unofficial fee: we are here in a ‘grey zone’ between the formal and the informal. Systematic land 
registration (SLR) – in the zones where it has started – seemingly allows a formalisation of land 
transaction registration. 
Since 2005, investors who want to invest in RR production have to buy the use rights of former 
DW-FR land before submitting the proposal for receiving ELC, with all the land being returned to the 
state when the contract is over. Actually, provincial authorities try to play with the discrepancies 
between 1992 and 2001 land laws (referring to the former even if the article was theoretically 
abolished by the latter). In a way, the sequence made of concession granting and state request 
constitutes a form of economic expropriation for the state, the private sector playing an 
intermediary role in this respect, the granting of a concession contributing to ground the state claim 
over land. However, provincial authorities face complaints from big farmers who have possessed 
land without interruption since the late 1980s.  
Land buying without informing the village chief has sometimes led to land dispute with the village 
chief. The buyer loses land, as the land was registered with the name of the village chief during the 
SLR. Thus, land titles have been instrumental for local authorities in resolving land disputes, allowing 
them to solve cases quickly and also to their own benefit. However, SLRs have also provoked land 
grabbing disputes. Arbitration mechanisms have not always been fair and people have lost their 
land although they have occupied and used it over the 5 years before the issuance of the 2001 
land law. 
                                                            
37 Council of Land Policy, 2002. 
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The number of ALFs varies from place to place and increases in areas, epending on the proximity 
to urban areas. The main reasons that they sold all their farm land are: indebtedness, lack of food, 
changing village and illness. These reasons may be closely correlated. When they faced problems 
of illness and the lack of food, rural people had to sell land or borrow money even though they 
have had to pay a high interest rate to private money lenders. There is also a widespread use of 
persuasion and threats in the functioning of land markets, often through brokers. The rapidly growing 
economy of plantation and RR production play a central role in the process of land commoditisation 
and concentration. However, cultivation remains a main economic activity for ALFs, so that they 
gain access to land by borrowing, sharecropping and clearing. However, they still faced the 
problems of not having draft cattle, a higher cost of land preparation and the repossession of state 
land. 
Land disputes 
As a general trend, land disputes have changed from disputes over boundaries to disputes over 
unclear ownership rights. But it is not clear whether the problem is about the lack of rights clarity or if 
it reflects rampant expropriations by provincial authorities in favour of allied entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, local authorities were reluctant to report disputed cases involving powerful men or 
state companies. 
As an effect of private investments in DW-FR land, granting land to private and state 
concessionaires has also led to many cases of land disputes. Farmers who did not cultivate the land 
and have abandoned DW-FR land more than 3 years try to claim their land back from new 
occupants or concessionaires. Both farmers and land buyers claim to protect their right on DW-FR 
land occupied before the issuance of the 2001 land law. 
Borrowing of land led to disputes as borrowers have occupied land since before the issuance of 
the 2001 land law. Land borrowers always claim for ownership because they thinks that they have 
occupied and used the land before the issuance of this law (Art. 30), or the new owners as land 
occupants of the abandoned land claim that they have possessed the land for 5 years before the 
2001 Land Law. In many cases, land was transferred from former owners to land occupants as new 
owners. However, resolving disputes over land rights between new owners as land borrowers and 
former owners is not consistent under the conciliation of the local authorities or AC. Disputes over 
loans or occupation of the abandoned land were resolved based on the equity principle by 
splitting the plot into two sub-plots for each conflicting party in a way similar to disputes over plot 
boundaries, or if the former owner agreed to receive compensation from new occupants. 
In the SLR zones, cases of land disputes have decreased, but many disputes over land rights are 
activated rather than generated by SLR (between a new owner as land borrower and the former 
owner, between an occupant and former owner, and between successors) remain un-resolved 
even though they were referred to the NCC. In many cases, land mortgaging has led to disputes 
and no intervention could assist in preventing people from losing their land.  
The rehabilitation of DW-FR land was unexploited for a long time. Flooded shrub/forest often 
creates conflict between farmers/fishers and the FiA due to diverging interpretations of what is (and 
where are the boundaries of) ‘flooded forest’ and ‘former DW-FR land with re-generating 
shrub/forest’. 
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CHAPTER V.  
 
Sihanoukville 
 
Pel Sokha, Sam Vitou, Laing Lan and Im Sothy 
 
  
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 121 
Context 
• Regional context 
Sihanoukville (SHV) had a population of 161,449 in 2004. It is situated in the south-west of 
Cambodia about 204 km from Phnom Penh. Sihanoukville has a main marine port and is going to be 
a tourist-economic area, especially when tourism plans and the special economic zone (SEZ) are 
implemented. 
Due to the historical background of the marine international port, the RGC plans to develop the 
industrial zone, airport and fishing port. It aims to enhance household income through the promotion 
of investment in agricultural production in the peri-urban area. The polder dam protecting salty 
water intrusion from the sea was reconstructed in 1998 to promote rice production. The government 
planned to develop three main sectors in these three different districts. Prey Nup district is planned 
for the agricultural development zone, Mittapheap is planned for the urban development zone and 
Stoeung Hav for the industrial development zone (possibly a duty-free zone for Chinese investors). 
However, there is request to establish a special development zone (SEZ) (or industrial development 
zone) in Prey Nup district. Tourism is now seen as another orientation in the development of this area. 
Consequently, these development policies and orientations will have (and have already had) an 
impact on land sales and other land transfer modalities. 
• Local context 
This section briefly presents the three villages under the study with regard to population, surface, 
land use and farming system, settlement, development projects and external investment: 
Pou Thoeung village is located about 20 km from the town of SHV along NR 4. In 2004, the total 
population was 1,233. Between 1998 and 2004, the annual household growth rate was 4.01% and 
the annual population growth rate was 1.14%. The village covers 389 ha, of which 80 ha (20.57%) 
allocated for residential land, 239 ha (61.44%) allocated for rice land, and 70 ha (17.99%) allocated 
for Chamkar land. The village population density is 317 per km2. Pou Thoeung village was created in 
1953. At that time, the village was administratively under Ream commune, Prey Nup district, Kampot 
province, and had 50 families. During the Pol Pot regime, people from this village were displaced to 
Sre Ambil, Cheung Kor and other places. In 1979, this village was re-created administratively under 
Bet Trang commune, Prey Nup district. In 2002, 10 farm families who migrated from Kampot 
province, Veal Renh commune, Klaing (Vietnam), and Prey Nup to settle in this village. They 
migrated in because they thought tha, in this village, they could practice fishing and cropping (on 
cleared forest lands) easily. However, they met disaster (flood) in their homeland. Based on 
cropping systems and the slope, Pou Thoeung village is classified into 3 sub-zones: 1) Sub-zone 1: 
residential lands in which people can grow fruit trees, vegetables and other crops and some farmers 
cultivate rice; 2) Sub-zone 2: rice lands; and 3) Sub-zone 3: foothill land in which people have 
cleared forest to cultivate rice and fruit trees. Large parts of this land are disputed with soldiers. All 
families in Pou Thoeung village cultivate wet season rice even though they do not own rice land. 
They currently rent in lands from companies or urban people after the latter stopped loaning land. 
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O’ Oknha Heng village had 277 households with a population of 2,071 in 2004 and an annual 
population growth rate of 8.95% between 1998 and 2004. O’ Oknha Heng village covers 1,083 ha, of 
which 15 ha (1.4%) are residential land, 19.7% rice land, and 73.9% chamkar land. The village 
population density is 191 per km2. O’ Oknha Heng village was created a long time ago. Before, this 
village was called Teuk Thla. In 1975, a road and bridge were reconstructed. During the 
reconstruction, a construction manager named Heng died. This is the reason why the village was 
renamed O’ Oknha Heng. Before 1986, this village covered a large area. But in 1986, the commune 
authority attributed part of the land in this village (free and unused lands) to the O’ Tasek village, 
which was created in 1986. O’ Oknha Heng village could be classified into four sub-zones according 
to the topography, soil types and cropping patterns: 1) sea-inundated rice land area with rice seed 
resistant to salty water, non-rice crops on chamkar land and on residential land; 2) wet season rice 
land area; 3) inundated forest; and 4) chamkar land, foothill land and mountain. About 80% of the 
total land area of this village belongs to urban dwellers and companies. The majority of farmers 
borrow land from urban dwellers and companies for rice cultivation. Rice growing faces salty water 
intrusion and drought. During the dry season, farmers do not grow anything because there is no 
water. 
 
Bekrong village had 136 households with a population of 736 in 2004 and an annual growth rate 
of 11.21% between 1998 and 2004. The village area is 671 ha of which 5 ha (0.7%) is residential land 
and 666 ha (92.3%) is farmland. The population density is 110 per km2. Bekrong village was created in 
1982 due to the increase of newcomers. Most newcomers were Khmer-Krorm,38 and have 
immigrated to fish or seek fishing work. The reasons for the in-migration to this village were racism 
and small landholding of internally displaced people from Takeo and Kampot provinces. They 
moved into the village to seek fishing work. Ninety per cent of the villagers are Khmer-Krorm (south 
of Vietnam). At first, people called this village Totoeung village as it consists of one dam lying width-
cutting39 of the village or the 75 Canal. In 1994, the name of village was changed to Bekrong 
because villagers had a good rice harvest surpassing their storage capacity.40 However, some new 
settlers left their home village in order to seek release from indebtedness. The village is located in a 
lowland area toward the sea and is classified into two sub-zones: 1) residential land area, with other 
crops; and 2) rice land area. In Bekrong, most farm-households are agricultural landless farmers 
(ALFs) as they are newcomers and immigrated from Kampuchea Krom (the Mekong Delta in South 
of Viet Nam, formerly a Khmer area). Moreover, rich and powerful men have occupied the rice 
land since the end of the 1980s but have not used it, or abandoned it due to salty water intrusion. 
Consequently, the newcomers encroached on that land for rice growing and this led to disputes. 
Despite this, the rehabilitation of the protecting-dam was completely finished, but rice farmers still 
faced a lack of water for complementary irrigation. The rice harvest depends on rains and limited 
rice damage, e.g. by rats. 
                                                            
38 Khmer Krorm: Khmer people living in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam.  
39 Toteung means ‘width-cutting’ in Khmer.  
40 Bekrong means ‘storage overcapacity’ in Khmer.  
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 123 
Figure 3: Map of area studied in Prey Nub, Sihanoukville 
 
 
• Land transfer modalities in the communes studied 
In SHV, accessing land through commoditised transfer (purchase as regards appropriation rights) 
is widespread and urban influences are very strong in this respect. 
However, non-commoditised forms of access to land exert strong influences, for example, 
administrative transactions such as land distribution, grants to the military, resettlement of returnees. 
Also it includes land clearing and land grabbing. 
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There are also relations between different forms of land appropriation which are embedded in 
strong asymmetries of power:  
• Land to be transferred by inheritance is often partly or totally sold by poor farmers to avoid an 
extreme fragmentation of the patrimony, contributing thus to the emergence of landless 
farmers. 
• Poor farmers often sell land (often under the pressure of their economic situation: distress sale, 
or of potential buyers: threat, corruption) to clear land elsewhere (it seems that the main 
trend for poor farmers is to leave rice land to move to chamcar lands). 
As far as use right transfers are concerned (i.e. different forms of agrarian contracts and derived 
rights), besides leasing and sharecropping, we have observed forms of loans that are closely linked 
to the dynamics of land appropriation: land loaned to the seller (namely as a promise to ‘persuade’ 
him to sell) or to the one who has cleared the land (a kind of exchange of land and labour). 
Institutional arrangements ruling derived rights usually do not comprise any written agreement 
and are based upon a negotiation only involving the owner and the tenant. One can differentiate 
between arrangements that are embedded in local relations of neighbourhood, kinship and trust 
and arrangements that are ‘socially dis-embedded (but embedded in broader power relations), 
involving external actors. 
The importance of powerful urban people in land purchases and the unequal agreements 
linking land sales and loans show that the boundaries between market transactions (the model of 
bargained-exchange system) and non-market transactions (linked to status and power relations, 
and also threat and corruption) are not easy to identify. To put it differently, the functioning of land 
markets is inherently pervaded by power relations and violence. 
 
Right transfer 
modalities 
Non-commoditised Commoditised 
Institutional 
arrangement  
(use rights) 
Loans (exchanges for labour to keep and clear 
land) 
Loan (loan against promise to sell land) 
Leasing 
Sharecropping 
(Pawning) 
Transfer rights  
(appropriation) 
Land distribution by the local authorities and Krom 
Samaki 
Spontaneous ‘re-occupation’ of former land 
property (sometimes negotiated with local 
authorities and monetary compensation) 
Inheritance 
Clearing (encroachment, grabbing, clearing on 
former property frequently leads to land disputes) 
Military development zone 
Land distribution by the local authorities to 
returnees  
Purchase 
Purchase rice land in the 
national park of protecting 
natural eco-system 
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Land appropriation 
In SHV, land appropriation has been following different modalities, as mentioned above: land 
distribution by the local authorities and solidarity groups, re-occupation of former properties, free 
access by land clearing, occupation of state private land, inheritance and sales/purchases. The 
forms of land appropriation have also varied according to historical changes, as shown in the 
following table. 
 
Date/Year Event and mode of appropriation 
1979-1980 Land distribution by local authorities to the solidarity group, krom samaki, 
1979-80 Re-occupation of former residential land 
1982 Land distribution by solidarity group to farmers  
1984 Land distribution to farmers in order to establish new villages in Steung Hav district 
1989-1992 Land distribution by local authorities to returnees and immigrants 
1982-2003 Movement of land clearing; around the villages (as far as 5-6 km from the village) 
1990-1991 Applied for land possession right ‘certificate of land possession’ during state registration 
campaign  
Sporadic land registration campaign, in particular for residential land and land in urban and 
industrial development districts: Mittapheap and Steung Hav 
1992-1993 
Massive land sale/purchase in Mittapheap urban development district 
1990-1993 
 
Distribution of land to military families in Mittapheap and Prey Nup (Ream) districts, and 
distribution of land to the demobilized army in Mittapheap district (1992) 
1993 Establishment of the National Park ‘Ream’ which overlaps rice land of farmers and urban land 
buyer in O’Oknha Heng commune, Prey Nup district 
Beginning land sales/purchases (chamkar land in the foot hill areas and rice land) 
Rice land in the polders abandoned, forest/shrub grow back in three years  
1993-1995 
 
Strong development of land market (land sales/purchases) 
Banning clearing land by the government declaration 1998 
 Dam (polders) reconstructed for preventing salt water intrusion  
1996-2000 Farmers cleared the abandoned land of the powerful men in the polders for rice cultivation 
which led to land disputes in 2003 during systematic land registration (SLR) 
2002-2005 SLR started of rice fields in the polders in Prey Nup district 
Granting state land for military development zones (1,389ha) in the national park of Ream  2003 
In February, a serious dispute over 126 ha of rice land occurred during the public display of 
systematic land titling between 131 farm-households, as new owner since 1996 and 7 powerful 
men such as the former (old) owner who held 28 certificates of land possession and use issued 
in 1993-94 but later abandoned. All land was expropriated in 2003 by powerful men and 
managed by their land keepers. About 20% of farmers agreed to rent that land for rice 
cultivation at a cost of US$20 per ha and season  
Massive entries of local people /immigrants onto unused private and public land for settlement, 
19 people were arrested, but they were released after a while at the request of LICAHDO 
2004 
 
Massive establishment of tree plantations after peri-urban dwellers took land back from farmers 
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2005 Establishment of SEZs in Steung Hav and Mittapheap districts 
April, 155 households complained to the municipal governor for preventing grabbing and 
conserving the river or lake of Taong, Ream commune, by putting up demarcation brick poles. 
If the lake can be conserved as public property they can sustain their livelihoods by fishing.  
On May 29, the Provincial Committee on Forest Clearance and Encroachment declared the 
expropriation of 9,444 ha of forested land (6,971 ha in Prey Nup district, 473 in Steung Hav), 
referring to a botbanhchea (regulation) no 01 and deika (decision) of the municipal authority. 
Most of the newly cleared land has titles which were issued in 2005. The military unit of the 
municipality has 2,700 ha through titles issued in 1996. Some land occupants have only letters of 
land right transfers. However, 20 to 30 ha of new land were cleared in O Tracheak Chet village, 
Cheung Ko commune, Prey Nup district. People were persuaded to clear land for sale to rich 
people a cost of US$600/ha 
On Sept 6, officials, including officials of the DLMUPC and local authorities (chief of Bit Trang 
commune) were accused of violations of private land and the municipal court ordered for 
them to be arrested. Three of them were arrested 
2006 
On Sept 18, the municipal authorities demolished 100 huts down which were built on private 
land in Smach Deng village, Ream commune, Prey Nup district 
• Land distribution 
Land distribution was conducted at different stages and followed different modes. In 1979, 
agricultural land was distributed to a solidarity group and then re-distributed between 1982 and 
1986 to individual households as members of the group. The residential land was also distributed. 
However, in some areas people could re-possess the land property which they had before 1975. Up 
to 1989, the government officially recognised the distribution of solidarity group’s land to their 
member’s households. In village 6 (Phom 6) of Sangkat 4 (commune 4) of Mittapheap district, 60 
households of immigrants (or demobilized armies), who arrived between 1989 and 1992 could 
receive land from the local authorities by giving ownership. After 1992, only five households whose 
members are relatives of the village chief still have land that is secured by the certificate of land 
possession issued in 1992, while the others sold all their land to urban dwellers. 
In Prey Nup district, each person received 2,000-3,500 m2 of agricultural land. There was 
recognition of the land they occupied for housing or/and of their rights to re-occupy their ex-
residential lands for housing. In 1984, outside the studied area in Stoeung Hav district, the local 
authorities distributed both types of land (farm land and residential land) to people in order to 
create new villages.  
• Land clearing 
Since 1995-96, people have cleared forested land in the two areas (lowland and upland). They 
cleared either rice land in the polder which is private rice land, or forest land for cultivation. The 
tendency was that immigrants cleared rice land, while many villagers cleared forest land after they 
sold all, or nearly all their rice land to urban buyers. In Bit Trang commune, nearly all villagers sold all 
their land and they accessed chamkar land ‘freely’ by encroachment or by clearing forest land. In 
Prey Nup commune, 25% of the interviewed farmers cleared land, while another 7% of ALFs cleared 
also forest land. Land clearing thus appears as an exit strategy for people having sold their land, 
showing a causal link between the two modes of appropriation (land sales and land clearing), 
which expresses at the same time strong asymmetries of power. This link is also a matter of 
dichotomy between the two areas (rice land and foothill areas) in terms of appropriation dynamics. 
To date, the clearing of land has led to two serious types of land dispute: (1) dispute between 
farmer’s groups and military on chamkar land; and (2) land between immigrant groups 
(newcomers) as new owners and powerful men who have possession of certificates for rice land 
since the early 1990s, or villagers or former local authorities as former (old) owners.  
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A serious case of dispute on rice land in the polder in Prey Nup commune occurred between 
seven ‘big men’ or government officials and urban people, as the former (old) land owners and a 
group of villagers/farmers as new owners (new comers in the early 1990s) over the right to 126 ha (7 
blocks) of rice land. For example: 
Four cases of massive land disputes occurred during the public display of systematic land titling 
in February 2003 and after the rehabilitation of the salt water protecting-dam. One case is a case of 
dispute involving 126 ha of rice land.41 Land was registered as ‘in dispute’, and no land title will be 
released to any party unless it is resolved. Land under this dispute is between 131 farm-households 
living in seven villages of four communes: Koh Khyang village (O Chrov commune), Prey Nup Muoy, 
Prey Nup Pi and Beth Trang villages (Prey Nup commune), Boeung Taprum and Boeung Chum 
villages (Boeung Taprum commune), O Oknhaheng village (O Oknhaheng commune) and seven 
government officials and ‘big men’ from SHV town. Those powerful people hold 28 certificates of 
possession and use of land issued in 1992-93. However, they abandoned it and did not use or 
cultivate on the land until 2002-03. They have complained about salty water intrusion due to the 
broken dam. Thus, forest and shrub re-grew on the abandoned rice land. Then, newcomers without 
any other access to land have cleared this land for rice cultivation since 1996.  
All 126 ha of rice land were repossessed in 2003 by the powerful men and this land managed by 
their land keepers. About 20% of farmers agreed to rent their formerly-owned land for rice 
cultivation at a cost of US$20 per ha and season. It is reported that US$8 of this rental amount is paid 
to the commune office. In 2003, Mr. Aing Saroeun, a farmer living in Bek Krong village was told do 
not continue growing rice on the disputed land. Ten days later, he was requested to come to the 
municipal court of SHV where he was arrested and detained for 19 days and accused of abusing 
another person’s property. Due to the intervention of ADHOC he was released, but not before he 
was forced to agree to withdraw his complaint with regard to the land dispute. Due to receiving 
threats, only 76 households among 131 affected households filed a complaint to the municipal 
court of SHV. ADHOC, a Cambodian NGO working on human rights, assisted people to file this 
complaint with the national cadastral commission (NCC) in Phnom Penh. To date, both parties are 
waiting for a decision from the NCC. People can continue rice cultivation on the disputed land, but 
they refuse to pay the water fee to the Polder Community unless they receive land titles. For 
example,  
Mr. Meas Vith, a farmer living in Prey Nup 2 village, Prey Nop commune cleared 5 ha of land for 
rice cultivation since 1996. He holds a receipt of land possession issued by the former commune 
chief (Mr. Em Mean). He paid a contribution of 32,000 riels/ha (US$8) every year to the commune 
until the land was expropriated in 2003. Nevertheless, to be able to grow rice on the same plot he 
agrees to rent this land from the powerful persons at a cost of 8 Thang (Khmer unit) of paddy, 
equivalent to US$20 per ha. 
In this case, the former owners can show legal documents (certificates of possession), and thus 
be recognised as the land owners, the officials say. However, farmers as new owners have 
requested the RGC to receive half of their land so that they can secure their livelihoods. This 
decision is still pending: the choice made will show whether equity principles and a concern for 
social stability and poverty alleviation are guiding the government. 
According to article 76 of the 1992 land law, “any land that a possessor has abandoned for 
three consecutive years shall become the private domain of the state”. However, officials say that 
the three-year abandonment rule does not apply to land to which a person has legal certificates. 
Article 70 of 1992 land law states: “The act to keep a low-yield soil in order to make it fertilized 
cannot be considered as abandonment”. This manner in such a condition during that period is 
considered continuous possession. But, it was in-validated or repealed by the 2001 land law”. In any 
case, there is enough ambiguity between the two land laws to give people room for diverging 
                                                            
41 From the case study we learnt the areas of 120 ha were under this massive dispute. 
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interpretation, usually working at the expense of the poorest. NGOs working in the field of human 
rights and legal brokerage play here a key role in redressing the balance of power. 
• Inheritance 
Khmer kinship is flexible and changes over time. It can be described and analysed as bilateral or 
cognatic (see for instance, Ledgerwood 1995). So too are inheritance rules. New couples inherit 
land from their parents, who in many cases in SHV received land through internal distribution of 
solidarity groups’ land in the early 1980s. In Prey Nup commune, over 14% of interviewed farm 
householders inherited land from their parents. Inheritance processes have of course, been deeply 
disrupted by the phases of civil war and the Khmer Rouge regime due to massive population 
displacement. 
The inheritance rules and processes in the areas studied seem to be similar in SHV. Inheritance 
depends on the parent’s decision and is always made without a written contract. Usually, if the 
parents have enough land to transfer it to all children, they alocate less land to the better-off 
children than to the poor children. If the parents die, the oldest child will be responsible for 
managing and distributing land to the younger children. For land poor households, parents give 
land to the youngest daughter, who will look after them until their death. Other ways of inheritance 
are: 
> Allocation of land to all children if the parents have enough land; 
> In cases where there is not enough land, the parents can decide to sell all the land and to 
share the money among their children; 
> Transfer to the poorest child: the parents decide to allocate their limited land to the child 
who is considered to be the poorest; 
> Transfer to the first child: the parents give all their limited rice lands received through 
distribution in the 1980s to the first child. In addition, they give chamkar land that they 
cleared to their other children. It could be explained that the first/elder child was born 
before time of land distribution, or received land commonly with his/her parents. This case is 
another modality of the dichotomy between rice land and chamkar land. 
The parents allocate land to all children if they have a lot of land 
Mr. Leng lives in Ream village, Ream commune, Prey Nub district, and has six children. He is also 
a land keeper for an urban dweller. He owns around 8 ha of rice land. Of that amount, 1.80 ha was 
given in 1982 by a solidarity group. For his family, only four members commonly received land from 
the solidarity group. Four of his children got married already, and he gave 1 ha of rice land per 
child. His other children will inherit less land than their elder brothers because they are studying and 
the parents pay for thier studies. 
The parents sell land for sharing the money to children (link between sales and landlessness 
through inheritance) 
Mrs. Sam Noeun, aged 30 years, has three children and lives in Ream village, Ream commune, 
Prey Nub district. She has six siblings. Her mother received 1.5 ha of rice land from a solidarity group 
in 1982. In 1986 her father died and the local authorities took 0.5 ha back. Her mother decided to 
sell land (1ha) in 1993 to an urban dweller from SHV for 30,000 Baht (US$762) due to two reasons: the 
land is too small to distribute to her children and lack of food. She gave 2,000 Baht (US$56) of all 
money from land selling to each child and bought another 1 ha of rice land in Prey Nub commune 
and 1 buffalo. In 2000, her mother sold land due to illness and then became an agricultural landless 
farmer. 
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Land allocation to the daughter, who would look after for parents if the parents only have a small 
amount of land 
Mr. Chreang has four children and lives in Ream village, Ream commune, Prey Nub district. 
During the land distribution by the solidarity group, his parents received 0.70 ha.. Currently, all his 
siblings are married. They did not receive land from their parents because their parents have only a 
small amount of land. He decided to allocate his land to his youngest daughter, who looks after the 
parents. He thought that his daughter would secure her livelihood without resorting to out-migration. 
This distribution was made in form of an oral contract. 
Land is distributed to the poorest child 
Mrs. Heng Lorn has six children and lives in Pou Thoeang village, Bet Trang commune, Prey Nub 
district. She has five siblings. Her mother received rice land 1.1 ha in 1983 from the Krom Samaki 
(solidarity group). During the land distribution only two members of the family received commonly, 
land from Krom Samaki. Her other siblings were born after land distribution. They are still young. Her 
mother distributed 0.5 ha to Mrs. Heng Lorn in 1990 and another 0.6 ha to keep for her two younger 
sisters because they are not yet married. Her two elder brothers did not want to inherit the land from 
her mother because they are better-off. They are living in SHV town.  
Distribute all land distributed by the solidarity group to the first child 
One householder lives in Ou Oknaheng village, Ou Oknaheng commune, Prey Nub district. 
During land distribution by the solidarity group in 1982, he received only 0.70 ha of rice land. Due to 
the small amount of land, he has occupied and cleared forest land to extend his agricultural land. 
The total amount of land which he has cleared is around 5 ha. In 1998 he distributed 0.70 ha which 
he received from a solidarity group to his elder son. He will distribute newly cleared chamkar land to 
other children. He distributed land to his elder son without a written contract.  
The above cases show that the origin of appropriation (of land rights) can exert an influence on 
inheritance rights between land distributed by the state (administrative transaction) and land 
cleared by individuals (investment in labour). 
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Institutional arrangements  
(derived rights)  
• Loans of land 
The term ‘loan’ conveys the idea of land rights temporarily ceded against no explicit or codified 
compensation or payment. In SHV, transferred rights usually cover annual cropping. Thus, it does not 
cover tree planting or the delegation of rights to a third party. Landowners (he/she are often the 
buyers as we will see) can take back his/her land whenever they wish. In this case, a loan is the 
means of securing land acquisition and avoiding having to pay tax on unused land. In Prey Nub 
district, there are three different groups of landowners: local villagers, urban private dwellers and 
companies. We have observed differences between these groups in terms of the compensation 
acquitted by the tenant. In general, plots are loaned by urban buyers or companies without any 
payment while the tenant often gives paddy or other farm products to the owner if he is a fellow 
villager. In some cases, he can even refuse money when the landowner buys him farm products. 
These differences show that loans among villagers are land transactions that are embedded in 
localised social ties (of neighbourhood, kinship, friendship, trust, etc.). When the lender is foreign to 
the villager, there is a sort of social dis-embedding of the transaction, or/and, as seen below, a re-
embedding in broader relations of power. 
In SHV, urban dwellers and companies have persuaded villagers (through allied land brokers) to 
sell land against the promise they would lend the land back to them (or other villagers) for rice 
cultivation. Moreover, those villagers who did not want to sell were threatened by expropriation or 
buying first the land surrounding villager’s land. However, after having bought all the land they 
wanted, some companies did not honour their promise. After a while, the loan was turned into 
leasing without any negotiation. For example, 
This occurred for instance in O’Oknha Heng village with 624 ha of rice land to be bought by the 
Chinese Company ‘Chin Yin Minh’ in cooperation with a rich Khmer man, Mr. Lim Mean Sok. 
Consequently, the transformation of this loan into leasing provoked protest on the villagers’ side, 
often under the leadership of their chief of village. In this case the leasing was reverted to loan. It 
was explained that at the time of purchasing land the company promised to loan it to farmers 
without taking anything until the company constructed a factory that would employ villagers. 
However, at the time of the study in 2005, the company had asked village chiefs to collect land 
rental because it feared that villagers would re-occupy the land or claim for ownership. In a way, 
the shift from loan to rent expresses a strategy of asserting land appropriation, in a context seen as 
insecure, despite the high differential of power and wealth between stakeholders. 
Actually, land loans are generally practiced 2-3 years after purchases and without a written 
contract. Since 2000, we have seen an increasing trend towards written contracts and a 
formalisation of the recognition by the village chiefs in order to prevent land grabbing or disputes. 
Both interviewed farmer groups – land (poor) holding farmers (FHs) and agricultural landless farmers 
(ALFs) – have asked for loans of land from land buyers for cultivation. Nearly 46% of FHs and over 
41% of ALFs could access land through a loan. With regard to rice land in the polders, a rice 
production zone benefiting from the dam to prevent salt water intrusion, farmers have had to pay 
the water fee since 2001 when they are landowners (the polders were a pilot area for SLR; see Kibler 
and Perroud 2003, Le Meur et al. 2005).  
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In the polders, over the last five years, rice land could be loaned from the landowners in 
exchange for farmer’s labour to clear land: such a land rights transfer is thus located on the edge 
between loan and relation of exchange of land and labour. The loan expressing the initial need for 
land clearing has been gradually changed into a rental system as there has been a high rice land 
demand as the result of the banning of deforestation in 1999 (limiting land clearing opportunities). 
Loans of land have thus declined, replaced by renting, or the landowner has taken his land back to 
plants or fruit trees such as acacia, teakwood, kreusna (Aquilaria crasna) jack fruit, mango, etc. In 
the case of land appropriated by urban dwellers or companies, the initial oral loans have been 
changed to written contracts of loan or leasing, as the owners wanted to secure their land holding 
rights. For example: 
Mrs. Long Chiev, farmer of Pou Thoeung village, Bet Trang commune, Prey Nup district, sold 0.6 
ha of land at a cost of 50,000 Bath (US$1,250) in 1992 because she thought that after she sold that 
land, the company would loan the land to her for cultivation. However, in 1993, the company 
started to collect land rental at 480 kg of paddy (US$50) per ha and season. This land renting also 
resorts to a contractual paper witnessed by the chief of village. 
The Lim Mean Sok Company bought 624 ha of land in O’ Oknha Heng commune. Then, the 
company loaned that land to villagers to cultivate rice and settle without contract papers between 
1992 and 1998. In 1999, the company took a land rental fee from the villagers. However, in 2000, the 
company stopped taking the land rental fee. This was due to the villagers’ protests. Also, the 
company had promised to loan land to the villagers for rice cultivation. However, in this year (2005), 
the company asked the village chief to make contract letters of land renting at 10,000 riel /year 
(US$2.5) for residential land and 50 kg of paddy per ha for rice land. 
A Chinese Company bought 40 ha of chamkar land in O’ Tapang village, O’Oknha Heng 
commune in 1993. Nowadays, the company loans that land to the villagers without contract papers 
but the villagers are not allowed to plant fruit trees (e.g. mango and jack trees).  
The Hou Sin Thean Company bought 400 ha of land of in Pou Thoeung village and other villages 
of Bet Trang commune. After this company bought land in 1992, they loaned that land to villagers 
for cultivation without contract papers. Mr. Pak Sin has six children and lives in Pou Thoeang village, 
Bet trang commune. He sold 1 ha of rice land to the company in 1993 because the broker promised 
that the company will give the land back to him for cultivation. He sold the land at a cost of 30,000 
Baht (US$750). Since 1993 he has cultivated free (in the form of a loan) on that land without a written 
contract. However, since 2004, after the construction of the salt water preventing dam he has to 
pay the water fee to the Water User Community instead of to the land owner. 
A loan of the land of an urban dweller 
Mr. Keat Saroeun, a member of the water users’ community, has six children and lives in Koki 
village, Betrang commune, Prey Nub district. In 2001, he borrowed a plot of land from Mrs Lok 
Cheng, an urban dweller in SHV. He asked the land owner directly when she came to collect the 
rental fee from the villagers. The size of the land is 0.30 ha (degraded land) so he had to clear the 
shrub forest. He was able to cultivate on that land only for 3 years without paying anything to the 
land owner (since the time preceding the polders rehabilitation). This agrarian contract was made 
without a written contract, through a simple verbal agreement. After 3 years of use, in 2004, the 
land owner took the land back and sold it to another urban dweller. 
Borrowers can also play on the ambiguities of the 2001 land law. For instance, they have 
occupied land since the time before the issuance of the new 2001 land law. Thus, they claim that 
they can apply for ownership because of their continued occupation since before 2001 (according 
to article 30). They resort to the articles 30 and 38 which state “if the possessor has land: Peaceful, in 
good faith, notorious to the public, unambiguous in 5 years continuously and free lands do not 
register and are not belong to someone. The possessor has to be the ownership by legitimating.” 
However, this interpretive device can only work if the loan was made under a merely verbal 
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agreement. Occupying land for over 5 years does not automatically mean ownership, for instance, 
if the borrowing was processed with written contracts. The final result of the dispute depends in such 
cases, on the power asymmetries between the different actors involved. 
• Renting 
Land renting is a delegation of rights, more precisely, the delegation of use right to farmer 
tenants. Land renting occurs on rice land. It is practiced by three groups of land owners: 
companies, urban dwellers, and local land owners. 
There are different rental arrangements depending on the category of landowners. Local large 
landowners tend to rent land to farmers without an intermediary, while companies resort to (private) 
land brokers or local authority representatives, then they act as brokers. Renting is practiced by the 
local landowner without any written contract, while urban landowners and companies use it in most 
cases, with formal written contracts that are recognized by the village chief or in some cases, by the 
commune chief. This strategy is a response to increasing land dispute cases. However, renting rice 
land from a relative remains practiced without written contracts. This means we find here the same 
distinction as for loans between transactions between villagers that are embedded in localised 
relations of trust and accountability and those transactions involving outsiders who ‘compensate’ 
their lack of social relations with formalising practices and search for alliances with brokers and 
local authorities. 
Rental contracts are mostly made for a rice growing season although people speak of a 1-year 
period. The companies as land owners share 20% of the total collected rental fee with the land 
broker who then becomes the land keeper or local authorities in charge of rental coordination. 
However, some companies distribute all rental fees to the local authorities (50%) acting as land 
keeper and the pagoda (50%) in order to build a good relationship with local people. This process 
might also be linked to a political act to gain the confidence of people. 
Leasing represents an important mode of access to land for poor and landless farmers. Nearly 
46% of FHs and 59% of ALFs have rented in land for rice cultivation. The rental fee varies depending 
on the land quality and distance from the settlement areas. Rice land is classified into three different 
types: type I) rice land with rich soil in the proximity to the village (sre leu); type II) rice land 
expanded from type I; and type III) shrub and bush land or re growth shrub land, close to the dam 
preventing salt-water intrusion. The rental varies between 20 and 30 thang42 (equivalent to US$50 
and US$75) of paddy per ha for type I, between 15 and 20 thang for type II, between 5 and 15 
thang for type III, or 5 thang for shrub and bush land. With type III rice land, sometimes the 
landowners loaned land to farmers, but the farmers were requested to pay water fees (about US$7 
per ha) to the ‘Water User Community’. The rental of rice land increased 75% compared to the last 5 
years (1998-99) due to a higher demand for rice land and good growing conditions after the dam 
reconstruction, resulting in an increase in rice yields and production. 
Local rules apply in the polders in cases of crop damage: 
> In the case of damage to 50% of the rice harvest, the tenant can keep all rice products without 
paying to either the landowner or for water fees (normally paid by the landowner). 
> In cases of crop damage, the water fee can be reduced according to the reality of each 
situation. However, farmers are requested to inform the Water User Committee before the 
harvest time. The Committee collects the water fee in collaboration with the commune 
authorities. Five per cent of the total collected fee is shared with the commune authorities (see 
Le Meur et al. 2005 for a discussion on the nature of the water fee; its basis being land 
ownership, we include it in this section although it is not a land rent). 
                                                            
42 A thang is a Khmer unit, equal to 24 kg of paddy. A thang of paddy costs 10,000 riels or US$US2.5. 
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Rentals are paid at the end of the season or during the harvest. If villagers did not pay for rentals, 
the land keeper or commune authority will take the land back in order to rent it out to other 
villagers. 
As mentioned above, loans tend to be changed into leasing after a certain period of land use. 
The company that has bought land from the villager loans it back to the seller or other villagers. 
After a period of 2-3 years, there is a shift to rental under the facilitation of the commune authorities 
or land keepers working for the companies (he can also be representative of the local authorities; 
see examples below). For example: 
Mrs. Heng Lorn, a farmer in Pou Thoueng village, Bet Trang commune. She has six children. In 
1995 she sold 0.70 ha of rice land to the company but she does not remember the name. However, 
the company loaned land back to her for farming without paying. Since 1998 the company has 
changed this arrangement from a loan to renting at a cost of 20 thang (US$50) per hectare without 
a written contract. This leasing was processed through the land keeper who collects the rental after 
harvest. In 2003-04, she faced crop damage. Then she requested the land keeper to reduce the 
rental amount to 3 thang (US$7.5). 
The company of Yos Sokunthearny bought 100 ha of land in Pou Thoeung village, Bit Trang 
commune, Prey Nup district. Then the company rented land to farmers at a cost of 20 thang of 
paddy (480 kg or equivalent to US$50) per ha with written contracts coordinated by the land 
keeper. This rental contract has been recognized by the village chief and re-negotiated every year. 
Mrs. Hong Sokha, with seven family members, living in Pou Thoueng village, Bet Trang commune. 
Due to a lack of food because she owns only a small amount of land, she rented in rice land from 
the company after she had sold her land. She has rented land since 2000 for a rental fee of 20 
thang per hectare. The size of the land which she rented is 0.8 ha. At the harvest time the land 
keeper (a commune authority) collects the rental fee (in paddy). However, since 2002 due to 
drought and animal disease, she was able to harvest only 12 thang. Then she asked the land keeper 
to pay only 5 thang, but the land keeper did not agree and charged her 10 thang. Regarding the 
water fee, the land keeper will pay for it. 
Mrs Heng Sokha, a farmer in Pou Thoeung village. She rented in 0.7 ha of rice land from the 
company. Moreover, she also rented another 1 ha of rice land from her uncle who lives in SHV town. 
Land renting from her uncle was made in 2004 through a oral agreement. The rental fee is 30 tang 
per ha. Even though the crop was damaged her uncle still charged her for it. For this year (2005) she 
has stopped renting the land from her uncle because it is not profitable for her. 
In Ream and Bet Trang communes, the Thai Bunrong Company has rented land out to the 
villagers but it does not collect the rental fee for itself. Renting is through a written contract for one 
rice growing season or 1 year. All collected rental fees have been allocated, one part to the 
commune authority and another part to the pagoda committee. Land renting is arranged by the 
intervention of land keepers who are village and commune chiefs. 
The legal basis for the intervention of commune authorities in this domain of agrarian contracts 
remains questionable. Several examples below show that local authorities tend to endorse a 
function in the enforcement of agrarian contracts which is not defined by law and often expresses 
collusions with private interests. 
• Sharecropping 
Sharecropping arrangements have strongly declined in Prey Nup district over the last 10 years 
due to land sales to outsiders, urban dwellers and companies. It remains practiced between farmers 
and their close relatives or neighbours as land owners for rice cultivation. This observation confirms, 
from a diachronic point of view, the distinction between socially/locally embedded transactions 
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and the social dis-embedding of transactions involving outsiders, or their re-embedding in broader 
power fields. 
Sometimes, the land owners are urban dwellers, but some are also farmer’s relatives. 
Sharecropping in this area is made without a written contract, and for a growing season. However, it 
can be an open-ended arrangement of sharecropping or a close-ended sharecropping contract 
for a defined period of time with an option to renew every year before the next growing season. 
Two main types of sharecropping arrangements are observed, depending on the contribution of 
assets of the two parties (as summarised in the table below, at the end of this section on derived 
rights): 
? If the landowner only contributes land (and pays the water fee), the product is shared at 
the rice harvest time according to a 2/3 or 1/3 rate: two thirds for the sharecropper, one 
third for the landowner. 
? It is equally shared between the two parties if the land owners contribute to rice seed and 
pay for land preparation services. For example: 
Mr. Uk Sam At, who lives in Prey Nub I village, Prey Nub commune, Prey Nub district owns around 
5 ha of rice land which he received from a solidarity group, clearing and buying. In 2004, he made 
a sharecropping agreement with Mr. Tem Chun, a villager who has land nearby. He practiced 
sharecropping on 1 ha of rice land without a written contract for 1 season but spoke of 1 year. The 
landowner contributes rice seeds and expenses on ploughing costs, and the tenant, Mr Tem Chun, is 
responsible for other expenses such as transplanting, weeding, harvesting and water fees. Last year, 
he harvested 45 thang from the total paddy product of 90 thang, and the rest was for the 
landowner. 
Mrs Ngoun Samet is 36 years old, has two children and lives in Prey Nub 3 village, Prey Nub 
commune, Prey Nub district. She migrated from Kampot province and does not own land. Since 
1999 she has practiced sharecropping on 2 ha of rice land without a written contract for her aunt 
who lives in SHV town. At harvest time, she gave one third of total paddy products to her aunt. Her 
aunt is responsible for paying water fees to the water user community.  
Mrs. Mak Kim, a farmer of O’ Tasek village, O’ Oknha Heng commune, Prey Nup district, has 
practiced sharecropping on 0.5 ha without a written contract with his relative, as land owner. In this 
sharecropping, the landowner provides land, contributes rice seed and land preparation with his 
draft animal. The tenant or farmer contributes only labor for other growing techniques. For expenses 
from other production costs such as harvesting and threshing are shared equally. The paddy 
harvested product is shared 50:50. 
• Land pawning 
Land pawning is still practiced in Prey Nup district, but this practice has declined. If somebody 
needs money urgently or faces serious problems, he can pawn the land to another villager, a 
money lender or to a relative. This form of land transfer usually does not entail any written contract. 
There are however, cases of written contracts made with the recognition of the village chief. The 
money lenders provide cash loans in exchange for access to a plot of land. Pawning is short term 
arrangement; usually covering 2-3 years depending on the agreement. If the money borrower 
cannot reimburse the debt, the money lender will continue to use this land. Nonetheless, the villager 
will not lose his or her land, and he/she can reclaim land anytime after reimbursement takes place. 
The plot of land thus acts as a guarantee for the loan, while the cultivation rights serve as a form of 
interest payment on the granted capital. In some cases, the land owner requested additional 
money from the money lender, re-conducting the credit and thus the pawning of land. If the 
borrower cannot reimburse, the pawning transaction will end as a land sale. For example: 
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Mrs. Meng Loam, a villager in Koki village, Bet Trang commune, Prey Nub district. In 2005, has 
pawned 0.50 ha of land for 3 chi of gold (about US$161) to her aunt living in the same village 
because she urgently needed money to cure the disease of her child. This arrangement was made 
without written contract because she said “her aunt cannot grab her land” (once again, the 
localised relations of trust/accountability). The duration is 3 years. After 3 years if she cannot 
reimburse the money, her aunt will continue to cultivate the plot of land as long as she has not paid 
back. The end of the story is still not known. 
Mrs. Kong Kaom, a widow with three children, lives in Pou Thoeang village, Bet Trang commune, 
Prey Nub district. In 2002 she pawned 0.70 ha of rice land to a villager in the same village for the 
amount of 200,000 riels (around US$50) to cure an illness and buy food. This pawning arrangement 
was made without a written contract. She promised that she would reimburse the money after 2 
years. After 2 years, if the debt is not paid the money lender would continue to cultivate on this 
land. Up to date, she has not received the land back. 
• Agrarian contracts and derived rights in Prey Nup district 
The diverse modalities of accessing land through agrarian contracts and institutional 
arrangements give shape to a wide array of derived rights in SHV. They are summarised in the 
following table with a mention of vernacular terms. 
 
Agrarian contracts 
categories 
Rights transferred Other conditions 
Open-ended loans 
(kar oay dei theu 
sen)  
Cultivation rights (in 
particular rice 
Without written contract 
Loan as measure to secure land and release from tax on 
unused land. 
Urban dwellers and companies loan (rice) the buying land 
to farmers or land sellers or land brokers, in most cases 
without written contracts. However, farmers or borrowers of 
rice land in the polders have to pay water fees. 
Loans, mostly in 2-3 years after land sale.  
Newcomers or immigrants borrow land from local villagers. 
For some cases, borrowing land from their sibling led to land 
dispute as the borrower thinks that he occupied land before 
the issuance of the 2001 land law. 
Loans of rice land of the big land buyers as urban people or 
companies have changed to written contract and are 
recognized by the chief of village as witness and broker. 
The company promised to loan the buying land to farmers 
for rice cultivation until the establishment of factories. Then 
villagers will be employed, as a process of persuading 
villagers to sell their land. 
Exchange of labour in order to keep and clear land, but 
some land keepers work for landowners when they are 
needed. 
Loan for a definite 
period of time  
(kar oay dei theu 
sen te mean 
kamnot pel) 
3 years usage for rice 
growing 
Loans from urban dwellers in exchange for labour to clear 
rice land in the polders, without written contract. After 3 
years when the agreement ended the owner took the land 
back. Many of them sold land to other urban dwellers.  
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Renting, access to 
land for a fixed fee 
of rental payment  
(kar chuol dei) 
 
Cultivation rights. Verbal 
contracts or without written 
contracts.  
Renewable at start of each 
season. 
Loans were changed to monetary transfers of leasing 
which required written contracts with the village chief as 
witness in order to secure land. 
Local big land owners have rented land out to farmers 
directly, while the companies have rented land out 
through land brokers or local authorities. 
Renting is practiced by local land owners without any 
written contract, while for urban land owners and 
companies, todate, most land has been rented with 
formal written contract and recognized by village and 
commune chiefs as witnesses as the consequence of 
increasing land dispute cases.  
Mostly, urban dwellers or companies bought land from 
villagers, and have derived use right back in form of loan 
to villagers or land sellers as promised. After a period of 2-3 
years, loan arrangement has been changed to rental 
through the commune authorities or land keeper. 
Rental amount ranges from 20 to 30 thang of paddy or 
(US$50 to US$75) per ha and rice growing season.  
No right for plantation and the owner can take the land 
back whenever they want. 
In the polders, in case of rice damage in excess of 50%, 
the tenant can keep all rice products without paying 
either to land owner or for water fees. 
Sharecropping  
(kar thveu sre Chek 
phal khnea)  
 
Cultivation rights, shared 
paddy harvest depending 
on arrangement made. 
Sharecropping for a 
definite period of time with 
an option to renew every 
year before the growing 
season. 
Strongly declined, it remains practiced between farmers 
and their close relatives or neighbours for rice growing. 
Payment after rice harvest, paddy is shared: 
- 2/3 shares for farmer and the remaining 1/3 for land 
owner. The owners pay for water fees. 
- 50:50 for each party if landowner contributes: 1) rice 
seed and pays for land preparation; or 2) rice seed, land 
preparation with his draft animal and 50% of costs for 
harvest and threshing. 
Arrangement without written contract. 
Pawning  
(kar banhcham dei) 
(antichrèse)  
No right to sell but the 
money owner can rent or 
transfer the use right to a 
third person.  
Land acts as a guarantee 
for the loan, while 
cultivation rights serve as a 
form of interest payment on 
the granted capital. 
The money lender gave 
land back after receiving 
money. 
In some cases, the land 
owner requested additional 
money from the money 
lender, and at the end of 
the process it will be 
changed from pawning to 
sale.  
Still practiced in Prey Nup district, but not often. 
Between their relatives, between villagers and neighbors. 
Practiced without written contract. In some cases, with 
written contract and recognized by the chief of village as 
witness. 
Short term arrangement, usually covers 2-3 years 
depending on the negotiation. 
Money lenders continue to use land until the landowner 
pays the money back. 
Some money lenders decided to accept pawning of land 
located close to their land because of the optimization of 
cultivated land size and easier management. 
Pawning made by their relatives (intra-family) occurred 
without written contract, while pawing to neighbors was 
with written contract between both parties without 
informing the chief of village. 
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Land Sales/purchases 
Land sales have been attractive in the industrial and tourism development zones. The price of 
land has varied according to locations and the presence of development projects. This started in 
1990, shortly after the shift to the market economy, and land prices peaked in 1995-96 due to the 
increasing land sales and investments. At the national level, land sales peaked in 1996 when the 
country achieved maximum economic growth (see also Chan Sophal et al. 2002). In SHV, land 
prices have increased as a result of increasing demographic pressure due to intense immigration, of 
foreign investment on land for the establishment of a SEZ in O’Oknha Heng and of speculation. 
Many outsiders and urban dwellers from SHV, Phnom Penh, Kampot and Kampong Speu purchased 
both rice land and chamkar land in the foothill areas between 1993 and 1995. Most plots were 
loaned on an unconditional basis in exchange for labour to clear and keep land as well. However, 
rental arrangements have increasingly replaced loans, as an expression of the highly uneven 
distribution of bargaining power between buyers/owners and sellers/tenants (see above on the 
relations between land sales, loans and leasing). 
In Prey Nup district, land speculators and brokers represent different categories of social actors. 
The former are generally urban dwellers, the latter often representatives of local authorities. Both 
however, are considered by local people as powerful men who could persuade – meaning all too 
often, by threat – to sell them their foothills land. The urban ‘big men’ and companies’ tactic was to 
first buy the land surrounding the village before threatening local farmers in order to convince/force 
them to sell their land at lower prices. Between 1993 and 1995, the price varied between US$130 
and US$280 per ha for newly cleared land in the foothills, and between US$260 and US$3,000 for rice 
land according to location and road proximity. The land value has increased between nearly 300% 
and 900 % in the last 10 years. The price of orchard land or tree plantation is up to US$8,000 per ha.  
In Prey Nup, farmers sold all their chamkar land and parts of their rice fields between 1993 and 
1995 to urban dwellers whose names remained mostly unknown to the villagers and village chiefs. 
Plots of land have changed hands without registration at the office of registration unit, usually 
through the action of third persons as land brokers. The sale contracts and letters of land right 
transfer are processed and registered at the commune level. However, land speculation sharply 
declined and disappeared in 2000. One reason for this is the overall decline of private investment in 
the area, added to the fact that a large amount of land was already in the hands of urban 
dwellers. This does not mean however, that there is no land selling (non speculative) between local 
farmers. 
With regard to the formal land sale process, this land changes hand from the occupants to the 
land buyers. If the occupants have no legal land documents the land transfer occurs in two 
different ways depending on the land size43: 
> For a plot of land under 1 ha, the land sale has to be registered at village and recognized by 
commune level and the contract of sale has to be formalised in writing. 
> For a plot of land of more than 10 ha, the sale contract between land buyer and land 
occupant or owner has to be formally registered at the district office and cabinet of the 
municipal governor. 
This classification of land size for transfers/sales does not refer to the 2001 land law.  
                                                            
43 Result obtained from the stakeholder workshop in SIHANOUKVILLE, Dec. 2004. 
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Article 65 of the 2001 land law states that the transfer of ownership can be enforceable as 
against third parties only if the contract of sale of immovable property is made in writing in the 
authentic form drawn up by the competent authority and registered with the cadastral registry unit. 
The contract of sale itself is not a sufficient legal requirement for the transfer of the ownership of the 
subject matter. 
 
 
Land conflicts 
In Prey Nup district, the reasons for many cases of land conflicts relating to land transactions are: 
? Land encroachment on private land. 
? Grabbing public land. 
? Encroachment on land claimed for ownership by military. 
? Overlapping of the protected area of national park on village rice land. 
In Prey Nup and other communes, four serious cases of disputes have occurred since 2003 during 
the systematic land registration (SLR), between a group of ex-land owners (local authorities, villagers 
and powerful men living in urban areas) and the new landowners (newcomers settled in the early 
1990s) over rights to rice land in the polders. Those disputes remained unresolved even though they 
were brought to the NCC in Phnom Penh with ADHOC assistance. The four disputes are:44  
1. Dispute between seven ‘big men’ (government officials and urban people), as former (old) 
land owners, and a group of villagers/farmers as new owners (new comers in the early 1990s) 
over 126 ha (seven blocks) of rice land in the polders (the case is described above in the section 
on ‘land clearing’). 
2. Dispute between local authorities (former owners) and a group of villagers/farmers (new 
owners) over 48.6 ha of rice land in the polders. 
3. Dispute between local authorities, including villagers as former owners, and a group of 
villagers/farmers as new owners, over 106 ha of rice land. 
4. Dispute between a group of villagers and local authorities, including powerful men, over 50 
ha of rice land. 
These conflicts between former and new owners show that individuals can manipulate the legal 
ambiguities and gaps existing between the 1992 and 2001 land laws, which leave room for 
diverging interpretations. The result of such disputes depends on the uneven distribution of power 
and social capital among the actors involved. 
Article 76 of the 1992 land law states that, “any land that a possessor has abandoned for three 
consecutive years shall become the private domain of the state.” However, officials say that the 3-
year abandonment rule does not apply to land to which a person has legal certificate. Article 70 of 
1992 land law: “The act to keep a low-yield soil in order to make it fertilized cannot be considered as 
abandonment". This article was repealed by the 2001 land law. 
                                                            
44 Case study by LAND and RAND groups on 17 September 2003 and monthly meeting. 
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Since July 2005, there have been three serious transaction-related land disputes in Prey Nup 
district: 
1. A protest of 155 families of Thmor Thom village, Ream commune against the grabbing of a 
public lake (Boeung Kang Kep) or river (Prek Ta Ong) for ownership occurred in April, 2006. They 
urged the municipal governor to prevent land grabbing and to preserve the natural lake/river for 
community fishing, as the source of household income of a thousand families in two communes: 
Ream and Bet Trang (RK, 26 April, 2006 and field study). 
2. A dispute between two commune councillors of Bet Trang and a group of villagers (more 
than 100 villagers) over the accusation of selling peoples’ chamkar land. 
3. A dispute between the military and a group of farmers of around 100 farm households in Bet 
Trang commune over rights to chamkar lands that have been cleared since 1996. 
First case: what was at stake here was the conversion of public land/lake used for fishing by local 
communities into private ownership, causing people to lose their daily income from fishing. The 
content of the protest is interesting: local populations turned to the state – here, the municipal 
governor – to protect public land (the state estate) against grabbing and privatisation. As far as the 
law is concerned, the 2001 land law creates three types of land classification: State Private, State 
Public and Private land. State Public Property (Art. 15 and 16) is land held by the state in public trust, 
which carries a public interest use. It includes the properties of a natural origin, such as the 
permanent forest reserve, floatable waterways, lakes, etc. It is important to note that State Public 
Property may not be sold or transferred to other legal entities, though it may be subject to rights of 
occupancy or use that are strictly temporary in nature. 
Second case: conflict between two commune councillors of Bet Trang and a group of villagers 
(more than 100 villagers) over the accusation of selling peoples’ chamkar land 
More than 100 people in Bet Trang commune, Prey Nup district filed a complaint (with thumb 
prints) to the court in relation to two Bet Trang commune councillors, namely Mr. Kuy Nen and Mr. 
Sam Pha. The people accused them of collusively and illegally selling the peoples’ chamkar land 
which is located about 10 km away from NR 4. The people involved in the conflict said that this land 
was previously densely forested and populated by ferocious animals; they started to clear forest for 
cultivation in 1995 and have been farming up until now. Unfortunately, the land was measured 
(surveyed) and sold by the two councillors. Mr. Kuy Nen denied having done this. He would just 
have accompanied land owner to visit the land. He means that this land currently used by local 
farmers actually belonged to the man who holds a certificate of land possession and use. He 
added that the claimants are in fact only people who have been illegally occupying this land. (RK, 
04 June 2005 and case study). 
Regarding the violation of private land in this commune, the provincial court ordered to arrest 
five officials in September 2006, including officials of Prey Nup district office of land management 
and the chief of Bet Trang commune. Today, two accused are arrested, and are waiting for the 
court ruling (RK, 07 and 15-16, Oct. 2006). 
Third case: conflict between soldiers and a group of farmers of around 100 farm households in 
Bet Trang commune over rights to chamkar lands that have been cleared since 1996 
The conflict between a group of soldiers and 100 households on forest land in Phnom Roung 
located in Chrang Krahorm area occurred with gun and rifle (B 40) in order to sweep people out of 
the disputed land. On 29th March 2005, around 10 soldiers arrested three people (two men, one 
woman) and illegally and seriously punished them when they went to do chamkar (grow) on the 
disputed land. After that, three people were evicted from the chamkar land. The 100 families have 
cultivated on the chamkar land for 10 years (since 1996) and grow fruit trees such as coconuts, jack 
fruits and mangos but they had never met problems. On the same day (29th March), 10 soldiers 
entered the area and threatened people by saying that the land belonged to them. They 
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confirmed themselves that they liberated from the Khmer Rouge and they do not allow any person 
to grow anymore on this land. (RK on June 04, 2005). On July 8th 2005, the Bet Trang Commune chief, 
Mr. Sgnuon Chom, affirmed that land owners (he means the soldiers) will compensate people for 
land clearing and crop loss at US$50 per hectare. This resolution was made with only five families. 
The remainder has not been resolved yet. During the conciliation process, the commune councillors 
did not show up and later on, they received records (written papers) with the signature of both 
parties from the soldiers. People would have received compensation. The representative of the 
victim households said that the group of soldiers promised to give an addition of US$300 to the 
US$100 for medical treatment. However, until now people have not received any money. They 
received only 50,000 riels at the beginning. LICADHO’s agent based in SHV confirmed that they 
hadn’t received any complaint from either side, yet. (RK, June 04, 2005) 
On July 18th, 2005, about 100 people in Bet Trang commune rented a taxi and travelled to the 
house of the Prime Minister Hun Sen to ask him to intervene in the conflicting land dispute. However, 
they were flanked by the police. (RK, 19 July 2005). 
Another serious case of a land dispute in Prey Nup commune/district regards the illegal 
occupation of land in areas of natural eco-system conservation. It is suspected that delineation and 
demarcation of the national park of Ream have been done without a field survey or investigation 
on the ground. People would possess land for cultivation before the national park was created with 
the issuance of royal decree in 1993. To date, people are requesting their rights to land ownership, 
but this has been refused by the authorities. In any case, the latter cannot intervene as long as the 
government has not reviewed the boundary of the national park. We have learned that people 
living in village of Bot Koki, O Oknhaheng (O Oknhaheng commune), Boeung Taprum and Boeung 
Tasrei (Boeung Taprum commune) have been occupying 650 ha45 of land in the national park for 
cultivation since 1980s via distribution by local authorities and clearing. 
In the case of unresolved disputes in the polders, many land occupants do not agree to pay 
water use fees even though they have cultivated rice, unless they receive land titles, which cannot 
be done in those areas formally included in the national park.46 According to the regulation, land 
owners have to pay water fees. 
Experiences in other areas in Cambodia have shown that in cases of land conflicts between 
people and powerful men or government officials, the former generally lose unless the Prime Minister 
Hun Sen intervenes (Pel Sokha et al., 2004). During the national meeting on food security in 1999, he 
used to warn powerful individuals and rich people who illegally hold and fenced on land, and land 
grabbing: “If these cases could not be eliminated a farmer revolution will happen against the 
government.” However, large areas of land are concentrated in the hands of ‘big’ /powerful men 
and land grabbing could not be prevented. In particular, in the new areas, land is still cleared even 
though the forestry law in 2002 banned the cutting of new forest trees. The government has 
obviously failed to deal with land disputes so far. 
In 2004, in his speech, the Prime Minister Hun Sen urged rich and powerful persons to give up any 
land they had acquired illegally. On September 01, 2005, during the inauguration ceremony of a 
tree nursery in Svay Rieng, he made a statement about the confiscation of 220,000 ha of state-
owned land that was illegally grabbed. Hun Sen’s statement also supported the enforcement of the 
article 18 of the 2001 land law. 
In the villages and communes we have investigated (Bet Trang, O’Oknha Heng and Prey Nub), 
there were other types and causes of land disputes which related to land transactions: 
                                                            
45 Result of the workshop in Sihanoukville on March 2004. Data from Jean Marie Brun, coordinator of rehabilitation project of 
polders of Prey Nup (GRET). 
46 All owner of rice land in the polders have to pay 28,700 riel ($US 7.2) per ha and season to the Polder User Community. 
Water fee is not collected from the tenant. 
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> Conflict between villagers and soldiers with regard to illegal land encroachment and land 
expropriation. 
> Conflict between four parties: villagers (land owners), land borrowers, the first land buyer 
(military) and second land buyer (wealthy people) related to buying by instalment, sale of land 
with unclear right and loan. 
> Conflict between villagers and a company (through land broker) over encroachment on the 
rice land of villagers (land size on certificate of land possession larger than the actual size). 
> Conflict between land buyer and land owner over double sale of land (to two different buyers). 
> Conflict between brother and young brother in-law over a loan of residential land. 
> Conflicts between villager (occupant) and villager (former owner) over right claims on rice land. 
> Conflicts between new land owner/occupant (new comers) and land buyers (owners) over 
land right outside and within the national park. 
Conflict between four parties: land owners (villagers), land borrowers (villagers), the first land 
buyer (military) and the second land buyer (wealthy people) related buying in instalment, sale of 
land with unclear rights and loan since 1998 
The chiefs of village reported that this conflict occurred in 2005 on 15 ha of Chamkar land in Pou 
Thoeung village, Bet Trang commune, Prey Nup district due to the illegal expropriation of land. He 
added that villagers of 13 families in Pou Thoeung and Chamnoat Ream villages (Party A) cleared 
forest land in Pou Thoeung village in 1989 and applied for a receipt of land possession in 1990. In 
1995, the soldiers (Party B) threatened those families to sell that land to them at a price of US$200 
/ha. After party A sold that land, they did not receive money, not even the deposit. They waited for 
a long time for the money from the selling of land but did not receive it. Thus, they went to ask chief 
of commune and made a letter with him indicating that they, party A, had not received any money 
yet. In 1998, there were 10 farm-families (Party C), living also in Pou Thoeung and Chamnoat Ream 
villages, who borrowed that land from the chief of village and party A to cultivate. Also, the process 
of borrowing was not written down. In March 2005, Mr. Thai Uy (Party D),claimed that he bought 
land from the military and told Mr. Nop Ven, his land keeper and as villager of Chamnoat Ream 
village, to file a complaint to the commune to get that land back because he (Party D) bought it 
from the military. Mr. Thai Uy claimed that land from those villagers. However, villagers of 13 families 
(Party A) did not agree. Moreover, villagers who asked for loan of that land to cultivate (Party C) 
also claimed that land for ownership and they committed to settle on it for ever, whatever happens. 
Until now, this case of conflict remains unresolved. 
The land borrower claimed for ownership, relying on the fact that he occupied and used this 
land before the issuance of the 2001 land law (Art. 30). He uses article 30 which states, “any person 
who, for no less than five years prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested 
possession of immovable property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request 
a definitive title of ownership,” and article 38, “In order to transform into ownership of immovable 
property, the possession shall be unambiguous, non-violent, notorious of the public, continuous and 
in good faith.” However, occupying land for over five years does not automatically mean ownership 
if borrowing was processed with a written contract. 
Conflicts between the occupant and the former owner (both being local villagers) over right to 
rice land 
Both conflict parties and people in O’ Tapang reported that the conflict of rice land occupation 
occurred in 2000 in O’ Tapang village, O’ Oknha Heng commune, Prey Nup district during the SLR 
between Mr. Tith Noeun (Party A) and Mr. Prum Pha (Party B) who both live in O’Tapang village. 
Party A, who has cleared that land since 1987, reported that his 0.4 ha of rice land was grabbed by 
Party B in 2000. Thus, Party A filed a complaint to the chiefs of village and commune seeking their 
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intervention. However, there was no resolution to date. Consequently, Party A filed a complaint to 
an upper institution, the SHV municipal court. However, the court sentence ruled in favour of Party B. 
There after recognised as landowner. Party A re-asserts he has cleared shrub land in 1987 for rice 
cultivation since that time without any complaint from another person. While clearing land, Party B 
did not ban Party A from clearing. But in 2000, he applied for ownership of that land. 
With regard to the dispute between the occupant and the former owner (both being local 
villagers), article 76 of the 1992 land law is the key text. The former owner received land through 
distribution in 1980s but abandoned it afterwards leaving it unexploited until the shrubs have re-
grown. However, he had received a written document from the local authorities. The poor land 
villagers who became the new owners cleared land for rice cultivation since the end of 1980s (or 
1996?) until 2000 (without any formal recognition at the village or commune levels). Thus, the 
judgement should refer to the 1992 land law, not the 2001 land law. The article 76 of the 1992 land 
law states that any land abandoned by its possessor during three consecutive years shall become 
part of the private domain of the state. However, this measure was abolished by the 2001 land law, 
thus creating a legal gap, or at least allowing a strategic choice between both legal frames of 
reference. 
Similarly, conflict between villagers (who can be displaced people or occupants) and land 
buyers, the actual owners, over land right in the national park was a complicated matter. It involved 
three parties; farmer-occupants (displaced peoples), urban dwellers (the land buyers) and the 
National Park of Ream belonging to the state domain. Referring to the article 76 of 1992 land law, 
the land should belong to displaced people. However, the land buyers have land documents. For 
instance, the wealthy urban buyer has obtained a certificate of possession of immovable property 
after he bought the land from villagers. However, the national park, which was established by a 
Royal Decree in 1993, overlaps the plot and is the owner within these boundaries. In this case the 68 
farm-households lost their ownership of land, but they have use rights for cultivation (see case 
below). 
Conflict between new land owner/occupants (newcomers) and land buyers (actual owners) 
over land rights in the national park 
The vice chief of village and O’ Oknha Heng villager reported that this conflict occurred in 2005 
in O’ Tasek village (O’ Oknha Heng commune, Prey Nup district) between land buyers and villagers 
because the land buyer had violated villagers’ land. He added that between 1992 and 1998, there 
were farmers displaced from Kampong Trach district (Kampot province) to be resettled in O’ Tasek 
village. They had cleared forest land for housing and rice cultivation. Some farmers asked the 
permission of the village chief and some had not. In 1998, the village chief told them that this land 
belonged to the Ream National Park. They stayed there notwithstanding. In 2005, urban dwellers 
hired labour to fence that land. This caused a dispute with 68 farm-households. Those farmers did 
not file complaints against the land owner/grabber because of the landowner’s social and 
economic capital. That land was bought by an urban dweller in 1989-1992 but was unused and 
abandoned until 2005. 
This case strikingly illustrates the multilayered nature of property relations in land, both in terms of 
discrepancies between successive legal texts and of the history of settlement, land clearing and 
occupancy. Conflicts arise out of discrepancies and contradictions between these layers of texts 
and of people. 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 143 
Stakeholders’ groups in land issues 
As seen in the other provinces (see the approach and policy chapters for elaborations on the 
topic), brokerage and intermediary actors are a widespread phenomenon as far as land 
transactions are concerned. We can distinguish brokers involved in the transactions themselves, 
especially sales and purchases, and intermediary actors playing a role in the access to the 
regulatory framework: legal and administrative brokers helping actors access to legal information 
and public authorities. One must also analytically differentiate the brokerage as social function from 
the brokers as social actors. With regard to land transactions for instance, brokers can be private 
people or public authorities’ representatives. 
• Brokers involved in land transactions 
As far as land sales and purchase are concerned, there are different profiles of land brokers: 
village chiefs, commune councillors, the military/police and villagers. Land brokers can be private 
people or public authority representatives, they can also be more or less local people or outsiders to 
the local arena. 
The commune councillors play an important role in resolving land conflicts. Besides, they act as 
land brokers for economic reasons. The money they receive from land brokerage is reinvested in 
new purchases of land for speculative purposes. They buy land to sell to urban dwellers from SHV 
and Phnom Penh. 
One can also observe alliances between local and urban brokers in order to gain a broader 
access to information on both potential buyers and sellers. Moreover, the representatives of local 
authorities have in-depth knowledge of the local land situation, which gives them a comparative 
advantage when they act as brokers. 
The different categories of buyers have different strategies with regard to land brokers. Urban 
land buyers buy rural land through different brokers, while companies buy land through the 
intervention of local authorities because they can buy large tracts of land, especially through a 
mixture of persuasion and threat. The broker can receive 5% of the total land value. Brokerage fees 
can be higher for the companies. When the loan is turned into a rental arrangement after two or 
three years (see above), brokers, in cases where they are village chiefs, commune chiefs or police, 
receive a part of the rental fee; up to 20% of the total amount. 
In the brokerage process, the local land brokers first go to meet land brokers in urban areas in 
the search for land buyers or land demands. After knowing the size, location and proposed price, 
they return to the village to persuade villagers to sell their land. Urban people or land buyers come 
to meet local brokers to make first contact, to seek villagers who want to sell land. Otherwise, the 
local brokers know the local situation well. The buyers also tell them about the size and location they 
need. When they have succeeded in convincing land owners to sell their land, in some cases, they 
arrange a meeting between both parties to negotiate the price. In most cases, the land sellers 
never meet the buyers from the beginning of negotiation until they receive the money. When both 
the sellers and buyers agree on the price, the land brokers prepare a contractual document of land 
sale. The village chief acts as a witness and the commune chief gives formal – if not legal – 
recognition to the sale. However, there is an objective alliance between land brokers and 
commune chiefs or councillors in land sales/purchases. Often, land brokers deposit some money to 
land sellers as a guarantee of land purchase. After making the contractual document of land sale, 
the local land brokers (villagers) take that document to meet the land brokers in urban areas and 
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bring the money to land owners. The land buyers’ and brokers’ strategy – persuading farmers/ 
landowners to sell their lands – leads them to purchase (often at a high price) the land surrounding 
a plot that the owner does not want to sell. In this case, the villagers have to sell land at a lower 
price because of the current barrier in accessing the plot. The costs of preparing the contractual 
document of land sales are borne by the land buyers. Then, after a few days, or one month later, 
they usually obtain the receipt of land possession with the change of name and the sale contract. 
The final payment is made at the time of receiving the receipt of land possession and sale contract. 
Brokers operating at the village level build alliances with commune councillors to facilitate the 
process for a brokerage fee of 5%, excluding the cost of land transfer paid to the district registration unit. 
Nowadays, it seems that the importance of land brokers has decreased. Land sales/purchases 
are more rarely processed through brokers because urban people tend to look for land sellers by 
themselves and they negotiate directly by phone with the landowner. Another emerging trend is 
represented by land brokers who are directly hired by companies willing to buy land and acting 
both as brokers and then land keepers (collecting rental fees). For example: 
Mr. Pho Chham, a policeman based in Tuol village, Teuk Laak commune. He has four children 
living in Chamnoat Ream village, Bet Trang commune, Prey Nup district. He is also a farmer. Besides 
his job as a policeman, he is also a land broker who buys land in Bet Trang commune for the 
Chinese Company, ‘Ho Sin Thien’. Moreover, he is in charge of collecting the land rental fee for 
another company ‘Yos Sokuntheary’. Thus, he earns 20% of total collected rental in-kind of paddy. 
Mr. Pon Bun and Mr. Song Bo are commune councillors of Prey Nup commune. They play an 
important role in resolving land conflicts. Besides this, they act as land brokers to increase their 
income. The money they receive from land brokerage is reinvested in land purchase and 
speculation. They buy land and then they sell it back to urban dwellers from SHV and Phnom Penh. 
These two examples show the key role of land brokerage in connecting both private 
entrepreneurship and public authorities, and rural and urban spheres. 
• Formal and informal politico-legal institutions 
The regulatory framework applied to land tenure in SHV is constituted by a multiplicity of 
stakeholders: the ministry of land management, human rights organizations: ADHOC, LICAHDO and 
CSP (Coalition Sangkros Phothochon), and GRET as a development NGO. This is a clear expression 
of the institutional pluralism already mentioned. 
Ministry of land management (including the national cadastral commission-NCC) 
Identifying the land registration process led us to understand the nature and the limits of 
government intervention in preventing and resolving land disputes and also preventing them from 
losing their land. LMAP is a project based in the Ministry of Land Management and responsible for 
the implementation of the SLR in the Commune (Sangkat) of Teuk Laak in Prey Nup district, while 
GRET funded the land registration in the polders in order to facilitate the collection of water fees. 
There are two modalities of land registration and titling: sporadic land registration and systematic 
land registration: 
• Sporadic land registration: This was conducted following the land registration campaign in 
1992-93, particularly for land in the urban area of Mittapheap district and for residential land 
in Prey Nup. Many powerful men or large land owners have benefited from this phase of 
sporadic land registration and they have held certificates of possession for rice land in the 
polders in Prey Nup district since 1992-1993. 
• Systematic land registration (SLR): This was conducted first in 1999, in Prey Nup district, SLR 
(pre-LMAP) in the polder zones benefiting from the dam preventing salty water intrusion. A 
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land registration project was implemented by LMAP-staff47, and funded by GRET in order to 
facilitate the collection of irrigated water fees. 22,458 plots or about 10,000 ha of rice land in 
the polders of nine communes of Prey Nup district were registered but only nearly 90%48 were 
titled. Titles were released to people in 2003. The land titles were not issued for disputed plots 
and occupancy rights were not clear (also in the part of the polder 1 unfortunately included 
in the Ream National Park boundaries). 
Since 2003, LMAP has conducted an SLR for land outside the polders in Sangkat (commune) Teuk 
Laak, and in 2005, the SLR team planned to register 28,200 plots in Prey Nup district. However, up to 
August 2005, only 33 % of the plan had been achieved49. The titling process was delayed due to two 
constraints:  
1. The large areas of unexploited land bordering villagers’ residential or rice lands and those 
belonging to high ranking officials or urban dwellers. In this case, the SLR team faced the 
problem of inviting such owners to come for thumb printing or signing to recognise the plot 
border. 
2. The plots of land are in conflict. Many cases of land disputes remain unresolved even 
though they were referred to the NCC in Phnom Penh, particularly those disputes over land rights 
between the new owners (occupants) and the former (old) owners (see cases above). 
Many cases of land dispute remain unresolved even though they were brought to the NCC in 
Phnom Penh. The NCC received a total of 4,000 cases of land disputes up to October 200650, with 
over 37% of the total cases involving government officials51. The NCC resolved 889 cases between 
2003 and 2005, out of 3,257 cases (RGC, 2005). However, systematic land titling is time-consuming, 
and faces a lack of technical competence52. 
National Cadastral Commission (NCC) 
The NCC received complaints of land dispute cases involving ‘big men’ during a public display 
of systematic land titling in 2003, but they have not been resolved so far. However, officials said the 
former (old) land owners have certificates of land possession and thus should be the land owners. 
However, maybe the NCC fails to resolve disputes involving high ranking government officials 
because of the political (and economic) pressure exerted on the commission.  
Provincial Committee on Forest Clearance and Encroachment 
On May 29, this committee declared an expropriation of 9,444 ha of forested land (6,971 ha in 
Prey Nup district), referring to Botbanhchea (Regulation) No 01, and Deika (decision) of the 
municipal authority. Most of the newly cleared land has a title issued in 2005. The military unit of the 
municipality has 2,700 ha with a title issued in 1996, and some of land occupants have only a letter 
attesting the land right transfer. In this case, the land owner can complain within 30 days.  
ADHOC, LICAHDO and CSP (Coalition Sangkros Phothochon) 
The three human rights NGOs have tried to assist people by organizing training on land law and 
workshops on land issues. They have helped people involved with land disputes over how to file 
complaints, and monitor complaints that have been referred to the court or the cadastral 
commissions (CC). Sometimes, they monitor the land dispute process and help people who have 
                                                            
47 LMAP is the project the department of land management and administration of the Ministry of Land Management 
Administration Urban Planning and Cadastre. 
48 Samne Thmei, 03-16 Jan. 2005 (Municipal New Daily in Khmer). 
49 Data obtained from LLIN (currently LAND) meeting on 26 August 2005. 
50 Data obtained from LAND meeting on 19 Oct. 2006. 
51 Franz-Volker Müller, GTZ head of LMAP, reported during the meeting on 16.Sept.2005 with LAND. 
52 RK, 22 April, 2005 and report during LAND meeting on 28 Jan. 2005.  
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been arrested. They negotiated with companies or land owners to compensate people who have 
had to move off the land. However, they also complain of a lack of cooperation from the CCs. 
 
 
Land inequity 
The analysis of land inequity helps us visualise the high degree of land concentration which 
seems to be the main characteristic of landholding distribution in Prey Nup district. 26% of 
interviewed FHs, who each have 1 ha or less, occupy about 5.5% of total land. Around 37% of FHs 
hold land more than 3 ha each and occupy around 66% of total land. However, a Gini-coefficient 
(0.44) confirms the conclusion that 20% of FHs investigated own around 5% of total land, while 
another 20% own around 50% of the total area. Some farmers have also sold land and become 
ALFs. 
• Agricultural landless farmers 
In our study, agricultural landless farmers (ALFs) are defined either as farmers who have never 
had farm land and/or as those who had to sell all their agricultural land to meet an immediate need 
for cash. Among the three communes studied (Bet Trang, O’ Okha Heng, and Prey Nup), on 
average, nearly 52% of total households have no agricultural land. In Bet Trang commune, the 
number of ALFs is very high (74%) because there has been a high incidence of land sales, and the 
commune is crossed by NR 4 and located close to urban development areas.53 The main reasons 
that farmers do not have farm land are: immigration from other provinces (73% of interviewed ALF), 
selling (under the pressure of strong persuasion and threat, 27%), crop damage (13%), illness (7%) 
and other reasons.  
The first factor (immigration) shows that no inclusion mechanisms are available to allow outsiders 
to gain access to land property. The others show that, at least with regard to sales involving landless 
farmers, the notion of the market as conforming to the concept of bargaining process between 
formally equal partners is largely irrelevant. The social working of land markets is a rather crude 
expression of uneven power relations and pervasive violence (at least latent, in the form of threat). 
The following criteria help to refine landlessness as a social category in terms of actual land 
rights. Although they have no land in ownership, farming remains ALF’s main economic activity 
besides their other activities such as: fishing, collecting NTFP or charcoal production in order to 
sustain their livelihoods. They access land for rice cultivation through renting (53% of the interviewed 
ALFs) and loan (41%). Responding to questions about their near future – how they will make their 
living in the next two or three years – many ALFs (33%) show an interest in increasing their agricultural 
production, running business such as small-scale trading or groceries. Some ALFs (7%) planned to 
move to the new agricultural development area to seek farmland. Most of them (53%) want the 
government to distribute farmland to them, stressing again (from another point of view) the 
importance of administrative transactions in land property relations. 
                                                            
53  Our field study in 3 in 2005. 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 147 
Summary of the main findings 
• Modalities of access to land 
Land was distributed in the early 1980s but farmers cleared more land for cultivation than for 
selling. The economic development by the establishment of industry and special economic zones 
has entailed the development of land markets (functioning through persuasion/threats with the 
active involvement of land brokers) and an increasing land concentration. This has had an effect on 
the evolution of agrarian contracts. Moreover, there are different modalities of access to land such 
as loans of land, renting, sharecropping, pawning, purchasing and inheritance. 
People have expanded their cultivated land by clearing degraded forestland for cultivation 
even though the government banned deforestation through a declaration (sechkdei prakas) in 
1999 and the 2002 law on forestry. Land use planning without people’s participation, and 
demarcation of protected areas without field survey led to the overlapping of residential and 
cultivated areas, and could cause people to lose their land. 
Regarding the agrarian contract, we observe a growing substitution of sharecropping by 
leasing. However, sharecropping remains practiced between relatives without written contract, and 
the harvested product is shared depending on contribution of capital and labour by both land 
owners and tenants or farmers. 
Loans of land are made by urban land buyers and companies for the 2-3 years following land 
purchase, without written contract. They are generally changed into written contracts or to leasing 
with a written contract witnessed by the village chief and recognized by the commune chief (with 
renegotiation at the beginning of the next cropping season). However, loans of land to relatives are 
still practiced without written contracts. 
• Land sales/purchases 
Land sales to companies and urban dwellers peaked in 1995-96 because of the effect of foreign 
investment and speculation, and involved an alliance of local and urban land brokers with local 
authorities. Then, the brokers become land keepers and rental fee collectors for the companies or 
urban dwellers. Some companies provided all collected rental fees to the local authorities and 
pagoda as a strategy to secure their land. However, sales/purchases have increasingly changed to 
involve direct contact between land sellers and land buyers through the telephone. In many cases, 
farmers have sold land under the pressure of threats by potential buyers, brokers or local authorities, 
and this phenomenon expresses the strong institutional and legal insecurity experienced by villagers 
and farmers. 
Land sales and purchases were registered and recognized by the local authorities (village and 
commune chief). However, for sales and purchases of large-scale rice land, the land transfer was 
registered at the district office of land management, urban planning, construction and cadastre 
(OLMUPCC). However, most newly cleared land being bought by urban dwellers or rich people 
have recent certificates of land possession issued in 2005-206. 
In the urban development zone, land prices increased more than 1,000% over the last 5 years. 
However, land prices have decreased in the industrial zones as the government banned land 
sales/purchases in order to generate a favourable climate for foreign investment. 
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Many farmers have sold part of their land or all of their land and have become landless and land 
poor farmers. In reaction, they try to gain access to land by clearing forest land for cultivation. 
Sometimes, land clearing leads to disputes with powerful people or the military, who claim the legal 
right to land. Moreover, those farmers who do not have large plots of rice land in the polder clear 
degraded forests illegally, hoping that the government will release it to them. Thus, we can see the 
link between land sales, land clearing, conflicts and rural/urban uneven relations. 
• Land disputes 
The reconstruction of dams/polders and other infrastructure projects have entailed an increase 
in land prices. Disputes around land grabbing issues have been frequent as land ownership rights 
were not clarified or remained unsecured when projects started. 
Small rice farmers, who lack rice land, have been forced to rent their land back from powerful 
men who bought their plots. Due to legal gaps and unfair dispute-resolving mechanisms, farmers 
have often lost their land even though they occupied and used it over 5 years before the 2001 land 
law. However, the SLR in the polders has made water fee collection easier and helped local 
authorities to resolve land disputes rapidly. 
In the SLR zones, land disputes have decreased due to land titles. However, disputes between 
the former owners as the powerful men and farmers remain un-resolved despite the intervention of 
different legal brokers such as the human rights NGOs, and although the complaints on land 
disputes are referred to the NCC in Phnom Penh. The land rights of farmers in the National Park 
remain unclear even though they occupied land for farming before the establishment and 
delimitation of this protected area. Farmers who cultivate on land under dispute refuse to pay water 
fees as long as they don’t have land titles. 
The number of ALFs would increase if the government wanted to repossess all land in the Ream 
national park and newly cultivated land which was cleared before the issuance of 2002 law on 
forestry. Economic development and land market mechanisms have resulted in an increase of land 
inequity and concentration (this is also due to ineffective tax collection on unused land and the 
absence of a land tax). Land inequity, the absence of a land tax and of legal instruments (law or 
article) in favour of the farmer tenants generate increasing rural poverty, opposing the poverty 
alleviation strategy formally supported by the government. 
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CHAPTER VI.  
 
Rotanak Kiri 
 
Pel Sokha, Laing Lon, Pel Setha and Im Sothy 
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Context 
• Regional context 
Rotanak Kiri province (RTNKR) is situated in the north-eastern part of Cambodia and has 16,758 
households with a total population of 94,243 (NIS, 1998). The population in the province increased 
from 99,733 in 2000 to 124,403 in 2004, or by 27.7%, with an annual growth rate of 5.5% compared to 
the national rate of population growth of 1.83%.54 In 2004, over 57% of the total population 
belonged to 11 ethnic minority groups55 (Brao, Jorai, Kachac, Kraol, Kraveth, Kreung, Kuy, Lun, 
Phnong, Stieng and Tampuan). However, the exact number of new migrants is unknown. It is 
reported that there are approximately 1,000 new settlers every year, in particular, from the provinces 
of Kampong Cham and Kratie. Earlier, Rotanak Kiri was considered to be no more than an isolated 
province until the introduction of an eco-tourism development policy which requires the 
construction of roads and other infrastructure. This has led to a wave of immigration and land sales, 
occurring in most cases along the main roads. 
The government plans to develop RTNKR as an Eco-Tourism zone as outlined in its Triangular 
Development Strategy. The three neighboring countries of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will work 
together to meet this plan. Moreover, in relation to promoting travel in the northeast, there is a 
concern that land rights for indigenous communities will buckle under the weight of tourism 
development and the development of cashew and rubber plantations. 
There are different modalities by which ethnic minorities and Khmer settler’s access land, 
including clearing with the permission or without the permission of community leaders, gifts, 
purchasing, renting and loans of land. These modes can be classified into two groups: non-
monetary transactions (including administrative transactions, grants, land clearing, inheritance, gifts) 
and monetary transactions. Monetary transactions could be also classified into two groups: selling 
and agrarian contracts (renting, sharecropping, etc.). Moreover, people had no tradition of selling 
their land in the period before 1995 when land was easily exchanged for food or other goods such 
as motor cycles, etc. After gaining experience of land transactions over time, villagers have started 
to plant trees to identify the boundaries of their land. At present, the Khmer new settlers can gain 
access to land for cultivation by buying, leasing, borrowing from other villagers or snatching the 
forest land of a local community or villager (concessions, grants, access through corruption, etc.). 
Meanwhile, non-Khmer farmers can access land by clearing forests, sharing with their relatives, 
inheritance and buying from other villagers. Land rights transfer modalities are also arranged in both 
forms: land appropriation (alienation) and agrarian contracts. 
• Local context 
Regarding the local context, the situation of in-depth studied villages (Sek, La En and Lon) 
related to population, land areas, land use, settlement, development project or investment can be 
described as follows: 
Sek village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district is located along national road (NR) No. 78 
about 20 km to the northwest of Banlung market. People in this village belong to the Kreung ethnic 
group which is one of the eleven ethnic minority groups living in RTNKR. In 2004, Sek village had 120 
                                                            
54  New data of population growth rate is 1.83 (NIS, 2004). 
55  But, the rate is 85% estimated by PDA in 2005. 
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households and a total population of 523 people. Between 1998 and 2004 the village had an 
annual household growth rate of 22.5% with a population growth rate of 9.3% per year. Sek village 
has a total area of 481 ha, which includes 3 ha of residential area (0.6%), 30 ha of rice field, 250 ha 
of plantation land (52%), 50 ha of forest land (10.40%) and 1 ha of a burial ground (0.21%). Sek 
village has a population density of 109 people per km². It was formed in 1930, when it was called 
Labaing Sek village because it was established by an elderly man named Labaing and his son, Sek, 
who were living on the Kachagn rubber plantation. In 1965, the government used the area for 
planting rubber. Villagers were moved to the recent village because the government feared that 
villagers’ livestock was destroying the rubber plants. The new location the people were moved to 
was called Seak village. Many years later, the name of the village was changed from Seak to Sek, 
because at that time, the father Labaing, passed away. One member of the commune in Banlung 
was already named Labansek. In 1970 during the coupe to overthrow King Norodom Sihanouk, 
villagers ran into the forest in O Charloy area, which is about 10 km from the current village to 
escape from the bombardment of the US military. Other villagers ran into the forest to join the 
revolutionary movement. Villagers lived in O Charloy for five years before moving out to the O 
Tateun dam which is about 6 km in the east of the recent village. During the Pol Pot regime, villagers 
were evacuated to work in the rice fields together. After 1979, villagers still lived and cultivated rice 
in the area until 1982. People moved into the current village since at that time the government 
wanted villagers to live near other villages in order to protect them from the Pol Pot’s guerrillas and 
due to the desire of villagers to cultivate plantations. When they first moved into the area it was 
covered with forest. People living there were involved in shifting cultivation. Besides cultivating 
Chamkar rice, they also planted other crops such as soy beans, maize and cashew. The cultivation 
faced certain barriers such as: destruction of crops by wild animals such as wild pigs; heavy 
droughts, resulting in a shortage of water for irrigation and the death of livestock; and land 
encroachment by a number of powerful people. 
Sek village consists of Khmer, Kreung ethnic people and Cham (Khmer Islamic). Khmer and 
Cham ethnic people came to live in the area along with their relatives or friends. The urban dwellers 
bought land within the village not for building houses and living in the village, but for keeping and 
selling at a higher price. Meanwhile, some urban dwellers moved to the area and cultivated 
cashew trees/plantations so that they can demonstrate their land ownership. However, to date, 
there is no land sale broker in the village. Khmer people who want to buy land meet the ethnic 
person who wants to sell land directly. Regarding land holdings, all households hold cultivated land, 
but the area of land can be small or large depending on the household. Thus far, most ethnic 
households only have around 2 ha of land per household. They are very concerned about the 
availability of cultivatable land for the younger generation. In Sek, DPA (CIDSE), an NGO, working 
on land issues has helped villagers to establish community forestry. From 1980 until 2002, the village 
was administered by a chief named Ta Chey. He was nominated as the village chief because of his 
Kreung ethnic origin through his ancestors in the area. Due to his illiteracy, he resigned from being 
the village chief in 2002 and Mr. Dorn Kamphorn was then nominated to be village chief. In 2003, Mr. 
Dorn Kamphorn was selected as the second deputy of commune chief. Then, the commune 
nominated Mr. Char Ving Kaduke, of the Kreung ethnic group to be the new village chief in 2004. 
La En village, Toeun commune, Koun Mom district is located along NR No. 78 around 25 km to 
the northwest of Banlung center. La En is one of the two villages in which DPA started a pilot project 
of communal land registration. In 2004, La En village had a total population of 649 with 318 families 
in total. Between 1998 and 2004, the village had an annual family growth rate of 40.3%. Meanwhile, 
the population growth rate was 6.4% per year. The village has a total area of 558 ha with residential 
land of 2 ha (0.36%), 26.2% for rice fields, 51.6% Chamkar land and 21.9% forest land. The village’s 
population density is 116 persons per km². Before the Pol Pot regime, the village was classified into 
two groups due to jealousy and a challenge to be the tribe chief. The location of this village was 
moved many times due to disease and war. Later on, when the elderly people died, the younger 
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people gathered and lived together in one village. During the Pol Pot regime, the village was 
located at O56 Kves, O Prey (at present is La En) around 4 km in the northwest of the current village 
for collective rice cultivation. After 1979, villagers were still living there where they were farming for 
their living. However, some families were clearing forest land because they wanted to cultivate 
other crops on Chamkar land. Due to the widespread clearance of the forest, people established a 
village at the present location of Ta57 Sreng’s house (La En Chamkar). At first, there were no people 
living in the village besides the elderly people who came to pray to the forest spirit to establish a 
new village. In 1997, people moved out to live in their respective Chamkar because a lot of diseases 
spread through the village (2-3 people died every day). The village elderly decided to sell the 
village land to Ta Sreng in 1997, where each family received one head of cattle and the village 
elderly received a pair of buffalos from the sale of their residential land. The elder kept all the money 
from selling about 5 ha of Chamkar land around the residential land. In 1999, they moved to live on 
the current village land together by buying 2 ha of land from two village members at a price of 6 
Chi of gold (about US$270). The money used to buy the village land came from the fines imposed 
on Dangkab villagers who illegally sold the land of La En village. The village was classified into two 
groups because during the Pol Pot regime one group of people was cultivating rain-fed lowland 
rice there; La En Sre (La En rice field). Later on, some people preferred to cultivate other crops on 
Chamkar land so they came to La En Chamkar. Those who did not like to cultivate Chamkar 
crops/plantations continue to live there until now. 
In La En village, most of the villagers are Tumpoun ethnic minority people and others such as 
Khmer and Cham. The last two groups came to live in the village through their relatives or friends. 
Many people from Trapheang Chres commune (Koun Mom district, RTNKR) bought land in the 
village. These people did not stay permanently in the village. They only came in the rainy season for 
planting on that land. Regarding migration, Khmer people have moved into the village since 1991. 
Until now, La En village has around 40 Khmer families, but only 10 among those Khmer families 
became members of the community. The other 30 families came from Trapheang Chres commune 
and did not apply for community membership. As discussed earlier, they came to live in the village 
only in the rainy season where they grow soy beans and return to Trapheang Chres in the dry season 
in the same way as displaced people. Some Khmer men married ethnic girls and established their 
lives in this village. At present, there are six Islamic (Cham) families living in the village, of which one 
family has become a community village member because the family has resided in this village since 
2001. 
To date, La En village is classified into two parts; La En Sre village with around 40 families and La 
En Chamkar village. The classification was not made by the authorities but rather classified by 
villagers themselves according to the situation and natural factors. However, both parts of the 
village remain under the administration of one village chief. In La En village, people practiced 
shifting agriculture by planting rice, beans, corn and cashews. Agricultural activities have 
encountered a number of problems such as: wild animals (pigs etc) damaging crops, droughts 
leading to a shortage of water, cropping problems and the death of animals, and land 
encroachment by a number of powerful people violating villagers’ land. One of the village 
members is working as the first deputy chief of commune and he is involved with land dispute 
resolutions. By understanding that the future of ethnic people is unstable and becoming worse, due 
to the gradual loss of their agricultural land, some NGOs have started providing them with training 
on land law, and facilitation to establish community and land management committees in an effort 
to prevent ethnic farmers from losing their land for various reasons. These reasons include selling and 
violation. In La En village, DPA conducted a collective land registration on May 15, 2005. A villager, 
Mr. Leung Bar was elected as a legal individual /representative to register the ‘certificates of 
collective immovable property’. The election was carried out through an election with around 20 
                                                            
56  O means ‘natural water river’ or course. 
57  Ta means ‘elder man’. 
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participants. When the legal individual /representative was elected, the next step was to resolve 
land disputes, and then commence the registration process. 
In order to ensure smooth and easy coordination and management, the commune and district 
authorities have nominated only Tumpuon ethnic people to be the village chief and deputy chief. 
However, the nomination shall be done through an election by the ethnic people within the village. 
From 1980 until 1988, the village was administered by a chief named Pri Kayuok, a Tumpuon ethnic 
person, with his home town in the village. In 1988, Mr. Pri Kayuok resigned from the village chief 
position because he is illiterate. Later, Mr. Ngue Lou, nephew of the former village chief was 
nominated to be the new chief. In 2004, Mr. Ngue Lou was nominated as the second deputy chief 
of the commune and Mr. Leung Bar was nominated by the commune chief as the new village chief. 
He has completed his education at primary level and can read and write. Also, he is the village 
chief and community organizer elected by villagers through the facilitation of DPA. Additionally, he 
works as the village veterinarian and is also a rice farmer. 
Lon is one of the five villages of Yeak Loam commune of Banlung district. Lon village is located 
around 5 km to the north of Banlung center. The commune has an eco-tourism site called ‘Beoung 
Yeak Loam Eco-tourism’ at which income can be generated through visits by national and 
international tourists. In 2004, Lon village had a total of 107 families and a population of 546. 
Between 1998 and 2004, the village’s annual population growth rate was 4.8% per year. Lon has a 
total area of 1,125 ha out of which there are 20 ha of residential land (1.8%), 0.44% of rice field, 
88.9% Chamkar land, and 9% forest land. The village’s population density is 49 persons per km². 
Lon village was established a long time ago. Elderly village people and the village chief have 
unveiled the history of Lon village, in which La Po village chief bought around 100 ha from the 
elderly people in Lon village for residential land (La Po village chief and the elderly people in Lon 
village were relatives). Before Sangkum Reasniyum (Society that people prefer) time (1960s), the 
chief of Phnom village bought the land from chief of Pou Tang village in O Chum district for 
plantation and wildlife hunting. During the 1960s, Lon village was located in O Kraing which is about 
2 km to the west of the present village. In 1970, during the time after the coup d’état, people ran 
into the forest in O Kantrang which is around 1 km to the east of the present village and some 
people ran into the forest to join the revolution movement. In 1974, people were evacuated to O 
Sal, located around 4 km to the south of the present village to cultivate rice together. In 1975, Pol 
Pot evacuated people to O Tateung and in 1976; people were evacuated to Sorya village, around 
30 km to the south of the present village. In 1977, people were evacuated to O Chri which is around 
30 km to the east of the present village, and O Tateung in 1979. In 1980, government officials 
ordered people to move back to their respective villages. People traveled back to their villages but 
stopped over at Chres village (which is now a new village) because it was a long way to travel. In 
1985, they moved to the present location. 
The government relocated Lon village to the present location because it wanted them to live 
together so they could be easily protected from Pol Pot’s army. When they arrived at Lon village, 
people cleared forest for planting rice where the forest land belonged to the ancestors of Phnom 
village. At the time of forest clearance, the Phnom villagers did not say anything. It was only in 2004 
that they had a serious dispute. Until 1997, people normally cleared Chamkar land in the forest and 
returned into the village at night. From 1997, due to security reasons (stealing rice after the harvest), 
people started to live on their respective Chamkar land and come back to the village during 
ceremonies such as meetings and village praying ceremonies. 
From 1995, migration to the village began. Now, the village consists of eight Khmer families and 
one Islamic (Cham) family. They all came from Kampong Cham and Takeo provinces. At first in 
1995, there were only two Khmer families, and by 2004 the number of Khmer families had rapidly 
increased. Lon village is situated in the centre plateau (zone 1)58, with red volcanic soil (rhodic 
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ferrosols) and rolling hills with gently sloped elevation forming the common characteristics of the 
district. The main agricultural practices in Banlung district are upland rice cultivation, cashew nut 
and rubber plantation. The ethnic minority people practice shifting agriculture by planting rice 
mixed with other annual crops. However, recently they have adopted the cultivation of cashew 
trees. According to topography and cropping, the village could be classified into sub-zones of: 
Chamkar and Chamkar chas (fallow land); Community forest land; and Environment conservation 
zone of ‘Boeung (lake) Yeak Loam that is currently under community-based management. 
Since the practice of shifting agriculture with rotation of Chamkar land in 2002-03 stopped, and 
with the practice of permanent agriculture, many problems have occurred which have made rice 
yields decline rapidly. Rice yields have decreased twice and stand currently at about 750 kg per 
hectare. This is due to degradation of soil fertility that affects the soil erosion, drought and late 
rainfall. As a consequence, ethnic farmers have gradually planted cashew nut trees for cash 
income instead of rice and other annual crops. 
Most people in Banlung city bought land in this village but not for living on. They speculated land 
for making a profit, while other people planned to cultivate strategic crops such as cashew nut 
trees and to secure their land. All land transactions with urban people were normally carried out 
through the intervention of land brokers such as such as commune councilors, village chiefs, 
policemen and villagers. Due to the eco-tourism site of Yeak Loam Lake in the village, people from 
Banlung or from other provinces have bought a lot of land in this village for speculation. One 
member of Lon village became the first deputy chief of commune. In addition, he works as a land 
broker and persuades people to sell land and is also involved in resolving land disputes. However, 
elderly people are also involved in resolving land disputes. 
At the moment, Lon has no village chief since the death of the former village chief in 2004. All 
work in the village is carried out under the responsibility of Mr. Thang Man, the deputy village chief. 
He belongs to the Tumpoun ethnic group and has a very low level of education (he can read and 
write slightly). Besides his responsibility as deputy village chief, he also serves as a member of the 
aYeak Loam Lake conservation committee. 
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Figure 4: Map of Area Studied in Rotanak kiri 
 
 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 157 
According to the agro-eco system, Rotanak Kiri has been classified into four agro-ecological 
zones: 
1. Center plateau, with rich volcanic soil (rhodic ferrosols) and rolling hills with gentle slopes, 
elevation between 300-500 meters. 
2. Mountainous region is the highest zone in the province and is covered in dense evergreen 
forests, the main soil type is orphic crosols, the soil is black and grey forest soils, sandy clay or 
clay. 
3. Lowland plains and rivers zone consists of river plains. The average elevation is not more 
than 100 m. Main soil textures found are clay, sandy clay and salty. 
4. Hilly region normally has stiff slopes with an average elevation of 300 m. Dominant soil is 
pellic vertisols, red and grey forest soils (Hkum, 1995). 
 
Figure 5: Agro-ecological zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hkum (1995) and PDA of RTNKR. 
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The agro ecological constraints seem to be different from zone to zone. However, the common 
constraints that the upland farmers face are soil fertility degradation due to erosion and drought. In 
the urban areas or areas straddling the main road and NR 78, land disputes have become a serious 
issue due to land encroachment by new settlers which has caused ethnic farmers to lose their land. 
• Land transfer modalities in the communes studied 
In RTNKR, most farmers from ethnic minorities gain access to land through allocation by the 
community elders or traditional leaders who are an advisory group to the chief of village for 
effective decision making. This includes the regular re-allocation of land plots among community 
members and the resolution of land conflicts among community members or between community 
members and outsiders. They gain access to clearing community land, loans of land and renting, 
while the new immigrants gain access to land through purchases, encroachment on the community 
land, renting, borrowing of land and sharecropping. In some cases, the new settlers have been 
allocated community land when they became community members. From now on, allocation and 
clearing the communal land are becoming more difficult due to population pressure and 
enforcement of forestry law. Increasingly, inheritance and sales have become a common practice. 
 
Right transfer modalities in RTNKR Non-commoditised Commoditised 
Use rights - Loan 
(Exchange land/labor to keep the 
plantation and clear) 
- Economic land concession  
- Leasing 
- Sharecropping 
 
Transfer rights (appropriation) - Re-occupation of ancestors’ land 
- Occupation of land of other ethnic 
minority group with compensation in 
money and animals as fine  
- Inheritance 
- Clearing community forest  
- Encroachment 
- Allocation after becoming 
community members 
- Gifts 
- Purchases 
- Purchases with the intention to 
encroach on surrounded land 
- Capital investment 
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Land appropriation 
In RTNKR, land appropriation has been carried out by clearing community forest with or without 
the permission of the village elders, re-occupation of ancestors’ land, occupation of ancestors’ land 
of other ethnic minority people with monetary payment and giving rice wine for offering to 
ancestor’s spirit, inheritance, and sales/purchases. The recent evolution of the modes of land 
appropriation is summarized below: 
 
Date Modes of appropriation 
After 1979 Continued with free access to chamkar land by clearing, chamkar chas could be occupied 
by other ethnic minority people for shifting cultivation 
End 1980s Khmer people moved to RTNKR, access to land for cultivation remain free/easy 
1992-93 Urban dwellers seek to occupy land along NR 78 to Steung Treng, while non-Khmer local 
people have no tradition of selling land 
1994 Beginning the sale of residential land in the urban or provincial capital 
1995 • First sales of land by ethnic minority members in 1995 
• Granting a 20,000 ha land concession to a Malaysian Company, handing over to the 
Mitapheap (solidarity) Men Sarun and Rama Khmer Company in 1999, but the area reduced 
to 5,000 ha in 2004 
1996 Immigration from the lowlands, e.g. from Kampong Cham, Kracheh, Takeo. In Barkeo district, 
20% of people were Khmer settlers, they could access land through gifts from local people 
1996-2000 • New settlers could access land through exchange with consumable assets such as 
motorbikes, TVs, video recorders or other 
• Allocation of land in the areas far from the provincial capital ‘Banlung’ is still possible 
• Buying chamkar land is still at a lower price 
• Starting a cashew plantation (1999) 
2000 • Increasing sales/purchases of land straddling NR  
• Beginning land disputes  
2001 • Mostly, land extended from NR 78 to residential land was sold. In most cases, the length of 
plot of land was not limited so that the buyers could encroach into forest land 
• Khmer settlers who married ethnic people could receive land through allocation by the 
village leaders/chiefs 
Clearing forest land straddling NR was a serious problem, and led in many cases to land 
disputes 
2002-04 
Participatory land use planning (PLUP) in La En (CIDSE ) and La Enkraen (PLG)  
Sales/purchases of land peaked in the areas straddling the main roads 2004 
Sales/purchases of 500 ha of land in Pate Commune, Oyadav district led to land dispute 
between ethnic people and an urban land buyer 
2005 Revise PLUP referring to legal framework of the department of PLUP of the ministry in Phnom 
Penh  
A land dispute between members of an ethnic minority community (Tumpoun) and a 
powerful man in Toeun village was resolved by the PCC and assisted by CLEC 
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In January, the government granted a 9,380 ha of ELC in Oyadav district to Yo Thear 
(military) Development Region 1 and GIALAI Company Limited, duration of contract is 70 
years, for cultivation of rubber, cashew, crassna trees 
In June, the Provincial Committee on Forest Clearance and Encroachment expropriated 
nearly 400 ha of land in Banlung district, referring to Botbanhchea (Regulation) No 01, in 
May, 2006, and at the request of the National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution (NALDR). 
Unused, fenced land use is considered as state land but it was illegally occupied and mostly 
sold to the urban people 
2006 
Meeting between representatives of MLMUPC and more than 100 ethnic minority 
representatives from five provinces: Kratie, Mondolkiri, Preah Vihear, RTNKR and Steung Treng 
in Banlung town on Government’s plan and pilot project of indigenous land registration  
• Land distribution (customary re-allocation of land) 
No land allocation had been made by a solidarity group or local authorities in the province of 
Rotanak Kiri after 1979, contrary to what happened in lowland provinces. Ethnic minority people 
were displaced or evacuated many times between 1970 and 1979. As they returned to their 
respective villages they occupied land by settling and cultivating crops on their ancestors’ land or 
the land of ancestor of other ethnic minority groups/communities. Moreover, the occupation of the 
land of ancestors of other ethnic groups led to disputes later on, particularly since 2004 when the 
land market and prices peaked. The land belongs to the community according to customary law. 
The members of ethnic minorities also gain access to land through clearing but they have to ask for 
permission from the elders and village chief (administrative village chief). For some villages, those 
leaders also ask permission from the commune authorities. This is not a ‘traditional system’ but 
already a hybrid system with the intervention of local state representatives. Clearing the community 
land is still practiced in some villages but very far from the villages, because of population pressure, 
agrarian colonization and plantation development. Perhaps in the future the farmers will not be 
able to clear land anymore. They will access land through inheritance from their parents, borrowing 
from their community or through other institutional arrangements. However, the Khmer or Islamic 
(Cham) migrants have been allocated land when they became members of the community. 
• Economic land concession (ELC) 
In Oyadav district, a 20,000 ha land concession was granted to a Malaysian company in 1995 
(but a Khmer company ‘Mitapheap Men Sarun and Rama Khmer’ took over in 1999). In 1996, a trial 
planting of oil palm trees on 20 ha was a complete failure and the already cleared land was left 
unused. Later on, a village chief asked the district authorities to allocate land along NR to assist 
ethnic people to establish their houses. Each family paid 3,000 riels for 0.5 ha and had to sign a 
contract with the company, stipulating that the company could take back the land in 3 years if the 
villager did not use the land (Jeremy Ironside, 2001)59. The company grew coffee on 200 ha of land. 
Because the price of coffee has dropped this plantation is likely to be a failure too. 
The Seila Program assisted ethnic minorities to map the area they traditionally used60. In 1999, the 
company agreed not to expand beyond the 200 ha they had cleared in 1996. In 2000, the rest of 
the area was given back to the community. The concession area has been reduced to 5,000 ha in 
O Yadav district through an agreement signed by the provincial governor and company. However, 
recently, in cooperation with the Cambodian Yo Thear (military) Development Region 1, the 
Vietnamese firm 30/4 GIALAI Company Ltd. was offered the opportunity to establish a land 
                                                            
59  Jeremy Ironside-NTFP project and Sal Yuch , Options for Agricultural Development-A Case study from O’Yadao district, 
RTNKR in International Conference on Strengthening Partnerships in Community Natural Resources Management, Rotanak 
Kiri, 6-8 March 2001, volume two: conference papers, paper 31. 
60  NGO Forum on Cambodia reported in 2005. 
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concession61 of 9,380 ha along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border in O’Yadav district. The 
company wants to cut back the forest for the establishment of a rubber plantation. It reported that 
the firm recently gave Pak Nhai commune officials a car as a gift for communal use. Cases of land 
disputes occurring in these areas have been observed since August and communicated to ADHOC, 
a human rights organization. The duration of both ELCs is 70 years62. Moreover, many other foreign 
companies from Vietnam seek to get ELCs of up to 100,000 ha for rubber plantations in the 
northeastern provinces (RK, 2007 and key informants). 
• Land clearing 
Land clearing is the common practice of all ethnic minority groups, including Khmer people. The 
members of a community have the right to clear community land. They have been free to clear any 
part of land within the village for Chamkar63 land/plantation, until recently, when the area became 
less fertile. They left it uncultivated for 3-5 years, which allowed forest re-growth and looked for other 
areas for new Chamkar land. Now villagers do not leave their Chamkar land as they did in the past 
but they keep that area for future plantations because they understand that land is becoming more 
expensive. To date, clearing land is limited only to their community areas. Clearing land for shifting 
cultivation is increasingly far from the village. However, ethnic people claim land within the 
community area after people have sold it. In many cases, Khmer land buyers bought land and 
encroached into the forest land, which led to many cases of land disputes. Some big land buyers 
took workers from other provinces for clearing land. Some workers did not return home and settled 
on land that they cleared illegally near to the land bought by the big land buyers. The area of new, 
illegally cleared land is unknown. However, the forest administration (FA) is conducting a survey on 
it. The FA can not ban people from illegally clearing land if there is no cooperation from the 
commune and district authorities64. 
Newly married couples of ethnic communities receive land from their parents from both sides. If 
chamkar land is not enough they gain access to clear forest land which is considered as community 
land through a request to village leaders/chief and village land management committees. Only the 
community members and new couples or newcomers (relatives of the spouse) are allowed to clear 
community forest. However, in many cases, the village leaders/chief has not been informed when 
community forest land was sold by villagers. They permitted newcomers to clear forest land for 
farming. However, some newcomers sold the cleared land secretly, which also led to land disputes. 
For example: 
Case of selling land without informing the village leaders/chief: Mr. Suon Van, Kreung, living in 
Sek village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district requested to the village chief to clear 1 ha of land 
for his Chamkar and his brother requested to clear another 1 ha because they had just moved into 
the village in 2004 (moved from their wife’s village). Customarily, for Kreung people, men live in the 
wife’s village for farming for a while following the marriage and then they move to live in husband’s 
village. The village chief agreed with the request and showed the area to be cleared. After the land 
was cleared, a man named Sreng, a Khmer, interrupted and told Suon Van and his brother that he 
has bought the land extended untill O Cheng (name of stream in Ta Ang commune). When asking 
the seller to clarify, he said that the extent of land sold was within the boundary of old forest area 
only. Therefore, Suon Van sold the land he had cleared to Mr. Sreng to whom he paid 150,000 riels 
(about US$38) per ha for his labor in cleaingr the forest. Mr. Sreng admitted that if Mr. Suon Van did 
not agree to receive the money he would receive no compensation because the district and 
provincial levels had known that he (Sreng) was the owner of that land. Also, a Kreung villager sold 
land without informing the village chief and the Khmer land buyer has not yet used that land. For 
                                                            
61 Cambodian Daily, May 11, 2005) 
62 More News about MAFF, visit: http://www.maff.gov.kh/elc/lesign.html. 
63 Land which is used for growing crops other than rice; also in the upland areas it is used for growing upland rice. 
64 According to Mr. Toeum Sinath, Director of DLMUPC of RTNKR in RK, Sept 24, 2005 and Feb 8, 2006. 
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Mr. Suon Van, he thought that land belong to the community, as he has cleared the area. He can 
claim only money for labor cost as conciliation of land dispute. In this case, the village chief agreed 
under pressure from the high level administration. 
• Access to community land by marriage 
New Khmer immigrants can clear community land if they become a member of the community. 
The process of community membership is: 1) live within the community in a period, then apply for 
community membership; 2) marry the son or daughter of a member of the local ethnic population. 
When the member of the local group clears the land they have to inform village elders and the 
chief of village as well. For example: 
A Vietnamese man married an ethnic minority woman: Mr.Vo, a Vietnamese man, was working 
as a laborer to saw wood with the Khmer and staying with other people at Banlung market. One 
day, a Sek villager, a Kreung ethnic villager, named Mr. Dorn Kamphorn, built his house and hired 
this Vietnamese man to saw wood at his house. Later on Vo married an ethnic Kreung woman in 
1993. Presently, he has three children. He grows soy beans on the land that he has cleared with the 
permission from the village chief. In addition he digs land for precious gems in Borkeo for his living. 
A Khmer man married a Tumpoun woman: Uncle Lim, a Khmer person from Takeo province and 
his wife, Nou Man, a Tumpoun woman with her origin in La En village, Teoun commune, Koun Mom 
district. He has four children and was living in Takeo before 1982. In late 1984, he moved to Banlung 
district of RTNKR due to the intensive mobility of people to serve in the military. In 1987, the 
government recruited three students for further study in Vietnam but there were no applicants due 
to the student’s lack of capacity to study. With the support of his relatives, he was selected for 
further study in Vietnam and returned from the study in 1993. Right after returning from Vietnam, he 
was living in Takeo. In late 1993, he moved back to RTNKR and lived within the rubber plantation of 
his brother due to the difficulties of living in Takeo.  
While living in Rotanak Kiri, he married a rubber resin tapper in 1994, a woman of a local ethnic 
group. Then the new couple worked as rubber resin tappers. In 1997, he cleared 1 ha of land near 
the rubber plantation for growing soy beans and settled there. In early 2001, he requested 5 ha of 
land from the village chief for planting cashew and soy beans. The village chief agreed with the 
request, but included a restriction that the land could not be sold. In 2003, he moved into La En 
village to make his living with soy beans and cashew planting and running a small grocery shop.  
A Khmer man who used to live in the urban area married a Tumpoun woman: Mr. Sin Sarak and 
his wife, Mrs.Thy Tep, Tumpoun, have four children. Before 1984, he lived in Phnom Penh. In 1984, he 
moved to Steung Treng due to difficulties of living in Phnom Penh. He joined the military in Steung 
Treng during the mobilization of people for the K 5 mission65. In 1988, he married a Tumpuon ethnic 
woman. According to tradition he continued to live with his parents-in-law in the village in La En 
village, Teoun commune, Koun Mom district. In 1993, he lived separately from his parents-in-law 
because it was difficult for him to adopt the Tumpoun traditional way. In 1992, he bought a plot of 
land from a local villager in the village for settlement before he left his parents-in-law. He transferred 
the land to his brother in 1998 to pay off the debt he had with his brother. In 2003, he requested 5 ha 
of land from the community for clearing because he had no land for cultivation but the community 
did not allow him to sell the land. Currently, he makes his living by cashew plantation and follows 
both traditions (Khmer and Tumpoun) but he does not pray much to the local spirits. 
Otherwise, access to land could also be made through other modalities, e.g. investment which 
mainly happens in the urban area, so it is not related to rural land.  
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• Access to land through investment 
In some cases, the provincial authorities have shared state public land with private investors in 
exchange for infrastructure investment, for example, due to the lack of money where the public 
land is unused and unfenced. Thus, it was encroached upon by people. Also, the provincial 
department of education shared one third of a piece of land with the Try Peap Company in 
exchange for nearly US$ 400,000 for the construction of a stadium that will be handed over to the 
department within the next 18 months66. 
• Inheritance 
Land heritance from parents is one of the appropriation rights. The process of inheritance in 
Rotanak Kiri is quite different from that in lowland areas, but it has been increasingly changed to 
become similar to lowland areas. Customarily, families retain ownership over the fields they farm, as 
well as access to the perennial crops remaining on their old fields which lie in fallow. New couples 
have to live with parents from both sides for at least 8 to 10 years. When they want to separate from 
their parents they are able to get land either by asking the village elders or chief of village to clear 
forest land. However, from now on, land to be cleared for cultivation is located very far from the 
village. Otherwise, they inherit fallow land from their parents. Since the land market has increased 
and enforcement of the 2002 forestry law by the FA, clearing forest land is becoming more difficult. 
Land is mostly occupied or reserved as collective land decided by the community land 
management committee, including the village elders. In 2002, in La En village, participatory land 
use planning (PLUP) was conducted, supported by the DPA, after the creation of a Land 
Management Committee. This committee is composed of seven community representatives who 
were elected by community members as a local body with a mandate to prevent illegal use and 
grabbing of community land. The committee can resolve land disputes among community 
members or with outsiders. As a consequence, inheritance from parents is becoming an important 
modality of land appropriation. Some new couples inherited land from their parents but we do not 
have quantitative data on new couples who receive land through inheritance. For example: 
Mr. Chea Sokunthy, 28 years of age, and his wife are a new couple living in Trang Chong village, 
O Chum commune. This new couple separated from his parents in 2004 and inherited 60m x 140 m 
of fallow land from them. He said that the inherited land is not enough but he has many siblings. 
Also, he has to generate additional income by selling labor for working on the plantations of the 
Khmer. During the time of clearing land and growing in 2005, he was able to secure his family 
livelihood by selling labor to others for clearing land and weeding.  
 
                                                            
66 According to Mr Nab Bunheng, chief of provincial cabinet and Mr. Phan Phirun director provincial department of 
education, reported by RK, Dec 11-12, 2005. 
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Agrarian contract  
(institutional arrangement)  
An agrarian contract is a temporary delegation of use rights to the tenant or borrower as 
defined in our study, including commoditized (leasing, sharecropping) and non- commoditized 
(loan/borrowing, gift) delegation. The rising land market causes the customary law on communal 
land right and use for shifting cultivation to gradually change to private ownership. Thus, agrarian 
contracts as derived rights have been increasingly practiced among ethnic minorities themselves. 
To date, agrarian contracts have been developed in three modalities: loans, renting and 
sharecropping. Loans have gradually changed to commoditized transfers of sharecropping and 
leasing. Types of institutional arrangement (agrarian contracts) in RTNKR are summarized in the table 
below: 
  
Institutional arrangement 
(agrarian contracts) 
Rights transferred Other conditions 
Open-ended loans (but 
not transfer to the next 
generation)  
Cultivation rights, and 
sometimes plantation 
right (on graveyard land)  
No written contract or as 
an oral agreement  
The land will be returned 
to the community at the 
end when the borrowers 
stop using land 
Ethnic minority farmers loan their land to other ethnic 
farmers  
Ethnic minority villagers loan their fallow land, chamkar 
chas or bos chas to immigrants (Khmer from the 
lowland areas) 
The community and/ or village leader loan the 
community land to members, and ban them from 
selling it. However, many land borrowers secretly sell 
that borrowed land, which leads to disputes between 
community and land buyers, in particular, when land 
buyers (Khmer) encroached on community land or 
forest  
Indigenous community through the Land Use and 
Management Committee or village leader loan 
communal land to Khmer teacher 
Fixed term loans  
(exchange land/labor)  
Cultivation right but 
sometimes plantation 
right (on community 
land)  
No written contract. As 
promise, the land will be 
returned to community at 
the end of the process.  
From now on, it is with 
written contract in the 
community where the 
community land 
management committee 
Ethnic community represented by the Land Use and 
Management Committee67 has loaned the communal 
land to its member with a written contract for 1 year, 
re-negotiated before starting the next season and with 
a written contract 
Land owners loan their land to ethnic people in 
exchange for labour to clear land and to plant 
cashew nuts, to weed for them (the term is fixed 
according to the growth of cashew nut trees) 
First immigrants (or new settlers) who arrived/settled in 
RTNKR before others, loaned young cashew plantation 
to new immigrants for annual cropping in exchange 
for labour to clear and weed. The owners, (first 
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including preventing land encroachment. For example, in La En village, Teun commune, this Committee was set up in 
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was established with the 
assistance of NGOs 
immigrants) will take plantation back or new 
immigrants can continue collecting fruit for 
land/plantation owners 
Urban dwellers or immigrants (without or with written 
contract) loan new cashew plantation to ethnic 
people or immigrants 
Overall, loans have increasingly changed from oral 
agreements to written contracts in order to prevent 
illegal land sales and grabbing  
Loans have gradually changed to renting due to the 
increasing land demand for plantation 
Access to land for a fixed 
fee of rental payment 
(leasing)  
 
Cultivation rights  
Contracts renewable at 
start of each growing 
season 
Increasing between the Khmers as first comers and 
Khmers as newcomers, (oral agreements) 
Khmer newcomers rent cashew plantation from ethnic 
minority villagers with written contracts and a witness 
Between ethnic farmers and displaced ethnic farmers 
from the villages of his wife’s parents or the village of 
himself  
Sharecropping  
(crop share contracts) 
 
Cultivation rights 
Sharing input costs and 
the harvest depends on 
arrangements made 
Between Khmer land owners and Khmer newcomers 
as tenants without written contracts. Land owners 
provided bean seed and 50% of bean harvest costs or 
land preparation. Sharecroppers pay 50% of the costs 
in bean product at the time of harvest 
Contracts with access to 
land against provision of 
labour 
Cultivation rights Exchange land or new plantation for labour to clear 
land and weed. Tenants need land for bean or rice 
cultivation  
Pawning, 
Mortgaging/pledging 
 
 These arrangements have not yet happened. 
However, poor Khmer farmers or ethnic people sell 
their product before cultivation to middlemen at a 
fixed price of 50% lower than direct sale at the time of 
harvest  
 
Most of the sellers always give some money in advance to the farmers, and this money is used as 
the capital for bean production. The provision of money in advance is preventing farmers from 
selling their land. In this case it is about the selling of product not selling about land. On the other 
hand, however, harvesting in advance allows farmers to terminate their cropping season. It is a sort 
of credit repaid on the product of land. Some Khmer rich men and big land owners lend money to 
tenants without interest, so that they can buy food and pay back at the harvest season. In this case, 
land owners want to keep good relationships with those farmers who rent their large areas of land 
and tractors for land preparation. Successive cultivation on the land would make land tenure more 
secure than for un-used land.  
Loan of community land to ethnic minority farmers often leads to disputes when the borrower 
secretly sells land to outsiders or Khmer urban dwellers. Disputes have happened not only between 
borrowers and communities but also between communities and land buyers, in particular, when the 
land buyers have encroached on community land or forest. In most cases, the community lost land 
to the land buyers. If there is assistance from human right organization such as CLEC in cooperation 
with the PCC, the community may receive some monetary payment and goods such as wine and 
pork for offering to the spirits of their ancestors and to repossess the encroaching land. In the villages 
where the DPA is working, a Land Use and Management Committee (LUMC) is set up with a 
mandate to manage the communal land, including preventing land encroachment. For example, 
in La En village, Teun commune, a Committee was set up in 2003 with the recognition of the 
commune councils and district governor. 
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• Loans of land 
Loans involve the temporary ceding of land rights with no explicit payment. Rights usually cover 
annual cropping. In some cases, communal land has been loaned to community members along 
with the right to plant trees, but the users can not delegate that right to a third party. The 
community can take the land back whenever it wants but needs to inform to borrower before the 
next growing season. For borrowing the communal /collective land, both parties, community 
members and LUMC, can change the time or terminate the agreement by informing each other. At 
the time of its return, the land must be cleared for cultivation use. There are two types of loan: open-
ended loans and fixed-term loans. However, the process and parties involving loans are different. 
They include:  
- Loan of land to members of ethnic minorities made by the LUMC. 
- Loan of land to Khmer people made by non-Khmer (ethnic) people. 
- Loan of land to new immigrants made by the first immigrants (both Khmer). 
- Loan of land within the local community. 
- Loan of land to ethnic minority people from another village made by village leaders (this 
occurs between members of the same ethnic group). 
Open-ended loans occurr when the farmers loan their fallow land to other community members 
or new settlers, while fixed term loans involve loaning land for a period, such as in the loan of a 
cashew plantation. On the other hand, the community loans the communal land to its members 
with written contracts. The first (old) immigrants give the young cashew plantation to new 
immigrants for weeding. The urban dwellers establish cashew plantations after buying land but they 
allow farmers to grow annual crops between the rows of trees. In several cases, a Khmer land owner 
has loaned a plantation to local villagers for planting rice and mung beans. Sometimes, they have 
paid seed and land preparation costs in exchange for labor to weed and maintain the plantation. 
Loans of land were made mostly without written contracts, and the process was made without a 
fixed period, and without the intervention of a broker. This can be re-negotiated (renewable) before 
the next growing season. Sometimes, land borrowers have to provide labor, for example to assist in 
rice planting, land clearing, maintaining the plantation or assisting in other social work, such as 
organizing ceremonies. Loans of land among members of ethnic minorities are still made by oral 
agreement. However, in the villages which are assisted by the NGOs in community mobilizing, loans 
with written contracts are made due to bad experiences in informal selling of the communal land, 
which led to land encroachment and disputes. However, the content of contracts is still not all 
correct. Experience shows that many indigenous farmers have sold land without informing the 
village chief or village elders, as they borrowed the communal land for cultivation. For example: 
Mr. Si Thung, 39 years of age, a farmer of La En village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district has 
borrowed 100m x 100m (1 ha) of collective land from the community for one year of cultivation, 
dated from Feb.19, 2005 to Feb.19, 2006. However, the size of the land was not correctly written on 
the contract (e.g. it was written 5,000 m² but written of 1 ha). Borrowing contract was signed by the 
borrower, chief of the LUMC, and the chief of village with a request of two witnesses. 
A case of selling borrowing land in La En village without permission 
This dispute happened in La En village, Toeun commune, Koun Mom district in 2004 when a 
family borrowed a plot of land from the community for cultivation. Then this family sold the 
borrowed land to other people without asking for the permission of the community. Ta68 Preut, a 
Tumpoun ethnic villager, living in La En village, asked for 2 ha of land from the community to plant 
rice in 2003. Until 2004, Ta Preut asked permission from the community organizers to sell the land to 
Mr. Oeun, but the community organizers did not agree with the request. Later on, Ta Preut asked 
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another community organizer in charge of development to sign on the deal of selling land to Mr. 
Oeun by offering him 50,000 riels (US$12.5). In that year, Mr. Oeun owed (borrowed) Ta Kang 400,000 
riels and he wanted Ta Kang to buy that land. However, Ta Kang did not agree with the offer 
(someone told him not to buy the land because it belonged to the community). Therefore, Ta Oeun 
sold the land to people from Phnom Penh for US$200. The land selling letter was signed by a 
community organizer and the village chief, and each of them received 10 dollars. The community 
organizer agreed with Ta Oeun to sell the land to people from Phnom Penh because he understood 
that once the land is in the hands of people from Phnom Penh, it will not be sold again. If he refused 
this time, Ta Oeun would still sell the land to other people later on. 
However, loans without a written contract between farmers belonging to ethnic minorities have 
gradually changed to loans from communities to their members with a written contract or to land 
renting. The first (old) immigrants loan their young plantation to new immigrants. The land owner as 
first (old) (Khmer) immigrant has delegated the cultivation right to the new immigrant in exchange 
for labor to maintain the young plantation. In some cases, the land owners pay the seed and land 
preparation costs. 
Villagers from other villages requesting (borrowing) Chamkar land: 10 families from Dangkab 
village cleared around 10 ha of land in La En village in 2005. Four of the 10 families requested to pay 
in advance the amount of 40,000 riels per ha to the community. However, the other six families 
came into the village to clear the forest land without asking permission from the village chief, LUMC 
or land community organizers. Those families were fined 100,000 riels per family by the land 
community organizers and the fine was kept in the community cash box. After this fine, the 
community asked those families to request a loan of land with the condition that it cannot be 
planted with strategic crops (trees). The six families agreed to print their thumbs on the agreement 
but the land loan document was changed afterward into a land leasing document. 
Loan which was written as leasing should be an example of a resolving mechanism of land 
dispute for ethnic minority villagers. It should be a modification of customary law which is for 
infringement, as a deterrent and keeps villagers aware of their obligations to the ancestors or the 
power of the spirits. The fear/deterrent consists not only of the cost of fine but also a cost in a spiritual 
sense (White, 1996). 
Borrowing collective village land: Mr. Pou Klas is a Tumpoun man living in La En village, Teoun 
commune, Koun Mom district. From 1979 untill 2003, he had been living in La En Srer by cultivating 
rice. In 2000, he cleared 1 ha of Chamkar land in La En Chamkar village. His older brother was living 
on the land for 1 year, and then his son had a serious sickness. Since they had no money to cure his 
son, he requested to the village to sell the land to buy buffalo for praying to the spirits. In 2002, when 
all of his cattle and buffalo had died, he abandoned rice cultivation and turned to cultivate 
Chamkar land where he asked for the land from the village elderly people, village chief and village 
LUMC. He was given 0.80 ha for planting rice and beans. The village chief and village LUMC gave 
him the land without making any contract, but he was banned from selling that land and planting 
the long-term strategic crops on that land. If he tries to sell that land secretly, the community will 
confiscate the land from him and the buyer.  
Loans of young plantation to immigrants lead in some cases to land encroachment when the 
trees are tall/big enough: the owner of young cashew plantation, an urban dweller, brought 
immigrants of 28 Cham households to look after his cashew plantation in Teun commune. The 28 
Cham households lived on a cashew plantation, growing soy beans and groundnuts between rows 
for three years up to the time when cashew trees are tall/ big enough. Besides, they cleared the 
community forestry land to continue their cropping activities even though they did not have 
permission from the community or local authorities. They requested to be members of the 
community in order to access communal land free but the request was rejected by the commune 
council. At the time of the study, The 28 Cham households had been informed that they would be 
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evicted. They asked local authorities where they could live and do need help from outsider in 
resolving disputes. For example: 
Mr. Sle Man (31) and his wife, Ms Te Var (28), a Cham migrant family from Kampong Cham 
province. His family lived in Roka Roung village, Thma Pich commune, Tboung Khmom district, 
Kampong Cham. They owned only 0.1 ha of rice land to feed four family members. Rice production 
was insufficient for the family consumption. Increasingly, fishing products have declined. Also, they 
had food shortage every year. They migrated in to Rotanak Kiri in 1999 with other Cham families 
because they were informed that it is easy to earn money and there is a lot of land available for 
free occupation. Two members of the migrant families are brothers of Mrs. Te Var. In 1999, the year 
of migration, they had two children and sold labor at the rubber plantation. They could earn 
between 7,000 and 8,000 riels per day. In 2002 they moved to settle on the cashew plantation of Mr 
Moul Samvang in Teun commune because they thought that their income would be increased by 
cropping activities. They accepted a loan from the owner of the cashew plantation. However, to 
sustain their livelihood they need to clear community forest land and for the cultivation of soy beans 
and ground nuts. However, the Cham families have been accused by the villagers as community 
land grabbers. In 2005, they could not grow between the rows of cashew trees anymore as the trees 
were tall/big enough already. They can not grow on the newly cleared land ‘frozen’ by the dispute. 
However, they borrowed money from the soy bean and ground nut collector to buy a motor bike 
under condition of selling the product at the price of 500 riels per kg. This selling price is 50% lower 
than the selling price at the time of harvest. Currently, the credit has not been all reimbursed. In 
2005, the local authorities banned the practice of growing on disputed land and want to evict them 
from the community, although this family has to feed five children. They complained that they 
cleared only state forest land and further asked where they can live if they are evicted from the 
community. 
Also, there are differences in understanding what forest land is between lowland people or 
Khmer immigrant and ethnic people. The immigrants consider forest as state land, according to the 
2001 land law (Art. 15) while the ethnic people claim that forest within homestead areas and 
chamkar land, including fallow land, belongs to their community. Article 25 of the 2001 land law 
states that the lands of indigenous communities are those where the said communities have 
established their residences and where they carry out traditional agriculture. The lands of indigenous 
communities include not only lands cultivated but also includes reserved necessary for the shifting 
of cultivation which is required by the agricultural methods they currently practice and which are 
recognized by the administrative authorities.....Also, article 28 states that no authority outside the 
community may acquire any rights to immovable properties belonging to an indigenous 
community. 
In some cases, the sale of borrowing land has led to disputes among ethnic minority people as 
relatives. Land owners lost their land when the local authorities resolved disputes based on 
documents of land sale contracts by providing land to the land buyers. For example: 
A dispute occurred in 2004 in Sil village, Yeak Loam commune, Banlung district when a man 
secretly sold land that he borrowed from his cousin. A Tumpoun ethnic man, Mr. Yos Phlek, living in Sil 
village, Yeak Loam commune, and Banlung district loaned 1.50 ha of land to his cousin in 2001, 
without preparing any written agreement. In 2004, his cousin sold the land secretly to Mr. Thy, a 
Khmer, living in Banlung market by preparing a land sale transfer letter at the village and commune 
levels. Also, Mr. Yos Phlek filed a complaint against his cousin to the commune chief. The commune 
chief requested the village chief to help resolving the dispute. They decided the land buyer wins this 
dispute because he has appropriate documents. For this resolution, land owner did not file the 
complaint or appeal to the district level because he does not have money and does not know any 
person at the district. 
Borrowing Chamkar land for cultivation caused by land selling: In some villages close to urban 
areas, all indigenous families land to the urban dwellers and expected to earn an income by selling 
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labor in Khmer cashew plantations. However, selling labor became difficult due to a labor surplus. To 
sustain their livelihood, they had to borrow land back from the Khmer to plant upland rice or other 
crops such as soy beans. For example: 
In Phnom village, Banlung district, all Tompuon families sold land to people living in Banlung, 
provincial capital. After the sale of the land, since 2003, the practice of traditional swidden 
agriculture has changed to permanent agriculture on small plots of land remain in the possession of 
the ethnic farmers. Lack of cultivated land and declining soil fertility have enforced farmers to 
borrow chamkar land from urban dwellers for cultivation of annual crops. In Phnom village, 10 
households borrowed land from urban dwellers for planting rice under condition that the farmer has 
to grow cashew trees and take care of the plantation for them. Three farmers (Mr. Yan Mil, 64, Mr. 
Khov Phoeung and Vo Tov), are borrowing 1 ha of land each in exchange for labor to maintain the 
young plantation and for rice planting for Mr. That Sophea, a provincial accountant. 
Recently, loans have evolved into renting, caused by a wave of immigrants and land market 
development for the establishment of plantations. 
• Renting 
Land renting is the delegation of use rights to a tenant in exchange for money. For cases in 
RTNKR to date, the main feature is the fixed amount of the rent, in contrast to sharecropping. 
Tenants have temporary use rights to grow annual crops but no right for plantation. Before 2000, no 
leasing system was practiced by the indigenous villagers. The poor immigrants seek to gain access 
to land through loans and sharecropping. However, both modalities have been gradually changed 
to a leasing system as mentioned above. Rich/well off Khmer immigrants, sought to rent young 
plantations from the ethnic minority villagers for growing beans because the land was already 
cleared. Some indigenous farmers have rented land from others because they are internally 
displaced people (IDP). However, the big land Khmer owners refused to rent their land out to the 
ethnic farmers arguing about the lack of growing technique and laziness. Also, land renting mostly 
happened: 
- Between land owner belonging to an ethnic minority and others as newcomers; 
- Between land owner belonging to ethnic minorities and new Khmer immigrants; 
- Between first (old) immigrants (as land buyers) and new immigrants (both Khmer). 
However, most ethnic minority farmers do not rent land in for cultivation because they can 
borrow land from their relatives, their community or from urban dwellers for annual cultivation in 
exchange for labor to protect the land from risks such as. fire. In some cases, ethnic minority people 
who are IDP have to rent land from other minority people as well. For example: 
Mr Suon Van, a Kreung, lives in Sek village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district. At present, he 
has no land for cultivation because he has just moved from Dangkab village (the village of his wife). 
He has rented 1.50 ha of land from Mr. Vi, another Kreung at a cost of 90,000 riels (around US$22) for 
1 year for cultivating beans. He has rented since 2004 without a written rental contract because 
they are relatives, and agreed with each other based on their verbal negotiation. 
Also, renting is processed mostly without written contracts for a period of 1 year, and leads 
sometimes to land disputes over grabbing. However, renting the new plantation is made with 
written contract between both parties with a witness. Normally, a relative (or a friend or a neighbor) 
is chosen as the witness with the recognition of the village chief. Land renting is arranged without 
the intervention of a broker. In most cases, new immigrants rent Chamkar land either from first (old) 
immigrants or from the local community. The rental fee ranges between 90,000-150,000 riels (US$22 - 
US$37) per ha depending on type of land (forest or degraded forest). The rental fee is paid at the 
soy bean harvest time. In cases of crop damage, the land owner reduces the rental fee. Recently, 
leasing has increased because of land demand, and changed from verbal agreements to written 
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contracts; this process is assisted by NGOs in order to prevent disputes and illegal land sales. For 
example: 
Mr. Sout Mab, a Khmer person, lives in Thmei village close to the urban, Labanseak commune. 
Since Dec. 2004, he has rented 2 ha of cashew plantation from Mr. Sach Vong, a Kreung living in 
Toeun village, Toeun commune, Kuon Mom district, at a cost of 1,105,000 riel (US$273). The 
agreement was written down between both parties with a witness, but the period was not noted. 
The tenant also promised not to slash animals that enter the plantation.  
Cases showing a link between land renting, loan and free access to land by clearing with 
permission 
Mr. In Thhin, aged 37, a father of one child, originally from Krouch Chmar district of Kampong 
Cham province. Since the rice cultivation in Krouch Chmar district was hampered by natural 
disasters (flood), the rice was damaged. In the meantime, he heard that large areas of land were 
still available, business activities are good and his brother is already living in Rotanak Kiri, so he 
travelled all the way from Kampong Cham. When he first arrived, he rented 3 ha of land from Mr. In 
Keat (Ta69 Keeat), a first (old) Khmer immigrant in 2004 from Kampong Cham and living in La En 
village, at a cost of 100,000 riels (US$25) per ha for planting soy beans. There was no document 
required for the renting but it needed to be renegotiated for the next growing season. It was a lease 
for an indefinite period of time. He hired Ta Keat’s tractor to plough the land by paying 80,000 riels 
(US$20) per ha. If villagers have a shortage of food, they can borrow money from Ta Keat to buy rice 
by paying back after the harvest season. There is no interest in borrowing money from him. During 
the latest harvest season (2004), he earned 3,000,000 riels of income from his soy beans. 
Since he made no profit from selling soy beans, he decided to stop renting the land. This year 
(2005), he grew soy beans on land that he cleared in K 60 village, Trapheang Chres commune, 
Koun Mom district. He cleared 3 ha of land at the recommendation of his brother and with the 
permission of the village chief who allocated a plot of land to him with an area of 100 m in width 
and unlimited length depending on his ability to clear land. Since he often helps Ta Keat in taking 
care of his cashew plantation, Ta Keat additionally loans him 2 ha of land by plowing for him. When 
he first moved into the village, he faced many problems due to his poor living conditions; he had to 
exchange labour for weeding in the Chamkars of other people and seek other work in addition to 
growing his own soy beans. 
In this case, Mr. In Thhin could access to the community forest easier since his entry in K 60 village 
because his brother is a first (old) immigrant, and maybe has good relationship with the chief of 
village, or he pays informally to the chief for access to land through his brother as a broker. Also, he 
has a good opportunity to have cultivated land instead of leasing. 
A farmer, Mrs. Phi Neun, Khmer, came from Tboung Khmom district, Kampong Cham province. 
She moved to and has lived in O Phleng village, Trar Pheang Chres commune, Koun Mom district, 
Rotanak Kiri since 1998. Due to her lonely life after her husband died, her first (elder) sister asked her 
to move to Rotanak Kiri. Upon her arrival in the village, her sister gave her 1 ha of land to build a 
house and 2 ha for cultivating rice. In 2003, she stopped cultivating rice on that land (2 ha) but she 
still cultivates rice on the homestead land (1 ha). In 2003, when she saw other villagers making a 
good harvest of soy beans, she asked to borrow free, 2 ha of land from Mr. Phat who is also living in 
La En village. When she had cultivated it for one year, the land owner changed his mind to rent her 
the land at a cost of 100,000 riels (US$25) per ha. 
The land owner changed from a loan to renting because he knew there would be a good 
harvest. However, market opportunities encourage many Khmer newcomers/farmers to seek leasing 
land for soy bean cultivation. 
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• Sharecropping 
Land owners transfer the temporary use rights to the villager but they can take the land back 
whenever they want before land preparation. This has been practiced between first (old) 
immigrants and new immigrants for mung or soy bean cultivation. Land owners also provide seed to 
the sharecropper, who has to cover all expenses and clear the land. In some cases, the big land 
owners plow or prepare land for tenants. The agreement is made without written contracts for a 
growing season and needs to be re-negotiated before the next growing season starts. The share of 
product is 50:50. On the other hand, a labor exchange system of helping each other is the common 
practice within local communities for clearing Chamkar land and weeding. 
Sharecropping before encroachment into forest land: Uncle Sat is Khmer with his home town in 
Chamkar Leur district, Kampong Cham province. Because the land in Chamkar Leur was too small 
for him to cultivate, he moved to live in La En village, Teoun commune, Koun Mom district in 2000 
through the help of his relatives. He sold his land in Chamkar Leur for 2 Damleung of gold (around 
US$1,070) for 2 ha. He re-bought 5 ha of land in Teoun village, RTNKR for only 1 Damleung and 2 Chi 
(around US$642). He bought the land from a Tumpoun through Ta70 Sreng (Ta Sreng knows a lot of 
people) with the land sale contract being made at the village level only. Then, he cleared the land 
further and his land has expanded to 8 ha. When he first arrived, he had a very small amount of 
land so he had to practice sharecropping, by exchanging his labour with Mr. In Keat, a Khmer 
person (owns more land than other people in the village), to get land for cultivation. At that time, he 
received 1 ha of land for planting soy beans. In the exchange, the land owner paid him for the 
seeds and 50% for labor to harvest beans. After the harvest, he shared 50% of the product with the 
sharecropper or grower. 
• Land pawning/mortgaging 
Pawning/mortgaging has not yet existed in the areas studied but soy bean producers who are 
poor Khmer farmers/new settlers and members of local communities sell their product in advance or 
before cultivation to (Khmer) middlemen or traders with a price approximately 50% lower than that 
of direct selling at the harvest time. 
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Land sales/purchases 
There has been a change in the modalities of access to land for cultivation compared to the 
time before 1995 when people did not have a ‘tradition’ of selling their land. After gaining 
experience of land transactions, ethnic villagers have started to plant trees to identify their right to 
their fallow land. Presently, new Khmer settlers can access land for cultivation, in most cases, by 
buying. However, Article 28 of the 2001 land law states, “No authority outside the community may 
acquire any rights to immovable properties belonging to an indigenous community”. 
Land sales/purchases in RTNKR started in 1995, but only in a small scale and for land straddling 
the national road. Before 1995, ethnic people used to practice an exchange system; land was 
exchanged for consumable materials and goods such as food, motorbikes, TVs, video players. 
However, the system has changed to the sale of land, and this increased gradually from year to 
year due to a wave of migration from the lowland areas, development projects and commercial 
plantation. Land sales peaked in 2004. However, in the districts close to the urban areas such as 
Banlung and Koun Mom, land sales became less active in mid-2005 because local people did not 
have any more land to sell. Some Khmer people have sold land or plantations in lowland areas at a 
high price in order to invest in cheaper land in Rotanak Kiri. For example: 
Mr. Kim Kheng, an official of Kang Meas district office of education and owner of a rubber and 
cashew plantation on red soil in the upland areas in Chamkar Leu district, Kampong Cham province 
sold a plantation in Kampong Cham at a higher cost (US$2,800 per ha) and re-bought land at a 
lower cost in RTNKR province (US$300 per ha) for a rubber and cashew plantation. This area is 
situated at the triangle zone of three districts: Kon Mom, Banlung and Lumphat, RTNKR. Within the 
total 400 ha of land that he bought, 50% have certificates of possession right and another 50% of 
land is degraded forest and chamkar cheu (forest), fallow land or old chamkar without certificate. 
He bought the land through a land broker, Mr. Chheng Lok, the Chheng Lok Hotel owner. He was 
mediated to get contact with the hotel owner by an immigrant from Chamkar Leu district, 
Kampong Cham. However, one hectare of land costs US$200/ha but the other $US 100 is for other 
costs (brokerage, protection and document of land right transfer). At the time of the study, the land 
buyer is seeking ethnic minority labor to clear the land. Normally, the cost of clearing land is 250,000 
riels/ha (US$60 per ha). 
Within villages in which the community has been mobilized, sales of land have happened 
secretly between both sellers and buyers because the village and commune chiefs did not 
recognize sale contracts. On the contrary, in other villages, they recognized sale of land which has 
been mostly carried out with the land sale contract or land transfer. Sometimes, the deal is easier if 
the commune chief is also working as land broker. Then the transfer contract can be quickly signed 
by the commune chief (in the case of Yeak Loam and Ta Ang communes). Due to the education 
on the importance of land issues conducted by NGOs and the network of highlander associations, 
some people have become aware of the issues and stopped selling their land. Most ethnic minority 
families have sold land but they were reluctant to tell their community or outsiders because they 
were frightened of being fined as determined by the community roles. According to the study’s in-
depth interview, only 37% of interviewed FHs admitted that they sold land. The main reasons that 
they sold land were: a lack of food, degraded soil fertility, indebtedness, buying a motorbike and 
acquiring other assets. 
With regard to land prices, in 1995, the selling price of chamkar land close to the NR was 50,000 
riel/ha (US$20). For land which is far from urban areas (over 30 km), but close to NR the price 
increased 300% or from US$120 in 2002 to 500 per ha in 2005. With regard to land right transfers, deals 
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among villagers mostly happened between buyers and sellers based on verbal agreements. 
Recently, land sales among urban people or people from Phnom Penh have changed from sale 
contracts recognized by the village and commune authorities to the district level in order to avoid 
land disputes in the future. According to the in-depth survey, land right transfers are mostly carried 
out at the village level (44% of total selling plots) and commune level (25%). They have to spend 
money for recognizing the land sale right transfer. However, in some cases the village and 
commune chiefs have not agreed with land sales/purchases. In Yeak Loam commune, most land 
was sold with sale contracts recognized by the commune chief because he is also working as a 
land broker. In addition, he is a person who is authorized to sign the land right transfer. Due to the 
high cost, people did not legally transfer the land rights at district level. In exceptional cases, rich 
Khmer land buyers applied to receive a certificate of possession right, refering to article 69 of the 
2001 land law; “The transfer of ownership shall be considered valid upon the registration of the 
contract of sale with the Cadastral Registry Unit, and a contract of sale of immovable property shall 
be registered only when all parties have proven by evidence that all taxes on the subject property 
have been paid”. For example: 
Mr.Kim Reth, a Khmer living in Ta Ang 2, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district admitted that he 
has 20 ha of land and he has certificates of possession on 10 ha of land which was provided by the 
district office of land management, urban planning, construction and cadastral. To get these 
certificates, he had to spend US$300 per ha for the document clearance and other related costs. 
Rich and cunning people bought land using three methods,71 threatening, cheating and 
persuading, which has often caused land disputes. Even though ethnic minority villagers were 
reluctant to sell their land they were threatened to do so at a very low price. The buyers used fake 
information showing that the land would be expropriated without compensation. Also, there has 
been cheating over land size by local authorities selling community land to outsiders/urban people. 
In many cases, land brokers have organized parties which were good occasions in which to 
persuade villagers to sell their land. Also, there are have been many problems with recent land sales 
such as:72  
• Forested areas are either being illegally cleared to claim possession or money is given to a 
villager who may allow this clearing. 
• Old chamkar land areas, fallow land, are sold and forestland around the chamkar land is 
illegally cleared. 
• Old chamkar areas continue to be sold at an increasing rate. People who have not sold land 
are often jealous of people who have sold some land or they feel pressure to sell before the 
land is taken or lost without any compensation. Some village leaders sell land illegally or 
approve the land sales, which sets an example for others to follow.  
• Land is sold either without a written contract or a contract that contains improper parties, 
approval and terms, or that is even backdated to before 2001. 
• Land is being borrowed or rented without written contracts with the intention of keeping the 
land.  
• Land of a neighboring village or commune is sold by the wrong village/commune with the 
excuse that they are not sure of the exact boundary, or the villagers selling the land wrongfully 
claims that the land is traditionally theirs. 
• Village and commune authorities are selling land without informing the community or against a 
village statute banning the sale of land. 
                                                            
71  According to Mr. Tep Bunrith and Mr. Grame Brown, trainer and advisor of the project of ‘RCNRMN-Ratana Kiri Community 
Natural Resource Management Network’. 
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• There are many possibly illegal old ‘sales’ chamkar lands where the buyers from the urban 
areas have not been in possession but are now trying to re-establish their rights to the land and 
are seeking to legitimize their old claims. 
Local leaders who recognized land sale contracts have also been accused of being involved in 
land sales. PDA (CIDSE), an NGO, has attempted to assist non-Khmer groups to prevent illegal land 
sales and encroachment by implementing a pilot project for collective land registration and titling. 
However, this project also had an effect on land sales because people think that they cannot sell 
their land once it is registered. Most families sold land for buying motor bikes before the project 
stated because everybody was informed they could not sell their land if land was registered as 
communal land. Many cases of land conflict caused by illegal sales remain un-resolved. For 
example: 
Case of dispute among ethnic minority people (Kreung and Tumpoun) over the sale of land in La 
En village to an outsider without permission 
There is another case of land selling without permission by villagers which happened on May 13, 
2005. It happened when six families of Kreung people living in Sek village, Ta Ang commune 
ominously and secretly sold 10 ha of land to a Muslim family living on the land of Mr. Moul Samvang 
in Toeun village, Toeun commune, Koun Mom district. In 2001, the six families firstly cleared their 
Chamkar land within the territory of Toeun village of Tumpoun people (there was no clear village 
boundary) with no request to the village elders or village chief. In 2003, after conducting the 
boundary demarcation, regulation on community land use and management, the land 
management committee and village chief informed the six families that they could continue living 
on the land but that they cannot sell that land. In 2005, they sold the land secretly to the Muslim 
people. At the time of this study, villagers had not filed a complaint about this case yet, they 
planned to complain when the case of another land dispute with Mr. Moul Samvang, a forestry 
official, is resolved. The provincial cadastral commission (PCC) is working to resolve the dispute in 
cooperation with CLEC (PILAP). 
Another secret sale of community land led to a dispute with the community and the district 
authorities intervened in this case to confiscate land to give it back the community:  
A case of land selling happened in Toeun village in 2001 by which,a Khmer Islamic person (Mr. 
Vich) came and cleared forest land in Toeun village without asking for permission from the village 
chief and elderly people. The area of land that Mr Vich cleared was 3 ha. In 2004, Vich exchanged 
that land for his debt of US$2,000 with Mr. Thy. The new owner continued to clear land as far as 10 
ha. According to the community organizers in Toeun commune, Mr Vich sold 10 ha of land to Mr Thy 
in 2004. The community filed a complaint to the district authorities for intervention. On April 28, 2005, 
the district authorities came to resolve this dispute. Mr Vich was reprimanded by the district officials 
and the officials promised to confiscate the land to it give back to the community. On May 2, 2005, 
the community issued a letter to the land buyers to inform them not to plant fruit trees on that land. 
In many cases, Khmer people bought land, as mentioned, and then encroached on forest land 
surrounded by or near it. They always thought they cleared the state forest land, not community 
land. However, the ethnic community claimed their land. Despite the ethnic community filing 
complaints against the Khmer encroachers, the dispute remained un-resolved. Refering to the 
forestry law (2002), it does not clearly classify the difference between forest land and fallow land of 
shifting agriculture (forest regrowth areas). In the shifting cultivation system, both land and forest are 
linked together. Art 37 of law on forestry states, “Local communities that traditionally practice shifting 
may conduct such practices on land property of indigenous community which registered with the 
state…. Forestlands reserved for shifting cultivation shall be identified by Anu-kret (Sub-decree). 
However, to date no single sb-decree has recognized the community land. For example: 
In 1995, Ta Mao, a Khmer person from Kampong Cham province bought 6 ha of land from 
Tumpoun ethnic minority people in La En village by bartering (exchange) for two cattle with the 
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signature of village chief on the land contract. In 2003, he continued his further clearance by hiring 
workers from lowland areas to cut the forest and expand his land. As a result, he expanded 20 ha of 
land. In 2003, the community filed a complaint to the district authorities but there was no resolution. 
However, the ethnic community filed complaints against the other seven people who were 
accused of encroachment on the communal land as well. 
 
 
Land conflicts 
Since the influx of immigrants from the central lowland areas, the province has faced many 
cases of land dispute. The main causes of land disputes are: illegal land sales, land encroachment 
by immigrants, powerful men snatching the land of the villagers, unclear plot boundaries, claims of 
ancestral land and fake land documents. Chamkar chas or bos chas73 (fallow land) has been sold 
to Khmer immigrants without clear measurement, and sometimes land sellers have shown trees as 
being the plot boundaries without asking the villagers. The latter were not aware of the land size unit 
in hectare that the Khmer use. The plot of land on the sale contract was mentioned in hectares but 
with incorrect length and width. Also, the interpretation of land laws relating to issues such as the 
unclear definition of forest land and community forest land, different understandings of 
administrative and traditional village boundaries, and ignoring the traditional right of fallow land or 
bos chas have led to land confiscation and land disputes. 
Most disputes related to land transactions are: 
• Between ethnic villagers over ancestral land (or between new land owners since 1979 and 
others introducing themselves as grant children of their ancestors as the former (old) land 
owner), and over sales of community land. 
• Between indigenous people and land buyers on claims for land re-possession;  
• Between ethnic minority people and powerful people who have encroached community 
forested land. 
• Between ethnic people and land buyers (Khmer immigrants, urban people) over plot 
boundaries or encroachment, issuance of land certificates violating people’s land. 
• Between ethnic minority villagers and poor immigrants (Cham) who are accused of land 
encroachment on community forest land. 
• Between ethnic minority villagers and rubber investment companies or government 
officials on boundaries or land encroachment. The villagers, in this case, were accused of 
land grabbing. 
• Between ethnic villagers and urban dwellers (with the involvement of commune and 
village chiefs) over ignoring the right of fallow land of villagers. In this case, the chiefs gave 
the fallow land to urban dwellers without informing their villagers, and were accused of 
land grabbing or secretly selling the community land. 
• Between a villager and his community (or dispute among ethnic minority people) over the 
secret sale of loaned land (e.g. burial ground). 
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The cases of land disputes among villagers belonging to ethnic minorities were resolved by the 
village elders and village chief based on their customary law, but several cases of disputes remain 
unresolved, in particular, disputes involving powerful or rich people with regard to encroachment on 
community forest or villagers’ fallow land. However, many brokers have intervened in assisting ethnic 
people from losing their land through selling and disputes. Also, not all conflicts are about land 
transactions. However, there have been cases of land conflict related to the area of ‘land 
transactions’ that started from land encroachment and different understandings of land rights. In 
many cases, disputes among ethnic minority people occurred on the village boundaries because 
they have a different way of thinking of traditional boundaries and/or administrative boundaries. For 
example: 
Between ethnic villagers over ancestral land 
A serious land conflict occurred in 1993 between three households of Phnom village and 
households in Lon village. They cleared land under administrative boundaries of Lon village. After 2-3 
years planting, they sold land to urban dwellers. In this case, the villager in Lon village did not agree 
and complained to the commune chief. However, the Phnom villagers claimed their ancestor land. 
This dispute was resolved by local chiefs and village elders of both villages with a request to villagers 
of Phnom to stop clearing land in Lon village. However, the same thing happened again in 2004 
between 20 households of Phnom village and 35 households of Lon village when Phnom villagers 
cleared land for selling to urban dwellers. Again, it was resolved through the conciliation of the 
commune chief, both village chiefs and village elders of both villages. The conciliation was that a 
villager of Lon had to pay between 30,000 and 50,000 riels and a jar of rice wine to the villagers of 
Phnom for offering their ancestors in exchange for gaining access to the land and to stop clearing 
land in Lon village. To avoid future land disputes, the commune chief issued receipts of land 
possession to Lon villagers for a payment of 20,000 riels (US$5) per plot. Usually, land changes hand 
only at the commune office with an unofficial payment between 20,000 and 40,000 riles per ha for 
village chief and 100,000 riels for commune chief. 
Nowadays, he local authorities try to prevent land disputes by the issuance of formal documents 
instead of the customary tool of planting trees. The process has been rapidly adopted in the areas 
where the Khmer were nominated as local chiefs. 
In some cases, there are possibly illegal old ‘sales’ (mostly community Chamkar lands often 
covering large areas) where the buyers from urban areas have not been in possession but they are 
now trying to re-establish their rights to the land and are seeking to legitimise their old claims. For 
example: 
Between indigenous people and land buyer on the claim for land re-possession 
Mrs Phan Saran, her husband is the director of provincial department of planning. In 1990, they 
bought from six local farmers about 20 ha of Chamkar land along national road 78 in La En village. 
There were six written contracts of land sale which were approved by the village and commune 
chiefs and village elders. Due to insecurity at the time she could not use that land. After a while 
about 15 ha of land was re-occupied by the ethnic farmers who sold land to them for growing rice 
and soy beans. As she returned to the land in the early 2000 she was able to access only free 
occupied land which was located in the middle of their land. She tried to negotiate with ethnic 
farmers to get the land back but a group of farmers agreed to give land back but ask for a 
payment of labour costs for clearing at 100,000 riels (US$25) per ha, while another group did not 
agree because the land is fertile and flat which is suitable for soy bean growing. In this case, she lost 
part of her land. After getting the land back, she has cultivated cashew trees and soy beans and 
she will apply for registration and certificates of possession right at the DLMUPC. 
The ethnic minority villagers took the land back as the owner did not use it. Even though the sale 
was with written contracts of land sale recognized by the village and commune chiefs and village 
elders, the buyer lost part of her land. She did not want to file a complaint against the ethnic 
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minority villagers or she fears that she may lose more of her land because it is not fully secure. Also, 
article 28 of the 2001 land law states: “no authority outside the community may acquire any rights to 
immovable properties belonging to an indigenous community”. On the other hand, the land seller 
tried to get land back when the price of land increased. For example: 
Dispute occurring in 2004 when a land owner wanted to get back the land he sold 
In 1995, Mr. Maon Teng, Tumpoun ethnic villager, living in Lon village, Yeak Loam commune, sold 
1,50 ha of his Chamkar land for 120,000 riels (US$40) to Mr. Cheus, living in the same village. They did 
not prepare any written document as evidence for the sale and purchase of the land. This was 
because they trusted each other and they were not aware how to prepare the written contract. In 
2004 when the price of land increased, the seller demanded the land back but Mr. Chreus, the 
buyer, refused this demand. In 2005, Mr. Chreus requested the commune chief to issue him the land 
tenure transfer letter because he fears that the seller tries to claim that land back. He spent 20,000 
riels (US$5) as the service fee to the commune chief for preparing the land transfer letter. In this 
case, the parties in dispute did not file a complaint to the village and commune chiefs. 
In many cases, the outsider or Khmer people are accused of buying or borrowing land with the 
intention of encroaching on fallow land or community forest land surrounding it. Encroachments 
were by either the land buyer or their hired labor. Some ethnic minority farmers also lost their land or 
plantations because they were afraid to complain or they did not know how to complain. In some 
cases, the community received land back if there was intervention from a human rights 
organization and the PCC to resolve a land dispute. For example: 
Dispute between community/ethnic minority people and government official over buying land in 
Teun village with the intention of encroaching on surrounding forest land 
Mr. Moul Samvang (a forest administrative official) from the provincial capital of Banlung bought 
20 ha of land from ethnic community villagers in 2000. He cleared forest land with the intention of 
expanding up to 200 ha. His encroachment into the community forest land led to a serious dispute 
with community villagers. Firstly, with the assistance of ADHOC and NTFP the community complained 
this case to the provincial governor. It was passed to the provincial land dispute resettlement 
commission. This commission worked on the complaint in January 2001, and decided in favour the 
community. Mr. Moul Samvang could receive/keep 20 ha of land and had to return the other 180 
ha of land to the ethnic minority people of Teun village or the Teun community with an additional 
payment of 1,000,000 riels, 6 jars of rice wine and 5 pigs, equivalent to a total amount 1,100,000 riels 
to three villages ( of Teun commune). However, a dispute occurred again in 2002 when he 
expanded his land over the ethnic villagers’ land. This dispute happened before the establishment 
of the Provincial Cadastral Commission (PCC). The ethnic villagers complained this case to the 
human rights organizations, ADHOC and CLEC. After the establishment of the PCC, CLEC urged the 
PCC to work on this complaint. The PCC conciliated this dispute and nominated Mr Toem Monirath, 
the vice director of DLMUPC and chief of PCC secretariat to conduct measurement and 
delineation of land in order to distribute land to Mr. Moul Samvang and the Teun community on 12 
May 2005. The conciliation and measurement was also assisted by the OCC, CLEC from Phnom 
Penh and observed by the NGOs and agencies working in Rotanak Kiri such as the DPA, PLG. 
Another case was related to encroachment on ethnic villager’s plantations after clearing. The 
ethnic minority villager lost his cashew plantation because he feared the powerful man and was not 
aware of how to make a complaint. The ethnic farmer lost land has no hope to get it back. 
The dispute occurred in 2000 in Sek village in Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district when a 
policeman received a certificate that violated another villager’s land. A party involved in the 
dispute who is the ethnic villager said that (Mr) Ta Khorn, chief of Koun Mom district police, cleared 
forest land along NR 78 within the boundary of Sek village, Ta Ang commune in Koun Mom district in 
1990 for planting cashew trees over an area of 5 ha. In 1994, he built a fence around his land and 
other 6 ha of land of a Kreung villager who is also living in Sek village (which is also land for cashew 
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plantation). The policeman (violator) told the Kreung villager that he built the fence around the land 
to prevent animals from entering the Chamkar. In 1998, Ta Khorn (the policeman asked the Land 
Management Office to issue a land certificate for his land, including the land of the Kreung villager. 
At that time, the Kreung villager was not aware of what he had done. However, a dispute 
happened in 2000 when he (the Kreung villager) asked his children to pick cashew fruits from his 
Chamkar. The policeman told the Kreung villager not to pick the cashew fruits because he was the 
owner of the cashew plantation. The Kreung villager did not make any complaint because he was 
afraid of the policeman and he did not know where to file a complaint.  
 
 
Stakeholders’ groups in land issues 
• Brokers involved in land transactions 
Land brokers play an important role in land sales/purchases. Since 2004, many cases of land 
sales/purchases involved the intervention of a broker. There are many actors who practice 
brokerage occasionally or are part-time brokers, such as relatives, villagers, school teachers, urban 
dwellers, hotel owners, policemen, chiefs of village and commune or commune councillors. There 
are also links between local brokers and urban brokers or alliances between commune councillors 
and others involved in brokerage. In some cases, people come from different lowland provinces to 
buy land through the assistance of their relatives/friends living in the province or relying on social 
(kin) networks as a sort of strategy for buying land. 
A farm household in Tahok village, Prek Tahok commune, Chhloung district, Kracheh province. 
He is preparing (March 2005) to resettle in RTNKR where it is not his home village but is waiting for the 
authorization. A broker/mediator has coordinated this resettlement affair but, he has to pay 500,000 
riels (about US$125) for the registration and a plot of land74. FIfty per cent of the total households in 
the village of Tahok migrated to Rotanak Kiri or Mundul Kiri due to declining rice production and 
fishing yields. They were forced to displace because rice production in areas along the Mekong 
River have often been damaged either by drought or flood. 
It is not only rich men who want to establish plantations. Also those people who face crop 
damage or a lack of agricultural land in the lowland provinces try to gain access to large amounts 
of marginal land through land brokers or relatives who have previously migrated to an area. Villager 
brokers are able to mediate in buying small amounts of land, while the chiefs of village and 
commune mediate in sales of large amounts of land. Some policemen acting as brokers have used 
the money made from brokerage to buy land for speculation. In most cases involving land 
sales/purchases to outsiders/urban people, the buyers never meet sellers so that the land broker is 
able to get a higher price than that which the seller has agreed upon. Land brokers are responsible 
for preparing land transfer contracts75. When these documents are made, the buyers give money to 
the land brokers to pass on to the sellers. However, in the land sale where the buyer and seller met 
each other, when the buyer asked about the price the seller asked him to negotiate with the land 
broker. As promised, the land seller did not claim more than the price which he had already agreed 
                                                            
74  Reported by RK, 30.03.2005. 
75  Land transfer contract or land sale contract. 
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upon with the broker, even though the broker was able to sell the land at a higher price. In this case, 
the broker gained money from both the brokerage fee and land sale profit. For example: 
Mr. Kvev Tuk, a Tumpoun farmer, living in Lon village, Yeak Loam commune, Banlung district, sold 
a plot of land of 20 m x 70 m in 2004 at a cost of US$700. He sold the land through the ‘facilitation’ of 
a broker. The land broker negotiated the price with the seller and agreed to sell at a cost of US$700. 
The urban buyer paid US$950. The buyer said he also asked the seller about the price when he first 
came to see the land, but the seller told him to negotiate with the land broker. From this transaction, 
the land broker made a profit of US$250. 
In one case, a village broker overheard a conversation between villagers who wanted to sell 
their land. He, informed another urban land broker in Banlung to seek out people who wanted to 
buy land. The price of the land was negotiated with a surplus in order for the brokers to make a 
commission. The land buyers believed that they could trust the land brokers because of their 
knowledge of the land history and their ability to avoid land disputes in the future. For example: 
A son of Mr Nan Chrong, aged 23, half-Tumpoun and Kreung, lives in La En village, Toeun 
commune overheard other villagers discussing that they wanted to sell their land. Then, he 
confirmed with the villager about this option of land sale. He informed the urban broker in Banlung 
(they used to have a walk together) about the villager who wanted to sell his land. He asked the 
urban broker to keep US$300 for him as the commission for informing. When the deal was made and 
the money was paid, the young man went to the urban land broker again to get the commission. 
Besides cultivation, the young man sometimes involves himself in land brokerage, but he works as a 
land broker within his village and neighboring villages only. 
The hotel owner acted as a broker for the rich Khmer immigrant or for those living in lowland 
provinces such as Kampong Cham looking for large land for commercial plantation. He also made 
an alliance with the authorities involved in land management, in order to get access to land titles 
certifying formal land rights for large land buyers. The brokerage fee being allocated to all 
authorities involved is 1/3 (33%) of the land’s sale price. In many cases, commune councillor brokers 
can gain up to 1/3 of the land price. For example: 
The sale of 100 ha of forest land in Lung Khun village, Borkeo district involved a number of land 
brokers such as the commune chief, the first deputy chief of the commune and a teacher at Yeak 
Loam Primary School (Mr. Meas Ton). At first, people in Phnom Penh communicated with Mr. Meas 
Ton to find out about land sales. Then, Mr. Meas Ton met with the chief and first deputy chief of the 
commune. The three of them traveled to Borkeo district in the car of the first deputy chief of 
commune to seek people who wanted to sell land. They found land of 100 ha at a cost of US$100 
per ha. However, they told the buyers that the cost was US$150 per ha. Then the land brokers 
brought the buyers to see the land. The buyers agreed with the price and asked the brokers to 
prepare a land transfer contract. When the documents had been prepared, the buyers gave 
US$15,000 to the land brokers. Then the land brokers gave the money the land sellers. From this deal, 
the brokers made US$5,000 profits.  
For village brokers, the land buyer covers the expenses of changing the name at the village and 
commune level, These formal written contracts are not legal according to article 65 of the 2001 land 
law, “The transfer of ownership can be enforceable as against third parties only if the contract of 
sale of immovable property is made in writing in the authentic form drawn up by the competent 
authority and registered with the Cadastral Registry Unit. However, no authority outside the 
community may acquire any rights to immovable properties belonging to an indigenous 
community” (Art. 28). However, in practice community land is sold to outsiders. Brokers bring buyers 
to see the land first but try to avoid them meeting with the sellers. Sometimes, the buyers do not 
come and see the land because they trust the brokers. On the transaction, the brokers prepare 
documents of land transfer and the land buyer pays for them. The cost for signing on the land 
transfer contract is US$10 for the village chief and US$30 - US$50 for the commune chief. In some 
cases, the land brokers sign documents as witnesses if the village chief refuses to sign. The signature 
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of the village chief is easier to obtain if the document has already been signed by the commune 
chief. Some villagers act as broker in the commune, while the commune chief acts as a broker are 
not only in his own commune but also in other districts. 
Before 1995, in many cases, the chiefs of villages and communes were asked by the urban 
dwellers or Khmer immigrants to seek land for plantation development. The act of giving land as 
indigenous commodity to the Khmer immigrants or urban dwellers leads to land disputes. For 
example:  
A dispute case of 50 ha of land in Tus village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district between 82 
indigenous families, Kroeung, represented by seven families and 10 urban dwellers from Phnom 
Penh and Kampong Cham province. They accused that both local authorities sold their land to the 
10 urban dwellers without informing the villagers. At that time, people felt fear but they referred this 
complaint to ADHOC in Jan, 2005 to claim their land back. 
Beside the above case in Tus village, local authorities were also frequently accused of selling 
community land secretly in Barkeo and O Yadav districts which are located far from the urban area. 
NGOs have tried to assist people to keep their land by different approaches. 
• 6.2. Formal and informal politico-legal institutions 
In Rotanak Kiri, there are many stakeholder groups working on land disputes, such as the 
provincial department of land management, urban planning and construction (DLMUPC), 
provincial cadastral commission (PCC), human rights organizations: ADHOC, CLEC, DPA (CIDSE), 
CFAC, the Rotanak Kiri Community Natural Resource Management Network, NTFP, CBNRM, the 
Highlanders Association, UNDP, LICAHDO, LAC, village chiefs and village elders. 
DLMUPC and PCC: The DLMUPC has not much to do with legal brokerage, but it is involved in 
implementing land policy, and the PCC is formally involved in resolving disputes over land without 
titles. Our inquiry into the land registration process led us to understand the intervention of the 
government in preventing and resolving land disputes and the loss of collective land. To date, some 
districts have an office of land management and administration but no chief has been nominated. 
People applying for sporadic registration of their land have to make a request at the provincial 
level. They face constraints in terms of both time and costs. Ninety-nine76 of occupied rural land 
does not have legal documentation. The transfer of land right by sales/purchases is (informally) 
recognized at the village and commune level. The DLMUPC certifies the non forested land and old 
chamkar land of cashew plantation, and recently has been asked to collaborate with the FA to 
identify forest land. The issuance of a certificate of possession rights of land has been mostly for plots 
of residential land in the provincial capital and for some plots in the downtown area77. Local leaders 
who recognized land sales were accused of also being involved with them. There have been some 
big land buyers who took workers from other provinces for clearing land. Some workers did not 
return home, and settled on land that they cleared illegally. The new illegally cleared land is 
unknown but the FA is conducting the survey of it. The FA can not ban people from illegally clearing 
land if there is no cooperation from the commune and district authorities78. Also, the DLMUPC has 
acted as an intermediary institution between claimants and authorities – through the provision of 
information and legal assistance in cases of land dispute. Up to June 2005, the DLMUPC had issued 
30 certificates of possession right in O Chum district. Ten of the certificates were issued for Khmer 
land buyers who own large amount of land. On average, each person owns land 50 ha. In Banlung 
district, the DLMUPC issued on average 3-4 certificates per month for residential land in urban areas. 
The recognition of land rights by the commune officers costs US$30 per ha of chamkar land. Some 
plots changed hands legally at the OLMUPCC but the cost may be higher. For example: 
                                                            
76  Reported by Mr Toeum Sinath, Director of DLMUPC of RTNKR. 
77  Mr. Toeum Sinath, director of DLMUPC of RTNKR in RK, Feb.8, 2006. 
78  According to Mr. Toeum Sinath, Director of DLMUPC of RTNKR in RK, Sept, 24, 2005 and Feb, 08, 2006.  
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Mr. Kim Reth, a Khmer person living in Ta Ang 2 village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district 
admitted that presently, he has 20 ha of land. He made a definitive sale79 issued by the OLMUPCC 
and received certificates of possession of 10 ha of land. To get this certificate, he had to spend 
US$300 per ha for document clearance and other related costs. 
In 2002, participatory land use planning (PLUP) was conducted after the creation of a Land Use 
Planning Committee through election by community members. PLUP aims to assist local ethnic 
minorities by preventing land disputes and promoting the sustainable use of natural resources. The 
Communal Land Titling Committee is the community representative and structured with five 
members, including village elders (2), village chief (1), and representatives of another committee. 
One of them will be elected by the villagers to be the community representative as a legal entity for 
titling of collective land. In La En village, DPA (CIDSE) in cooperation with LMAP, is conducting the 
registration and titling of collective land. A villager belonging to a local ethnic minority has the 
possession right, Sith Poukkak, but, he will have no right to sell land. However, land can be 
transferred to his children or relatives as possessors, and a villager can sell his land if all parties are in 
agreement. If a farmer goes to another village outside the community, the community distributes 
part of his possessed land for sale depending on the community’s decision. However, he cannot get 
the land back again when he returns to the village. 
Steps and pilot activities of community/collective land registration are: 
1. Selecting the target villages 
2. Provincial task force formation 
3. Extension on land law 
4. Community applies for communal land title 
5. Review PLUP by the district cadastral administration 
6. Training of adjudication and demarcation team 
7. Formation of legal entity of community 
8. Measurement, demarcation adjudication, survey 
9. Public display 
10. Conflict resolution 
11. Endorsement of agreement 
12. Issue of titles. 
This process is intended to be harmonized with the newly formed commune councils’ 
responsibilities in budgeting and planning. PLUP can explicitly include an opportunity for the council 
or community to identify potential Social Land Concession (SLC) sites. However, there will be no 
sustained poverty alleviation benefit if SLCs become a tool for deforestation, and a subsequent 
degradation of the natural resources upon which the livelihoods of indigenous people gathering 
non-timber forest products (NTFP) are based. The Ministry of Land Management established a Task 
Force which aimed to develop a policy strategy on indigenous land rights and to draft the sub-
decree on collective land title. 
ADHOC, LICAHDO: The two human rights NGOs have tried to assist people by organizing training 
on land law. They have helped people involved with land disputes on how to file complaints, and 
monitor the complaints that have been referred to the court or cadastral commissions. Sometimes, 
they monitor the land dispute process and help those people who have been arrested. They also 
negotiate with land owners to return land or parts of land back to villagers. 
CIDSE (changed to DPA): has been involved with community resource management activities 
since 2001. CIDSE assists indigenous people to keep their land by implementing PLUP and supporting 
                                                            
79  Legally, with transfer tax of 4%. 
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the systematic land titling of the communal land. Its first pilot project began with land use mapping 
and community forestry activities in Teun commune, Kon Mom district. In 2002, PLUP activities were 
carried out in La En village because the village straddles NR 78, there have been high incidences of 
land sales and land disputes since the end of the 1990s. 
CLEC: In Rotanak Kiri, CLEC provides training on land rights and advocates at the national level 
for the protection of indigenous land rights. CLEC has also launched the Public Interest Legal 
Advocacy Project (PILAP) which aims to use the legal system to assert and protect citizens’ rights. 
PILAP selected a case of land dispute between 12 Jarai villagers and a provincial forest 
administration official from Teun village. It is alleged that the official illegally seized communal land. 
PILAP has prepared its legal case, and resolved this case in collaboration with the PCC, and through 
a mixture of publicity, negotiation and conciliation. The goal was to set an example by forcing 
persons who illegally grab indigenous land to respect the land law. To date (Feb 2007), CLEC has 
assisted the villagers to file a complaint to the provincial court seeking legal action against the land 
buyer from Phnom Penh, the former Kang Yu village chief, O Yadav district governor and three Pate 
commune councilors demanding the return of 270 ha of land. 
Community meeting organized by the chief of village and adjudicated by the elders, 
intervention from the commune chief: There is customary law which governs social behavior. This is 
related to the power of ancestors who, if angered, may punish through misfortune, sickness and 
even death. The mechanism by which this is enforced is standard if a recognized customary law has 
been infringed, it is usual for a meeting to be called and village elders will decide upon an 
appropriate fine. 
In cases of disputes between community villagers, the elders must adjudicate. The two parties 
agree on a mediator to ‘manage’ the case and work towards a solution. There are arrangements 
set up by the community meeting organized by the chief of village, which aim to prevent land sales 
and encroachments. The arrangements state that the community fines those villagers who sell land 
to outsiders through the payment of collective cash. If the villagers sold land at a cost lower than 
infringement they have to find money for an additional payment. The land seller has to pay the 
community box, or both land buyer and seller have to be evicted from the community/village or the 
community confiscates their cows for sale instead of taking the payment. However, land disputes 
caused by land sales between local people in two neighboring villages need intervention from the 
commune chief as well. For example, 
A dispute happened in 2004 between 20 households of Phnom and 35 households in Lon village 
when the villagers of Phnom cleared land in Lon village for sale to urban dwellers. The dispute was 
conciliated by the commune chief, both village chiefs and village elders of both villages; the Lon 
villagers had to pay between 30,000 and 50,000 riels and a jar of rice wine to the villagers of Phnom 
for offering to their ancestors in exchange for stopping the clearing of land in Lon village. It is like 
buying land from the ancestors of the Phnom villagers. In order to prevent land disputes in the 
future, the commune chief issued receipts of land possession to the Lon villagers; the payment for 
the receipt was 20,000 riels (US$5) per plot which is lower than recognizing the land sale contract.  
National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution (NALDR) and the Provincial Committee on Forest 
Clearance and Encroachment: This Committee expropriated nearly 400 ha of land in Banlung district 
referring to Botbanhchea (Regulation) No 01, in May, 2006, and at the request of the NALDR. Land 
with fencing without use is considered as state land but it was illegally occupied and mostly sold to 
urban people without legal documents.  
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Land inequity 
Analysis of land inequity shows a trend toward land concentration. In RTNKR, even though ethnic 
people have sold land they still have land for their own by using fallow land or by clearing. However, 
most of them now have smaller amounts of land in comparison with former times. Thirteen per cent 
of interviewed FHs, who had land equal to or less than 1 ha per FH, occupied over 2% of total land. 
Forty-seven per cent of FHs hold more than 4 ha of land each and occupied nearly 74% of the total 
land. However, a Gini-coefficient (0.39) confirms the conclusion that 20% of investigated FHs own 
around 5% of the total land while another 20% of FHs own around 45% of the total area. There were 
some indigenous farmers who do not have land for farming due to displacement but they are able 
to survive on land borrowed from their relatives or community.  
Those having land holdings of 1 hectare or less than can be classified as ‘near landless or poor 
land farmers’. In terms of income, this group, in particular youths, depend on selling labour for 
weeding the cashew plantations and for clearing land of the Khmer, while the elders collect NTFP. 
Land sales began in 1995 and peaked in 1999-2001 because 36% of interviewed FHs sold land. 
With regard to the level of land right transfer by sale/purchase, selling plots were registered at 
village level (44% of total selling plots) and commune level (25%). Fewer cases of land sale/purchase 
were registered at the commune level because those were deals made among ethnic people. 
Only 36% of interviewed FHs made a land right transfer letter at the commune level. They have to 
spend money for land right transfer, but in some cases the village and commune chiefs did not 
agree with the land transfer. In Yeak Loam commune, most of the land was sold with the sale 
contracts being recognized by the commune chief, who also works as a land broker. He is a person 
who is authorized to sign on the land right transfer. They did not transfer the land right at the district 
level because of the higher cost. In exceptional cases, rich Khmer land buyers have applied for and 
received certificates of possession right. For example: 
Mr. Kim Reth, a Khmer person living in Ta Ang 2 village, Ta Ang commune, Koun Mom district 
admitted that he has 20 ha of land at present. He has certificates (two) of possession right on 10 ha 
of land which is appropriately issued by the OLMUPCC. To get this certificate, he had to spend 
US$300 per ha for the document clearance and other related costs.  
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Future Trends 
• Ethnic minority people will face a lack of agricultural land that will cause food instability. This 
problem will occur because of many factors including the sale of land to urban people, 
demarcation of state forest land and the banning of land encroachment, land concentration 
and population growth/pressure. The shortage of agriculture land for ethnic minority farmers will 
happen in the places where large areas of land are still available. 
• The majority of land in the rich soil areas is no longer owned by the indigenous or ethnic minority 
communities. As a consequence, they will be prevented by the issuance of a consistent statute 
and regulations to protect the act of illegal sales of chamkar land. 
• Land right transfers will increase because there is a great need for land for plantation (cashew, 
rubber, acacia...). Distress land sale will lead to land disputes due to ignoring the ethnic people’s 
traditional right to chamkar chas and bos chas (fallow land).  
• The tradition of ethnic minority people will be changed in the same way as they have often 
changed their village location and farm land for shifting agriculture before because all land will 
be privatized or occupied. 
• Ethnic minority farmers will face the problem of food shortages because their livelihoods are 
mainly based on shifting cultivation. Even though the province is seeing development projects 
for tourism and trade, the capacity of ethnic minority people to gain employment from such 
development is very limited, and requires a lot of external support. 
Cases of land dispute will increase between indigenous people and migrating people if the 
boundaries of community land are not clearly demarcated. Increasingly, indigenous families are 
becoming land poor families, and will probably go on to become landlessness. Thus, there is a need 
to formally recognize the community’s land ownership before tourism and other development 
projects are further promoted in these areas. 
 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 185 
Summary of the main findings 
• Modalities of access to land 
• There are different modalities by which ethnic communities and new Khmer settlers access land 
such as clearing with or without the permission of village chiefs and elders; gifts, purchases, loans, 
sharecropping and renting. Ethnic minority people did not sell their land before 1995. After 
gaining experience with land sales/purchases, the villagers started to plant trees to identify the 
boundaries of their land.  
• Since 2000, exchange systems of land with other consumable assets such as motorbikes have 
changed to a selling system. For indigenous people, exchanges of land do not mean selling 
land. They have asked for additional money as the land price has increased. From now on, land 
sales such as sales of ownership practiced by Khmer people are confronted with fines and 
punished by the village elders or land use and management committee. They have sold 
chamkar land close to their village and straddling the main road to Khmer immigrants/urban 
people and then cleared their fallow land or community land, which is located far from the 
village, for cultivation. 
• Presently, rich Khmer settlers can access land for cultivation by buying and leasing, while the 
poor access it by borrowing and snatching the forest land or fallow land of ethnic minority 
communities. They have been permitted to clear land when they become community members 
(e.g. through marriage). For ethnic farmers, access to land by clearing is becoming difficult; they 
confront the administrative boundaries and the forestry administration’s bans. Also, borrowing 
communal land and inheritance are increasingly practiced. 
• Land institutional arrangements are very dynamic; previously, ethnic villagers loaned land to 
Khmer settlers, but now they borrow either young plantations from the Khmer or communal land 
from the community land use management committee for cultivation. The loan process has 
changed from verbal to written contracts. In many cases, loans have changed to renting. The 
communal land title will be issued in order to prevent land sales, but the situation of local 
communities is fragile or uncertain when they all agree to sell their communal land. Moreover, 
land sale processes are easier if the commune chief mediates as a land broker. 
• Rental and loan of land for cultivation for 1 year occurred in the villages without any written 
contract. The process has been changed to the rental and loaning of land where a written 
contract is prepared due to the existence of land encroachment. Land loans between ethnic 
minority people are carried out without requiring any written agreement, while loans of 
communal land require written agreements which are mostly facilitated and prepared with the 
help of NGO staff (DPA). 
• The majority of fertile land in the area is no longer owned by indigenous communities. Land 
sales/encroachments still have occurred despite the 2001 Land Law (Art. 28) which prohibits 
further encroachment. 
• Land sales/purchases 
• In some cases, Khmer immigrants bought chamkar chas (fallow land) from ethnic people with 
intention of illegally clearing the forest land surrounding chamkar chas to expand their land, and 
then applied for the ownership rights. Ethnic people lose their land under the rules on land 
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disputes if they are not mobilized. However, there hae been many possible illegal old ‘sales’ of 
community chamkar land where the buyers from urban areas have not been in possession of the 
land. They are trying to re-establish their rights to the land and are seeking to legitimize their old 
claims. 
• Land sales between urban people/Khmer and ethnic villagers are processed with written 
documents of land right transfer that are recognized by the village and commune authorities, 
while land sales among ethnic minority people within the same village are conducted in which 
buyers and sellers make letters of land sales or land right transfer among themselves, or with 
verbal agreements. However, Khmer land buyers have increasingly applied for certificates of 
possession (refer to article 69 of the 2001 land law).  
• Between 2000 and 2004, land sales/purchases peaked for land close to urban areas but 
declined in 2005 because people did not have any more land to sell,and because of the 
establishment of community land use management. Land sales in other areas far from urban 
centres have risen. Also, the triangle development plan, NR 78 development project and 
commercial plantation are all reasons for land sales/purchases, while ignoring the rights of 
ethnic villages on chamkar chas and not having demarcation between state forest land and 
ethnic community forest land are ‘main reasons’ for land encroachment and disputes. 
• Traditionally, Kreung or Tampuon used to practice shifting cultivation by clearing forest land. 
The traditional way of shifting cultivation has been forgotten under the pressure of migratory 
flows and land market development. Rapid tree planting has increased in an effort to secure 
land. In several cases, ethnic minority villagers were accused of clearing and selling land which 
belonged to the ancestors of other ethnic minority groups, and they had to share the money 
from selling land to them. Sometimes, ethnic minority people who sold land required land 
buyers to pay additional money to them. 
• Within the villages of established communities, land sales have happened secretly between 
both sellers and buyers. Sometimes, land sales have been recognized by the village chief or 
community organizer. This transaction is easier if the commune chief also works as a land 
broker. Sales of borrowed land belonging to the communities of ethnic minority villagers have 
led to land disputes with land buyers from outside the communities. The communities have 
often lost land even though land buyers paid money and other goods (wine and pork) to offer 
to their ancestors’ spirits. 
• Cropping systems rapidly changed from shifting cultivation to plantation. Cashew trees and soy 
beans have been increasingly integrated into the traditional upland cropping system. Even 
though they have transferred the new cash crops and growing techniques from the Khmer 
immigrants they have not been able to grow crops as well as the Khmer due to a lack of skills 
and mechanical equipment. Cash crops would help local communities to generate cash 
income rapidly, but sustainability requires appropriate techniques for upland farming. However, 
plantations and cash crop production have increased at the expense of forest areas. This 
includes encroachment which has significantly correlated to an increase of soil erosion and 
pests. This could also be a determining factor in destroying the natural eco-system. 
• Land disputes 
• The interpretation of land laws such as the unclear definition of state forest land and 
community forest, different understandings between administrative and traditional village 
boundaries, ignoring the traditional right of chamkar chas and bos chas (fallow land) have led 
to land confiscation and land disputes. Disputes over land have frequently happened, caused 
by the lack of clear land rights before selling and buying. Khmer immigrants have bought land 
with the intention of encroaching on forest land surrounding it. Disputes related to the claim of 
ancestral land have been resolved in cases where there has been mediation by elderly 
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people, and village chiefs from both sides. However, disputes can be ended/prevented when 
the commune chief issues receipts of land right for ethnic minority villagers who are considered 
as owners. But such recognition by the commune authorities might conflict FA claims over state 
forest land. 
• Loans of land tend to be fragile, except in ethnic communities organized by NGOs, which 
ensure that they are made using written contracts. Loans among members of ethnic minorities 
by oral agreement have caused the secret sale of borrowed land. This has led to forest land 
encroachment, while Khmer immigrants have also borrowed land with the intention of 
encroaching on community land. Mostly, ethnic villagers or communities have lost land despite 
being able to claim back the encroached land. 
• Several cases of land disputes among ethnic people have been resolved by local authorities, 
but those disputes between ethnic people and urban/powerful people or new immigrants 
have not been resolved where there has been no intervention from outsiders, such as the PCC, 
and the participation of other government agencies and NGOs. However, mediation of 
disputes still requires the involvement of villagers and elderly people in the traditional way, in 
order to be more effective. Land disputes and land sales have been reduced since the 
establishment of LUMC. 
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General synthesis of findings 
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Describing Land Transfer Modalities 
• Trends in land transfer modalities  
In the areas studied, non commoditised forms of transactions on land rights have been playing a 
major role in regional land tenure dynamics. These transactions occur through administrative 
modalities such as land distribution, grants to the military, resettlement of returnees and landless 
farmers, and include land clearing after a period of occupation or customary ways such as 
inheritance, loans and the clearing of ethnic community forests with the permission of village elders 
and village chiefs. Land re-distribution was not limited to the post-Khmer Rouge in the 1980s, but 
continued in the 1990s. In SR and KPT in the uplands, degraded forest lands have been distributed to 
ALFs and land poor farmers with the formal recognition of local or provincial authorities and 
sometimes with the establishment of new settlements. In KPT, the provincial committee for land 
allocation distributed degraded forest land to local villagers as to resolve the protest against the 
granting of ELCs. The lack of cultivated land enforced farmers to occupy land for clearing in the 
following year. In RTNKR, ethnic minority people occupied their former ancestral land. They could 
clear community forests with the permission of village elders and village chiefs. 
Nevertheless, we observe a clear trend toward the commoditisation of land right transfers. This is 
partly due to the development of tourism, plantations and SEZs, which have favoured speculative 
behaviour with regard to land. Farmers leave their home areas to clear remote forest lands after 
having sold their own plots of land under the pressure of developing land markets, threat organised 
by land brokers, or poverty (distress sales). 
The peak of land sales/purchases occurred in 1998/2004 in SR, KPT and RTNKR, somewhat later 
than in SHV. In this respect, in SR the APSARA authority has been playing a key role since 2004, when 
its regulatory power was strengthened by the government in freezing large tracks of land as 
protected areas, thus removing it from speculation. Conversely, the Triangle Development Zones, 
plantations and SEZs caused an increase in land speculation. The development of recession rice 
(RR) in the flooded areas also caused encroachment on flooded shrub and forest land. 
• Links between different land transfer modalities 
There are also mutual links resulting from the development of land sales. They include: 
A strong link between land sales and land clearing: Smallholders leave in the agricultural areas 
surrounding the city of SR and in Prey Nup of SHV and RTNKR, selling their land under pressure (very 
often under threat) from land brokers and buyers, or anticipating a risk of complete land loss and 
then move to peripheral areas to buy land at a lower price or, more often, to clear land at the risk 
of being evicted by forest agents or the military (concessionaires). In the upland areas, there is a 
tendency towards the commoditisation of land and the individualisation of property rights in former 
areas of shifting cultivation, particularly in KPT, where landowners have sold land close to the NR 6 at 
high prices and re-bought land which was far from the road at lower prices, or encroached on 
forest or degraded forest land.  
A link between land clearing and loans: In SR, there is a link between the military development 
zone and the reproduction of shifting cultivation through short-term loans. In SHV, SR and KPT the rich 
people/urban dwellers have been accused of illegally snatching forest land by persuading people 
to clear it in exchange for clearing costs and short term loans of land. In SHV, the owners of rice land 
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with regenerated forest loaned it to farmers in exchange for labor to clear land. However, in RTNKR, 
Khmer immigrants have borrowed land from ethnic minority people with the intention of 
encroaching on forest land surrounding the borrowed land. 
A link between land sales and derived rights: Land sellers, generally smallholders and poor 
farmers, have borrowed the same plot they have sold. Very often, the loan is changed into a rental 
contract without any negotiation, expressing a highly uneven power balance. In cases where the 
plot is used for planting cashew nut trees, the loan duration is limited to 4 to 5 years according to 
the growth of the trees. We observe also, a trend toward the commoditisation of derived rights with 
the development of rental contracts and, to a lesser extent; sharecropping at the expense of loans; 
leasing instead of sharecropping. 
A link between capital investment and sharecropping: Another trend that is specific to the Tonle 
Sap flooded area is the access to land through capital investment in water reservoirs on borrowed 
land and on state concession land for cultivation of RR or dry season rice and fast growing trees 
(acacias, with the active participation of local authorities as brokers). Then, the investors or 
concessionaires derive land for temporary cultivation rights of RR through sharecropping 
arrangements. However, sharecropping would change to leasing for easier management. Also, 
importantly, sharecropping is a resolving mechanism for disputes on former and abandoned deep 
water and floating rice (DW-FR) land. 
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Describing Land appropriations 
Each of the case studies identified at least five, and sometimes more than 10 different 
appropriations, including: 1) distribution by the local authorities and solidarity groups; 2) re-
occupation of former land owned prior to 1975 or of former properties; 2) clearing of (or formally 
clearing) forest land; 3) re-distribution of land; 4) settlement; 5) providing land as social land 
concession (SLC) to ALFs or vulnerable women; 6) clearing ethnic community land with or without 
permission; 7) purchasing; 8) inheritance; 9) borrowing the land 5 years before the issuance of the 
2001 land law; 10) occupation of the abandoned land of the former owners; 11) occupation of 
public land (village or ethnic community land), state land and private land. Overall, land 
appropriation has been carried out initially, with land distribution by local authorities and the re-
occupation of former properties, free access by clearing, or clearing ancestral forest land. Such 
diversity can also be classified as distribution, clearing, purchasing, and inheritance. 
• Land distribution 
Cultivated land was distributed by the local authorities to the solidarity group, krom samaki in 
1979. Later, it was redistributed several times between 1982 and 1986 to the members of krom 
samaki or individual households due to conflicts around land allocation in which they were accused 
of not being equal in terms of land quality. In some villages, there was a need to allocate land to 
newcomers. In some villages local authorities distributed residential land to households equally, 
while in other villages people re-occupied the land they owned prior to 1975. In the new villages 
created during the Pol Pot regime, villagers continued to settle and occupy residential plots which 
were allocated during the Pol Pot time. Overall, the distribution of land was mostly restricted to the 
areas controlled by the government in Phnom Penh. 
Moreover, up to 1989, the government officially recognised the distribution of solidarity groups’ 
lands to their member households. However, land distribution continued in the 1990s and 2000s, to 
returnees in 1992, to ALFs between 1996 and 1997 and in 2002. In some villages, households of 
immigrants (or demobilized armies) who arrived between 1989 and 1994, could receive land from 
the local authorities by giving ownership, by sharing land from villagers who had large amounts of 
land or by establishing of new settlements in the degraded forest areas, which caused disputes on 
land rights between former (old) owners and new owners and between farmers and the military. The 
military claims ownership of newly cleared land as their former defending zone during the war, or 
that land inside the military development zone. 
However, in RTNKR, ethnic minority people returned to their respective villages although they 
were displaced or evacuated many times between 1970 and 1979. They occupied land by settling 
and cultivating crops on their ancestoral land or the land of ancestors of other ethnic minority 
groups but within the new administrative boundaries. The occupation of the ancestral land of other 
ethnic minority groups or clearing land in the new administrative commune has led to disputes, 
particularly since 2004, when land market values increased. According to customary law, the land 
belongs to the ethnic communities. Currently, land tends to be privatized. The LUMC was set up to 
prevent the sale of communal land. However, ethnic villagers have sold or borrowed land from the 
community in secret. 
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• Land clearing 
After the redistribution of agricultural land, farmers in the lowland zone toward the Tonle Sap 
Lake also encroached in the flooded forest for the cultivation of dry season rice due to the lack of 
rice land, while those farmers in the upland zone encroached into the forest to expand their 
chamkar land, or for selling. Many of them sold their newly cleared land due to urgent need (distress 
sales) or under the pressure – the usual mix of threats and persuasion – of brokers, buyers and/or 
local authorities because the newly cleared land is insecure. Furthermore, rich and powerful people 
bought newly cleared land, chamkar chas (fallow land) or chamkar land for tree plantations or loan 
it to farmers in the short term. Often, the FA has accused rich and powerful people of snatching 
state land. Also, there is a link between clearing, sales and loans of land. 
People have cleared forested land in the two areas (lowland and upland) since 1986-87. They 
cleared either rice land already possessed by other owners or forest land for cultivation, while many 
villagers cleared forest land after they sold all, or nearly all of their rice land to urban buyers. Land 
clearing appears thus, to be an exit strategy for people who have sold their land, which shows a 
causal link between the two modes of appropriation (land sales and land clearing), or they have 
sold their labour, clearing land for urban people or the military, or cleared land for a short-term loan 
or to earn money. This link relates to to the land size, its distance from a settlement and seasonal 
cropping work.  
To date, land clearing has led to two serious types of land dispute: between farmer groups and 
the military on chamkar land, and between immigrant groups (newcomers) as new owners and 
powerful men who hold possession certificates for rice land since the early 1990s, or villagers or 
former local authorities as former (old) owners. Despite this, since 1986-87, people have occupied 
degraded forest land in the upland areas for clearing; they have experienced disputes with the 
military in some areas. Since the issuance of the government’s Botbanhchea (regulation) No 01 
2004, forest land clearance has become more difficult. In the upland areas, the FA has complained 
of illegal grabbing of state forest land, while clearing flooded shrub and regenerated shrub was 
subject to the complaint of the Fishery Administration (FiA). Article 29 of 2001 Land Law states, “Any 
beginning of occupation for possession shall cease when this law comes into effect.” However, in 
practice, it is difficult to know which occupants cleared land after 2001 and claimed it for ownership 
if local authorities have registered, witnessed and recognized the terms, even dating back to before 
2001. However, since 2006, the government has spoken about a change from warning against to 
suppressionn of the encroachment into forest land. Big land owners have been accused of illegally 
snatching forest land by persuading people to clear it, by providing clearing costs and a short term 
loan of land. They have bought newly cleared land from local people, and then requested the 
witnessing and recognition of local authorities. 
Land clearing is the common practice of all ethnic minority villagers for shifting cultivation. They 
lay land fallow after 2 -3 years of cultivation. Now, villagers do not leave their Chamkar land as they 
did in the past, but they keep that area for future plantation since land is becoming more 
expensive. To date, clearing land occurs increasingly further from the village, but ethnic villagers 
claim that land is located within their community area though they are supposed to have ‘sold’ it to 
outsiders. In many cases, the Khmer land buyers bought land and then encroached into the forest 
land surrounding it. Some big land buyers took workers from other provinces to clear land. Some 
workers did not return home, and settled on land that they cleared illegally. Also, clearing has a 
connection with in-migration labor. Newly married couples of ethnic communities receive land from 
their parents from both sides. If chamkar land is not enough they are allowed to clear community 
land with the permission of village leaders/chiefs and the CLMC. In many cases, the village 
leaders/chiefs have not known when community forest land was secretly sold by the ethnic minority 
villagers. The forestry law (2002) does not clearly classify the difference between forest land and 
fallow land of shifting agriculture, on which the forest re-generates/grows. In the shifting cultivation 
system, both land and forest are linked together. Article 37 of the Forestry Law states that: “Local 
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communities that traditionally practice shifting may conduct such practices on the land property of 
indigenous communities which registered with the state… Forestlands reserved for shifting cultivation 
shall be identified by Anu-kret” (Sub-decree). However, to date not a single sub-decree has 
recognized community land. 
• Inheritance 
New couples inherit land from their parents. The inheritance process can be different depending 
on a parent’s decision and negotiations among the family’s members, and always occurs without 
written contracts or informing the local authorities. Transfers by registering the names of successors 
were made during SLRs. Inheritance is strictly an intra-family (domestic/private) affair. For those 
households without parents, the inheritance process is strongly decided by the elder brother. 
There are different processes of inheritance such as: 1) allocation of land to all children, but the 
elder child will receive more land than the younger children because the elder child helps the 
parents more than the others in farm work; 2) giving land to those children who got a share of 
landholding in common with their parents during land distribution in 1980s and giving bought land or 
cleared land to the other children; and 3) giving residential land to the youngest child. The parents 
will keep the residential land and house for the youngest child, in particular, for the youngest 
daughter who will look after them in their old age. If the parents do not have enough, they keep it 
for themselves and will give it to the child who looks after them in old age. 
Usually, if the parents have enough land to transfer it to all their children, they allocate less land 
to the better-off children than to the poorer children. 
The process of inheritance in RTNKR used to be quite different from the lowland areas, but it 
tends to resemble it since most of land has been occupied and reserved. Customarily, families 
retain ownership over the fields they farm, as well as access to the perennial crops remaining on 
their old fields which lie in fallow. New couples live with parents at for least 8-10 years on each side. 
When they want to separate from their parents they could receive land either by clearing forest 
land with permission from the village elders or administrative chief of village or inheriting fallow land 
from their parents. Since the land market has increased and the enforcement of the 2002 forestry 
law by the FA, clearing forest land has become more difficult. Land is mostly occupied or reserved 
as collective land. To date, inheritance is becoming an important mode of land access. 
• Social land concession 
Through social land concessions (SLCs), people have rights to cultivate land, but they would only 
be able to get land ownership after a consecutive period of 5-year’s exploitation (Art. 18 of sub 
decree No 19 on SLC, 2003). Despite vulnerable farmers/women receiving land and other support 
such as housing, training on growing techniques, land preparation, subsidies on health care, 
children’s education and marketing, some of the vulnerable women left the settlement and 
abandoned the land because they have never been farmers before. 
On the other hand, despite that article 4 of the sub decree No 146 on ELC, 2005, states that 
evaluating economic land concession (ELC) proposals shall be based on seven criteria, in which 
any link and mutual support between SLC and ELC shall be considered, the local land poor farmers 
have never received land unless they have protested. The Prime Minister ordered to return new 
Chamkar land as SLCs to the farmers and military families in SR: there is a clear link with SLC. 
• Land access through capital investment 
In the flooded areas of KPT, as in SR, toward the great lake of Tonle Sap, local private investors 
seek to invest in reservoirs on former and abandoned DW-FR lands in exchange for parts of that 
land. This way of accessing land must be differentiated from purchases. A common point between 
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these two modalities of land appropriation is, however, the role of brokers (often commune 
authorities) in the process, at the interface between local communities and external investors. 
Capital investment can be differentiated from the grant of ELCs, as a way of providing state private 
land to concessionaires. For capital investment, investors borrowed the former and abandoned DW-
FR lands from the former commune militants or former farmers in exchange for sharing water and 
sharecropping as mechanisms to resolve disputes over land rights with former land owners (farmers 
or former militants): there is thus a link between access to land through investments in capital and 
derived rights (sharecropping). The provincial authorities intend to preserve that land as state 
property referring to article 76 of 1992 land law although it was repealed by the 2001 land law, 
making these lands available for granting to investors as ELC. However, the former owners try to 
claim ‘possession rights’ over their DW-FR lands because they were obliged to abandon it by various 
factors such as insecurity, kidnapping and natural disasters. However, officials claim that the 3-year 
abandonment rule does not apply to that land for which a person has legal documents/certificates. 
Cases of abandonment of DW-FR lands in KPT could be differentiated from those in SHV. In KPT, local 
farmers abandoned DW-FR lands, while in SHV, rich/urban people abandoned rice lands, but they 
have legal possession rights. 
Also, some groups of farmers living in different communes or investors were granted ex-DW-FR 
land that had remained state property by the provincial authorities. This did not cause conflicts. 
Farmers have the right to practice temporary cultivation of RR through group investment in reservoirs 
(e.g. in Sralau commune of KPT). In some cases, however, the granting of that land did not lead to 
disputes about land rights but about community boundaries (between communes), as people are 
aware of the utility of a good harvest of RR. 
In KPT, in the flooded areas toward the Tonle Sap, modalities of access to former DW-FR lands are 
different, including distribution by solidarity groups (1985-86), clearing, granting of ELCs of flooded 
shrub and grass lands remaining as state property to concessionaires or farmer groups, buying of 
former DW-FR land from farmers and borrowing land from farmers or commune militants who own 
the land in form of sharecropping. The concessionaires also gained access to DW-FR land through 
two modalities: (1) ELCs granted for state land; and (2) buying while investors gained access to that 
land by borrowing or renting in exchange for irrigated water and borrowing in relation to 
sharecropping arrangements (please see the section below on agrarian contracts). However, some 
of them play two roles; acting as concessionaires and investors. Rich people have bought former 
DW-FR land before submitting a proposal of ELC to the provincial authorities. Then, the investors 
practiced sharecropping, while the concessionaires practiced sharecropping or leased land to 
local farmers: This shows the link between investment in capital and sharecropping and between 
investment in capital, sharecropping and leasing, expressing the agreement between investors and 
local farmers and between concessionaires and local farmers. However, sharecropping could be 
changed to leasing for easier management. 
In SR, a resevoir project funded by a private investor aimed to convert former and abandoned 
DW-FR areas into RR fields. Before beginning to build the dam, the commune chief and other 
commune councillors mobilized farmers in a Dry Season Rice Farmer Community. The number of 
members increases if farmers are aware of and understand the process of capital investment, how 
to share and pay the costs and how to consolidate land. Capital investment appears as a tool for 
redistribution of former DW-FR land between investors and farmers because potential farmers can 
gain access to larger plots of land. The local leaders named this process deysampatein (Economic 
Land Concession). By law it is the ‘temporary transfer’ of state private land to the private sector. The 
farmers who did not agree with the project accused the local authorities of land grabbing because 
they had abandoned it since 2000 due to a natural disaster. However, the local authorities intend to 
keep the land by referring to article 76 of the 1992 land law.  
In some cases, groups of farmers mobilized themselves in a farmer community as a strategy 
aimed at securing their former DW-FR land rights by investing in the reservoir for RR growing. In this 
case, this investment is a way to get access to formal rights on the way toward legal ownership. 
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Reservoirs provide good potential for increasing RR production instead of the declining DW-FR. 
However, reservoir dams have impeded the natural water flow from the upper land and resulted in 
conflicts between reservoir owners and farmers over rice crop damage in upper land areas. 
Farmers/fishery communities have complained of a lack of water for cattle and a loss of fishing 
areas because the natural lakes were enclosed by the dams. 
Nowadays, accessing the former DW-FR land through ELCs that will be directly granted by the 
provincial governor is becoming difficult due to the confrontation with people’s claims with regard 
to their former land. Moreover, the rehabilitation of long term unused DW-FR land, flooded shrub/ 
forest often confronts the fishery administration (FiA) due to differing interpretations of ‘flooded 
forest’ and ‘former DW-FR land with re-generating shrub/forest’. Providing land possession rights or 
ownership under the fishery management areas (floodplains during the flooding season….) can be 
processed if there is an impact assessment by MAFF (Art. 13 of 2006 Fishery Law). 
Since 2005, those investors who want to invest in reservoirs and RR production have to buy former 
DW-FR lands, as purchase of use rights before submitting the proposal for receiving ELC. The land will 
be repossessed as state land when contracts terminate. As the provincial authorities intend to 
preserve that land as state property, referring to the 1992 land law, this intention may encounter the 
complaints of those (bigger) farmers who have consecutively possessed land since the end of 1980. 
Thus, it could be a model of peaceful repossession of state land from illegal occupants through 
economic expropriation and thanks to the private sector.  
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Describing Agrarian Contracts 
(derived rights) 
Each of the case studies identified different arrangements (agrarian contracts). Such diversity 
could be classified in different categories such as: loans, sharecropping, leasing and pawing). 
Pawning has been practiced by farmers in urgent need of money for immediate purposes. 
However, many urban land buyers prefer loaning the land they have bought to the local farmers 
(very often the seller himself) for temporary cultivation. Loans are a means for securing land 
acquisition, preventing shrub or forest re-growth and avoiding taxation of unused land. 
• Loans of land 
The differentiation between both the allocation of a right to clear and a loan of degraded forest 
land should be noted. In the first case, farmers, particularly ALFs or ethnic minority farmers, obtain 
the right to clear, carry out actions which transform the bush or degraded forest into farmland and 
obtain a right of appropriation through a form of re-distribution; in the second case, the right of 
cultivation on degraded forest land or farm land already exists and/or it is this right which is 
transferred on a provisory (temporary) basis. 
There are different land owner groups that have loaned land to farmers, ALFs and inmmigrants: 
land poor farmers, relatives, commune councillors, government officials, urban land buyers, 
companies, the military, land buyers living abroad, ethnic minority farmers, ethnic communities and 
first (older) Khmer immigrants. They have loaned plots of land, in many cases in exchange for 
labour, to keep and clear land. One can distinguish different strategies of loans practiced by the 
different categories of actors: 
1. Urban land buyers, companies or buyers living abroad buy land for speculation, and as they 
generally do not need the land immediately, they loan it to farmers: this shows the link between 
land sales and loans. In such cases, brokers often act as land keepers/managers for the owner, 
collecting the rental fee. 
2. Farmers who lack land and draft animals have loaned land to their neighbours or relatives, and 
have left their villages to seek new chamkar land elsewhere for cultivation. This is a sort of 
reverse tenancy (the landowner is the poorest in the relationship) showing a link between loans, 
mobility and land clearing. 
3. The military loan land to shifting cultivation farmers for the reproduction of shifting cultivation or 
to ALFs in exchange for labour to clear the land in the short term, and rich people hire labour 
(farmers) to clear land for them in exchange for clearing costs and a short-term loan: this shows 
a link between appropriation (offering by the government link, encroachment) and loan.  
4. The chief of village borrows public (village) land for temporary cultivation during his mandate 
instead of paying low incentives, and later on he claims for ownership: this shows a link between 
loan and appropriation. 
5. Former owners, as farmers, or former militants loan abandoned DW-FR land to private investors 
in water reservoirs. Both groups agree to practice sharecropping: this shows a link between 
loans and sharecropping. 
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6. Urban (rich) people reimburse loans to credit institutions or private money lenders on behalf of 
farmers under the condition that the farmers agree to sell the mortgaged land to them. Then, 
farmers borrow the land for growing rice: this shows a link between mortgaging, sale and loan. 
7. Urban people loan their young plantations of cashew trees to farmers. When the trees are big 
enough they sell the harvesting rights to farmers: this shows a link between loans and harvesting 
rights. 
8. Urban dwellers and companies persuade villagers (through allied land brokers) to sell land 
against the promise they would lend the land back to them (or to other villagers) for rice 
cultivation. However, after having bought all the land they want, after a while, the loan is turned 
into a lease (managed by land keepers): this shows a link between loans and leasing, land 
keepers collect rental fee. 
9. Borrowing or informal occupation of abandoned land over 5 years before the issuance of the 
2001 land law has led to land disputes: the borrowers or occupants became land owners thanks 
to SLR procedure although the former owners received compensation; this shows the link 
between loan/borrowing or informal occupation and access to ownership. 
Borrowers can also play on the ambiguities of the 2001 land law, if for instance they have 
occupied the land since before the issuance of the new land law. They thus claim that they can 
apply for ownership because of this continued occupation since before 2001 (according to article 
30). They resort to articles 30 and 38 which state, “if the possessor has land: Peaceful, in good faith, 
notorious to the public, unambiguous in 5 years continuously and free lands do not register and are 
not belong to someone. The possessor has to be the ownership by legitimating.” However, this 
interpretive device can only work if the loan was made under a verbal agreement. Occupying land 
for over 5 years does not automatically mean ownership, for instance, when the borrowing was 
processed with a written contract. The final result of the dispute depends in such cases on power 
asymmetries between the actors involved. 
10. The village elders/village chief loan community forest to ethnic minority villagers to clear for 
shifting cultivation, but many ethnic farmers have secretly sold land to Khmer immigrants or 
urban people: this shows a link between loan and sale. 
11. The land use management committee loans community land to ethnic minority farmers or 
members of the community through a written contract: this shows a link between sale and loan. 
12. Ethnic minority villagers/leaders loan land to Khmer immigrants after they build relationships, or 
Khmer immigrants borrow land with the intention of encroaching on the surrounding community 
forest land. Also, urban people, as the owners of young plantations of cashew nut trees, bring 
labor to maintain the plantations by loaning the young plantations for annual cropping 
between rows of trees for 3 - 4 years, or according to when the cashew trees are big enough. 
Later on laborers clear land in the community forestry for doing their own cropping activities; this 
shows a link between loans and encroachment. 
Regarding agrarian contracts, loans can follow two procedures: through written contracts and 
without written contracts depending on trust/accountability relations between local actors and the 
development of land markets. However, learning from past experience of land disputes, the land 
owner can request land with written contracts witnessed and recognized by the chief of village or 
by the chief of commune. Similarly, for rice lands in, or close to the urban development zone and 
the newly cleared lands in the upland areas that have good market opportunities, loans without 
contracts have been increasingly replaced by loans which rely on written contracts (issued by the 
land management committee of indigenous communities). 
In some cases, loans have been processed when the large land owner lacked rice seedlings or 
had no agricultural equipment. According to the farmer’s habits if they have no more rice seedling 
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to transplant, they prefer to loan other unused land to their neighbours. In thiscase, the loan is a form 
of land adjustment to the farmer’s production means. 
Otherwise, shifting cultivation farmers borrow land from other villagers or their relatives or from the 
military when they have lost all their fallow land by expropriation or banning from the government 
authorities. In the following year, the loan is changed to sharecropping even though they still use the 
term for ‘borrowing’ (som dei thveu sre sen). 
However, some loans practiced between villagers or between relatives without written contracts 
have changed to renta arrangementsl, where landowners receive a sort of rent in-kind (paddy). 
Interestingly, this rent is not considered as such, but rather as symbolising a kind of mutual help or 
gratitude. 
Both interviewed farmer groups: landholding farmers (LHFs) and agricultural landless farmers 
(ALFs) have borrowed land, mostly from urban land buyers for annual cultivation (see table below). 
They have been able to access land through loans, and some ALFs have also borrowed land from 
the land buyers who bought land from them. Loaning is thus an important means of gaining access 
to land for landless and poor farmers. 
 
Modalities of access to land (in % of interviewed LHFs and ALFs) 
 
Modalities of access to land SR KPT SHV RTNKR 
Appropriation 
Clearing FH/LHF 45 40 40 100 
 ALF     
Buying LHF 20 58 67  
 ALF     
Inheritance LHF 75 48 33  
Institutional arrangement 
FH/LHF 13  46  Loan 
ALF 35 15 41  
LHF 5 8 46  Leasing 
ALF 15 8 59  
Pawning LHF  5 7  
Source: in-depth survey (April-June, 2005) 
• Renting 
Leasing has increasingly replaced loans and sharecropping as a result of the growth in the land 
market, and because it is easier to manage, And in some cases owners have lost their trust in 
sharecroppers. Other reasons for renting land out are the lack of labour, large cultivated land and 
labour competition between farming and non-farming activities. The lack of labour, in some cases, 
could be linked to elderly headed households. If children live separately from them, the elders have 
to rent land or practice sharecropping to sustain their livelihoods. In some cases, renting of rice land 
for cultivation has led to distress land sale as the tenant was not able to pay the rental due to bad 
harvests and declining rice prices. 
Some farmers have large amounts of land that they cannot completely cultivate, while others 
are too busy running other non-agricultural economic activities. Local landowners can be classified 
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into two groups: small land farmers who lack the means and family labour capacity, and big land 
owners. Sometimes, both groups rent land out because they are busy with non-agricultural activities. 
In these cases, the adjustment through rental functions at another level, between farm and non-farm 
activities. 
In some cases, land poor farmers rent land for increasing rice production to meet their family 
food needs. Even though the agreement is not written down, both the owner and the tenant make 
a verbal agreement in which both parties agree that rental should vary depending on the harvest 
results. Tenants stop renting land as the soil fertility declines after 5-6 years cultivation. Even in the 
processes between farmers of different villages the agreement is not written down. 
In some cases, farmers have sold their rice land but they have rented other plots for rice 
cultivation. Rental of rice land is often paid in-kind by paddy which could be diminished if the 
harvest is bad or lower than estimated. The process of renting does not resort to any written 
document but on mutual relations of trust and accountability. 
However, in the case of a 10-year investment in weaving handicraft, the renting of land was 
made with a written contract, witnessed and recognized by the chiefs of villages and communes. 
• Sharecropping 
Sharecropping in rice production was often used and practiced 10 years ago among villagers. 
Sharecropping arrangements were generally open-ended and re-negotiated before the next 
growing season. Sharecropping has rapidly declined and changed to leasing arrangements (kar 
chuol dei) for two main reasons that are both related to the issue of the embedding of property 
relations in social relations warranting trust and accountability: 
? Landowners say they have lost trust in the farmers/sharecroppers. However, sharecropping 
remains practiced between close relatives or neighbours. Landowners accuse the tenants of 
cheating them by refusing to tell the real harvest results, and accuse them of being lazy. 
? The change is also related to the change of land ownership from local people to urban 
people/dwellers who mainly work outside, on off-farm business activities. They have no time 
to follow up on the process. 
There is thus a link, though not lineal, between the commoditisation of land relations and the 
diminishing role of localised social relations. 
Landowners want tenants to pay part of the rent before starting cultivation and do not further 
consider the harvest conditions. However, the contract is not written down. Moreover, villagers seem 
to confuse renting and sharecropping. During the interviews, they talked of sharecropping by using 
the Khmer word for renting (kar chuol dei), probably because both arrangements are similarly paid 
in-kind (paddy), and the amount could be similarly diminished according to negotiation. 
Regarding arrangements, harvested products are shared according to the respective 
contributions of the tenants and the landowners. In other cases, the landowner only receives 1/3 or 
50% of the harvest paddy depending on negotiations. Sometimes, the landowner provides the 
tenant with seed because farmers lacked rice seed or owners do not want to leave land unused. 
The range of arrangements is broad and interpersonal relationships play a key role. 
For close relatives such as brothers or parents, the product share is not fixed before the cropping 
season: this is an intermediary case between loan and sharecropping involving relatives. In some 
cases, the loan of land seems to have been changed to unfixed sharecropping, if the landowner 
contributes to the cost of land ploughing. Land owners want farmers to keep land cleared. Farmers 
can give the land owner any amount of the harvested product depending on the farmer’s decision 
and result of the harvest, because they are intra-family. In some cases, loans of land were changed 
to sharecropping, but sharecrops were not fixed before the landowner contributed to production 
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costs such as land ploughing. This arrangement changes if the owner wants the farmer to keep land 
and clear it or if the tenant is poor and does not have draft cattle or capital to start farming. 
Moreover, urban people have settled in rural villages for land brokerage and speculation. They 
loan land to practice sharecropping with farmers and aim to make close relationships with local 
villagers. Urban people try to re-embed property relations into social relations. 
• Pawning land for credit 
Villagers pawn their land for a loan from their relatives, people in the same village, and people 
from a neighbouring village. Villagers will not lose their land if they are not able to reimburse the 
debt. Some money lenders decided to become involved in the pawning of land which is located 
close to their land for optimizing cultivated land size and making management easier. 
Moreover, land owners (particularly those living in peri-urban areas) pawn land for a loan from 
their relatives at times of urgent need because they do not want to sell their land immediately, 
preferring to wait for a higher price resulting from urban growth. This demonstrated a mutual help 
mechanism within families or between relatives to avoid distress sales of land, debt with high interest 
rates, and an attempt to re-embed profit between relations. 
Land pawning can be written down or not, depending on the relationship between the land 
owners and money owners. Land pawning practiced by close relatives does not require a written 
contract, while pawning land to other people such as villagers in the same village, or villagers or rich 
people in the neighbouring village is written down, witnessed and recognized by the village chief. 
The duration of pawning for credit depends on the type of land or plantation. Money lenders 
request a fixed term pawning for three years because of the profit gained from plantations. In some 
cases, land owners have requested a further amount of money from a pawnbroker. Also, at the end 
of the process, if the land owners do not have enough money, they have to sell the plots of land to 
the pawnbrokers. In this case, the pawning becomes a sale. In some cases, pawnbrokers ask for a 
supplementary amount of money to compensate currency devaluation compared to the price of 
gold. 
One case led to conflict as the landowner requested more money. At the second time of 
payment, the money lender made a written contract, which was actually a sale contract. It was 
rejected at the time of reimbursement and the landowner accused the money lender of having 
cheated him in terms of the contract. 
In some cases, villagers have pawned their land for money to be released from other debt, while 
others villagers buy new land. These cases show that pawning can pertain to diverging strategies: 
pawning land for repaying a debt is close to distress sale (and sometimes actually results in sale) 
whereas pawning land to buying another plot is rather an accumulative strategy. 
In the previous case, we see that pawning (as leasing or sharecropping; see above) can be part 
of a strategy of rationalising and optimising land use according to accessibility and the availabitily 
of assets for cultivation. 
• Mortgaging 
In SR, land mortgaging has been practiced, but has declined in Angkor zones I and II (in the 
archaeological zone, all kinds of settlement and construction are prohibited), contributing to 
decreasing land prices since the reinforcement of APSARA authority at the end of 2004. Mortgaging 
land for the credit of a large amount of money from the ACLEDA bank or from private money 
lenders has been replaced by village group mobilization (a guarantee group of five members) to 
gain access to a group loan of a limited amount. 
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In some cases of mortgaging, farmers who were not able to pay back the credit have asked the 
creditor to sell the mortgaged land, and share the additional money so that they can be released 
from the debt. Many farmers can not pay back the credit due to illness, which has caused their 
farm business to fail. In KPT, in many cases, the bank complained to the court for the right to sell the 
mortgaged land. The borrowers have sold their land due to losing in their lawsuit to the ACLEDA 
bank. Some have then left the village with the remaining money to live elsewhere or to clear new 
land where land prices are less expensive. This shows a link between mortgaging and sales. 
Mortgaging was one of the reasons for out-migration; there is a link between mortgaging and 
mobility. 
However, mortgaging land to the bank is more favourable compared to the past practice of 
borrowing money with a daily payment of interest (Luy Rab) of 4 to 7%, and borrowing from private 
money lenders at an interest rate of 12% per month. 
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Land Sales/Purchases 
Overall, in SR as in SHV, land sales began in 1992/93 for land close to urban areas and main 
roads. Urban dwellers and rich local people bought land close to the main roads for speculation 
while they bought new clearing lands in the upland zones and the lowland zone toward the Tonle 
Sap Lake for tree plantation and for RR production. In RTNKR, there has been a change in the 
modalities of access to land for cultivation in comparisson to the time before 1995 when people did 
not have a ‘tradition’ of selling their land. After a period of experience with land transactions, 
villagers started to plant trees to identify their rights on their fallow land. Now, new Khmer settlers can 
access land for cultivation, in most cases by buying, initially urban land and land straddling NR 78. 
However, Article 28 of the 2001 land law states, “No authority outside the community may acquire 
any rights to immovable properties belonging to an indigenous community”. 
Also, sales/purchases decreases when there is the enforcement of authority in order to protect 
natural resort sites, historic heritage monuments and claims to state forest land. To date in those 
areas, land sales/purchases have decreased, but land prices outside the resort sites have 
increased. However, land prices of newly cleared land in the upland areas have tended to be 
stagnant since the FA filed a complaint against the land occupants/owners to the provincial court 
over illegal grabbing of state forest land. Also, the increase in the land market may cause land 
encroachment on degraded and flooded forest. The mutual relationship between land market 
development in peri-urban areas and land clearing/encroachment in peripheral areas is at work 
here. Land sales have risen in (peri)-urban communes but outside the protect areas. Land has 
changed hands mostly at the local level and the process is different in rural and urban communes. 
In urban areas, most land has undergone a name change and is registered at the district office of 
Land Management, Urban Planning, Construction and Cadastral (OLMUPCC). In comparisson, rural 
land sales far from the provincial capital involve name changes and registrtion mostly at the 
commune level. 
In RTNKR, within villages with established communities, sales of land have occurred secretly 
between both sellers and buyers. This is because the village and commune chiefs have not 
recognized the sale contracts. In comparisson, in other villages, they have recognized land sales 
which have been mostly carried out with land sale contracts or with a letter of land right transfer. 
Sometimes, the deal is made easier if the commune chief is involved with as the land broker.  
Most buyers are urban dwellers who buy land for speculation, while some others buy land for 
growing crops or tree plantations. Mostly, land to be purchased is degraded forested land and 
chamkar chas, fallow land (upland areas) or land straddling the national road or other main roads. 
However, unclear land rights before selling have led to some serious cases of land dispute. For 
example, a chief of commune sold abandoned rice land to an outsider without informing the 
former owners; a returnee as new owner sold the re-distributed land that was confiscated from big 
landholding households; a new owner as occupant sold rice land that he had occupied since 1987. 
In RTNKR, in relation to land sales, many disputed cases have occurred over the secret sale of 
community land and secret sale of borrowed land among ethnic minority people, or between 
ethnic communities and Khmer land buyers or new immigrants. The land of a neighboring village or 
commune may be sold by the wrong village/commune with the excuse that they are not sure of 
the exact boundaries, or the villagers selling the land may wrongfully claim that the land is 
traditionally theirs or their ancestral land. Sometimes, the land sellers as ethnic minority villagers want 
to get the land back after selling when the price of land rises or ethnic minority villagers take the 
sold land back as the owner /Khmer land buyer has not used it. Often, urban people, government 
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officials and Khmer immigrants have bought land with the intention of encroaching on fallow land 
or community forest land surrounding it. 
Since 2004, the investment in former DW-FR land for RR cultivation through reservoirs in the dry 
season has tended to increase rapidly. Investors gain access to that land through two modalities: an 
investor80 may seek a joint-investment with a farming community, to borrow abandoned DW-FR land 
under the condition of sharing water or practicing sharecropping with the former owners through 
the mediation of the commune councillors. Other other better-off families may buy ex-DW-FR land 
by themselves or through land brokers. The purchase of large amounts of land has been processed 
through land brokers who are chiefs of villages and communes as well as commune councillors. 
Those farmers who did not want to sell their abandoned DWR land have been convinced and/or 
threatened by those land brokers to sell because they say that local authorities intend to preserve 
the land as state property.  
We find here the configuration organising land markets that is widespread in rural Cambodia: 
external (powerful) buyers, local authorities working as brokers and the use of latent violence to 
force farmers to sell. 
People who have sold land close to main roads and urban development zones buy less 
expensive land elsewhere for farming and use the rest for house construction, while farmers in the 
upland zones, such as in RTNKR, encroach on forested land for farming after they have sold their 
land. There also double dynamics here: between land sale in peri-urban areas and land purchase in 
peripheral areas, and land sale in peri-urban areas and land clearing in peripheral areas. Also, 
farmers living in the rain-fed lowland area have bought rice land elsewhere, far from main roads 
and for less money after they have sold land at a higher price. This could be a farmers’ strategy 
aimed at expanding their land for rice production, inheritance or speculation. Khmer people have 
sold their land or plantations in lowland areas at a high cost in order to buy chamkar land (or fallow 
land) land in RTNKR at lower cost. 
Other farmers have sold part of their land due to many reasons, including insecurity 
(threatening), and also because companies or rich people have sought to buy large ampounts of 
land through the intervention of commune councillors acting as land brokers. Many villagers have 
sold land to them, and those who did not want to sell their rice land have been forced to sell their 
land through persuasion and threatening and in some cases trough the provincial court. 
Occasionally, farmers who initially did not want to sell land do so because they feared that it 
might be expropriated by local authorities or encroached upon by others (because they had 
abandoned it). The appropriation of newly cleared land in upland areas is not secure. The process is 
also cumulative: as many farmers/neighbours have sold their land, other farmers fear land 
encroachment/grabbing. In this case, they have made the hypothesis that selling the land was 
better than nothing. What is at work here is a strong feeling of land tenure insecurity, actually 
nurtured by the ‘real’ functioning of the land market, through brokerage, unequal power relations 
and threats. 
For land sales by instalments, sometimes ex-landowners have refused the selling prices that were 
agreed upon and then asked for a higher price or decided not to sell the land because the 
dateline for the payment has been exceeded. Sometimes, land sales have resulted in pawning 
without a written contract. Farmers have agreed to sell land by receiving additional money from the 
pawnbroker, who refused to give the land back, with conciliation of the chiefs of village and 
commune. 
In some cases, farmers have re-occupied the land to be sold because they have not received a 
share of money from its sale. Often, local authorities have persuaded farmers to sell chamkar land 
and fallow land; the people agreed to sell due to the fear of expropriation. When land brokers have 
                                                            
80 For example, Mr. An, investor from Prasat Bakong district. He is doing the same investment in Prasat Bakong district. 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 206 
not shared money with them, in some cases, villagers have petitioned the Prime Minister, asking for 
assistance in reclaiming their land. Furthermore, in some areas of newly cleared land in the uplands 
(e.g. in SR), the FA has lodged complaints to the provincial courts against land buyers and farmers 
for illegal land occupation. 
Sale contracts of rural sales are mostly registered and recognized at the village and commune 
levels. Only purchases of large tracts of land by companies or urban dwellers and the purchases of 
residential land in urban areas are fully legally processed and registered at the district cadastral 
unit. 
However, many cases of land sales lead to disputes between the new and the former owners 
due to diverging interpretations over the ‘bundle of rights’ at stake. Was it a loan? An occupation of 
abandoned land? A former abandoned rice land? Fallow land? Ancestral land? 
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Land conflicts 
Land conflicts are becoming a serious problem since the government introduced the ‘open sky 
policy’ in SR, encouraged the development of RR on former DW-FR lands in KPT (as in SR), and 
planned the development of tourism and industrial sectors with the establishment of SEZs in SHV. 
Moreover, the Northeast Triangle Development Zone in RTNKR has had a further impact on the 
development of the land market. It could be that the land market has rapidly expanded in a 
context of weak enforcement of the land law and unclear/unsecure land rights (before the 
infrastructure development project started). The main types of land dispute have changed from 
disputes over boundaries to those over ownership rights. Land markets have expanded and this has 
led to many land disputes for various reasons, including: 
1. Unclear land rights before land transfers or sales, such as over a loan; (formal or informal) 
occupation for over 5 years before the issuance of the 2001 land law; rice land abandoned for 
3 consecutive years, etc. 
2. Absence of demarcation between state forest land and private or community land. 
3. Ignoring traditional rights of fallow land in shifting agriculture areas. 
4. Illegal encroachment on forested land for selling. 
5. Overlapping of administrative boundaries or overlaps between administrative boundaries and 
customary ‘ancestral’ land. 
6. Enforcement by the APSARA authority. 
7. Over the claim of village (public) land for ownership. 
8. Over informal purchasing of land. 
9. Over land pawning without written contract. 
10. Land encroachment on private land. 
11. Grabbing of public land (e.g. lakes). 
12. Encroachment on land claimed for ownership by the military. 
13. Overlapping of the national park or natural protected zones on rice land. 
14. Land encroachment on ethnic community land. 
15. Secret sales of ethnic community land that was accessed by borrowing/loan or encroachment. 
Land borrowers claimed ownership by relying on the fact that they occupied and used land 
before the issuance of the 2001 land law (Art. 30). They use article 30 which states that, “any person 
who, for no less than five years prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested 
possession of immovable property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request 
a definitive title of ownership.” However, occupying land for over 5 years does not automatically 
mean ownership if borrowing was processed with a written contract. Article 38 states, “In order to 
transform into ownership of immovable property, the possession shall be unambiguous, non-violent, 
and notorious of the public, continuous and in good faith.” 
With regard to issues of continued exploitation of land, people are far from being completely 
aware of the legal texts. As they used to occupy a plot of land, they believe that they can keep 
ownership rights to it although they have abandoned the plot. Article 76 of the 1992 land law states 
that, “any land that a possessor has abandoned for three consecutive years shall return to the 
private domain of the state.” Also, local authorities tend to favour new occupants by referring to the 
1992 land law (art. 76) and the new 2001 land law (art. 30). However, they do not only re-assert the 
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law; they also act as a mediator by organising the negotiation according to a principle of equity 
and an objective of social peace. In KPT, as in SR, private investors seek to invest in reservoirs on 
former and abandoned DW-FR land in exchange for parts of that land. The arrangement of 
sharecropping between investors and groups of former landowners was considered as a 
mechanism for resolving disputes over the right to abandoned DW-FR land. 
This is also true with regard to the re-distribution of land to newcomers or new couples. It refers to 
the period preceding the promulgation of the 1992 land law. Between 1979 and 1989, all land 
officially belonged to the state and solidarity groups (krom samaki). People occupied land for both 
agricultural and residential uses. Thus, to assist landless people, the expropriation of land by local 
authorities from large land occupancy was officially recognized. However, villagers, as the former 
owners of that land, still think that land belongs to them because they did not abandon it. To end 
land disputes, local authorities often make a judgement in favour the new occupants and request 
them to compensate the former owners. 
The allocation of inheritance land was traditionally processed before the death of the parents. 
They allocated their land to children without written documents. Cases occur in which rural parents 
have allocated their land to the children living commonly with them, and have not considered the 
elder children who have left the family or were considered to be rich enough. If there are disputes 
over heritage land, the court judges in favour of all successors, based on the equity principle, refer 
to article 75 (2001 land law) which states, “in case the partition of the succession is contested, the 
co-successors are titled to file a complaint to the court to decide the case”. 
Sometimes, land speculators have deposited a part of the purchase price of a piece of land. 
Later, they have sought people wanting to buy the land, but since the FA has claimed that large 
parts of newly cultivated land area is included in the degraded forest land and complained against 
illegal occupants, urban dwellers or rich people are reluctant to buy the land. Normally, landowners 
could claim to get the land back without returning the money to the land brokers. However, 
sometimes this is not possible because the land brokers are perceived to be powerful men. 
Shifting cultivation farmers have cleared their fallow land, chamkar chas or old chamkar after 
selling their rice land, while other farmers in the zone towards Tonle Sap Lake have tried to clear 
flooded forest for RR cultivation. Clearing the flooded forest has often led to disputes with the FA. In 
snatching upland illegally, both groups, farmers and rich and powerful men, have confronted the 
claims of the FA for state forest land. Sometimes, these disputes also relate to administrative 
boundaries. Commune authorities claim its role in managing all land and water areas in the 
administrative boundary of the commune because they are also government agencies. However, 
the claim is against article 45 of the law on the administration and management of 
commune/sankat issued in 2001, which states that the commune administration shall have no 
power to decide on forestry. On the ground there is no demarcation between forest or flooded 
forest land and private rice land. Also, the definition of flooded forest is not clear concerning 
abandoned rice land with re-growing forest. Some farmers have consecutively possessed land for 
DSR since the 1980s or land distribution; slashing the flooded re-growing forest. 
With regard to the land sales in zones for the protection of agro ecosystems, including the zones 
managed by the APSARA authority, when land was bought, the environmental authorities or 
APSARA authority competencies were limited and the zones were not demarcated on the ground. 
However, local authorities might encourage the sale/purchase of land under their administration 
because they can get brokerage fees, without providing information on the restricted zone.  
Land buying without informing the village chiefs has sometimes led to land disputes with them. 
Buyers lose that land as it was registered in the name of the village chief during the SLR.  
Thus, land titles are instrumental for local authorities in land disputes, allowing them to resolve 
cases quickly and to their own benefit. However, SLRs have also provoked land grabbing disputes. 
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Arbitration mechanisms have not always been fair and people have lost their land although they 
have occupied and used it for over 5 years, before the issuance of 2001 land law. 
What was at stake was the conversion of public land/lakes used for fishing by local 
communities/public purposes into private ownership. Thus, people lose their daily income from 
fishing and this causes villagers to lose land for future public building. Also, the local population turns 
themselves to the state – the provincial governor or parliamentarian – to protect the public land 
(lakes/village land) against grabbing and privatisation. It is important to note that state public 
property may not be sold or transferred to other legal entities (Art. 16 of the 2001 land law). The law 
states that leasing of state public property cannot exceed 15 years (Art. 106). In dealing with the 
collective dispute, villagers’ tactics have been to bypass local levels and move directly to upper 
levels to ask influential decision makers to intervene on their behalf. In particular, when disputes 
over land with powerful men occurred, people have complained directly to a parliamentarian who 
had a close relationship with the Prime Minister.  
In RTNKR, nowadays, land security tends to be like the lowland provinces. Local authorities try to 
prevent land disputes by the issuance of formal documents instead of through the customary tool of 
planting trees. This process is rapidly adopted in the areas where Khmer people have been were 
nominated as local chiefs. 
Land disputes among ethnic minority villagers/communities have been resolved by the village 
elders and village chiefs based on their customary law, but several cases of disputes that remain 
unresolved are involving powerful or urban people, related to encroachment on community forest 
or fallow land. However, many brokers have intervened in assisting ethnic minority people to keep 
their land. In some cases, ethnic communities have received land back where there was an 
intervention from human rights organizations and the PCC.  
Furthermore, not all conflicts are about land transactions, but are related to this topic as they 
started from land encroachment and different understandings of land rights. Khmer or Khmer Islamic 
immigrants think they are clearing forest state land, while ethnic people claim it as their forest or 
fallow land. In many cases, disputes among ethnic minority people have occurred on village 
boundaries because they have a different way of thinking about traditional boundaries and 
administrative boundaries. In many cases, outsiders or Khmer immigrants have been accused of 
buying or borrowing land with the intention of encroaching on fallow land or community forest land 
surrounding it. Some ethnic minority farmers have lost their land or plantations because they were 
afraid to make a complaint against men who are considered to be powerful, or because they did 
not know how to file a complaint.  
In some cases, there are possibly illegal old ‘sales’ of Chamkar lands where buyers from urban 
areas have not been in possession but they are now trying to re-establish their rights to the land and 
are seeking to legitimize their old claims. Ethnic minority villagers take the sold land back as the 
owner has not used it. Through the negotiation process some of them have agreed to give land 
back, but against compensation. Buyers have lost part of the land but did not file complaints 
against them. They may have feared losing all land because it was not fully secure. Article 28 of the 
2001 land law states that: “no authority outside the community may acquire any rights to 
immovable properties belonging to an indigenous community”. Ethnic minority villagers have tried 
to get their land back after they have sold it when the price of land has increased. 
When land conflicts occur, if people cannot reach an agreement by themselves, they file 
complaints to the village and commune chiefs. Some cases have been resolved by the village 
elders and chiefs of villages, particularly those related to plot boundaries and between siblings. If 
the village and commune chiefs cannot resolve the dispute, people bring the case to the DCC for 
intervention. Sometimes, people have filed a complaint of land dispute directly to the DCC, for 
instance, when the commune councillor or commune chief has been involved in the dispute. 
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Stakeholders’ groups in land issues 
• Brokers involved in land transactions 
In the research sites, brokerage and intermediary actors are a widespread phenomenon as far 
as land transactions are concerned. In SR, as in SHV, land brokers are extremely diverse: village 
chiefs, commune chiefs, commune councillors, policemen, the military, villagers, relatives or wives 
of local leaders and company staff, urban dwellers, real estate companies (for land in urban or peri-
urban areas).  
The village chief is a key actor at the village level. He is the person who can resolve conflicts in 
the village related to land and other matters. Commonly, he and his commune councillors, or the 
chief of commune builds an alliance for buying large tracts of land at the request of the rich and/or 
urban people or companies. Thus, there is also an alliance between commune councillors and land 
brokers and companies. 
Land sales and purchases occur between villagers and urban dwellers, mostly through the 
intervention of a land broker, while sales and purchases between villagers are done directly, without 
intervention by brokers. There are alliances between local and urban brokers made in order to get 
broader access to information on both potential buyers and sellers. 
Brokers can become land keepers/managers after the transaction. Some brokers such as the 
military or village chiefs may be awarded by a loan of land (the sold land) by the buyer for provisory 
cultivation. Sometimes, the chiefs of village and commune or other key persons, after the brokerage 
phase, become land keepers or managers on behalf of big land buyers. They make written 
contracts to loan or lease land with villagers for temporary cultivation. When the loan is turned into a 
rental arrangement after 2 or 3 years, the brokers receive a part of the rental fee. This can range 
from 20 to 50% of the total amount. 
In some cases, urban people, having settled in rural areas, engage in land speculation, land 
brokerage, and other businesses such as money lending and grocery running. They loan land to 
villagers for temporary cultivation as a strategy to establish close relationships with them. Then they 
can identify those villagers wishing to sell land and use their knowledge of the local situation in their 
negotiations with urban people. 
Villagers or local brokers organise meetings and direct negotiations between land sellers and 
land buyers on a small scale, whereas local authorities act as land brokers for entrepreneurs or 
companies on a large scale. Nowadays, it seems that the importance of land brokers is decreasing. 
Land sales/purchases are more rarely processed through brokers. Urban people tend to seek land 
sellers independently and they negotiate directly per/by phone with landowners. Another emerging 
trend is represented by land brokers directly hired by companies willing to buy land and acting both 
as brokers and then as land keepers. However, 2% of the land selling price has to be paid illegally to 
the commune chief and other local authorities for recognizing the sale contracts or letters of land 
right transfer and changing the name on the back of the receipt of land possession.  
In RTNKR, the brokerage fee being allocated to all authorities involved in land sales/purchases 
could be up to 1/3 (one third) of the land selling price, supposedly the land value is still less 
expensive. 
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• Formal and informal politico-legal institutions 
Formal and informal politico-legal institutions of stakeholders are classified in two groups; as 
stakeholders involved in land tenure regulations, and others involved in land dispute resolution. 
However, some of them play both roles, acting in land registration and dispute resolution. Local 
authorities witness and recognize all letters of land tenure transfer and letters of land sale contracts 
or land right transfers as formal registration and they employ local customs to resolve land disputes 
between neighbours or within a family.  
Stakeholders involved in land registration 
As mentioned above, identifying the land registration process led us to understand the 
intervention of the government in preventing and resolving land disputes and in securing land rights. 
The DLMUPC in cooperation with LMAP and other stakeholders has carried out SLRs in several 
communes in 11 provinces in the first period of 5 years (2002-2007). Rice lands and homestead plots 
were registered while chamkar land on the foothills, newly cleared land or chamkar land located in 
protected areas were not titled even though people have occupied and cultivated on that land 
since the end of 1980s. The registration of chamkar land in the foothills, newly cleared land was not 
made, and still requires demarcation between farm land and forest land. The disputed land could 
not be titled if the dispute was not solved by the AC. Moreover, rice land in all destructed reservoirs 
and canals was not registered even though the owners received the land during the distribution in 
the 1980s. However, farmers can cultivate temporarily on that land. Consequently, they will lose their 
rice land supposedly without compensation, according to the legal framework. 
In the flooded area of the Tonle Sap basin, disputes occurred between the FiA and RR farmers 
because the flooded forest boundary is still not demarcated. There are different understandings of 
‘flooded forest’ land and former DW-FR land with re-growing shrubs/forests. According to the 2006 
fishery law, the construction of crossing dams or filling-in water bodies or digging or construction of 
new buildings in fishery areas/flood plain has to be evaluated by the MAFF/FiA (article 25), and it is 
prohibited to expand cultivated land and to provide ownership or occupation rights to land in the 
fishery area/flood plain (article 28). The enforcement of this law will probably generate or activate 
many disputes with farmers on rice land in the flooded areas, and maybe also conflict with the 
government’s policy of rehabilitation of former DW-FR lands through RR cultivation. 
In RTNKR, in 2002, a participatory land use planning (PLUP) was conducted after the creation of a 
Land Use Management Committee elected by community members. The PLUP aims to assist local 
ethnic minority groups by preventing land disputes and encouraging sustainable use of natural 
resources (land, forest). La En village, DPA (in cooperation with the DLMUPC) is conducting the 
registration and titling of collective land. A villagers belonging to a local ethnic minority shall have 
the possession rights (Sith Poukkak). They will have no right to sell land but it can be transferred to 
their children or relatives as possessors. However, the deal would confront the conflict with Khmer 
land owners who have bought community land because they would claim on the basis of individual 
ownership.  
Stakeholders involved in resolving land disputes  
Two legal institutions work on resolving land disputes: provincial court (formal mechanism) and 
cadastral commission (informal mechanism). 
The court works and sentences disputes over land with titles but has sometimes been accused of 
threatening farmers to sell land (without titles) at lower than the market price to companies. 
However, the court has not resolved one single case related to the grabbing of degraded forest 
land that was raised by the FA. The PCC and DCC conciliate the land disputes based on mutual 
respect or equity principles of parties involved in disputes. In many cases, the PCC could not 
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conciliate disputes without the participation of a parliamentarian. Despite the fact that farmers 
repossessed their land and received the use rights for temporary rice cultivation on disputed land, 
the ownership rights remain uncertain81. Sometimes, the PCC has resolved land disputes in 
cooperation with human rights organizations. 
To date, rural people have been far from fully aware of the DCC and PCC’s existence and roles. 
Despite the fact that both the ADHOC and LICAHDO human rights organizations are well known, 
they cannot do a great deal except to monitor the cases in dispute. However, collaboration with 
the legal institutions is still limited. In RTNKR, CLEC has actively assisted ethnic minority people to file 
complaints to the provincial court or PCC seeking legal action against those Khmer land buyers who 
have encroached on fallow land or community forest land. As mentioned above, to date, no single 
sub-decree to be approved has recognized community land. 
Especially when disputes over land with powerful men have occurred, people have complained 
directly to a parliamentarian who has close relationships with the Prime Minister, as mentioned 
above. 
In some cases, monks play a role in conciliating disputes over land rights between two villagers 
effectively in cooperation of the DCC. The monk has succeeded in arbitrating a dispute by 
requesting that both parties swear at the pagoda in face of the Buddha statues and other monks. In 
some cases, both parties have agreed to give the disputed land to the pagoda for public use. In 
other cases, villagers do not complain to local authorities, DCC or PCC. However, they file a 
complaint to their relatives, high–ranking officials working at the ministry of interior or defence or to 
the opposition political party. These cases have been sent back to the provincial governor. 
However, the governor referred them to the PCC and to DCC for investigation. 
Sometimes, villagers have filed complaints to the police (instead of to the court, for a reason of 
distance). This also means that people think the police could solve the dispute. Usually, the police try 
to reach conciliation, and tend to favour social peace (e.g. by trying to reach a compromise) rather 
than ‘stating the law’. This attitude would be similar to that of local authorities who equally share the 
disputed plots or request compensation for the ex land owner. 
In RTNKR, in cases of disputes among ethnic minority villagers, the elders must adjudicate. The 
mechanisms by which they are enforced are standard, according to customary law. It is usual for a 
meeting to be called and village elders to decide upon an appropriate fine. There is an 
arrangement set up by the community meeting, aimed at preventing land sales and 
encroachments, stating that the community fines those villagers who have sold the land by making 
them give a payment to the collective cash box. 
Moreover, as with the formal and informal institutions such as the PCC, DCC or AC, the chiefs of 
villages and communes (local authorities) and the provincial governor have often resolved disputes 
over unclear plot boundaries, land rights between ex-owners and new owners (land borrowers or 
land occupants of the abandoned land or re-distributed land) and between successors based on 
the equity principle. Disputes on plot boundaries have been resolved by equal allocation to both 
conflicting parties. Disputes over land rights have been resolved by requesting that the new owners 
compensate the ex-owners. Moreover, disputes over rights to former and abandoned DW-FR land 
have been resolved by the provincial governor (or PCC) through a sharecropping arrangement.  
                                                            
81 Interview with ADHOC provincial coordinator. 
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Land inequity 
In the areas studied in SR, the number of LHFs who have less than 1 ha is higher than in other 
provinces, or the majority of farmers own less than 1 ha of land per household. In RTNKR, ethnic 
minority villagers/farmers sold land but keep some land for themselves by using their fallow land or 
clearing new land. Most of them have smaller amounts of land compared to before. Sixty per cent 
of LHFs have over 3 ha of land per household. In KPT, considered to be an agricultural province, the 
number of ALFs is on average 8% and lower than in other lowland provinces. Also, in SR, the Gini-
coefficient (0.53) confirms that land inequity is higher than in other provinces. 
 
Land equity in the selected provinces 
 
 SR KPT SHV RTNKR 
Gini co-efficient 0.53 0.43 0.44 0.39 
Land area of 20% of LHF of lowest 
land size (in % of total land) 
4 3 5 5 
Land area of 20% of LHF of largest 
land size (in % of total land ) 
57 42 50 45 
% of LHF with less than 1 ha land 63 27 26 13 
% of LHF with 1-2 ha of land 14 30 13 7 
% of LHF with 2-3 ha of land 10 20 24 20 
% of LHF with over 3 ha of land 13 23 37 60 
% of ALF (average, range in %) 16 (2 to 31%) 8 (5 to 11%) 52 (30 to 74%) 0 
Source: In-depth field survey in April-July 2005 
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Agricultural landless farmers 
The number of ALFs range from small numbers in villages far from the city, to higher numbers in 
villages close to urban areas. However, the number varies depending on location and zone. In 
protected areas, the number of ALFs is lower than in other areas outside the protected zones. The 
main reasons that farmers do not have farm land are illness, lack of food, being a new couple, 
indebtedness and immigration. There could also be a correlation between the three main reasons: 
indebtedness, illness and lack of food. The importance of immigration as a factor of landlessness 
shows that mobility is a key factor in land tenure by occupying abandoned land for cultivation. 
In some cases, sales of land result from the strong pressure (from persuasion to threats) exerted 
by brokers or buyers, showing that the real functioning of land markets is not only a matter of supply 
and demand but that of power and violence. Some households have lost all of their land through 
encroachments. However, agriculture remains an important economic measure in sustaining their 
livelihoods. They access land for rice cultivation through an arrangement of loans and renting; 41% 
and 53% of the interviewed ALFs in SHV, 40% and 15% in SR and 15% of ALFs in KPT borrow land for 
cultivation. However, there are also ALFs in SR who have cleared land that belonged to other 
people for temporary cultivation, while others in KPT plan to clear degraded forest for cultivation. 
However, in the provinces where there are large areas of land and a low population density, such 
as RTNKR, ethnic minority people have started to borrow land or young plantations from Khmer 
immigrants, communities or LUMCs. 
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Summary of the main findings 
• Modalities of access to land 
Despite land being distributed in the early 1980s, many farmers have cleared more land in both 
the upland areas for selling or cultivating and in the flooded land for RR cultivation. Many urban 
dwellers have bought land in the upland areas for tree plantation, and loaned it to land sellers or 
other villagers for growing annual crops in exchange for labour (plantation keeping), while others 
have purchased DW-FR land for RR cultivation, with the intention to rent it out or practice 
sharecropping with farmers; there is an interaction between clearing, purchasing and loans. 
However, those people who have occupied newly cleared land in the upland areas for cultivation 
have faced the state policy of land repossession that strategically resorts to the government’s 
botbanhchea (regulation) no 01, issued in 2006. Land clearing is the common practice of all ethnic 
minority villagers for shifting cultivation but also conflicts with article 37 of the 2002 forestry law. 
Nowadays, people clearly land increasingly far from the village, because most of the land around 
the village has been sold. However, Khmer immigrants have also borrowed or bought land with the 
intention of encroaching upon forest land. 
In the upland areas, ignoring the right of fallow land for shifting cultivation has led to land losses. 
Many farmers have lost all of their land through expropriation, encroachment and the granting of 
land to the military (military development zones). Expropriation, encroachment and military grants 
have generated new dynamics in terms of access to use rights. To sustain their livelihoods, farmers 
have had to ask for loans of land for cultivation in exchange for the labour to clear land. However, 
loans without contracts have recently changed to loans with contracts with the recognition of the 
village chief in order to avoid disputes over land rights and illegal sales. 
Inheritance is linked to other modes of access to ownership: The process of inheritance in RTNKR 
was quite different from the lowland areas, but now, it tends to resemble it as most of land has been 
occupied and reserved. Inheritance, instead of clearing, is becoming an important mode of land 
access. 
Loans are linked to land sales/purchases: Land buyers from urban areas or from abroad buy 
land for speculation or tree plantations, but loan it to villagers or local brokers for temporary 
cultivation. Also, sharecropping has declined and strongly changed to become a leasing system. 
However, sharecropping remains an important mode of land access at the level of relatives and 
neighbours evolved in a localised sphere of mutual accountability.  
Linkage between capital investment, sharecropping and leasing: On the former DW-FR land 
areas, sharecropping with a written contract is a mechanism which helps to resolve land disputes 
between concessionaires/investors and former land owners. However, it is being replaced by an 
arrangement combining land renting and water selling which is favourable to the land owner and 
investor in terms of costs and management.  
Despite the fact that sometimes pawning leads to distress sale of land and disputes, this 
arrangement is also a mutual help within families or relatives to prevent from distress sale of land 
and debt at high loan interest rates, and attempts to reimburse profit inside relative’s relations.  
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• Land sales/purchases 
Policy developments relating to tourism have caused land markets to develop and land 
concentration to increase. They have also had an effect on the evolution of agrarian contracts. In 
many cases, farmers have sold their land, fallow land or abandoned DW-FR land under the pressure 
of threats or out of fear of expropriation (anticipating strategy). However, unclear land rights before 
sale have led to some serious cases of land dispute such as the sale of abandoned rice land, re-
distributed land, occupied and borrowed land. Even though Khmer immigrants gain access land, in 
most cases, by buying (secretly) from ethnic minority people, they also confront article 28 of the 
2001 land law.  
Land sales/purchases have occurred between villagers and urban dwellers through the 
intervention of brokers, while sales/purchases between villagers are carried out directly, without the 
intervention of land brokers. There is a channel between local and external/urban brokers. Some 
local brokers have been loaned land by land buyers for cultivation or have become land keepers. 
Officially, land transactions have to be registered and changed to the name of the new land 
owner at the OLMUPCC. However, fewer people have followed this rule because of the related 
costs and time it takes. Most people have bought rural land without registration at the OLMUPCC. 
For an unofficial fee, village or commune chiefs change names on the back of receipts, witness and 
recognize the letters of land sale contracts or of land tenure rights transfer as the rural land changes 
hands. However, the exception is when rich and urban dwellers or companies purchasing large 
amounts of land for a large plantation, or buy land in urban areas where it is legally registered at the 
district cadastral unit.  
• Land disputes 
Land conflicts become a serious problem when the government has launched development 
plans while land rights are still insecure. Land disputes have changed from conflicts over boundaries 
to conflicts over possession or ownership rights. The expansion of the land market has led to many 
cases of land disputes due to many reasons such as: 1) unclear land rights before transfer; 2) the 
absence of demarcation between state or public land and private land; 3) ignoring traditional 
rights of fallow land; and 4) illegal encroachment into forested land for selling. Land disputes 
happened mainly due to unclear land rights before land transfer or sales, e.g formal or informal 
occupation for over 5 years before the issuance of 2001 land law and rice land abandoned for 3 
consecutive years, etc. Moreover, land borrowers or occupants have claimed the right of ownership 
under article 30 of the 2001 land law. However, many cases of land sales have led to disputes 
between the new and former owners due to diverging interpretations over the ‘bundle of rights’ at 
stake: was it a loan, an occupation of abandoned land, former abandoned rice land, a part of 
fallow land or ancestral land?.  
Rice production remains a main source of rural income even though the tourist sector has rapidly 
grown, or due to the lack of skills to run other businesses. Increasingly, farmers are interested in 
converting their DW-FR land to RR land through reservoir construction. Moreover, many private 
investors seek access to those lands through capital investment in reservoirs with the intervention of 
local authorities. Disputes relating to rights over that land would be a serious problem if the 
authorities were to grant or provide a farmer’s former DW-FR land to the private sector or 
companies by referring to article 76 of the 1992 land law. Arrangements of sharecropping between 
investors and ex-land owners could be an example of a mechanism for resolving dispute over the 
rights of abandoned DW-FR land. 
Shifting cultivation farmers have hoped to clear their fallow land, chamkar chas, after selling their 
rice land or other chamkar land, while other farmers in the areas towards Tonle Sap Lake are trying 
to clear flooded forest for RR cultivation. Sometimes, they have been encouraged by rich and 
powerful people to clear land, and then sell it to them. As a consequence, snatching up land 
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illegally has become a serious problem for both groups of people: farmers and rich and powerful 
men. However, land encroachment has declined since the FA officials have filed complaints to the 
court and claimed for repossession of state forested land. 
Land security is the key to sustainable development. There is no empowerment and no hope for 
farmers or ethnic minority farmers who lack land security. Ignoring the traditional rights of shifting 
cultivation farmers on fallow land and the rights of farmers on former DW-FR lands will cause an 
increase in the number of agricultural landless and land poor farmers. Farmers who lose all of their 
land by expropriation and the granting of land to the military face an uncertain future. Their 
livelihoods are currently based on loans of land for cultivation in exchange for labour to clear the 
land. However, loans would be changed to leasing if all land has to be cleared. 
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CHAPTER VIII.  
 
Land policy issues 
Pierre-Yves Le Meur 
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Introduction 
Historically, land access and control in Cambodia basically relied on shared moral principles of 
labour investment (property right acquired ‘by the plough’) and royal eminent ownership in a 
context of low demographic pressure. As Jean Delvert wrote in the 1950s, “Cambodia, by chance, 
does not know any agrarian question” (1994: 508). This is not the case anymore and the national 
political economy tends to produce a class of landless farmers, in relation to an increasing land 
concentration in the hands of the elite (Kato 1999, Pel Sokha et al. 2004); hence there is a renewed 
concern for land tenure policy in Cambodia. Various state institutions, development projects, NGOs, 
co-operation agencies and research institutes explicitly focus on the issue. A new land law was 
issued in August 2001 and a project funded by the World Bank – the Land management and 
administration project (LMAP) – has launched a process of systematic land registration aimed at 
covering the whole country. 
The right to land ownership (limited to Cambodian citizens) was reaffirmed by the 1993 new 
constitution (article 44).82 Actually, the 1992 land law did recognise ownership, its article 19 restating 
the legal principle of the colonial Civil Code of 1920, namely ownership as an absolute and 
exclusive right to enjoy and dispose of property (of course within the limits and conditions of the 
law). However, ownership was restricted to residential areas and the law related to urban areas was 
never promulgated. 
Actually, the philosophy underlying the new land law and the land titling policy remains strongly 
‘proprietarist’ boiling down the notion of land tenure security into the issuing of ownership titles. In 
the same vein, land markets are implicitly equated to land sales markets without taking account of 
the importance of land rental markets as a significant device for adjusting land supply and 
demand. 
Besides, the concession policy, actually consisting of two diverging orientations (economic and 
social land concessions), seems ambiguous, at least in its implementing modalities, if not in its very 
conception. Social land concessions are conceived as a device to protect disadvantaged people 
from the impact of an open land market, which is one of the main objectives of the government’s 
land policy strategy (see Council of Land Policy 2002: 11). Economic concessions granting 
procedures are rather opaque, to say the least. 
These elements give shape to the legal context within which the land transaction issue must be 
analysed and policy proposals can be formulated. We will thus review these legal elements in the 
first section of the text before moving to conclusions drawn from our research results in the third 
section. The second, intermediary section will stress aspects of land tenure dynamics that are clearly 
related to, and influenced by historical trends; sometimes anchored in the long run, especially the 
moral principles underlying the ideology of land possession and mobility as a structural feature of 
Khmer farmers’ life (beyond the dramas of recent history). 
                                                            
82 “All persons, individually or collectively, shall have the right to ownership. Only Khmer legal entities and citizens of Khmer 
nationality shall have the right to own land. Legal private ownership shall be protected by law. The right to confiscate 
possession from any person shall be exercised only in the public interest as provided for under law and shall require fair 
and just compensation in advance.” 
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The national context:  
land law, policy, history 
The idea of this study stemmed from a simple observation. The national land policy in Cambodia 
is led by an ownership-oriented – or ‘proprietarist’ – paradigm symbolised by the massive land titling 
LMAP project. This project is embedded in the new land law promulgated in 2001 and we must first 
analyse its main orientations. In the second section, we will briefly compare it to the 1992 land law it 
has officially replaced. The objective is not to propose a systematic analysis of both laws but to 
highlight and analyse the points that are relevant as regards our research questions and sites. 
• The policy framework: the ownership/security equation 
The new land law 
A new land law was issued in 2001, aimed at replacing the former 1992 law. From the 
introductory article, it stresses private ownership as its fundamental concern: “This law has the 
objective to determine the regime of ownership for immovable properties in the Kingdom of 
Cambodia for the purpose of guaranteeing the rights of ownership and other rights related to 
immovable property, according the provisions of the 1993 Constitution of Cambodia” (article 1).83 
Ownership is clearly the focus of the law and not, for instance, land tenure security, equity or 
poverty alleviation. Article 3 focuses on the cadastral administration, the title I on “Private and 
public ownership” (art. 4-28; see below), the title II on “Acquisition of ownership” (art. 29-84), the title 
III on “The regime of private ownership” (art. 85-167) and the title IV on “The forms of ownership” (art. 
168-197). 
The following titles deal with “Immovable property used as surety” (title V, art. 198-225), 
“Cadastre” (title VI, art. 226-246), “Penalty provisions” (title VII, art. 247-266) and the title VIII is about 
“Final provisions” (art. 267-268). Article 267, though classical from a legal standpoint, is noteworthy: 
“Any provisions that are contrary to this Law are repealed”. As we will see with the case studies, 
contradictions and legal gaps between the 1992 and 2001 land law do exist and are sometimes 
instrumented by actors involved in land disputes. 
Despite the strong focus on ownership, the law recognises other property rights: possession, 
concession, leases, usufruct, use & stay, easements. 
Rights to transfer land (i.e. alienation rights) are differentiated according to the legal 
classification of land ownership forms: state land (public and private), private land, monastery land, 
indigenous community land, private land (see table below). 
 
                                                            
83 The quotations of the 2001 land law I use in this text come from the unofficial translation into English prepared by the 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) with the support of World Bank, ADB, GTZ and 
Finmap (Kingdom of Cambodia 2001). 
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Legal status of rights to transfer land in Cambodia 
 
Type of land Can transfer? To whom? Conditions Subject to 
possession? 
State Public Yes State Private No longer serves 
public purpose 
No 
State Private Yes Anyone None Yes 
Monastery No - - No 
Indigenous 
Community 
Yes Member of group Must be leaving 
group or have 
special 
arrangement 
No 
Private Yes Anyone None No 
(Source: East-West Management Institute 2003: 57) 
 
Cadastral land registration system 
The law provides two forms of cadastral land registration: sporadic land registration and 
systematic land registration. Thereafter, any transfer of land must be registered on the cadastre, 
which is called subsequent registration, referring to the crucial issue of the cadastre maintenance. 
Although tax collection has historically been the main objective underlying the cadastre 
implementation,84 in the current Cambodian context, it functions primarily “as a record of land 
ownership, and includes official copies of not only title deeds, but also related legal documents 
such as mortgages, leases and easements, as well as details about the size and boundaries of the 
property” (East-West Management Institute 2003: 204). As far as our study is concerned, the question 
is, of course, to what extent the daily work of maintenance is really taken on by the administrations 
in charge of registration. This is a matter of procedure and logistics, but more fundamentally, a 
question of state capacity (especially as far as working links between administrative levels are 
concerned) and of political economy (as we will see below as regards strategic choices made in 
favour of a concession policy). This is also a matter of how to deal with the multilayered nature of 
property rights, of legal texts, and of a complex history of settlement, displacement and land 
appropriation. 
As mentioned above, this policy has been enacted through a project of land registration and 
titling, the Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP 2003) funded by World Bank with 
German and Finnish technical assistance. LMAP has integrated previous pilot registration projects 
carried out by GTZ (1995) and FINMAP (1997). LMAP specific objectives are “to improve land tenure 
security, and promote the development of efficient land markets” (LMAP 2003: 3).85 The issuance 
and registration of land titles constitute LMAP key action (receiving 60% of the whole project 
funding) besides the establishment of an efficient regulatory framework and land administration 
system. 
The systematic land registration system is what the national land policy aims at, that is to 
demarcate and register all the land in Cambodia, area by area, and to record the names of the 
owners and the details of the land in the Land Register, which is a public and accessible document. 
The procedures are detailed in the sub-decree 46 of 31 May 2002 on “Systematic registration” and 
the whole process is carried out under the aegis of the MLMUPC. The procedure is launched at the 
                                                            
84 Let us remind ourselves here of the classical definition of the cadastre found for instance in Simpson (1976: xxxvii): “A 
public register of the quantity, value, and ownership of the land of a country compiled for the purpose of taxation”. 
85 “The overarching objectives of this project are to reduce poverty, promote social stability, and stimulate economic 
development” (ibid.). 
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provincial/municipal level by the governor who declares an area an Adjudication Area for 
registration and sets up an Administration Commission (AC), which plays a key role in receiving 
complaints and settling disputes linked to – meaning revealed, activated or generated by – the 
registration process. If the AC is not able to solve an objection, it is submitted to the National 
Cadastral Commission (NCC). The demarcation of parcel boundaries must be validated by 
neighbours before the creation of the cadastral map of the adjudicated area. A period of public 
display is organised afterwards in order to gather further claims and objections (settled through a 
specific procedure for dispute resolution). 
The sporadic land registration system allows individual registration of parcels in the area not yet 
covered by the systematic registration programme (which will take years to be achieved). Owners 
and possessors apply individually to register their holdings in the cadastre, in accordance with the 
provisions of the sub-decree 48 of 21 May 2002 on “Sporadic registration”. The agreement of the 
neighbours is needed for validating the procedure. If there is an objection, the dispute is submitted 
to the District/Khan cadastral commission. 
At the time of the study, systematic land registration was still in an early stage of implementation 
in Kampong Thom and Siem Reap province. There has been a pilot project of registration in the 
polder areas of Prey Nup near Sihanoukville (see Kibler & Perroud 2003, Le Meur et al. 2005). Rotanak 
Kiri is a special case as pilot experiments of communal land titling are planned (in relation to 
participatory land use planning, PLUP). 
A point is worth noting as far as the first systematic registration attempts are concerned. In 
Kampong Thom as in Sihanoukville, land titling has only been carried out in the lowlands/rice lands 
whereas chamkar lands, newly cleared lands and foothills have been left aside. This echoes the 
colonial cadastral policy which was eventually restricted to the lowlands too, the so-called 
“Cambodge utile”. The systematic registration is in too early a stage to allow any solid evaluation 
and the case of Prey Nup is specific as the pilot project of land registration was a by-product of the 
enterprise of polder rehabilitation. This notwithstanding, the dichotomy reflects a policy orientation, 
shared by the government and the donors, that tends to focus on lowlands and rice production. 
The trend is not new and it has underlain colonial and post-colonial agricultural policies. Another 
interpretation we could draw from this observation is rather technical. Land titling – any form of 
cadastral strategy – is easier to implement in areas where boundaries and ownership are already 
stabilised. Upland areas used to be the domain of shifting cultivation and they are nowadays 
marked by a strong mobility as far as human settlement and land appropriation are concerned, 
rendering land registration more difficult. 
• The 1992 and 2001 land laws compared 
The main areas of legal intervention added in the 2001 land law deal with: leases, concessions, 
co-ownership, pledges, cadastral maps, indigenous community ownership. Articles on succession 
rules and temporary concessions were removed. 
We will consider here the following aspects that are related to our research topics and sites: the 
relationship between possession and ownership, the possibility of collective ownership rights for 
indigenous communities, the recognition of leases by the new land law, the new policy of social 
and economic land concession. 
From possession to ownership 
The removal of temporary possession from the new law (article 60-76 of the 1992 land law) can 
be interpreted as marking the end of a transition started in 1989 with the limited reintroduction of the 
private ownership – of house (1989) and residential land (1993). 
A person who has been legal possessor of a plot of land for at least five years, at the time the 
new law comes into effect, may apply for ownership. This provision was introduced in the 1992 land 
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law and renewed by the 2001 land law. If the legal possessor has not completed the five years at 
the time of the new law, he or she has to wait for the completion of the five years for applying for 
ownership.86 
What is now prohibited is a new (i.e. after 2001) possession. As we will see, this raises difficulties for 
farmers engaged in land clearing in remote areas, in most of the cases after having sold their land 
in more densely populated and/or periurban areas (especially in Siem Reap province and 
Sihanoukville municipality). People develop alternative, informal ways of securing appropriation (at 
least at local level), for instance by planting trees on the land they have cleared. 
Ambiguities result from possible discrepancies or contradictions between two provisions: the 
requirement of 5-year continuous cultivation on a parcel for applying for ownership and the clause 
according to which a land is considered as abandoned, and thus vacant (which means reverted to 
the state domain), after three years fallow: “any land which the temporary possessor has 
abandoned for three consecutive years shall become the private domain of the state” (article 76 of 
the 1992 land law). But note that article 70 considers that fallow land for reproducing soil fertility is 
not considered as abandoned land. 
This raises the question of the possibility of claiming possession over privately owned property. The 
East-West Management Institute notes in analysing the new land law that prescription is evoked in 
the 2001 land law (article 29, 78), but not clearly defined. In article 29, it “relates to situations where 
someone acquires ownership rights in land not by agreement (such as sale) or by way of grant, but 
by way of occupying the property for such a long period of time that the law now deems them the 
owner” (East-West Management Institute 2003: 112). They conclude by wondering “whether the 
reference to prescription in Article 29 means that the right of acquisition by prescription actually 
exists in Cambodian law. (...) So whereas Article 29 refers to the concept of prescription no rules 
allowing for such a method of acquiring ownership exist in the land law” (ibid: 113). 
The observations made during the field research show that practical ambiguities arise out of 
prescription’s lack of clarity. This is especially striking in the areas (especially in Siem Reap and 
Kampong Thom) where farmers were forced to abandon their land (that was distributed to them 
when the krom samaki were dismantled in the 1980s) under the pressure of insecurity (continued 
presence of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas) or natural events (disastrous floods). The provincial 
authorities have considered that these lands were abandoned and thus could be granted as 
economic land concessions to investors. In other cases, outsiders have seized the opportunity to 
obtain a certificate of possession (under the 1992 land law) or a land title (under the 2001 land law). 
When the former owners claim their rights over land that was legally distributed to them in the 1980s, 
local and provincial authorities sometimes arbitrate in accordance to ‘customary’ principles 
favouring peace, by organising the negotiation between stakeholders, rather than by enforcing 
legal texts that reveal ambiguity (a way of “saying the law” could be, for instance, to consider the 
claimants as “temporary possessors” because they do not have any certificate of possession). The 
compromise crafted by provincial authorities can be, for instance, to give in loan the land claimed 
by the farmers who have been forced to abandon it. The arrangement is made under the aegis of 
provincial authorities. 
                                                            
86 Article 30 of the 2001 land law: “Any person who, for no less than five years prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed 
peaceful, uncontested possession of immovable property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request 
a definitive title of ownership. In case the granting of a definitive title to ownership is subject to an opposition, the claimant 
has to prove that he himself fulfils the conditions of peaceful, uncontested possession for no less than five years over the 
contested immovable property or to prove that he purchased the immovable property from the original possessor or his 
legal beneficiary or from the person to whom the ownership was transferred, or from their successors.” The conditions for 
legally claiming land ownership are detailed in the article 38: “In order to transform into ownership of immovable property, 
the possession shall be unambiguous, non-violent, notorious to the public, continuous and in good faith”. 
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Indigenous community properties 
An exception to the individual titling is constituted by so-called “ethnic minorities”. The expression 
must not be taken at face value: Cham, Chinese or Vietnamese are not considered as ethnic 
minorities in this context, as they are seen as non-“indigenous” (another questionable category). 
Actually, “ethnic minorities” correspond to the ethnic groups living in the peripheries of Cambodia 
and often relying on slash-and-burn agriculture to make their living. This categorisation, evoking the 
“hill tribes” as they are called in neighbouring countries (Chao Khao in Thailand or Orang Ali in 
Malaysia), reproduces the dualism between ‘civilised’ (Buddhist) lowlands and ‘wild’ mountain, 
which is pervasive in the Southeast Asian worldviews. Also called “Khmer Loeu” (upper Khmer), they 
represent a tiny minority at the national level (around 120,000 people, less than 1% of the total 
population) but the great bulk of the population in the north-eastern provinces (Ratanakiri and 
Mondulkiri) where 90% of them are living (lowland Khmer are still the actual minority in these 
provinces). 
Their cause has been supported by international and national NGOs. Advocacy work has 
combined environmentalist and autochthonous justifications aiming at preserving both nature and 
people, especially in front of the uncontrolled land encroachments by Khmer lowlanders and 
foreign companies, through clearing, purchase, and land concessions. 
This active lobbying eventually resulted in the recognition of “Indigenous Community Properties” 
corresponding to the granting by the state of collective ownership title to the community (article 
26). “This collective ownership includes all of the rights and protections of ownership as are enjoyed 
by private owners” (article 26), but it is inalienable. Nevertheless, “for the purposes of facilitating the 
cultural, economic and social evolution of members of indigenous communities and in order to 
allow such members to freely leave the group or to be relieved from its constraints, the right of 
individual ownership of an adequate share of land used by the community may be transferred to 
them”, as long as it is not State Public Property (article 27). No right to the land belonging to the 
community can be transferred to an outsider, whether it is right of ownership (title) or right of use 
(lease, usufruct, etc.). 
We handle this point in detail in the chapter on Rotanak Kiri. Let us just mention here that such a 
policy tends to rigidify ethnic boundaries by defining them a priori and using these boundaries as a 
clear-cut basis for land titling). It also relies on the usual misconception of collective ownership 
whereas these groups, as others in the world, combine collective and individual forms of property 
rights. It confines these groups in the stereotype of the “traditional community”, which is denied any 
capacity or will to change (or only on the basis of an individual and exclusive choice; see above, 
article 27)87. To be fair, one must however recognise that protecting these lands and communities 
against uncontrolled immigration and encroachment has become an urgent matter. 
Leases 
Leases were absent in the 1992 law (but covered, at least partly, by the Decree #38 Contract 
law of 1988). They are considered in the 2001 land law: “The owner of immovable property may 
lease it out to another person. A lease agreement is a contract by which the owner of immovable 
property makes such property temporarily available to another party in consideration for regular 
payment of rental, proportional to the time of possession” (2001 land law, article 106). Two types of 
lease agreement are considered by the law: “lease for an indefinite period of time and lease for a 
definite period of time. A lease for a definite period of time includes a short-term lease with an 
option to renew and a long-term lease for 15 (fifteen) years or more” (article 106). 
                                                            
87 The article 23 illustrates this “traditionalisation” of indigenous minorities: “An indigenous community is a group of people 
who reside in a territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia whose members manifest ethnic, social, cultural and economic 
unity and who practice a traditional lifestyle, and who cultivate the lands in their possession according to customary rules 
of collective use” (article 23; my emphasis). 
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Besides the duration of the agreement, the other major difference between short-term and long-
term leases is that the former is merely a personal right between the lessor and the lessee whereas 
the latter creates a right in rem that is deemed to be stronger and more secure in the theoretical 
context of a functional rule of law and free-market economy. 
What our case studies show is that there are different “spheres” as far as agrarian contracts 
(lease, sharecropping, loan, etc.) are concerned. One can differentiate between arrangements 
that are embedded in local relations of neighbourhood, kinship and friendship and arrangements 
that are ‘socially dis-embedded’ (but “re-embedded” in broader power relations) involving external 
actors. Actually, the localised sphere of socially embedded arrangement is not inherently a sphere 
of trust. We do not want to idealise the community. The social clauses of agrarian contracts rather 
express a form of mutual accountability between local actors that works through daily interactions 
and social relations (this observation was also made in a previous study on land consolidation; Le 
Meur 2005). External actors cannot rely on this form of social capital but this does not mean that 
they do not resort to similar mechanisms. They do it at a higher level and in other social arenas (by 
building alliances and networks with civil servants and officials at the provincial level, for instance). 
This means that the security and the strength of agrarian contracts are always, though to a various 
extent, a matter of social relations and not only of legal texts in rural Cambodia. 
The legal framework is also blind to the fact that actual agrarian contracts and derived rights are 
much more diverse and context-specific than the broad categories of lease and loan recognized in 
the law. This raises specific questions about how these kinds of rights can be secured beyond the 
local sphere of mutual accountability. 
Concessions 
“A land concession is a legal right established by a legal document issued under the discretion 
of the competent authority, given to any natural person or legal entity of group of persons to 
occupy a land and to exercise thereon the rights set forth by this law” (2001 land law, article 48). 
A concession is thus a right to use state land (private property of the state) for a specific purpose. 
Three categories of concessions are distinguished in this respect: (i) social concessions, (ii) economic 
concessions, and (iii) use, development and exploitation concessions. The latter type falls outside 
the scope of the 2001 land law. 
Social land concessions constitute a tool aimed at allowing landless farmers to get access to 
land for residential and subsistence farming purposes now that the acquisition through temporary 
possession has been rejected by the new law. After five years of valid occupation, that is in 
accordance to legal provisions (article 18), the land recipient can apply for ownership title. This 
policy tool is new and we did not see it much on the ground, with the exception of an NGO 
(HAGAR) acting as an intermediary between the state and beneficiaries chosen among landless 
women in Kampong Thom province. 
Economic land concessions provide investors with exclusive rights to manage and harvest land 
for up to 99 years but they cannot be converted into land ownership (article 52). “Land concessions 
responding to an economic purpose allow the beneficiaries to clear the land for industrial 
agricultural exploitation of land in the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia” (article 49). The 
concessionaire must invest in land and pay an annual fee (article 51). 
We will come back to the concessions issue in the last section. The three following points are 
worth mentioning by now: 
? The nature of ELC is ambiguous. They are considered as granting rights that are legally 
different from ownership, possession and leasing. The question of the fee to pay off, 
mentioned in the law, is not clarified so far and added to the deep opacity of the whole 
process, we can argue that ELC are actually closer to administrative and even grant 
transactions (based on giver’s good will and taker’s power; see below §II on research 
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findings), than to what they are legally deemed to be, namely a commoditised transfer of 
use rights submitted to specific and verifiable constraint of use and investment. 
? Economic concessions granting procedures are rather opaque, to say the least (in some 
cases, they function as disguised forest concessions bypassing the 2002 banning on non-
timber products; see United Nations 2004). 
? ELC can be granted by the state (up to 10,000 ha) and by the province (up to 1,000 ha). 
These legal limits are poorly enforced and there is an obvious lack of co-ordination 
between the state and provincial levels as far as grant procedures are concerned. See also 
the UN report on land concessions: “The fieldwork undertaken for this report also confirmed 
the existence of a parallel structure at provincial level, where local officials have granted 
smaller concessions in military development zones” (United Nations 2004: 17). We also 
observed the importance of military concessions especially in Siem Reap provinces and the 
ambiguity and conflicts linked to the process of granting these concessions. 
If land titling seems to be the unique path toward land reform in Cambodia (according to 
development agencies and government discourses), the concession policy is another thread that 
proves to be at least potentially contradictory. We will come back later to the political implications 
of this complex co-existence. 
• The influence of history 
A history of land tenure and land policy would lead us far beyond the scope of this study. 
However, current land issues are not understandable if one does not pay attention to history, which 
means taking the longue durée into account from pre-colonial times onward. We will select here 
elements that are relevant to exploring and understanding the field of rural land transactions. Two 
are of the essence: (1) the conception of possession and its moral grounding in the principle 
according to which “labour creates rights”; (2) the mobility of rural populations and the related 
weak cohesiveness of the village level onto which recent history has superimposed chaotic 
movements of population displacements and resettlements. 
About history, one must also add that the colonial policy appears as a matrix of later 
developments in this respect, particularly as regards its focus on both cadastre and concession. 
Possession 
One form of property relations seems to cross all historical periods, although in various forms. It is 
possession. Historically, land access and control in Cambodia basically relied on shared moral 
principles of labour investment and royal eminent ownership in a context of low demographic 
pressure. Property right was acquired “by the plough”, meaning by investing any form of labour in 
land: by clearing the land, cultivating it, fencing it, planting trees, building a house, and also by 
investing in ritual and religious work. A corollary is that the right created by labour must be defended 
and publicly re-asserted through continued work. The right of possession would stop when the 
investment in labour was suspended, though not immediately. The 3-year delay seems to be found 
in pre-colonial Khmer codes too; after 3 years, the land reverted to the king (see Delvert 1994: 489). 
Delvert also notes that “collective property was unknown” (ibid: 490). Taxation attached to the 
crop, thus to farming activity, rather than to the land, which is consistent with the central role of 
labour as justifying principle of appropriation. 
The colonial administration kept on with this orientation despite an official turn toward a 
cadastral policy of land ownership registration. The convention of June 17, 1884 abolished the king’s 
ownership, which was replaced by a formally dual, French and Cambodian, but practically French 
authority on land. The cadastral policy was progressively implemented from 1902 onward and 
developed quite well from the 1920s and especially from 1930 to 1945. Despite this shift toward 
private ownership, the 1920 Civil Code also recognised the right of possession in a sense which was 
Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia 
Gret - Collection Études et Travaux - Série en ligne n° 18 229 
implicitly similar to the pre-colonial conception. Actually, the legal opposition between ‘owner’ and 
‘possessor’ never gained currency, as the possessors had the same rights and duties and could 
transmit and alienate land. Possession was acquired through purchase, inheritance, or occupation 
and exploitation during 5 years of a land belonging to the state or local domain and on which the 
farmer was attributed a “permit of cultivation”. 
It is noteworthy that article 723 of the Civil Code is phrased with the same words as the 
equivalent article in the new land law on the conversion of possession in ownership: “En matière 
immobilière, le possesseur devient légitime propriétaire, lorsque la possession paisible, de bonne foi, 
publique, continue et non équivoque pendant cinq ans consécutifs et qu’elle porte sur une terre 
non immatriculée” (quoted in Delvert 1994: 490-491). Article 725 provides that the possessor loses his 
right after five years’ non-use. 
The colonial legal frame remained in force after independence in 1953 and until the Khmer 
Rouge victory in 1975. After four years of abolishing any form of property and possession and an 
aborted collectivisation, the PRK regime reintroduced property principles by 1989 (see Frings, 1997; 
Gottesman, 2002; Slocomb, 2003). Interestingly, the right of possession quickly re-emerged. The 
“Instruction on implementation of land use and management policy” of June 3, 1989 recognised as 
regards rice fields the right of possession of the person who was managing and using the land. 
Other elements introduced by the colonial administration are still present in current land policy 
and practice. 
Local administrative validation of land transaction. Under the French cadastral policy, a 
centralised Cadastral Conservation system was created aimed at registering the different types of 
right (ownership, possession, and mortgage). Actually, the cadastre was only implemented in 
certain parts of the country, corresponding to the central rice bowl. One could put it differently: 
there are landowners only where cadastre has been achieved (at the khum level) and elsewhere 
possession was hegemonic. “In places where the Conservation did not exist, landowners registered 
the transactions at the khum level” (East-West Management Institute 2003: 22). This informal role of 
formal authorities is currently widespread, as we will see in the case studies.  
Land concession policy. As mentioned above, the concession is a specific modality of land rights 
granting, different from ownership and from leasing. In a way, it is a peculiar enactment of the 
possession right, as the maintenance of the right is submitted to effective investments in land 
development and agricultural production. Actually, and this a striking element of continuity 
between the colony and the postcolony, the politics of concessions have always been made of 
power relations and political collusions, and the principle that investment in land was a criteria for 
the grant was always subject to negotiation (see Slocomb 2007: 19 et sq. on rubber plantations 
under the concession regime during in colonial Cambodia and United Nations 2004 for striking 
similarities with the current situation). 
The principles underlying land appropriation remain active in the current context. Justifying 
possession by investment in labour has been a central feature of land tenure dynamics from pre-
colonial times through colonisation and up to now. This principle must been understood in relation to 
another key feature of rural Cambodia: mobility. 
Mobility 
Contrary to the representation of a peasantry deeply rooted in bounded localities and traditions, 
the history of Cambodian farmers bears the hallmark of mobility. As Delvert would note, “l’habitat 
n’impose donc pas au paysage une marque aussi forte qu’ailleurs. Le Cambodgien au surplus a un 
caractère quelque peu nomade: il se déplace facilement pour des raisons d’ordre économique, 
d’ordre familial et surtout, peut-être, d’ordre religieux” (1994: 198). For Nepote, “agrarian activity 
remains linked to practices at the edge of a fluid semi-nomadism” (1992: 171). This observation of 
Khmer rural life renders less relevant the dichotomy between lowland Khmer and upland Khmer (or 
so-called “hill tribe”). 
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Agricultural mobility is linked to the weak definition of the ‘village’ as a community or social 
entity. Beneath the khum – the administrative commune created by the colonial state in 1908 
(ordinance of June 5, 1908, also establishing eligibility principles for the chief of commune or 
mekhum) – the local level of the village or phum never acquired any strong social, political or 
administrative consistency. Delvert proposes a regional typology of village configurations that 
stresses the point. The word phum merely indicates “any inhabited place, whatever it is and 
whatever the number of houses composing it”. He sums up the idea by stating that “this inhabited 
location has no temporal permanence” (1994: 202-204). He adds that the administrative village or 
phum (created by law in 1919) does not correspond to the “farmer phum”, which represents any 
localised form of human settlement. Finally, for Delvert, it is the house which is of the essence in the 
rural Cambodians’ life-world (see also Ovesen et al. 1996)88. 
Late colonial and post-colonial developments exerted a strong impact on farmers’ mobility, all 
the more because of protracted situations of war generating measures of village groupings, forced 
displacements of population and escape strategies (people’s grouping organised by the French in 
1948-1954; years of war under Lon Nol, forced displacements during the Khmer Rouge regime and 
intense movements in the post-conflicts 1980s)89. 
All these events had a strong influence on social organization at local village level. As May 
Ehibara puts it for the Pol Pot years, “obviously, these moves ruptured people’s ties to their home 
communities, familial lands, kin, and friends” (1993: 153). However, beyond the effects of crises and 
wars on people’s displacement, mobility must be seen as a normal social fact, which is structuring in 
the production of social and political order (see Chauveau, Jacob & Le Meur 2004). This point has 
been stressed by scholars studying rural Cambodia who have shown the weak consistency of the 
village (as seen above). This observation implies to take account of how ‘strangers’ are integrated 
in this fluid local society through different forms of matrimonial and goods exchanges (see Nepote 
1992: 175). 
As far as the current situation is concerned, the mobility issue is a key point: 
The rural situations we have observed are still strongly influenced by the displacement of 
populations of the Khmer Rouge era (especially in zones like Kampong Thom and Sihanoukville that 
have remained insecure until 1998 or 2000). Mechanisms facilitating the social integration of 
strangers have been disrupted and the sphere of mutual accountability we have identified as 
regards land transactions has been transformed (see the case studies and Le Meur 2005). 
New forms of mobility have emerged with the development of land markets driven by external 
buyers (entrepreneurs and officials): farmers sell land for different reasons (distress sale, anticipation 
in front of increasing speculation, threat) and leave peri-urban areas (Siem Reap, Sihanoukville) to 
move to peripheral zones where they buy or, more often, clear land. It seems that a cycle of 
mobility has started related to the development of peri-urban land markets pushing poor farmers to 
remote areas, rather to the north and north-western regions than to Rotanak Kiri and Mondulkiri, as 
seems to be suggested by the aerial coverage of forest expansion recently carried out by DANIDA. 
Both cycles – resettlements of refugees and returnees and land sales/land clearing – are linked in 
different regions, placing mobility at the core of land tenure dynamics. This issue must be dealt with 
by policy makers and not only by NGOs specialised in de-mining, refugees and humanitarian aid. 
                                                            
88 May Ehibara depicts the Cambodian village in 1959/1960 in a similar way, as a rather “loose structure” (Embree 1950), but 
adding the structuring role of the religious factor: “The village formed a social unit as an aggregate of kinsmen, 
neighbours, and friends. Various bonds of affection, loyalty, and mutual aid also extended beyond the village to relatives 
on both sides of the family Religion was an integral and critical part of village life. Sobay had its own Buddhist temple 
compound (wat), with resident monks, that served as a moral and social center. Politically, Sobay and its village chief 
formed the lowest rung of an administrative ladder that rose through various territorial levels to the central government in 
Phnom Penh and, ultimately, to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who evolved considerable respect and loyalty from Sobay 
villagers in 1959-1960” (1993: 150). 
89 See Le Meur & Leurent (2006) for a case study stressing a similar logic of frontier and farmers’ mobility in the Mekong delta. 
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Research findings 
In this section, we have tried to synthesise the main findings resulting from the four provincial 
case studies in the forms of four issues that raise specific questions for policy-makers: 
? The description of land transactions in rural areas shows that non-commoditised and more 
specifically, administrative and grant transactions play a key role in the dynamics of land 
rights transfer. 
? A double movement linking the emergence of landless farmers as a significant social group 
and a trend toward land concentration has been observed in the four provinces. This link is 
more complex than a linear movement of social differentiation and class formation. It goes 
through specific links between land sales/purchases, agrarian contracts and a movement 
of land clearing toward peripheral areas. 
? The concrete functioning of land transactions is marked by the widespread presence of 
different types of intermediary actors or brokers. We can distinguish two broad categories: 
economic brokers and legal/administrative brokers. 
? The case studies have illustrated a wide range of conflicts related to land transactions, in 
terms of actors involved, issues at stake, modes of arbitration and authorities intervening in 
the process. Formal authorities legally in charge of dispute resolution are not the ones that 
are the most frequently used by the stakeholders: people often try to keep disputes at the 
local level or choose, on the contrary, to bypass formal intermediary bodies (cadastral 
commissions) by resorting to legal brokers and political parties. 
• Non-commoditised, administrative and grant transactions 
In all the areas under study, and despite the development of commoditised land transactions 
(see next section), we have noticed the central importance of non-monetary transactions as a 
major path toward land appropriation throughout the last three decades. Of course, inheritance 
plays a key role. However, the history of mobility and displacements resulting from long eras of war 
or regime of war (as the Khmer Rouge regime) has logically weakened its role in accessing land.  
The post-Khmer Rouge era was marked by a policy of land distribution through the krom samaki 
that were rapidly dismantled (as soon as 1984 or 1985 in many areas). However land distributions 
were still practiced in the 1990s for refugees, returnees and landless farmers, according to policies 
implemented at the provincial level. 
As we will see, complex movements of populations in the 1990s and 2000s were linked to the 
development of land markets and also took the form of commoditised and non-commoditised land 
appropriation, through land clearing, buying, grabbing and encroachment. Actually – and this is a 
crucial point from both analysis and policy points of view – the difference between these categories 
is less than obvious. For instance, in the Cambodian context, land purchase often comprises 
elements of threat, violence, force and corruption, let alone the question of controlling information, 
and often thus resembles land encroachment. 
Administrative and status transactions have thus been playing a key role since the 1980s and the 
end of the Democratic Kampuchea, especially in the form of administrative transactions: several 
waves of land distribution since 1979 and the more recent policy of economic and social land 
concessions. Other forms of grants and concessions, for instance to military forces, are also frequent. 
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The following table helps differentiate between broad categories of transactions according to the 
nature of the social ties linking the stakeholders involved in the transaction. 
 
Typology of transactions 
 
Transaction type Transaction features Examples 
Bargained transaction Bilateral agreement between 
legally equal partners, through 
price arrangement 
Sale/purchase, agrarian contracts 
Administrative transaction Unilateral transfer between parties 
engaged in a relation of authority 
and subordination 
Public concession 
Status transaction Transfer ruled by social status, 
referring to social obligations and 
not (or to a lesser extent) to 
bargaining exchange mechanisms 
Intra-household delegation, 
inheritance 
Grant transaction Unilateral transfer of rights based 
on the giver’s “good will”, thus not 
directly resulting from his social 
status 
Extra-household loan, donation 
(Adapted from Schmid 1987, quoted in Colin 2004: 19) 
 
It must be noticed that the boundaries between these different categories are not clear-cut and 
transactions can be interpreted in different ways by the stakeholders.  
The case of economic land concession is illustrative of this difficulty. Officially, a concession 
differs from both land appropriation and land lease. It corresponds to the granting for a long period 
of a specific bundle of rights for economic purpose, with a requirement of effective investment and 
a fee to be paid off. However the very process of concession attribution is totally opaque, the legal 
criteria are often bypassed, as regards the ceiling surface (10,000 ha for state concessions, 1,000 for 
provincial concessions), the reality of the investments (no real evaluation), and also the payment of 
the fee. All this means that the nature of transaction is not easy to interpret. In many cases, we are 
obviously close to a grant transaction relying on a rationale of personal ties (or corruption). 
The dis-articulation between the state and province levels generates further uncertainties and 
strengthens the pervasive opacity of the process. The lack of clarity of the legal status governing 
many concessions renders the delegation of (already derived) rights on these areas highly uncertain 
for the farmers who are granted use rights. There is a sort of cumulative mechanism reinforcing 
institutional opacity and uncertainty that contributes to farmers’ land tenure insecurity. 
• Land concentration, power relations and farmers’ vulnerability 
Compared with the 1950s, where there was “no agrarian question in rural Cambodia” (Delvert 
1994) and the 1960s when social classes did not exist in the village studied by May Ehibara, although 
people spoke of four categories of wealth (1993: 161; 1968), the current situation in rural Cambodia 
has profoundly changed in terms of economic differentiation and class formation. 
We observe the parallel emergence of landless farmers and big landowners very often of urban 
origin. According to various estimations there are between 12 and 20% of landless farmers in 
Cambodia. The 1990s have been a crucial period of land sales development after the dismantling 
of the krom samaki in the 1980s and the recognition of private ownership by 1989 (at least 
possession, but it practically makes no difference). There have been slight differences between 
provinces in terms of land market development. For instance, in Siem Reap, the peak of land 
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sales/purchases occurred in 1998-2004, thus a bit later than in Sihanoukville province (1993-1995). 
These differences depend on external factors: urbanisation, tourism policy, entrepreneurs’ 
investment strategy. 
However this double trend is more complex than a linear movement of social differentiation and 
class formation. It goes through specific links between land sales/purchases, agrarian contracts and 
a movement of land clearing toward peripheral areas. 
There are two sets of mutual links resulting from the development of land sales: 
Links between land sales, land clearing and mobility. Smallholders living in the agricultural areas 
surrounding the city of Siem Reap sell their lands under the pressure (that is, very often, under the 
threat) of land brokers and buyers, or anticipating a risk of complete land loss, and move to 
peripheral areas to buy land at a lower price or, more often, to clear land, at the risk of being 
evicted by forest agents or concessionaires (military). In the uplands, there is also a tendency 
toward the commoditisation of land and the individualisation of property rights in former areas of 
shifting cultivation. 
Links between land sales and derived rights. Land sellers, generally smallholders and poor 
farmers, take in loan the plot they sold. Very often, the loan is changed into a rental contract 
without any negotiation, due to a highly uneven power balance. Or if the plot is used for planting 
cashew nut trees, the loan duration is limited to 4 to 5 years by the growth of the trees. We observe 
also a trend toward the commoditisation of derived rights with the development of rental contracts 
and, to a lesser extent; sharecropping at the expense of loans. 
We must also mention another way of accessing land through a commoditised right transfer, 
which does not exactly correspond to a purchase of land. This trend, specific to the Tonle Sap area 
(especially in Kampong Thom, to a lesser extent in Siem Reap), is the access to land through capital 
investment in water reservoirs, with the active participation of local authorities acting as brokers 
between external investors and local farmers. 
Another key element for understanding the concrete working of the land market is power. 
In the four provinces, the importance of powerful urban people in land purchases and the 
unequal agreements linking land sales and loans show that the boundaries between market 
transaction (the model of bargained-exchange system) and non-market transactions (linked to 
social status and power relations, and also threat and corruption) is not easy to identify. Or put it 
differently, the functioning of land markets is inherently pervaded by power relations and violence. If 
we add to this the extreme opacity of the land concession policy, we can have an idea of the high 
level of land tenure and institutional insecurity farmers are currently experiencing in Cambodia. 
As regards the central place of threat and power in land transactions, it must be added that 
they are not necessarily enacted by the buyer – generally an outsider who never or seldom meets 
the farmers – but very often by the brokers (see the next section), and among them, local authorities 
play a key role. 
The link between land concentration and farmers’ vulnerability takes the form of purchase and 
concession implying a resort to power relations, on the one hand, and of land sales, mobility (exit 
option) and precarious contracts (loans transformed into leases), on the other. 
• Brokerage and the social working of land markets 
The strategic groups or stakeholders involved in the field of land tenure and land transactions are 
plural and they fulfil different roles: dispute arbitration, regulation enforcement, policy making, 
brokerage. Each function does not correspond to a specific type of actor and many of them are 
involved in different forms of action. 
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In this respect, the pervasiveness of intermediary actors and functions is a striking feature of the 
concrete working of land rights markets. In the four provinces where we carried out fieldwork, 
brokers were present at different “places” of the transaction. We can define a broker as a specific 
entrepreneur whose strategy is based on the control over information and social relations90. 
We have identified two main categories of brokerage, depending on the function fulfilled: 
? Economic brokerage centred on the land transaction itself (widespread as regards land 
sale and purchase, rare in cases of agrarian contracts except for leasing). 
? Legal and administrative brokerage helping private persons to get access to legal 
information and public authorities. 
? One must also analytically differentiate the brokerage as social function from the brokers as 
social actors. 
Economic brokerage 
The cases observed in the four provinces allow us to outline a typology of the brokers, according 
to a set of criteria: 
? Private persons or representatives of local authorities (village chief, commune chief, 
commune council member). 
? Independent broker or private company staff. 
? Local or non-local broker. 
In Siem Reap for instance, where land markets are booming, land brokers are extremely diverse: 
village chiefs, commune chiefs, commune councillors, policemen, military personnel, villagers, 
relatives or wives of local leaders and company staff, urban dwellers, real estate company (for land 
in the urban or peri-urban areas).  
In Kampong Thom, too, many categories of people act as land brokers: villagers (rice farmer 
and/or cattle trader), money lenders, village chiefs, urban dwellers (also traders of agricultural 
products, motorbike repairers and land keepers. 
Brokers do not always operate alone: 
In Siem Reap, the village chief is a key actor at village level. He is a person who can resolve 
conflicts related to land and other matters in the village. Moreover, he acts as a land broker in order 
to generate more income. Commonly, he and his commune councillors, or the chief of commune, 
build an alliance for buying large tracts of land at the request of the rich or/and urban people or a 
company. We also observe alliances between commune councillors and companies’ land brokers. 
Another observation regards the plurality of activities fulfilled by people. 
Brokerage and dispute arbitration. A typical case in this respect is represented by local 
authorities acting, according to the context, as land brokers, dispute arbitrators or for the 
enforcement of regulations, and this from a point of view which is more or less private or public, 
depending on the situation, and does not necessarily reflect their official position. This makes the 
boundary between private and public, between arbitration and direct involvement somewhat 
difficult to draw. 
                                                            
90“ A person who builds and manages an enterprise for the pursuit of profit in the course of which he innovates and takes risks 
may be called an entrepreneur. Now the resources an entrepreneur manipulates are of two distinct types, although they 
are very often found in combination. The first are resources, such as land, jobs, scholarship funds, specialized knowledge, 
which he controls directly. The second are strategic contacts with other people who control such resources directly or 
who have access to such persons. The former may be called first order resources, the latter second order resources. 
Persons who dispense first order resources may be called patrons. Those who dispense second order resources are 
brokers. A broker is thus a special type of entrepreneur: one who controls second order resources and manipulates these 
for his own profit. Brokers are thus highly expert network specialists” (Boissevain 1974: 147-148). 
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Brokerage and land keeping. Brokers can become land keepers/managers after the transaction. 
Some brokers such as military or village chiefs may be awarded by a loan of land (the land bought) 
by the buyer for provisory cultivation. We have observed cases where a military member acting as a 
broker becomes land keeper and has been supported with rice food by his commander who is the 
land buyer. Sometimes, the chief of village, after the brokerage phase, becomes land keeper and 
manager on behalf of a big land buyer. He makes written contracts with his villagers for temporary 
cultivation. 
A final point; the concrete setting of a land sale can vary according to the position of the broker: 
? There is a direct interaction between the buyer and the seller and the broker plays a role in 
organising the interaction. 
? There is no direct interaction between the buyer and the seller and the broker plays a role in 
keeping the two other actors at bay by monopolising strategic information. 
Legal and administrative brokerage 
Legal and administrative brokerage represents a different type of activity which is taken on by 
different social actors, generally organisations rather than individuals. We observe a flourishing of 
NGOs working in the field of human rights and legal issues (LICAHDO, ADHOC, CLEC, CIDSE, etc.). 
They play an important role in making legal information circulate downward, to farmers often 
caught in conflicts with powerful outsiders. One of the dimensions of this power relies upon access to 
information, in this case, to legal information on land property and land transactions. 
Direct intervention in land disputes. Legal brokers strive to shift the balance in favour of poor 
farmers in intervening directly in front of courts of justice and administrative authorities (communes, 
cadastral commissions), by bringing arguments or acting as observers, and they sometimes succeed 
(see cases in Sihanoukville and Rotanak Kiri and Le Meur et al. 2005). 
Information diffusion. Human rights NGOs are also involved in a long term work of training, 
information circulation and awareness raising with the farmers and rural people. 
It seems that there is no overlap between these two mains types of brokerage in terms of who is 
doing what – except in the case of a policeman we met in Prey Nup, who was actively involved in 
land brokerage and was proud to exhibit his LICAHDO card. 
A last case is represented by an NGO, HAGAR, fulfilling in Kampong Thom a specific form of 
administrative (or social) brokerage, by helping poor women (generally widows) to get access to 
land through the social land concession policy.  
Land (100 ha of degraded forestland) was allocated by the provincial authority to HAGAR, an 
NGO operating in Kampong Thom since 1995 in the field of community development, for settling of 
a group of women in 2000. Each woman was allocated 2 ha of land for farming and homestead 
and title would be given to the women after 5 years of consecutive cultivation. 
• Conflict solving mechanisms and land tenure security 
The case studies have illustrated a wide range of land conflicts, in terms of actors involved, issues 
at stake, modes of arbitration and authorities intervening in the process. 
Land dispute and institutional pluralism 
Formal authorities legally in charge of dispute resolution are not the ones that are the most 
frequently used by the stakeholders. People often try to keep disputes at the local level or choose, 
on the contrary, to bypass formal intermediary bodies (cadastral commissions) by resorting to legal 
brokers and political parties. 
At the local level, local authorities are central in dispute solving processes. It is however difficult 
to assess to what extent they act in a formal or informal manner. The legal basis for the intervention 
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of commune authorities in the domain of agrarian contracts remains questionable. Many examples 
from the four provinces show that local authorities tend to endorse a function in the enforcement of 
agrarian contracts which is not defined by law and often expresses collusion with private interests. 
This leads us to the much debated issue of legal pluralism, which is all too often reduced to a 
mere dualism. Many research documents (such as So Sovannarith et al. 2001: 16) tend to oppose 
two forms of what would be legal systems: customary law and state law, as if both where (1) 
internally consistent and homogenous and (2) belonging to a common conceptual and social 
(legal) category. Actually, each of them is internally pluralist. 
So-called “state law” is made of different regimes of order: the legal order (land titles and land 
concessions as regards land, for instance), but also the political order (in the real working of land 
concessions, for instance; see UNDP 2004, Global Witness 2007 on the politics of land and forest 
concessions), or, from a broader point a view, the political economy of land transaction including 
patron-client ties, social networks, business interests, corruption and collusion. 
It is debatable whether one can categorise so-called “customary law” as a form of legal order. It 
is actually closer to a mode of reasoning that underlies the way of dealing with disputes. It is a 
matter of interpreting and arbitrating cases in accordance with local principles of justice. To put it 
briefly, the customary logic is rather a socio-political logic aiming at restoring social ties and peace 
than a legal logic able to “say the law”. 
The plurality of normative orders gives social actors room for interpreting disputes – here land 
transactions – and for resorting to various arguments and institutions (cf. Luco 2002). It is probably in 
the case of Rotanak Kiri that the “cultural gap” between actors involved in land disputes is at the 
widest, as is the gap between the interpretations of a transaction (for instance between sale and 
loan). 
It is noteworthy that the functioning of land transactions is itself embedded in different normative 
orders (before any conflict), as we have seen in the four provinces. We have identified two spheres 
of transaction and accountability (this without any dualism, as actors and discourses overlap).  
? One is based on localised social ties (kinship, neighbourhood, alliance, friendship) 
generating a sort of mutual accountability.  
? The other involves local actors and outsiders and is relatively ‘dis-embedded’ from local 
norms, resorting to the administrative and legal framework and/or being ‘re-embedded’ at 
a higher level of social ties and power relations. 
Legal pluralism and the local history of settlement and land appropriation 
Conflicts are more often about property rights than about boundaries. 
In Sihanoukville for instance, the main conflicts we have identified were about (1) land 
encroachment on private land, (2) grabbing public land, (3) encroachment on land claimed for 
ownership by the military, (4) overlapping of the protected area of national park with villagers’ rice 
land. 
In Kampong Thom, we have observed that many cases of land loans or informal occupation 
started around five years before the 2001 land law, resulting in disputes as people use article 30 to 
ground their claim to ownership: “Any person who, for no less than five years prior to the 
promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested possession of immovable property that 
can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request a definitive title of ownership”. Due to 
the room for interpretation generated by the absence of written contracts and the informal nature 
of many settlements and arrangements, arbitration results were often different or inconsistent. 
Moreover, the SLR process was instrumental in the expression of claims. 
This trend is linked to the complex history of displacement and settlement we have encountered 
in the four provinces, made even more complex by the intrusion of powerful outsiders. The 
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multilayered history of settlement and property meets an equally multilayered history and land 
policy and land law. This creates areas of uncertainty as regards what legal text should prevail in 
case of dispute. 
Many conflicts between former and new owners show that individuals can manipulate the legal 
ambiguities and gaps existing between the 1992 and 2001 land laws. Ambiguities result from possible 
discrepancies or contradictions between two provisions: the requirement of 5-year continuous 
cultivation on a parcel for applying for ownership and the clause according to which a land is 
considered as abandoned, and thus vacant (which means reverted to the state domain), after 
three years fallow: “any land which the temporary possessor has abandoned for three consecutive 
years shall become the private domain of the state” (article 76 of the 1992 land law). This gap 
leaves room for diverging interpretations. The result of such disputes depends on the uneven 
distributions of power and social capital among the actors involved. 
Land conflict and land registration 
Land registration is often advertised as a conflict-solving tool. Actually, land registration 
procedures almost mechanically stimulate, activate or generate conflict. We are still at a pilot 
phase of the systematic land registration carried out through LMAP with first experiences in 
Kampong Thom and Sihanoukville.  
What we observed in Kampong Thom is already significant however: 
In Kampong Thom, disputes over unclear plot boundaries of deep water rice land and land right 
between ex-owners and new owners were very common during systematic land registration (SLR). 
Most of the land disputes during SLR related to boundaries because the plot of deep water rice land 
was not clearly measured during land distribution in the 1980s and has no dike for demarcation. 
Moreover, disputes over land right between new owner and old owner, and between successors 
often remain unresolved because of diverging interpretations of the law, even though they were 
brought to the NCC. 
Moreover, land titles have been instrumental for local authorities in land disputes, allowing them 
to solve cases quickly and to their own benefit, namely by having plots bought by outsiders 
registered on their own name. But systematic land registration also provoked land grabbing 
disputes. Arbitration mechanisms have not always been fair and people have lost their land 
although they have occupied and used it over the last five years before the issuance of 2001 land 
law. 
The systematic land registration process has let emerge numerous land disputes highlighting the 
plurality of historical and legal layers of land property. 
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Policy debates 
The four issues we have raised in the precedent section – on non-commoditised land transaction, 
land concentration and landlessness, brokerage, conflict and institutional pluralism – are the result 
of empirical case studies carried out at the local level in four provinces of Cambodia.  
They all raise questions for policy-makers, especially as regards the overall orientation of the 
national land policy toward land titling but also land concessions. We have tried to summarise the 
points of debate in order to structure and launch the debate. 
• Legal and political invisibilities 
Any public policy has an impact on the visibility of social facts. In other words, before acting on 
reality (or by acting upon it), public policy renders things visible and others invisible. We argue that 
the following components are made invisible by the current land policy and legal framework: 
? Derived rights as a means to get access to land: there is a great diversity of institutional 
arrangements and agrarian contracts that provide smallholders and the landless with a 
relatively secure access to land (use rights). They are not visible in the legal framework. 
These forms of right delegation are also useful as a variable of adjustment between land 
distribution/availability and the means of production (see the different forms of 
sharecropping and exchange between land and labour). The absence of derived rights 
from the interpretive grid underlying land policy makes also landless farmers, if not invisible, 
at least difficult to “grasp” from a conceptual point of view (in terms of concrete access to 
land rights of any kind). 
? Transactions are very often facilitated or made possible by a wide range of intermediary 
actors or brokers. These brokers can be private persons, but in many cases, they belong to 
the local authorities (village chief, commune chief, communal councillor) and play an 
ambiguous role by doing more than establishing a contact between buyer and seller: they 
resort to persuasion or threat, get personal benefits from the transaction while they are 
involved in dispute arbitration (here again in a role which is not fully formalised). There is thus 
a double invisibility, of brokers as key players in the functioning of land markets, of local 
authorities as ambiguous actors playing on the edge of informality. 
? Behind the discourse on land market development, there are real markets that work 
according to other principles than the ideal-type of a commercial transaction between 
partners standing, at least formally (from the legal point of view) on an equal footing 
(corresponding thus to the model of bargained transaction). Land purchase often 
comprises elements of threat, violence, force and corruption, let alone the question of 
controlling information, and thus often resembles land encroachment. 
? As an effect of the development of land transactions, we have observed renewed forms of 
farmers’ mobility. Mobility cannot be reduced to the question of refugees and returnees. 
On the one hand, it has been for centuries a key feature of the peasant’s rationality and 
livelihood in rural Cambodia. On the other hand, new forms of mobility are rather a by-
product of the “real land markets” mentioned above, as smallholders tend to sell land 
under the strong pressure exerted by outsiders and local brokers, as much as in distress 
situations, and move away to find new land to clear or buy. This movement seems to 
happen on a national scale, from central/urbanised areas to peripheral regions. 
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• Legal and political contradictions 
The second point is about contradictions and dichotomies. Of course, some of them can stem 
from the different forms of invisibility we have listed in the previous section. 
A key issue about the current policy with regards the relation between its two main orientations. 
On the one hand, we have a strong policy directed toward the issuing of private ownership titles 
(except in the areas of ethnic minorities where a specific policy of communal titling is 
implemented). On the other hand, the policy of land concession is applied to huge areas in 
absence of transparency and without any evaluation of the effectiveness of the legally requested 
investments. The question is extremely simple: in a case of conflict involving a farmer (endowed with 
a land title) and a concessionaire (endowed with social capital), who wins? 
Another possible contradiction takes its roots in an old representation of Cambodia as made of 
two opposite components (beyond the internal diversity of each area, in terms of farming systems 
and land tenure dynamics): the lowlands where water is abundant and rice is produced and the 
uplands, which stay a bit outside the policy landscape (as was already the case during the colonial 
era). Re-integrating upland areas in the policy framework would help see the links between both 
areas and the contradictions generated by massive land evictions and migrations toward 
peripheral zones.  
As regards these two oppositions, it is noteworthy that the World Bank wishes now “to extend 
titling from the densely-settled, stable communities where it has operated to date (and where 
formalization of ownership is relatively straightforward) to more conflict-prone, marginal areas where 
titling will need to engage with carefully-managed reclassification of state land” (World Bank 2007: 
55). It sounds like a tacit recognition that the national policy of land-titling implemented through 
LMAP has not really been a national policy so far (the similarity with the colonial land policy is striking 
in this respect). What is striking (and a bit appalling, I would say) in the same report is that the World 
Bank keeps on taking for granted the equation between land title and tenure security: ‘big men’ 
and entrepreneurs involved in the concession business obviously know that the equation is false and 
they choose political and economic forms of security. 
• Proposals regarding invisibilities and contradictions 
? To think in terms of land tenure security rather than in terms of ownership – and this would 
imply that local institutional arrangements are integrated into the land policy and legal 
framework –, it could be interesting to reflect on the social land concession from this 
standpoint. Land tenure security is related to the issues of accountability and authority. We 
have identified different spheres of mutual accountability, depending on the actors 
involved (local/non-local, etc.) and resulting in different strategies for securing transactions. 
These findings offer a sound basis for developing policy taking roots in actors’ principles and 
norms, instead of designing huge machineries like LMAP (without knowing their exact 
domain of validity: in terms of feasibility and sustainability).91 Such a viewpoint – starting with 
local principles and norms – is close to the notion of interim institution proposed by Adler et 
al. (2007). 
? To reappraise the roles and functions of local authorities in the frame of decentralisation 
and, for this, to link decentralisation and land policy. This could help get local authorities out 
                                                            
91  World Bank statement (2007: 66) according to which “rather than constituting a general problem, tenure insecurity is 
concentrated among vulnerable groups, particularly poorer households who occupy lands outside of core residential or 
farming zones, such as those which are or were forests, flood plains, seasonal lakes, marshes and informal urban 
settlements – that is land contested by the state” is questionable, at least a bit convoluted: it could actually mean that 
tenure insecurity is ‘restricted’ to a wide array of frequent situations and strongly linked to state ambiguities (to say the 
least). 
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of the “grey zone” in which they work (between brokerage, privatisation of their function, 
the informal validation of transactions) and involve them in local but legal processes of 
transaction validation (including local forms of institutional arrangements). 
? To work in cooperation with legal brokers and human rights NGOs around diffusing legal 
information to farmers and supporting them in cases of land conflict. For this, training, forums 
of dialogue and negotiation, communication strategies, etc. are needed. 
? To really enforce the land concession policy, especially in terms of productive investments 
and effective exploitation of ELCs: “the vast majority of these concessions have not been 
planted since they were allocated, strongly suggesting that they are being held as 
speculative rather than productive investments, and currently make no contribution to the 
economy” (World Bank 2007: 59). This would imply, however, a profound reform of the state 
which is not likely to happen rapidly considering the deeply entrenched neo-patrimonial 
nature of the Cambodian state (see Pak Kimchoeun et al. 2007) and the poor co-ordination 
between administrative levels (as seen in the granting of economic concessions). 
? To clarify the boundaries of state lands, one of the necessary conditions for implementing 
the SLC policy through which the government could allocate state land to the poor for 
housing and agricultural use (ownership rights would be granted after 5 years of continuous 
occupation). The delimitation of state lands and specifically state forests is also necessary 
for securing the land rights of small rubber growers, for instance. We have the same 
reservations about the effective enactment of this point as for the previous one on ELCs: 
vested interests and neo-patrimonialism constitute powerful obstacles92. 
These proposals are situated at the level of general statements and they have to be made 
operational, at least in the form of pilot projects and through the implementation of dialogue forums 
involving all the stakeholders’ categories involved in land transactions 
.
                                                            
92  See World Bank’s sense of understatement: “For SLCs to succeed requires finding ways to recover illegally-claimed tracts 
and reach consensus on reallocation of specific state lands. Policy documents provide the basis for recovery, mapping 
and allocation of state lands, but it is not yet clear if these mechanisms can be implemented In a manner that meets all 
the desirable process criteria” (2007: 63). 
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Annex 1. Programme 
 
 Phase Duration Objectives Participants 
0 Preliminary 
mission 
(April 2004) 
8 d. - Defining research themes 
- Identifying national partnerships 
- Defining the research canvas 
GRET researcher 
1 Research sites 
identification 
& literature 
overview 
 - Identifying research sites (criteria of diversity 
regarding land tenure)  
- Defining research units (commune? village?) 
- literature overview on land tenure and 
transactions 
Senior researcher and 
resource persons 
2 Preliminary 
inquiry & 
literature 
overview 
4 d. - Identifying the main stakes and actors involved in 
land issues at the local level 
- Literature overview on the research area 
Junior researchers 
3 Preliminary 
workshop (1) 
4 d. - Discussing first data and hypothesis 
- Elaborating (and training in) methodology and 
objectives 
Junior and senior 
researchers 
(CEDAC/GRET), 
resource persons 
4 Collective 
field research 
4 w. - Short collective field research on the different 
sites (1 week for each: Kampong Thom, 
Sihanoukville, Siem Reap, Rotanak Kiri) 
Junior and senior 
researchers (CEDAC) 
5 Intermediary 
workshop (2) 
3 d. - Presentation and discussion of first results and 
hypothesis 
- Definition of the ‘terms of reference’ of individual 
fieldwork (research hypothesis, methods, 
descriptive indicators) 
Junior and senior 
researchers (CEDAC), 
resource persons 
6 Individual field 
research 
4 m. - Individual fieldwork (carried out by junior 
researchers in teams of 2 researchers for each 2 
sites) 
Junior researchers 
7 Supervision 
field trip 
10 d. - Field visit on each site 
- State of advancement, practical and 
methodological difficulties, new research 
orientations, etc. 
Senior researchers 
(CEDAC/GRET) 
8 Final 
workshop (3) 
4 d. - Internal discussion of research results and analysis 
- Organisation of the comparison 
- Preparation of the public presentation 
Junior and senior 
researchers (CEDAC), 
resource persons 
9 Individual 
report writing 
1 m. - Fieldwork report writing by junior researchers (in 
English) 
- Editing by national senior researchers 
National junior and 
senior researchers 
(CEDAC) 
10 Result 
presentation 
2 d. Several presentations of the research results and of 
policy orientation 
- At MAFF and Land policy national council level 
- Public seminar 
Junior and senior 
researchers 
(CEDAC/GRET), 
resource persons, 
policymakers, 
development agency, 
NGO, researchers 
11 Final report 
writing 
10 d. - Final report writing in English Senior researchers 
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Annex 2. Supervision in Rotanak Kiri Province 
 (9-13 May 2005) 
The methodological recommendations apply well for Siem Reap province, too (supervision 4-6. 
May 2005). The descriptive indicators must be adapted to the specific site contexts. 
• Fieldwork organisation 
> Up to now, the JR did not stay at night in the villages (came back to Ban Lung for 
accommodation) 
> They have conducted research in 2 villages so far: Lon, Sek 
> The 2 next villages are: La’en, Trong Chom 
> JR have conducted interviews mostly together with translators (two Tampuon people from Lon 
villages; the two are CEDAC trainees in agriculture) 
Recommendations 
> Stay in the villages (see the land use committee chief’s invitation in La’en): getting the view from 
the village/villagers! 
> Maybe keeping only three of the four selected villages for the inquiry 
> Separate interviews (but systematic exchanges of information and hypothesis each evening) 
Methodological points 
> Combining quantitative & qualitative methods: “late & light” questionnaires 
> How to use the case study method: productive if embedded in a good knowledge of the local 
context and of the local actors 
> Politics of interview: social interaction, negotiation (never forget that the informant has his own 
strategy and perception of the situation of interview); translating questions you are asking 
yourself into questions to ask (also to make easier the translator’s task) 
• Topics (descriptive indicators) 
Based on: January workshop (first list of indicators), identification field research, supervision field 
trip 
The list of criteria is not limited. 
Local leadership: 
Main question: strong or weak leadership? (cf. the enforcement of the banning on selling land) 
Village chiefs 
> Who are the village chiefs? How were they nominated or elected? When? Are they close to the 
traditional leaders (possibly the same)? Are they literate?  
> Did they stay their whole life in the village or did they migrate or have jobs outside (including 
military experience)?  
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> What is their local legitimacy and how are they perceived by the population (as a real insider or 
a hidden outsider…)?  
> Were they involved in land disputes (as actors, for instance by buying or selling land or signing a 
contract without informing the villagers)? 
> Role and composition of the VDC? 
Traditional leaders 
> Who are the traditional leaders? What is their life history (biographical elements as for the village 
chiefs)?  
> What is their power, field of competence, role in dispute settlements, religious ritual?  
> What is their local legitimacy and are they perceived by the population (as a real insider or a 
hidden outsider…)?  
> Where they involved in land disputes (as actors, for instance by buying or selling land or signing 
a contract without informing the villagers)? 
Other forms of local leadership 
> Is there any other local leader or big man respected or followed by people and, if yes, for what 
reason (money, power, wisdom, knowledge, etc.)? 
> New committees (for instance Community Land Use Planning Committee in La’en) 
> Presence of NGOs representatives (cf. ADHOC informants at the district, commune and village 
levels) and project facilitators and agents? 
> Influence of political parties? (hypothesis: less influence than in the lowlands) 
Internal relations 
> Are there conflicts, forms of co-operation or labour divisions between “modern” and 
“traditional” leaders? 
Link with the supra-village levels 
> Identifying the local intervention or interference of the commune chief (cf. section on 
brokerage too) as well as of other supra-village (district, province) authorities 
> How these interventions and also the idea of the state are lived and perceived locally (also: 
local peoples’ expectations vis-à-vis the state)? 
> Role of tribal networks (probably too new) and national/foreign NGOs and development & 
natural resource management projects? 
Migrants’ biographies 
> Trajectory and reason to migrate, stops on the way to Rotanak Kiri province 
> Previous relations in the province, first access to land and previous jobs in the province (for 
instance wage labourers in rubber tree plantations or “brought” by a big landowner, cf. the 
Cham in Toen village) 
> Movement within the province and associated land transactions (and other forms of natural 
resource access and use: clearing, non timber exploitation, gem or gold mining) 
> Social integration in the village or living outside (in Ban Lung), marriage, participation in local 
ceremonies, contribution to collective works, specific relation with one insider (“tutor”) 
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• Brokers 
Land brokers 
> Sociological profile, biography, strategy (professional or part-time), mode of remuneration 
(share of the transaction, others?), incomes investments (politics, business, housing, farming, 
etc.) 
> Typology (first hypothesis): local authorities (village and commune levels), professional brokers, 
members or not of local ethnic groups 
Transactions without brokers 
> See section on land alienation and migrants’ access to land 
Legal brokers 
> Human rights and natural resource management NGOs and projects 
> Hypothesis: situation less conflictive and more co-operation between NGOs and state 
administrations (cf. ADHOC Rotanak Kiri compared to ADHOC Siem Reap) 
• Land alienation: processes and perceptions 
> Keep documenting the process of sales (cf. the pattern identified: the broker finds a seller, asks 
him his price, goes to find a buyer, organises a visit to the plot, but avoids any direct contacts 
between the buyer and the seller) 
> “Biographies” of sold plots: succession of transactions (sale and transfer of use rights) (beyond 
the face-to-face: lowlander/buyer-highlander/seller) 
> Perception of selling: what is sold? Is there any clear delimitation of the plot? Hypothesis: what is 
sold would be a right to clear the land in a given direction (hence the “misunderstandings”, real 
or manipulated) 
• Derived rights 
> See if there is any form of leasing or sharecropping (even if a case is marginal, it can be 
significant) 
> Traditional loans within a community or for a newcomer 
> Forms of loans associated with plantations of cashew nut trees (cropping between the row to 
weed and protect the plantation) 
> Are there links between land rights transfers and other transfers of goods and services (wage 
labour, investment in land development or plantation, marketing of crops etc.) 
• Current land policy 
> Pilot communal land registration (La’en): observing the process, the external actors involved, 
the local reactions and expectations, special events (like meeting or training sessions) 
> Conflicts and public policy: for instance the defining of community boundaries in La’en (conflict 
with neighbouring villagers and Khmer migrants) 
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> Determing whether there are any social & economic land concessions (also gem mining 
concessions) 
> Perception and knowledge of local people regarding the land laws, the policy of concessions, 
the pilot registration, the communal titling 
For the rest, see the first list of descriptive indicators! 
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Land Transactions in Rural Cambodia
A Synthesis of Findings from Research on Appropriation
and Derived Rights to land
This study on land transactions in rural Cambodia is based on a
twofold observation. On the one hand, Cambodian land policy,
basically organized around a large-scale land titling program (LMAP)
funded by the World Bank, ignores the land tenure relations that do not
tally with the individual private ownership model, namely derived
rights and indirect access to land. On the other hand, research on land
tenure in Cambodia has mainly focused on purchase and sale markets
and not on the transactions that are precisely the ones public policy
neglect. The study, carried out by CEDAC with GRET methodological
support, has relied on a qualitative approach on research sites located
in four provinces: Siem Reap, Sihanoukville, Kompong Thom, Rotanak
Kiri. The empirical fieldwork has made possible the identification
and analysis of the transactions as social processes and of the actors
involved, and thus the understanding of « real » land rights markets.
Were highlighted the importance of land brokers in the transactions,
the informal functioning of local authorities, the weight of urban
stakeholders, and the influence of power relations on so-called
« market » mechanisms, resulting in the eviction of smallholders from
peri-urban areas and in the emergence of a class of landless farmers.
The contradictions between land titling policy and the concession
policy were also underscored.
The study was funded by the Solidarity priority fund (FSP) of the French
ministry of foreign affairs « Supporting agricultural policy » lodged at
the Cambodian ministry of agriculture, forests and fisheries.
Cette étude sur les transactions foncières dans les campagnes cambodgiennes part
d’un double constat. D’une part, la politique foncière cambodgienne, essentiellement
structurée par un grand programme de cadastrage et d’immatriculation foncière (LMAP)
financé par la Banque mondiale, ignore les relations foncières ne correspondant pas
au modèle de la propriété privée individuelle, à savoir les droits délégués et les modes
de faire-valoir indirect. D’autre part, les recherches foncières au Cambodge se sont
essentiellement intéressées aux marchés de l’achat/vente et très peu aux formes qui
précisément sont celles que négligent les politiques publiques. L’étude, menée par
le CEDAC avec l’appui méthodologique du GRET, a privilégié une approche qualitative
dans 4 provinces du pays : Siem Reap, Sihanoukville, Kompong Thom, Rotanak Kiri.
Ce travail empirique a permis d’identifier et d’analyser les transactions en tant que
processus sociaux et les acteurs impliqués et ainsi de mieux comprendre comment
fonctionnent les marchés « réels » des droits fonciers. On a en particulier mis en lumière
l’importance des intermédiaires et courtiers dans les transactions, les fonctions
informelles des autorités locales, le poids des acteurs urbains et l’influence des rapports
de forces sur les mécanismes marchands, aboutissant entre autres à l’éviction des
petits paysans des zones périurbaines et à l’émergence d’une couche de paysans sans
terre. Les contradictions entre politiques d’immatriculation foncière et politiques de
concessions ont également été mises en lumière.
L’étude a été financée par le Fonds de solidarité prioritaire (FSP) du ministère
français des Affaires étrangères « Appui aux politiques agricoles » basé au ministère
cambodgien de l’Agriculture, des Forêts et de la Pêche.
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